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1 
Introduction 
The birth of the new minimum wage research (NMWR) can be 
dated to a conference at Cornell University held in late 1991 and the 
subsequent symposium that appeared in Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review (see Ehrenberg [1992] for a description of the conference and 
its attendees). The first period of this research came to a close nine 
years later. Prior to the conference, empirical research on the minimum 
wage had been dominated by studies that considered only the effect of 
the federal minimum wage on teenage employment, using aggregate 
time-series data. These earlier studies generally concluded that a 10 
percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 1–3 percent 
decrease in teenage employment (Brown 1999). Energized by increases 
in the federal minimum wage in 1990, 1991, 1996, and 1997, research-
ers approached minimum wage issues through a variety of statistical 
frameworks, techniques, and data sources; explanatory economic mod-
els proliferated, as did the number of articles. 
By the end of the first period in 2000, it was no longer possible to 
identify a dominant line of research. In this review, which primarily 
focuses on articles published from 2000 forward, we have considered 
more than 200 scholarly and policy papers relating to the minimum wage 
that have appeared in English since the conference. While a few are 
surveys, most are original analyses, and most of these are statistical in 
nature rather than presentations of theoretical models or survey results. 
This book is our attempt to make sense of the research.1 We look at 
which observable, measurable variables (e.g., wages, employment, 
school enrollment) the minimum wage influences; how long it takes for 
the variables to respond to the minimum wage and the size and desir-
ability of the effect; why the minimum wage has the results it does (and 
not others); and the workers most likely to be affected by changes to the 
minimum wage. Our emphasis is on studies that analyze data from the 
United States, but we also touch on studies of data from other countries: 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and other 
countries in Western Europe. 
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2 Belman and Wolfson 
One set of issues revolves around who is affected by changes in 
the minimum wage. It is almost a given that those living in poverty are 
less likely to be affected than low-wage employees, since those below 
the poverty line, to a great extent, are not involved in the labor market 
(Freeman 1996). There remains an issue of who, among those who are 
employed and those who want to be employed, is affected when the 
minimum wage is increased. Among the employed, does the minimum 
wage affect only those who would be earning less than the minimum 
without it, or does it also affect those higher up the wage scale? Older 
minimum wage studies have generally focused on teenage workers— 
with their low skills and limited attachment to the labor market, it was 
thought that teenagers were most sensitive to the minimum wage and 
therefore any effect would be clearest here. While much of the NMWR
examines what happens to teenagers when the minimum wage rises, 
many studies focus on other demographic groups with limited skills and 
labor market attachment, as well as workers identified specifically by 
their low wages, by membership in a specific demographic group (such 
as single mothers, young women, or immigrants), or by the industry in 
which they work (primarily hospitality and home care/nursing home). 
Another issue relates to identifying the outcomes of minimum 
wage increases. As with earlier research, most NMWR focuses on the 
number of jobs or the probability of employment. However, there has 
been considerable expansion of issues, even within the realm of em-
ployment broadly defined. We review studies of the consequences for 
hours worked, turnover, unemployment, and labor force participation, 
along with studies of the effects on wages and their distribution, fringe 
benefits and training, prices and profitability, and the effect of the mini-
mum wage on school enrollment. 
The timing of effects of the minimum wage has become a recog-
nized and challenging issue. How long it takes for the response to the 
minimum wage to play itself out is central to the effectiveness of policy. 
Before the NMWR, response to the minimum wage was thought to be 
nearly immediate. Most recent research also assumes that the response 
is rapid and examines only a short period immediately following an in-
crease. Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), in a look at the Canadian 
experience with a minimum wage, argue that such assumptions result 
in missing much of the response, which can take up to six years. Stud-
ies of timing require careful attention to dynamics, which is generally 
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absent in the NMWR. The few analyses of this issue (including some 
of our own work, such as Belman and Wolfson [2010]) suggest that the 
response is not entirely immediate but ends well before six years. 
Assessing the size of effects is also important to understand-
ing the minimum wage. By and large, the size of the impact of an 
increase in a minimum wage is related only to the issue of job loss, 
and the observations are all over the map. For over a decade, the 
minimum wage elasticity of employment was widely believed to be 
between !0.3 and !0.1, with greater faith in values closer to zero.2
This accord no longer exists, with the range of estimates for U.S. teen-
agers extending “from well below !1.0 to well above zero” (Neumark 
and Wascher 2007, p. 107). In addition, the issue of the magnitude of 
the impact is composed of at least two distinct parts: 1) does the wide 
range of results apply to all outcomes or only to employment, and 2) are 
patterns in the magnitude of the response related to who is under study, 
the methods used in the study, measurement issues, or other factors? 
Researchers have spent a great deal of effort developing models to 
explain the results just mentioned, but no agreement yet exists on which, 
if any, should replace the simple supply and demand model of the labor 
market that Stigler (1946) expounded. Card and Krueger (1995) de-
vote a chapter to various theoretical models before leaning toward one 
in which employers have market power in the labor market, enabling 
them, up to a point, to set wages rather than take them as given by the 
market. They conclude that “this . . . is inconsistent with the proposition 
that the standard model is always correct” (p. 383). We take no stand on 
which model is most useful, much less settle the question. Rather, we 
present three general models discussed in the literature—the competi-
tive labor market, the monopsony labor market, and search models of 
the labor market—and show how they relate to the issues at hand. 
MINIMUM WAGE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HOURLY EARNINGS 
As much as the minimum wage is an issue of importance in policy 
circles, few of those involved in the analysis or debate have had re-
cent experience with the minimum wage. Many may have earned the 
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4 Belman and Wolfson 
minimum wage or close to the minimum wage when in high school 
or college, but that was typically many years ago. To many of those 
involved in this issue, the minimum wage would seem very low and 
unlikely to affect many in the labor force. 
Contrary to this view, the minimum wage and jobs that pay close 
to the minimum wage play an important role in the U.S. labor force. 
Research reviewed in this monograph indicates that changes in the mini-
mum wage affect 20–30 percent of the labor force. As such, considering 
minimum wage policies and their effect is more than a scholastic exer-
cise—they may affect a large portion of the labor force. We consider in 
detail the place in the earnings distribution of the minimum wage itself 
and near minimum wage earnings in the chapter on wages and earnings, 
but we briefly discuss this now. 
Table 1.1 provides three views on the importance of the minimum 
wage in the distribution of wages and hourly earnings. The first, panel 
A, considers the wages associated with points in the distribution of in-
dividual wages in 2010. Panel B displays the percentiles of the wage 
distribution associated with specific hourly wages. Panel C considers 
the proportion of the employed earning no more than a percentage of 
the minimum wage in their state. In each panel, the left-hand column 
of data is for individuals who are paid by the hour, and the right-hand 
column adds employed salaried workers. The distributions are limited 
to those who report that they are not enrolled in school. Individuals 
who report being enrolled in school are fairly evenly distributed across 
family incomes. By removing this group from our data, we improve the 
association between being employed near the minimum wage and being 
from a lower-income household, and thereby improve the association 
between the minimum wage and economic need. 
Panel A displays the association between individuals’ place in the 
national distribution of wages and the wage they earn. Those at the 5th 
percentile for wages or hourly earnings are very close to the federal 
minimum of $7.25 and below the minimum wage for some states. At 
the 10th percentile, those paid by the hour earn $8.00, 110 percent of the 
federal minimum wage; for all employees the 10th percentile is $8.50. 
Twenty percent of wage earners earn $9.25 or less; 20 percent of all 
employees earn $10.00 or less. Thirty percent of wage earners earn no 
more than $10.25, $3.00 per hour more than the federal minimum; the 
30th percentile for all employees is $12.00. Considering the distribu-
   
5 
Table 1.1  The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings in 2010 for Individuals Not Enrolled in High 
School or College 
Panel A: Earnings by percentiles Panel B: Percentiles by wage or hourly earnings 
Wage of those Wage at this Percent of Percent 
paid hourly at this percentile including Wage ($) or those paid by the below including 
Percentile percentile ($) salaried workers ($) hourly earnings hour below salaried workers 
5th 7.50 7.50 < 7.00 1.2 1.8 
10th 8.00 8.50 < 7.51 (minimum wage) 4.7 4.1 
20th 9.25 10.00 < 8.00 (1.10% of federal min.) 7.3 6.0 
30th 10.25 12.00 < 9.00 (1.25% of federal min.) 16.7 12.5 
40th 12.00 14.00 < 10.00 24.7 17.8 
50th (median) 13.50 16.34 < 11.00 (150% of federal min.) 34.9 24.9 
Panel C: The distribution of hourly wages and earnings relative to the effective minimum wage in 2010 
Percent of those paid by the Percent below minimum wage
hour below minimum wage  including salaried workers 
Less than the minimum wage 2.9 3.0 
At the minimum wage 5.9 4.8 
Less than 110% of the minimum wage 10.7 8.1 
Less than 125% of the minimum wage 21.9 15.7 
No more than 150% of the minimum wage 36.4 26.0 
NOTE: Calculations of average hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) does not include those who report variable hours. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 Outgoing Rotation File of the Current Population Survey. 
 6 Belman and Wolfson 
tion for all employees, the more complete of the two distributions, only 
1 in 20 employees works at or very close to the minimum wage, but 1 
out of 10 employees who are not also students earn within $1.25 of the 
minimum wage, and 1 out of 5 employees who are not also students 
earn within $2.75 of the minimum wage. 
Panel B provides a different view of the same data. Here we cal-
culate the percentage of our sample who work at or below particular 
wage levels. For example, 4 percent of all employees (the right-hand 
data column) work at or below the federal minimum wage (allowing 
for rounding). Six percent earn no more than 1.1 times the federal mini-
mum, 13 percent earn no more than 1.25 times the federal minimum 
wage, and 1 out of 4 employees work for no more than $11.00 per hour, 
1.5 times the federal minimum wage. Research reviewed in this vol-
ume suggests that increases in the minimum wage affect the earnings 
of those in the lower quarter of the earnings distribution; and we might 
then expect that those earning up to $11 per hour would see their wages 
rise in response to the minimum wage. 
A limitation of Panels A and B is that we compared wages to the 
federal minimum in a period when many states have minimum wages 
above the federal minimum wage. In Panel C we calculate the ratio of 
individuals’ wages and hourly earnings with respect to the higher of 
the federal or state minimum wage, often called the effective minimum 
wage, and then create a distribution from this ratio. Again, focusing 
on the more complete distribution, that for all employees (right-hand 
column), 8 percent of the nonstudent workforce are employed in jobs 
paying no more than the minimum wage, 8 percent are in jobs paying 
no more than 1.1 times the minimum wage, 16 percent are paid no 
more than 1.25 times the effective minimum, and 25 percent are paid 
no more than 1.5 times the effective minimum. The proportion earn-
ing no more than each of the levels above the effective minimum is, of 
course, substantially higher for those on hourly pay. Again, although 
the proportion of employees earning exactly the minimum wage is 
modest, the proportion earning close to the minimum wage comprises a 
substantial proportion of the labor force. Given evidence that increases
in the minimum wage extend to some of those whose earnings are 
above the new minimum wage, and that the minimum wage is a bench-
mark for those earning above the minimum, the minimum wage can 
affect a substantial proportion of the employed labor force.3 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Introduction 7 
Another view to consider is the ability of those earning the mini-
mum wage to meet their basic needs. To do this, we consider a household 
with either one or two individuals working full time at the minimum 
wage, and compare its total earnings to three standards of income ad-
equacy: 1) the poverty line, 2) the income limit for qualifying for food 
stamps, and 3) a basic family budget provided by the Economic Policy 
Institute (EPI) (Bernstein and Lin 2008). The latter measure updates a 
budget developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which compiled 
the costs of essentials such as housing, transportation, food, and like 
items. We also consider a household with one or two members earning 
150 percent of the minimum wage, a point near the upper limit at which 
wages respond to changes in the minimum wage. 
The upper panel of Table 1.2 provides calculations of family in-
come with one and two earners who earn either the minimum wage 
or 150 percent of the minimum wage. In the first row, the household 
has either one or two earners working full time, 2000 hours, at the 
current federal minimum wage. If there is only one earner, the annual 
earnings for a 2,000-hour work year are $14,500; if two, $29,000. The 
second row provides annual household income if a household has one 
or two individuals working full time in positions that pay 150 percent 
of the minimum wage. In this case, household earnings are $21,750 and 
$43,500, respectively. 
The second, middle panel, considers two common measures of 
income adequacy, the poverty line and food stamp eligibility, for fami-
lies of between one and four members.4 Poverty thresholds are used to 
evaluate the extent of serious economic deprivation in our society and 
determine eligibility for income maintenance programs. To establish 
the adequacy of the minimum wage in providing an income that moves 
households beyond this threshold, we can compare our annual earnings 
estimates from the upper panel to the poverty threshold for households 
of various sizes. For example, comparing the 2012 federal poverty 
threshold to our annual income calculations for households earning 
exactly the minimum wage, we find that a single-earner household is 
above the poverty line for a single-person household, at the poverty 
line for a two-person household with no other income, and below the 
poverty line for a three- or four-person household. With two minimum 
wage earners, the household income is well above the poverty line for 
even a four-person family. A household with one member employed 
  
  
 
8 Belman and Wolfson 
Table 1.2  How the Minimum Wage Relates to Measures of Income 
Adequacy 
Family earnings if family members work 2,000 hours 
One earner ($) Two earners ($) 
Earners employed full time at 14,500 29,000 
minimum wage 
Earners employed at 150% of 21,750 43,500 
the federal minimum wage 
Measures of income adequacy 
Number of family members 1 2 3 4 
Federal poverty threshold 10,890 14,710 18,530 22,350 
($, 2011) 
Food Stamp eligibility ($) 14,157 19,123 24,089 29,055 
Low family budget (2007) 
1 adult, 1 adult, 2 2 adults, 2 adults, 2 
1 child children 1 child children 
Utah (rural) ($) 26,089 32,961 33,358 39,125 
Utah (Salt Lake City) ($) 31,898 38.769 37,933 43,499 
SOURCE: Bernstein and Lin (2008). Food Stamp eligibility guidelines: http://www
.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility#income (accessed March 18, 2014). Health and Human 
Services poverty guidelines: http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11poverty.shtml (accessed 
March 18, 2014). 
full time at 150 percent of the minimum wage comes close to exceeding 
the poverty line for a family of four, and, with two earners, household 
income is well in excess of the poverty line for even a family of four. 
Food stamp eligibility is a second measure of whether a family is 
earning enough to avoid serious economic deprivation.5 A one-member 
household whose member earns the minimum wage is only $343 above 
the income limit for food stamps. Larger households without additional 
earners are between $4,623 and $14,555 below the limit on food stamp 
eligibility. Households with the income from two people earning just 
the minimum wage are slightly below the limit (that is, eligible for food 
stamps) if they have four members, and above the limit with only three. 
A household with a single earner who earns 150 percent of the mini-
mum wage (at 40 hours per week or 2,000 hours per year) is below the 
food stamp limit for a household of three or more. The household of 
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four is not eligible for food stamps if it has two full-time earners with 
wages equal to 150 percent of the minimum wage. Just as in the case of 
the poverty line, full-time earnings at the minimum wage help move a 
household above the threshold, and earnings of 150 percent of the mini-
mum wage on an annual basis substantially improves the likelihood that 
a household would be above the threshold for food stamps. 
An alternative measure is a basic family budget, the income a fam-
ily needs to secure safe and decent-yet-modest living standards. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics developed the basic family budget as part 
of a broader set of standard-of-living measures, which were published 
annually from 1966 to 1979 (the program was discontinued after 1979; 
see Johnson, Rogers, and Tan [2001]). The basic family budget is the 
income that a household needs for a nutritionally adequate diet, shelter, 
clothing, and transportation. The EPI updated this basic budget in 2007. 
It includes the cost of health insurance, renting shelter at the 40th per-
centile of the rental housing distribution in the area, child care, limited 
necessities, and taxes, but it does not include savings of any type, res-
taurant meals, emergency funds, or insurance to cover emergencies. EPI 
calculates this budget for rural areas and for the metropolitan statistical 
areas of each state. We use basic family budgets for Utah, the state that 
has a median income closest to the U.S. median family income. Table 
1.2 provides the 2007 basic budgets for rural areas and for Salt Lake 
City. The budgets are calculated for one- and two-adult households; all 
households include at least one child. 
Households in which the earners only make the minimum wage do 
not net enough for the basic family budget, even when there are two 
working adults. The maximum income earned by two adults employed 
at the minimum wage is $29,000. The minimum income required for 
the modest but decent basic budget in Utah is $33,358; in Salt Lake City 
it is $37,933. The result is substantially better if the adults are earning 
150 percent of the minimum wage. A single earner is still not able to 
earn a sufficient income to meet any of the basic family budgets, even 
in rural areas. A two-earner household earns somewhat more than the 
rural basic family income, and just at the level of a basic family income 
in Salt Lake City. 
In summary, a large proportion of the labor force works at or rela-
tively close to the minimum wage. While only about 1 in 20 nonstudent 
employees work at no more than 110 percent of the minimum wage, 
10 Belman and Wolfson 
almost 1 in 6 earn no more than 125 percent of the effective minimum 
wage, and better than 1 in 4 earn no more than 150 percent of the effec-
tive minimum. Having a single minimum wage earner does not assure 
any but the smallest households of incomes above the thresholds for 
economic deprivation, but having two full-time minimum wage earners 
moves households above this mark. With two individuals earning 150 
percent of the minimum wage, the representative family of four moves 
into the ranks of those living at a safe and decent standard of living. 
THREE LABOR MARKET MODELS USED IN NMWR 
Competitive 
Relying on the simplest and most widely used economic model 
to analyze the labor market leads to the conclusion that whenever the 
minimum wage results in higher wages, someone who would have been 
employed, in the absence of the minimum wage at a wage less than the 
minimum wage, must instead now be out of work. This is easily seen in 
Figure 1.1  Competitive Labor Market with a Minimum Wage 
Wage Demand Supply 
Minimum 
wage 
Equilibrium 
wage 
Min. wage employment Equilibrium employment Labor 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Introduction 11 
Figure 1.1, which shows the demand for labor increasing as the wage 
decreases, and the supply of labor increasing as the wage increases. In 
the absence of a minimum wage, their intersection indicates how many 
people will be working, indicated by equilibrium employment, and the 
wage that they will receive, the equilibrium wage. In this analysis there 
are many firms, none large enough to have a detectible effect on the la-
bor market by itself, and there are many prospective employees, none of 
whom individually have any effect on the wage or employment. Each 
firm hires just to the point where if it employed one worker more or 
fewer, profits would be lower. If there is a minimum wage that exceeds 
the equilibrium wage, more people will want jobs, but firms will not 
want to employ as many. Both of these facts can be seen where the 
dashed line indicating the minimum wage intersects the supply and de-
mand curves. Because there is no compulsion to hire but there is to pay 
at least the minimum wage, the wage will be higher, but there will be 
fewer jobs than in the absence of a minimum wage. 
Before moving on to the next model, an explanation is required to 
explain the derivation of these demand and supply curves and to make 
the two analyses comparable. The marginal product of labor (MPL) for 
each firm is defined as the increase in total output that is associated with 
employment of the last, or marginal, worker: MPL(N) = Q(N) !Q(N! 1), 
where Q(N) is the amount of output the firm produces when employing 
N workers. The marginal cost of labor (MCL) is the increase in total 
payroll from employing the marginal worker: MCL = W(N) !W(N ! 1), 
where W is the total payroll when N workers are employed. Both must 
be measured in the same units if they are to be compared, so let both be 
measured in money terms (dollars), and let R(N) be the firm’s revenue 
when it employs N workers, net of all costs of production other than 
labor (materials, energy, and so forth). 
Deriving the industry or aggregate demand curve requires working 
backward. Each firm can calculate its MPL for each level of employ-
ment, each value of N. The labor demand curve is the horizontal sum 
of the individual firm MPL curves. That is, for each value of the wage, 
we find the level of employment for each firm that equates the MPL to 
the wage, and add all those values of employment. Doing this for all 
values of the wage gives the demand curve. The equilibrium wage is the 
value that equates this sum, total labor demanded, to the corresponding 
value of the supply curve. The way the market is considered to work is 
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that it is already functioning when each firm enters the market. There is 
already an equilibrium wage that the entering firm can see, and the firm 
knows it must pay that wage if it is to hire any employees. It will hire 
employees to the point where the MPL equals the equilibrium wage.6 
Because each firm is small, and because each firm’s impact on the mar-
ket is not detectible, its decisions have no effect on the equilibrium 
wage, and the firm can hire as many or as few workers as it wants at 
this wage. The equilibrium wage is its MCL; it hires to the point that 
MPL = MCL = equilibrium wage. A competitive market is at one logi-
cal extreme. 
Monopsony 
Another labor market model is monopsony, in which only one firm 
is in the labor market, appropriately defined: only one firm that hires 
teenagers, for instance. Here, the competitive assumption is replaced 
by the assumption that the single firm recognizes its effect on wages, 
and that if it wants to hire an additional worker, it must not only pay a 
higher wage to attract that one, it must also raise wages for all current 
employees. 
Like the competitive firm, the monopsonist hires until MPL = MCL, 
but unlike the competitive firm, the wage necessary to attract the desired 
amount of labor is less than the MCL (because in raising the wage to 
attract an additional worker it must also raise wages to that level for all 
current employees), so it pays a lower wage. This is graphed in Figure 
1.2. Equilibrium employment here is less than it would be if the monop-
sonist did not recognize its effect on wages; if the monopsonist did not 
recognize this effect, the equilibrium level of employment would be the 
same as in the competitive model, where MPL = supply. 
Figure 1.3 shows what may happen when a minimum wage is im-
posed on a monopsony labor market. Because the employer must pay 
at least the minimum wage to all its employees, its MCL equals the 
minimum wage for all levels of employment less than some value (la-
beled minimum wage employment). The MCL exceeds the minimum 
wage only at employment levels higher than this, where a higher wage 
is necessary to attract that much labor. In Figure 1.3, the relevant MCL
schedule is indicated with a solid line, and the one that is relevant only 
in the absence of a minimum wage is indicated with a dotted line. The 
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Figure 1.2  Monopsony Labor Market with No Minimum Wage 
Wage 
Equilibrium 
wage 
MPL MCL 
Supply 
Equilibrium Labor 
employment 
Figure 1.3  Monopsony Labor Market with a Minimum Wage 
Wage 
Equilibrium 
wage 
MPL MCL 
Supply 
Minimum 
wage 
Equilibrium Minimum wage Labor 
employment employment 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
14 Belman and Wolfson 
monopsony firm once again hires until the further hiring would raise 
the MCL above the MPL, and this is a higher level of employment than 
without the minimum wage. 
Search Models 
While the minimum wage can raise both employment and wages 
in the case of monopsony, the monopsony model has one important 
drawback. Evidence that it is relevant to low-wage labor markets where 
the minimum wage is relevant is scarce on the ground. Except for those 
living in the most isolated areas, teenagers in the United States typically 
have more than one fast food establishment in a small neighborhood to 
canvas for employment opportunities, and often possibilities exist in 
other sectors as well. 
A more plausible but more complicated class of models that gen-
erate analytic results similar to those of monopsony is that of search 
models. The fundamental distinguishing feature is that prospective 
workers and employers cannot find each other without some cost, so 
that not all individuals willing to work at wages that firms are willing 
to pay can find employment. This is based on the observation that in-
formation is neither free nor perfect, and that individuals must use time 
and resources to determine who is hiring. Individuals recognize this 
and must decide on the basis of incomplete information whether it is 
worthwhile even to engage in search.7 
Two key variables in search models are 1) the contact rate, the 
probability that someone who is searching for a job will be offered one 
in any period of time; and 2) the distribution of wage offers. In the 
competitive model, the contact rate equals one and the offer distribution 
implies that all offers equal the equilibrium wage. In search models, 
the contact rate is positive but less than one, and the wage distribution 
is not necessarily degenerate. Other important parameters include an 
individual’s cost of searching, typically positive; the rate at which jobs 
disappear due to layoffs, firings, and quits; and the value of not being 
employed, for instance, the value of additional schooling, leisure, or 
unpaid work in the home. 
Along with other details of model specification, it is possible to use 
these models to analyze not only employment but also unemployment, 
participation in the labor force, job vacancies, and wage distributions 
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within and among firms. While it is not necessarily the case that search 
models of the labor market generate results similar to that seen in Fig-
ure 1.3—that is, both higher wages and employment—it is a possibility 
when the model is appropriately specified. In Flinn (2006) and Ahn, 
Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011), this is largely because the participa-
tion rate responds to the minimum wage, and within a certain range, the 
greater ease of hiring dominates the greater cost of employment in the 
response of firms to the minimum wage. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
This review includes more than 200 articles on the minimum wage. 
Most date from 2000 forward but some, on topics that have not re-
ceived much attention, date back to the 1980s and 1970s. Chapters 
are organized around narrowly defined topics. We focus on micro and
market-specific outcomes in the earlier chapters and then turn to broad-
er, macro issues toward the end of the review. 
Chapter 2, the first chapter in the Micro section of the book, consid-
ers the research on employment, or more precisely, on the effect of the 
minimum wage on the number of employees or jobs. Chapter 3 broad-
ens the measures of employment in considering research on the effect 
of the minimum wage on hours of work. Here we find strong evidence 
that the implementation of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom 
reduced hours of work, but that the evidence for the United States is 
inconclusive. Chapter 4 presents a meta-analysis of the employment 
and hours research, providing estimates of the effect of the minimum 
wage corrected for publication bias and article-specific effects, includ-
ing specific estimates for young workers and the restaurant industry. 
Although estimates of the elasticity of employment/hours with respect 
to the minimum wage vary across estimates, most are either statisti-
cally nonsignificant or are too small in magnitude to be economically 
meaningful. 
Starting with Chapter 5, the review considers a broader set of the 
labor market outcomes. Chapter 5 addresses the effect of the minimum 
wage on the level and distribution of wages and the provision of fringe 
benefits. We find almost universal agreement that increasing the mini-
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
16 Belman and Wolfson 
mum wage raises the wages of bound and near-bound workers, and that 
the effect of the minimum wage is far stronger for women than for men. 
Chapter 6 considers the effects on human capital formation, including 
education and employer-provided training. Results on education are 
sufficiently varied, and sufficiently problematic, to preclude a simple 
conclusion; the evidence on training is likewise too varied to support a 
straightforward summary. Chapter 7 looks at the evidence about the im-
pact of the minimum wage on wage inequality, poverty, and the length 
of time individuals remain at low wages. Although the magnitude of the 
effect remains in play, there is universal agreement that the minimum 
wage reduces wage inequality, particularly among women. In contrast, 
the minimum wage appears to have no effect on the poverty status of 
individuals, possibly because so few of those below the poverty line 
are employed. Finally, although most employees who earn a wage at 
or close to the minimum rapidly move to wages considerably above 
the minimum, a substantial number remain at wages no more than 150 
percent of the minimum wage in the initial decade of employment. 
Chapters 8 and 9 return to employment-related issues, with Chapter 
8 looking at gross flows in the labor market and Chapter 9 considering 
the effect of the minimum wage on firms’ hiring and layoff behavior 
and unemployment. Current research finds that increases in the mini-
mum wage reduce both hiring and layoffs almost equally; both labor 
force participation rates and unemployment appear to increase slightly 
with increases in the minimum wage. The minimum wage has a dif-
ferential effect on unemployment duration, with duration declining for 
better-educated and rising for less-educated workers. The effect of the 
minimum wage on product markets is addressed in Chapter 10. Al-
though there is too little research to reach any conclusions about the 
effects of the minimum wage on firm performance in the United States, 
research using data from the United Kingdom suggests that profitability 
declines with increases in the minimum wage, but this does not lead to 
an increase in firms leaving the market or a decrease in share prices. 
Rounding things off, the conclusion attempts the yeoman’s work 
of summarizing our review, suggesting issues that are in need of fur-
ther research, and providing some thoughts on improving the quality of 
research on the minimum wage. The conclusion is followed by an appen-
dix, which discusses data sources and variables and their construction. 
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Finally, a brief discussion on our statistical approach is in order. 
According to one well-known opinion, the function of cavalry in mod-
ern warfare is “to give tone to what would otherwise be a mere vulgar 
brawl!” (Hammerton 2011). It is our hope that this is not the role of 
statistics in the minimum wage debate. Our approach has been to hold 
the articles we discuss to reasonable standards. We typically apply a 5 
percent p-value in determining whether there is an effect. Given typi-
cal sample sizes used in this research, this standard is a low hurdle. We 
also require that specifications be reasonably complete—that there are 
no grounds to be skeptical about estimated standard errors. This may 
lead to an apparent fetish about p-values, but with the large number of 
studies we consider, setting a minimum standard is a necessary screen-
ing device. 
Different standards and criteria may appeal to readers. Our meta-
analysis of the employment and hours studies remedies this otherwise 
arbitrary, discontinuous, either/or cutoff with a continuous method of 
weighting estimates based on their estimated standard error. The sum-
mary tables in each chapter provide fairly complete information about 
the studies included in this review. The reader is invited to use these to 
reach their own conclusions. 
Notes 
1. More than 600 scholarly and policy papers that mention the minimum wage have 
been published since 2000. The 200 that we review were selected because they 
included empirical research on developed countries. 
2. An elasticity between -0.3 and -0.1 indicates that a 10 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage will reduce employment by 1–3 percent. 
3. We use benchmark to mean a guideline for assessing how satisfactory a wage or 
wage offer is. 
4. The column for a one-person household reports only the annual income from hav-
ing a single person employed at the minimum wage because it is difficult to have 
more than one earner in a one-person household. The balance of the columns re-
port household earnings with both one and two individuals receiving the minimum 
wage. 
5. Although based on both income and assets, we attend only to the income require-
ment since that is the only one that the minimum wage directly affects. 
6. In the standard analysis, it is assumed both that the MPL is positive in the range 
of employment considered, and that it gets progressively smaller as N increases. 
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7. This is most often modeled from the perspective of the individual looking for 
work. Depending on the issue of interest, it can also be viewed from the perspec-
tive of the firm, so that all firms willing to pay wages that individuals are willing to 
accept can find people to hire only with some cost. In this case, firms must devote 
resources to identifying individuals appropriate to hire and the suitable wage. Fi-
nally, both perspectives can be combined, so that firms and individuals encounter 
difficulty finding suitable partners for an employment relationship. 
Part 1 
Micro 
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Employment 
Employment, specifically the number of jobs, is square one for dis-
putes about the minimum wage and its effects. Support for the mini-
mum wage is premised on its improving the lives of those most vulner-
able in the labor market. If a minimum wage leads to job loss for many 
of those same people, serious questions arise with respect to its relative 
benefits and costs, especially if third parties, such as employers, also 
bear some of the costs. The disagreement here is not so much whether 
the minimum wage ever leads to some loss of jobs but whether it al-
ways or usually does. If it does not, then legislation setting a minimum 
wage is not necessarily a bad idea. The NMWR has yet to come to any 
widely accepted resolution on this issue, and we will not presume that 
we can settle the matter here. This chapter presents a comprehensive 
review of research on the effects of a minimum wage on employment, 
describing the contributions and mutual criticisms of the best-known 
early protagonists in the NMWR, followed by a detailed look at more 
recent research. 
EARLY NMWR 
The employment effect of the minimum wage is the topic of four of 
the five (revised) papers from the conference that appeared the follow-
ing year in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Among them, 
they contained many of the features that were to become common in the 
NMWR: state-level panels and establishment data rather than national 
aggregates, quasi experiments in addition to regressions, and ways of 
gauging minimum wage changes other than the Kaitz index (or similar 
measures).1 Neumark and Wascher (1992) draw on the framework of 
the earlier aggregate time-series research on teenagers to study a panel 
of state-year observations. Card (1992a) performs a differences analy-
sis of state-level data to examine the response of teenage employment 
to the federal minimum wage increase in 1990; the minimum wage 
21 
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variable is the fraction affected, the percentage of a state’s teenage em-
ployees who were earning less than the higher minimum wage in the 
three quarters before the increase.2 Katz and Krueger (1992) perform a 
differences analysis of establishment data to examine the employment 
response of Texas’s fast food industry to the federal minimum wage in-
crease in 1991; the minimum wage variable is a wage gap measure, how 
much an establishment’s starting wage would have to rise from its value
five months before the increase in order to comply with the new mini-
mum wage. Card (1992b) uses the 1988 increase in California’s mini-
mum wage as an opportunity for a (proto-) difference-in-differences 
analysis of several employment responses: of teenagers, of the retail 
sector as a whole, and of one specific part of the retail sector, eating 
and drinking establishments.3 Only Neumark and Wascher (1992) find 
a negative employment response, consistent with the earlier literature. 
A year and a half later, an exchange between Card, Katz, and 
Krueger (1994) and Neumark and Wascher (1994) appeared. Card, 
Katz, and Krueger (1994) criticized aspects of Neumark and Wascher’s 
(1992) analysis, including the reconciliation with Card (1992a,b) that 
Neumark and Wascher believe shows that Card’s (1992b) specifica-
tion was unable to detect much of the employment response. Card and 
Krueger (1994), the most well-known and controversial analysis in the 
NMWR, appeared almost immediately following this exchange. Build-
ing on Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card (1992b), Card and Krueger 
(1994) use the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage to con-
struct a quasi experiment. The treatment group consists of fast food 
establishments in New Jersey, and the control group consists of similar 
establishments in nearby Pennsylvania counties. This generated a final 
exchange of criticism (Neumark and Wascher 2000) and response (Card 
and Krueger 2000). In describing this work in detail, the focus will be 
on what has turned out to be most influential: Neumark and Wascher 
(1992), Card and Krueger (1994), and the exchange that each generated. 
The Conference: Staking Out Positions 
Prior to NMWR, studies of the minimum wage and teenage em-
ployment in the United States relied on aggregate time-series data or, 
much less frequently, a cross section of states. Neumark and Wascher 
(1992) introduce to this literature state-by-year panels based on the CPS 
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Outgoing Rotation Groups. Analysis of data sets like this became pos-
sible because of both advances in computer technology and the avail-
ability of data at this level of aggregation, and it was useful because of 
the increasing variation in the minimum wage across states.4 The basic 
version of Neumark and Wascher’s (1992) empirical model resembles 
that of the older time-series work. Their outcome variable is the teenage 
employment ratio, their minimum wage variable is the Kaitz index, and 
their control variables, reflecting fluctuations in supply and demand, 
are drawn from the same short list as in the older literature.5 The panel 
structure allows for an obvious extension, two-way fixed effects (i.e., 
dummy variables for each state and year) to account for factors that 
are roughly constant within each state over time or within each year 
across states. They present several versions of the basic model to verify 
robustness of results, and the one that became the most prominent in-
cluded not only a contemporaneous term of the minimum wage but 
also a single (i.e., one-year) lagged term. For this version they report an 
employment elasticity (with respect to the minimum wage) of −0.19. 
The importance of the lagged minimum wage term becomes ap-
parent when Neumark and Wascher (1992) reconcile their results with 
Card’s (1992a,b) report of a “positive contemporaneous correlation be-
tween changes (that is, short first differences) in the minimum wage and 
changes in the employment of teenagers” (p. 67). When Neumark and 
Wascher estimate their model in first differences, they too find no em-
ployment response to the minimum wage (or a small positive response). 
The difference between the two specifications, one in first differences 
and one in levels with both contemporaneous and lagged minimum 
wage terms, is that the former can capture only short-term effects of the 
minimum wage, while the latter can capture longer ones as well. That 
is, it takes time for the minimum wage to influence teenagers’ employ-
ment, and specifications that do not allow for this possibility will be 
unable to detect it. 
Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) make serious criticisms of Neumark 
and Wascher (1992), the most important of which concerns the variant 
of the Kaitz index that Neumark and Wascher use.6 A major part of the 
index is a ratio, of which the numerator is the nominal value of the mini-
mum wage and the denominator is the average nominal adult wage. Card, 
Katz, and Krueger object that this way of measuring the minimum wage 
leads to the mistaken attribution of effects to the minimum wage when 
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they are actually due to other factors.7 Card, Katz, and Krueger conclude 
by reconsidering Card’s (1992a) examination of the 1990 increase in the 
federal minimum wage, modifying the analysis in two ways. First, they 
include a measure of teenage school enrollment. Second, they measure 
employment change over two years rather than one to capture the same 
phenomena that the lagged minimum wage term does in Neumark and 
Wascher’s specification. The minimum wage variable remains the frac-
tion affected. With only the minimum wage variable on the right-hand 
side of the equation, its effect on teenage employment is positive and 
statistically significant. However, once they include a variable to control 
for the business cycle, the estimated minimum wage coefficient remains 
positive but is no longer statistically significant. 
Neumark and Wascher (1994) disagree with each criticism that 
Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) level at their work and argue that the 
two-year window that Card, Katz, and Krueger consider in their re-
analysis is not equivalent to the lagged term in their own specification. 
We are left neither with agreement between the two parties nor with an 
obvious way to determine independently who is correct. The dispute 
has no clear winner. In addition to the question, “Does the minimum 
wage always reduce employment if it leads to higher wages?” other is-
sues that are left unresolved include the appropriate way to measure the 
minimum wage in addressing this question and the time frame in which 
employment responds (if indeed it does). 
Card and Krueger (1994) and After 
Card and Krueger (1994), the best-known article in the NMWR, is 
the coming-of-age of the quasi experiment in this literature. Like Katz 
and Krueger (1992), they survey several hundred fast food restaurants, 
but they do so in two states rather than one: in New Jersey and in several 
counties of eastern Pennsylvania that are close to New Jersey. Like Katz 
and Krueger (1992), they perform a differences analysis using a measure 
of the wage gap, but the best-known part of their study is a difference-
in-differences analysis using a treatment dummy. In April 1992, the 
minimum wage in New Jersey rose from $4.25 to $5.05, while that in 
Pennsylvania remained constant at $4.25. This allows Card and Krueger 
to define their treatment group as fast food establishments in New Jersey 
and their comparison group as the fast food establishments in eastern 
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Pennsylvania. They also consider a secondary comparison group of New 
Jersey fast food establishments that were paying at least $5 per hour at 
the time of their first survey, before the law went into effect. With neither 
comparison group are they able to detect a loss of employment in re-
sponse to the minimum wage increase. Nor could they detect any effect 
when they considered the opening of new McDonald’s establishments 
rather than employment. Card and Kreuger find that prices did rise in 
New Jersey more than in Pennsylvania following the increase, but not 
more in lower-wage New Jersey establishments than in the higher-wage 
ones that constituted the secondary comparison group (p. 792). 
Neumark and Wascher (2000) begin their response to Card and 
Krueger’s (1994) analysis with a long, detailed critique of the data set 
that Card and Kreuger constructed. At the center of their argument is 
an alternative data set that they constructed from historical payroll re-
cords for fast food establishments in the same areas and the same chains 
as Card and Kreuger examined, and that they believe is superior to 
Card and Krueger’s. It consists of two parts, one of establishments for 
which they compiled the data, and one of other establishments whose 
data were given to them independently of their own efforts. Neumark 
and Wascher assert that a comparison of their data set with Card and 
Kreuger’s brings to light problems in the latter that cast doubt on the 
results. Further, when they replicate Card and Krueger’s analysis on 
their data, they find employment losses in the New Jersey fast food 
establishments relative to those in Pennsylvania that are about the size 
one would expect from their earlier analyses of teenage employment. 
To bolster their case, they next turn to two government data sets for 
employment in the entire restaurant industry (since neither allows them 
to examine the fast food sector alone). Based on both a quick examina-
tion along quasi experimental lines and a more careful regression analy-
sis over a longer period, Neumark and Wascher conclude, “Taken as a 
whole, it is our view that the BLS data on employment at eating and 
drinking places neither confirm nor reject our findings from the payroll 
data that the New Jersey minimum-wage increase appears to have re-
duced fast-food employment in that state. The BLS data do, however, 
provide complementary evidence that minimum-wage increases reduce 
employment in the restaurant industry” (pp. 1389–1390). 
Neumark and Wascher (2000) explain the differences between their 
results and Card and Krueger’s (1994): 
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We think that there is simply considerable measurement error in 
[Card and Krueger’s] data, attributable to the design of their sur-
vey. In contrast, our data should accurately reflect the actual 
quantity of labor employed at each restaurant in each survey pe-
riod. . . . Because the Pennsylvania sample in both data sources 
is rather small, and much of the difference between the two data 
sources arises for Pennsylvania, it is entirely possible that random 
measurement error in Card and Krueger’s data is the culprit. . . . 
The second possibility is that the measurement error is not random. 
(p. 1387) 
Card and Krueger (2000) respond in several steps. First, addressing 
the criticisms of the data set that they had constructed themselves, they 
follow Neumark and Wascher’s (2000) lead and turn to the same BLS 
data that are gathered to administer the unemployment insurance pro-
gram.8 Using the same type of analysis as in Card and Krueger (1994), 
they generate similar results about the employment effects. New Jer-
sey’s 1992 minimum wage increase.9 Second, having constructed a 
sample through the middle of 1997 from the government data, they per-
form the same analysis for the 1996 increase in the federal minimum 
wage, which increased the minimum wage for Pennsylvania but not 
New Jersey.10 Once again, Card and Krueger (2000) find no evidence of 
employment responding to the minimum wage. 
 Finally, they turn their attention to the data set at the heart of Neu-
mark and Wascher’s (2000) critique. Neumark and Wascher clearly feel 
vulnerable to questions about the two different sources for their data, 
devoting several pages to showing that, despite concerns about its prov-
enance, it is in important ways similar to unquestionably reliable data. 
Card and Krueger have elsewhere labeled the two parts of the sample as 
the NW sample and the Berman sample, BNW when combined (Card 
and Krueger 1999). They detail numerous problems with the samples, 
the most serious being that the Berman sample, more than 40 percent 
of the whole, was constructed in part through personal contacts in the 
industry. As a result, it is not at all a random sample and has all the 
problems that that entails for statistical analysis. All 23 observations for 
Pennsylvania in the Berman sample came from a single Burger King 
franchisee. Neither subsample contains any establishments in Pennsyl-
vania affiliated with KFC, one of the slower-growing chains in Card 
and Krueger’s (1994) original sample. In comparing these data with 
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their own, Card and Krueger (2000) find a strong resemblance in the 
New Jersey portions, but not in those for Pennsylvania until they re-
move the 23 Pennsylvania observations of the Berman sample. They 
conclude, “The increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage probably had 
no effect on total employment in New Jersey’s fast-food industry, and 
possibly had a small positive effect . . .” [italics in the original]. 
The only data set that indicates a significant decline in employ-
ment in New Jersey relative to Pennsylvania is the small set of 
restaurants collected by [Berman]. Results of this data set stand 
in contrast to our survey data, to the BLS’s payroll data, and to 
the supplemental data collected by Neumark and Wascher. . . . We 
suspect the common denominator is that representative samples 
show statistically insignificant and small differences in employ-
ment growth between New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania, while 
the nonrepresentative sample informally collected for Berman pro-
duces anomalous results. 
An alternative interpretation of the full spectrum of results is that 
the New Jersey minimum wage increase did not reduce total em-
ployment, but it did slightly reduce the average number of hours 
worked per employee. Neumark and Wascher (1995b) reject this 
interpretation. Although we are less quick to rule out this possi-
bility, we are skeptical about any conclusion concerning average 
hours worked per employee that relies so heavily on the informally 
collected Berman/EPI sample, and the exclusion of controls for the 
length of the reporting interval. Moreover, within New Jersey the 
BNW data indicate that hours grew more at restaurants in the low-
est wage areas of the state, where the minimum-wage increase was 
more likely to be a binding constraint. This finding runs counter 
to the view that total hours declined in response to the New Jersey 
minimum wage increase. (Card and Krueger 2000, pp. 1419–1420) 
In contrast with the exchange following the conference (Card, 
Katz, and Krueger 1994; Neumark and Wascher 1994), this one leaves 
the reader feeling confident about the appropriate resolution of the 
disagreements between the two contending parties. Card and Krueger 
(1994, 2000) demonstrate that the minimum wage is not necessarily 
bad for employment, contra Neumark and Wascher (1992, 1994, 2000). 
Rather than directly defend their original data set, they analyze an al-
ternative one drawn from government data about which no serious con-
cerns have been raised; the results are similar to their original results. 
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Finally, they examine Neumark and Wascher’s (2000) BNW data set 
thoroughly and show that once questionable observations are deleted, it 
too gives similar results. 
The 1990s Studies in Retrospect 
The next important developments for this literature (but not ac-
tually of or by it) were several methodological pieces that brought to 
light statistical issues sufficiently severe to destroy confidence in most 
inferences from both lines of research, both the state-year panels of 
Neumark and Wascher and the simple quasi experiments of Card and 
Krueger. Rather than explain this in media res, it will be better to start at 
the beginning. Kloek (1981) and Moulton (1986, 1990) examine situa-
tions in which ordinary least squares (OLS) is used on data that can be 
grouped, and within each group either some regressors have a constant 
value or it is plausible that the error term is correlated (as with a random 
effect) or both. Not only are the coefficients inefficiently estimated but 
the estimated standard errors are biased downward. A common solution 
is to estimate the coefficients with OLS and to cluster observations by 
group when estimating the standard errors. 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrate that even 
where the Moulton problem as conventionally understood is appro-
priately addressed, serial correlation remains and results in estimated 
standard errors that have a large downward bias.11 They begin with a 
50 × 20 (50 states by 20 years) repeat cross section in a difference-in-
differences framework, soon switching over to a 50 × 20 panel of ag-
gregated data to make clear that the symptoms they are examining are 
related to serial correlation. Hansen (2007a,b) explores this further in 
the context of panels and more conventional serial correlation than is 
typical of the treatment dummy of difference-in-differences analyses. 
Hansen (2007a,b) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan demonstrate 
that in the presence of positive serial correlation, the estimated standard 
errors of key variables are biased downward substantially, leading to 
fantastically high rates of false positive results. This is true not only 
for estimates based on conventional formula that take no account of 
serial correlation but also for several commonly used parametric and 
nonparametric treatments of serial correlation (Wolfson 2011). Only 
clustering and several bootstrap procedures that account for unspecified 
serial correlation do not exhibit this problem.12 
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Donald and Lang (2007) examine (what has become known as) 
the Moulton problem, specifically in the difference-in-differences 
framework. In the two-by-two framework of Card and Krueger (1994, 
2000)—two states and two periods—if all restaurants within each state 
are subject to common factors each year (other than the minimum wage) 
that affect their employment, and these are not included on the right-
hand side of the regression equation, the dummy variable for each cell 
will reflect those factors. Calculated as the difference-in-differences 
from these dummy variables, the estimate of the employment effect ab-
sorbs these common non–minimum wage factors. With a mean of zero, 
they do not cause the estimate of the employment effect to be biased. 
However, its estimated variance reflects only the contribution from the 
sample of restaurants within each state-year cell and nothing from the 
sample of the common non–minimum wage factors across the state-
year cells. With additional time periods or states in either the compari-
son or control group, it is possible to estimate this part of the variance, 
but not in the two-by-two framework. Consequently, the standard errors 
are biased downward. 
Where does this leave us? First, it is worth noting that both of the 
problems identified raise more serious questions for studies that report 
a statistically significant employment effect, whether negative or posi-
tive, than for those that do not. Second, Donald and Lang (2007) show 
that those results of Card and Krueger’s (1994, 2000) that are based on 
a statistically significant treatment dummy are questionable. However, 
Donald and Lang’s point does not undermine those results based on a 
treatment variable that varies across treated units, as (for example) a 
wage gap variable that relates the ex ante wage or wage bill to ex post 
employment. Since both of their analyses include a differences analy-
sis using a wage gap, Donald and Lang’s point also does not under-
mine the statistically significant positive employment effect that they 
report. Third, the problem of serial correlation that Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004) highlight is an issue not only for Neumark and 
Wascher’s (1992, 1994, 2000) analyses of panels during the 1990s but 
also for much of the work into the first decade of the new millennium. 
In what follows, rather than repeating these concerns with each 
analysis, we take up only results for which we believe the problems 
are not too serious. This is (almost completely) straightforward with 
respect to quasi experiments and the bias problem that Donald and Lang 
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(2007) describe. Several factors come into play, however, with regard 
to serial correlation in panels: the degree of bias in the standard errors 
depends not only on the amount of serial correlation in the error term 
but also on the minimum wage variable and the number of time periods 
in the data. Further, when the number of groups is too small, neither 
clustering nor the simplest bootstrap procedure that accounts for serial 
correlation (known variously as the cluster-robust or block bootstrap) 
turns out to be ineffective. What number of groups is “too small”? The 
Monte Carlo results of Hansen (2007b) suggest that clustering works 
reasonably well with as few as 10 groups, while those of Bertrand, Du-
flo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) 
indicate a figure closer to 20. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller examine 
several alternative techniques when there are very few groups, three of 
which appear to work reasonably well with as few as five groups. 
This leads us to some rules of thumb in evaluating analyses that rely 
on panels or longitudinal data. The first is that analyses based on more 
than seven periods must account for serial correlation. Second, if there 
are fewer than 10 groups, clustering is ineffective. A third is that the 
degrees of freedom depend on the number of groups: while a consensus 
about the precise value does not currently exist, there is some agree-
ment that it should be no more than the number of groups (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008); t-statistics should 
be evaluated accordingly. 
We respond to these problems by discussing entire articles in some 
cases, while discussing only parts of others. Where we entirely neglect 
a study, we nevertheless include it in our tabulations of papers and ar-
ticles toward the bottom and indicate with a footnote that the standard 
errors are suspect. This set includes nearly all panel-based analyses 
that appeared before 2008. It also includes all difference-in-differences 
analyses that use a two-by-two framework and an at-risk or treatment 
dummy, as well as those that have more comparison groups or periods 
but do not take advantage of that fact to correct the estimated standard 
error of the employment effect so that it is not biased. With multiple 
comparison and treatment groups, as in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 
(2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), the estimated stan-
dard error automatically reflects this contribution to the variance, so this 
source of bias is not a problem. Because clustering is ineffective with 
fewer than 20 groups, several otherwise attractive analyses of Canadian 
provincial data are not discussed.13 
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THE NEW MINIMUM WAGE RESEARCH SINCE 2000 
To provide an understanding of the current state of research on the 
minimum wage and employment, we review 50 articles published or 
written between 2001 and early 2013 that address this issue (and in-
clude more than 20 additional analyses with suspect standard errors 
or other serious problems toward the bottom of the tables). The pri-
mary focus will be studies of U.S. data, but English-language studies of 
data from other advanced (that is, OECD) economies are also included. 
Analyses are organized in two broad classifications. The first concerns 
the employment response of a demographic group; the list of groups 
studied includes not only teenagers but also young adults, women who 
satisfy various criteria, immigrants, and a small assortment of others. 
The second concerns the employment response of selected industries, 
most often fast food or restaurants more broadly, but also hotels and 
motels, retail, broader sets of low-wage industries, and, in the United 
Kingdom, nursing homes. In the first category, the dependent variable is 
most often the employment rate of the target demographic group when 
aggregate data are being studied and the employment status of members 
of the target demographic group when individual data are used. In the 
second category, the dependent variable is the number of jobs, whether 
in the entire industry or particular establishments. In both categories, 
several consider either group members who were employed prior to a 
minimum wage increase or industry employees prior to an increase, to 
examine the effect of the minimum wage on their likelihood of contin-
ued employment. The discussion below makes no attempt at complete 
descriptions of any studies, focusing only on what is directly germane 
to employment and the minimum wage in each, and largely ignores 
those that exhibit the econometric problems described above. The ta-
bles, however, will include them at the bottom.14 Finally, fewer studies 
than one would wish report elasticities, and those that do too rarely 
report the relevant standard errors. Unless an elasticity is reported, the 
focus in the discussion of an article will be qualitative, not quantitative. 
Since the end of the first decade of the NMWR, the study of the teen-
age and youth employment response remains the most common, both 
in studies that examine U.S. data and in those that use data from other 
countries. Less than a handful of these analyses use one-dimensional 
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data structures, aggregate time-series, and cross sections, to which they 
apply much more sophisticated econometric techniques than typical 
in this literature. Panels are the most common data structure early in 
the period, giving way to repeat cross sections in the second half of 
this period. The most common analytic approach in this group of pa-
pers is similar to that of Neumark and Wascher (1992) and the older 
time-series literature, although several studies, of both youth and other 
groups, rely on economic search models. Individual-level data are more 
common much earlier in studies of other countries than of the United 
States, especially longitudinal data. Quasi experiments are relatively in-
frequent in studies of both U.S. demographic groups and industries but 
quite common in foreign studies. Rather than rely solely on a broadly 
defined demographic group, a handful try to identify those affected, 
whether employed or not, based on traits typically found in a wage 
equation. Several pay careful attention to the choice of the implicit or 
explicit comparison group against which the employment effect of the 
minimum wage is measured. Below, studies of U.S. data are discussed 
first, then of foreign data. Within the discussion of U.S. studies, the 
order is youth employment, other low-wage groups, other demographic 
groups, the hospitality sector, and other low-wage sectors. The discus-
sion of other countries has no section on other demographic groups and 
combines all low-wage sectors into one section. 
U.S. STUDIES 
Demographic Groups 
Youth 
Studies that use aggregate panels. Table 2.1 lists the 12 studies 
that analyze panel data for the United States; all but one rely on data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The typical or canonical 
framework is that of Neumark and Wascher (1992): estimation of a sin-
gle equation in which the dependent variable is the employment ratio 
and the list of independent variables includes both one that reflects the 
value of the minimum wage and others that reflect supply and demand 
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characteristics of the labor market: for example, the unemployment 
rate for all workers in a state, and teenagers’ share of the population 
in a state. It is common to include two-way fixed effects, though those 
for time are not universal, and occasionally a trend term is included. A
lagged term of the minimum wage variable is not uncommon, either 
instead of or in addition to the contemporaneous value of the variable. 
Neumark and Wascher (2004) include separate trends for each country 
in some specifications, while Keil, Robertson, and Symons (2009) in-
clude no regressors other than the two-way fixed effects and separate 
trends for each state. 
Neumark (2001) was to be part of an intended symposium for 
which he turned out to be the only participant.15 It was organized out 
of concern that the protagonists in the minimum wage debates of the 
1990s were able, consciously or not, to adjust their analyses to provide 
“satisfactory” results. Neumark locked in his specification before the 
data to be used, the CPS for the last three months of each year in 1995– 
1998, were available. The specific question examined is the response of 
teenage (and young adult) employment to the federal minimum wage 
increases of 1996 and 1997. In contrast with all the rest of the mini-
mum wage work that Neumark published before Neumark and Wascher 
(2011), the evidence presented in support of the hypothesis that the 
minimum wage reduces teenage employment is quite sparse. The only 
statistically significant results are for those who are both not currently 
enrolled in school and have no education beyond high school. Neumark 
states that it is in this group, the youngest and least skilled part of the la-
bor force, where one would expect the strongest disemployment effects; 
he suspects that one reason for the lack of definite results is that with 
such a short sample, imposed by the need to lock in the specification in 
advance of the data, the standard errors are larger than they likely would 
be in a longer sample. However, it is also in just such a short sample that 
serial correlation is least likely to lead to biased standard errors; that 
is, the results may be more, not less, reliable than in analyses of longer 
samples that contain no correction for serial correlation. 
To reconcile the first-round NMWR results of Neumark and Wascher 
(1992, 2000) with those of Card and Krueger (1994, 2000), Bazen and 
Le Gallo (2009) suggest that changes in the federal minimum wage 
influence teen employment differently than changes in state minimum 
wages. They examine several recent intervals: the mid- to late 1980s, 
    
	 	
 
 
 
 
34 Table 2.1  Youth (Panels, U.S. Data) 
Sample Analytic Unit of Type of Data 
Study Effect Novelty Target groupa period approach observation standard error setb 
Addison, Blackburn, Mixed Amplifying effect of Teenagers 2005–2010 Regression State-month Clustered CPS 
and Cotti (2013) recessions? 2006–2009 State-year ACS 
Bazen and Le Gallo Mixed Reconciling results of Teenagers Various Regression State-year Block bootstrap CPS 
(2009) Neumark and Wascher 
and Card and Krueger 
Neumark (2001) None Prespecified research Teenagers, 1995–1998 Regression State-year Conventional CPS 
design young adults 
Neumark and None Long-term Teenagers, 1979–2001 Regression State-cohort- Clustered (state) CPS 
Nizalova (2007) consequences young adults year 
Orrenius and Mixed Immigrants Teenagers 1995–2005 Regression State-year Clustered (state) CPS 
Zavodny (2008) 
Sabia (2009a) Negative Using CPS to study the Teens in 1979–2004 Regression State-month Clustered (state) CPS 
retail sector retail 
Sabia (2009b) Negative Annual vs. business Teenagers 1979–2004 Regression State-month Clustered (state) CPS 
cycle effects 
Thompson (2009) Negative County-level data Teenagers 1996–2000 Quasi County- Clustered (state) QWI 
experiment quarter 
Keil, Robertson, and None Rise in precision from Youth 1977–1995 Regression State-year Various, none CPS, 
Symons (2009)c post-2000 data clustered QCEW, 
GPEU 
Neumark and Negative Disequilibrium Youth 1977–1989 Regression State-year Conventional CPS 
Wascher (2002)c methods 1973–1976 
Neumark and Negative Extending work on Teenagers 1977–1998 Regression State-year Conventional, May 
Wascher (2003)c enrollment-employment PCSE-PSARd CPS 
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Wessels (2007)c Mixed Redoing C&K’s Teenagers 1989–1997 Regression State-year Conventional CPS 
teenager study 
a Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19. Young adults refers to those aged 20–24. Youth combines the two groups together. 
b CPS = Current Population Survey. ACS = American Community Survey. GPEU = Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemploy-
ment. QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. QWI = Quarterly Workforce Indicators (based on Unemployment Insur-
ance records). 
c This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
d PCSE-PSAR = Panel-corrected standard errors, allowing for different serial correlation coefficients for the residuals of each state. 
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when the only increases in the minimum wage were at the state level; 
the increases in the federal minimum wage of the early 1990s; and the 
mid-1990s, when there were only a few increases in state minimum 
wages and most but not all of the action was at the federal level. Bazen 
and Le Gallo conclude that, on the whole, increases in state minimum 
wages have no impact on employment but that increases in the federal 
minimum wage do. Why? In the 1980s, few states increased the mini-
mum wage, and most of the increases were both regionally localized 
(in New England, the upper midwest, and the Pacific Coast states) and 
individually small, even if their cumulative total over time was large. 
This suggests some selection bias to Bazen and Le Gallo; states that in-
creased their minimum wages did so knowing from experience that the 
employment effect would be small. Over the same period, firms in those 
states acquired experience in preparing for and responding to binding 
minimum wages, further reducing the employment effects of increases 
in the state minimum wages. In the 1990s, when increases in the federal 
minimum wage played a more important role, the changes were both 
relatively larger and more widespread, and firms in many affected states 
lacked this expertise. These conditions were reflected in teen employ-
ment. Because Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2000) consider both state 
and federal minimum wage increases over an extended period of time, 
and the increases at the federal level had effects on teenage employ-
ment, while Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) study only a single state 
minimum wage increase, which did not affect employment, it should 
be no surprise that their conclusions disagree, according to Bazen and 
Le Gallo.16 
Analyzing a five-year-long quarterly panel of county-level data, 
Thompson (2009) starts with the assumption that a county’s sensitiv-
ity to the minimum wage is negatively related to the mean quarterly 
earnings of its employed teenagers. Employment will be more sensitive 
to the minimum wage in a county where mean quarterly earnings of 
employed teenagers is low than in a county where that figure is high.17 
With this, he constructs a quasi experiment to examine the effect of the 
federal minimum wage increases of the late 1990s on the teen share of 
employment. The treatment group consists of counties with low val-
ues for teens’ earnings, while the comparison group is another set of 
counties with high values for teens’ earnings. In addition to the quasi 
experiment, which entails excluding a large fraction of counties with 
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intermediate values of mean teens’ earnings, he also performs a regres-
sion analysis on a full sample, using teens’ earnings in the first quarter 
of 1996 as the measure of sensitivity to the minimum wage. Follow-
ing the increase in October 1996, the teenage employment share fell in 
the treatment counties by three percentage points relative to that in the 
comparison group, using a broad definition of high- and low-earnings 
counties, and by six percentage points using a narrower one. The re-
gression results show that the teen share of employment fell by about 
one percentage point for each $100 decline in prior per capita teens’
earnings. 
Different cuts at the data are illuminating. Teenage employment can 
be split into roughly equal halves: stable jobs, which last the full quarter 
in which the minimum wage rose, and transitory jobs (all others). This 
dichotomy indicates that the minimum wage had no impact on stable 
employment but a substantial effect on transitory employment. Further 
analysis shows that employment of young adults (age 19–22) is not 
measurably affected, and that much of the decline in the teen employ-
ment share, at least in 1997, can be attributed to a drop in the hiring of 
teens.18 
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) ask, “What accounts for 
the difficulty in uncovering adverse minimum wage effects in recent 
studies?” (p. 1). They examine the possibility that relatively tight labor 
markets in the U.S. data may explain this. That is, the employment re-
sponse to moderate minimum wage increases is muted when labor is 
scarce, only to be amplified during recessions. To study this, they use 
two data sets and several equation specifications to study the impact 
on teenagers in a period that straddles the beginning of the 2007–2009 
recession, a period when both the federal minimum wage and the aver-
age of state minimum wages rose from one-third of the average manu-
facturing wage or less to about three-eighths or more. The key variable 
is an interaction between the minimum wage, on the one hand, and on 
the other, the difference between the state unemployment rate and the 
mean national unemployment rate in the three years before the onset of 
the recession. In the absence of the interaction term, three of four point 
estimates of the effect on teenagers’ employment are positive, and none 
are statistically significant.19 The point estimate on the interaction term 
is negative, statistically significant, and quite small. It appears that teen-
agers’ hold on their jobs may be unusually tenuous during recessions, 
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and the authors believe that the previously tighter labor market is the 
answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph. 
Full discussions of four analyses, Neumark and Nizalova (2007), 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008), and Sabia (2009a,b), appear later because 
they each consider minimum wage effects on youth employment only 
as by-products of their main concern. Neumark and Nizalova examine 
the long-term effects of the minimum wage experienced as a teenager 
and young adult. For Orrenius and Zavodny the focus is the effect of 
the minimum wage on immigrants who lack a high school diploma, 
while for Sabia (2009a) it is the effect on employment in retail.20 Sabia 
(2009b) is more methodological, primarily concerned with the best way 
to account for the business cycle in minimum wage studies. In both of 
his articles, Sabia uses similar but not identical models to analyze the 
same data. He reports point estimates of the elasticity of employment 
with respect to the minimum wage, ranging from a low of about −0.20 
in specifications without annual dummies to a high of about −0.30 in 
specifications that include them, but he makes no mention of standard 
errors.21 The lack of standard errors nevertheless makes it difficult to 
determine whether the differences between his elasticity estimates are 
statistically significant. None of the elasticity estimates that Orrenius 
and Zavodny (2008) report for all teenagers or for teenage girls is sta-
tistically significant. For teenage boys, the elasticity estimate from a 
regression equation that includes business cycle controls is statistically 
significant, and at about −0.20, in the middle of what was previously the 
consensus range. For teenagers, Neumark and Nizalova report no statis-
tically significant employment response to the average minimum wage 
that has prevailed since one turned 16 in the current state of residence. 
Substituting 20 for 16, they report the same for young adults (20–24), 
even those with no more than a high school education. 
Studies that use individual-level data. Table 2.2 lists eight studies 
that examine individual-level data. Three—Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wes-
sels (2011); Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011); and Flinn (2006)— 
start with fairly sophisticated search models of the labor market, which 
they put to quite different uses. The remainder broadly resemble ear-
lier work, though each has its own novelty or twist. Allegretto, Dube, 
and Reich (2009, 2011) emphasize the importance of controlling for 
regional heterogeneity and show that neglecting it can result in holding 
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the minimum wage responsible for effects that are due to factors with 
which it is correlated. Neumark and Wascher (2011) present results 
for teenage girls in the course of examining the employment response 
of single mothers to both the minimum wage and the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC). Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) study the 
minimum wage increases in New York in 2005 and 2006 from several 
different quasi experiment perspectives and conclude that it reduced 
employment of young people who had not graduated from high school. 
These six studies all rely on repeated cross sections, where individuals 
are not followed over time. 
Flinn (2006) develops and analyzes a search model in which the 
minimum wage can affect both the probability of finding a job and 
the wage offer. Only unemployed individuals engage in search; once 
employed, workers remain at that job until it disappears, an event that 
happens with a constant probability. Individuals are identical except 
for factors that influence their decisions about labor participation, espe-
cially the opportunity cost of participation. Similarly, firms are identi-
cal. These assumptions imply that no firm or individual is consistently 
more or less productive than any others. Productivity depends only on 
the specific match of individual and firm. The value of a match is its 
productivity and is immediately known to both parties when they begin 
to consider the possibility of joining forces; it is the basis of the wage 
negotiation, the outcome of which depends on the relative bargaining 
power of labor and management. Because employed workers do not 
engage in search, an individual will turn down a wage offer that is too 
low, since accepting it would preclude further search. 
A minimum wage creates a distinction between jobs that would 
have been offered in its absence. Those for which the value is less than 
the minimum wage will not be offered, and matches that would have 
been made because the low offered wage would nevertheless have been 
acceptable to the searcher will not be made. In this way, the minimum 
wage reduces the value of search. Firms will continue to make job of-
fers where the value of the match exceeds the minimum wage, but the 
wage offered will now always be at least the minimum wage. The mini-
mum wage imposes a wage floor for these matches since, previously, 
workers’ low bargaining power would have otherwise allowed firms to 
make some of these offers for a lower wage. In this way, the minimum 
wage increases the value of search. Flinn (2006) describes this latter 
      
 
 
40 Table 2.2  Youth (Individual-Level Data, U.S. Data) 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of Data 
Study Effect Novelty groupa period approach observation structure standard error setb 
Eckstein, Ge, and Negative Enforcement of White male 1979– Regression Individual- Longitudinal General NLSY 
Petrongolo MW in a search high school 1996 month method of 
(2011) model graduates moments 
Ahn, Arcidiacono, Mixed Search model of White 1989– Regression Individual- Repeated Conventional CPS 
and Wessels the labor market teenage boys 2000 year cross section 
(2011) 
Allegretto, Dube, None Addressing Teenagers Various Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered Census, 
and Reich regional and quasi quarter cross section (state) ACS 
(2009) heterogeneity, experiment 
commuting zones 
Allegretto, Dube, None Addressing Teenagers 1990– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered CPS 
and Reich regional 2009 and quasi year cross section (state) 
(2011) heterogeneity experiment 
Flinn (2006) Mixed Search model of Youth 1996– Regression Individual Repeated Conventional CPS 
the labor market 1998 cross section 
Neumark and Mixed MW-EITC Single 1977– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered Various, 
Wascher (2011) interaction mothers 2006 month cross section (state) CPS 
Sabia, Burkhauser, Negative New York State Youth, 2004, Quasi Individual Repeated Clustered SE CPS 
and Hansen minimum wage 16–29, not 2006 experiment cross section bootstrap 
(2012) increase high school 
graduates 
Turner and Mixed Minority and Teenagers 1991 Regression Individual Longitudinal FO Taylor SIPP 
Demiralpc inner-city teens Expansion 
(2001) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
41 
a Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19. 
bACS = American Community Survey. NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
c This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
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effect as the equivalent of an increase in labor’s bargaining power. Both 
of these effects increase total unemployment, the first because some 
workers who would have willingly accepted a low wage cannot now 
find a match, the second because individuals with higher reservation 
wages now enter the labor market in response to the wage floor. If the 
second dominates, both labor force participation and total employment 
may increase.22 
Flinn (2006) derives a likelihood function and estimates it us-
ing data from CPS outgoing rotation groups for four nonconsecutive 
months that together span each of the two federal minimum wage in-
creases of the mid-1990s. To measure the effects of the minimum wage, 
he plugs different values of the minimum wage into two versions of 
the estimated model. The second model, which Flinn believes to be 
more reliable, indicates that employment of young workers rises until 
the minimum wage equals about $7.50 per hour.23 It further implies 
that the youth employment rate rose slightly in response to the 1990s 
increases in the federal minimum wage, from a bit more than 57 percent 
to a bit more than 58 percent. As with more than one analysis previously 
discussed, the lack of confidence bands for these results (equivalent to 
standard errors) makes it impossible to determine whether this differ-
ence is statistically significant or the equivalent of noise. 
Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) elaborate on Flinn’s (2006) 
model to study the compositional effect of the minimum wage on the 
employment and labor force participation of white teenage boys. They 
distinguish these boys according to traits of the head of the household 
in which they live: marital and employment status, and especially edu-
cational achievement. The intuition is that the opportunity cost of work-
ing is greater for boys living in households that are more affluent and 
more stable, so drawing these boys into the labor market requires a 
higher expected wage. Once in the market, however, they are better at 
navigating the process of finding a job because of skills associated with 
their background. Because the expected wage is a product of the prob-
ability of finding a job and the wage paid once a job is found, the effect 
of the minimum wage on their decision is ambiguous. If they decide to 
enter the market, they likely outcompete others already in the market, 
taking jobs that would otherwise have gone to boys from less favored 
backgrounds. 
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Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) estimate the model with data 
from 12 years (1989–2000) of CPS outgoing rotation groups (exclud-
ing summer months), which leads to problems. Their theoretical and 
econometric work is ambitious and impressive, but they overlook the 
issue of serial correlation and standard errors already mentioned. They 
report statistically significant results for the expected compositional 
effects (i.e., higher employment and labor force participation of boys 
from advantaged backgrounds, lower values of these variables for boys 
from disadvantaged backgrounds). With standard errors that are almost 
certainly biased downward, it is not possible to ascertain whether the 
estimates are statistically significant. 
Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) analyze the importance of non-
compliance with federal minimum wage laws, along the way generating 
estimates from which it is possible to calculate employment elastici-
ties (but not their standard errors) for white males who completed high 
school between the ages of 17 and 19 and were never in either college 
or the armed forces. Their search model specifies two types of workers 
and assumes that the wage distribution depends on the distribution of 
productivity across firms. Increases in the minimum wage affect both 
sides of the labor market. On the demand side, an increase reduces em-
ployment by driving low-productivity firms out of business, resulting in 
a lower rate at which job seekers receive job offers. On the supply side, 
it raises both the reservation wage and the expected wage of job offers. 
The first two effects both lead to lower employment, but the last one 
leads to higher employment, so what happens to the employment rate 
following a minimum wage increase is not evident a priori. 
For the population Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) study, the 
minimum wage elasticity of employment during the first year after 
graduation and in the labor force is −0.061, and it is −0.035 during 
the next three years, two to four years after graduation and in the la-
bor force.24 These values correspond roughly to those for teenagers and 
young adults, respectively. It is difficult to evaluate them both because 
they are for groups that do not closely match those examined elsewhere, 
and no standard errors are reported. In any event, both point values are 
very small. Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo write, 
Increases in the minimum wage and/or compliance deliver small 
effects on the wage distribution and the nonemployment rate. (p. 
580) 
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According to our model, the employment effect of the minimum 
wage comes from a combination of lower job offer arrival rates 
and (ambiguous) changes in the reservation wage. However, em-
pirically we find that [the minimum wage] has a negligible impact 
on [the reservation wage]. Thus the increase in nonemployment 
driven by the increase in the minimum wage is almost entirely 
driven by the fact that [most but not all low productivity firms 
choose not to evade the new minimum but instead] leave the mar-
ket. (p. 604) 
The vein of research that rests on data aggregated or grouped by 
state has from the start addressed the possibility of geographic hetero-
geneity with state fixed effects. Using two different approaches, Al-
legretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) show that this is insufficient 
because the problem is not just one of heterogeneity but one of local 
or regional correlation. Both analyses measure the correlation between 
employment and the minimum wage only within well-defined regions 
in order to reduce the likelihood of mistakenly attributing to the mini-
mum wage employment effects that are instead due to other factors with 
which the minimum wage is correlated. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 
(2011) argue that regions of the country have different economic cul-
tures that result in regional differences in both the level of the minimum 
wage and the functioning of labor markets.25 Distinguishing the specific 
effect of the minimum wage from that of the broader economic culture 
requires comparing states only with close neighbors rather than, say, 
Maine to Texas or California to North Dakota. Allegretto, Dube, and 
Reich (2009) approach this issue from a different angle, drawing on 
other work that relies on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of 
commuting zones to treat them as local labor markets. In their data, 
74 of these commuting zones straddle state boundaries and comprise 
counties with different contemporaneous minimum wages at some time 
in their sample. 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) account for geographic cor-
relation with a set of dummy variables for census division by quar-
ter combinations. This reduces the point estimate of the employment 
elasticity by two-thirds, from statistical significance to insignificance. 
The effect of these controls on the response of teenagers’ wages to the 
minimum wage is just the opposite, increasing the elasticity by about 
one-third (more than one standard error) with no discernible effect on 
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the estimated standard error.26 Their treatment group consists of those 
counties whose minimum wage is contemporaneously higher than that 
of other counties in the same commuting zone, and they are matched to 
specific counties in the comparison group, those in the same commut-
ing zone with a lower contemporaneous minimum wage. To show the 
importance of the commuting zone to their results, Allegretto, Dube, 
and Reich begin with a conventional regression framework that they 
apply to all 741 commuting zones. Then, in two steps, they move to a 
difference-in-differences framework by changing the regressors until 
the estimated coefficient of the minimum wage comes entirely from 
the difference that exists within each of the 74 cross-state commuting 
zones.27 
After the obligatory demonstration of a wage response in each of 
their specifications, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) turn to the em-
ployment response. In the version that corresponds to the conventional 
model, they get a conventional result: an elasticity of −0.16. The result 
from their difference-in-differences analysis is an employment elastic-
ity that is positive and almost as large in magnitude, 0.13. An interme-
diate specification that controls for regional heterogeneity at a grosser 
level, census divisions, generates an intermediate elasticity of 0.01. 
None of these are statistically significant at a 0.05 level, although using 
their preferred specification, they state that “we can rule out at the 5 per-
cent level an employment elasticity more negative than −1.5 percent. 
Tests of coefficient equality between [the conventional model and the
difference-in-differences analysis] can be rejected at the 1 percent 
level” (p. 17). 
The central concern of Neumark and Wascher (2011) is interactions 
between the minimum wage and the EITC, but they also briefly con-
sider the side effect of what happens to teen employment.28 In equations 
that include only the minimum wage variable, the employment impact 
for boys who are black or Hispanic is negative and significant but insig-
nificant for other boys.29 For both groups of boys, the results appear not 
to be statistically significant when the EITC is considered.30 The pattern 
is different for girls: by itself, the minimum wage reduces employment 
for girls who are neither black nor Hispanic but not for those who are 
either black or Hispanic. However, once interactions with the EITC are 
accounted for, the only statistically significant effect is on girls who 
are either black or Hispanic, for whom “the additional increase in labor 
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supply among adult women in response to the combination of a high 
minimum wage and generous EITC [leads] to noticeable reductions in 
both the employment rates and wages of female teenagers, thereby re-
ducing their earnings sharply.” This effect is not found to apply to teen-
age boys. 
Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) construct a quasi experiment
to study the combined effect of New York’s 2005 and 2006 minimum
wage increases on the employment of those aged 16–29 who do not have 
a high school diploma.31 Their primary analysis is a 4 × 2 difference-in-
differences, with a comparison group consisting of three nearby states,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. The availability of several
comparison states makes it possible to avoid the problems of biased
standard errors produced in the simpler 2 × 2 model (Donald and Lang
2007), but they do not take advantage of this; however, they present
two other analyses that sidestep the problem. The first uses the tech-
nique of difference-in-differences-in-differences (D3), and the second
uses the synthetic comparison group technique of Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller (2010). 
The additional dimension for comparison in the analysis based on
the D3 approach is people in their twenties who have completed high
school. To the extent that this group and the less-educated one expe-
rience the same state-year shock to employment, the three-way dif-
ferencing removes it from both the treatment and comparison groups,
and Donald and Lang’s (2007) concern is no longer an issue. While
more-educated individuals in their twenties do not make an ideal com-
parison group for teenagers who have not completed high school, the
use of this group in both the treatment and comparison states means
that, at worst, the only likely consequence is additional noise in the
estimates. The point estimates are negative for both the whole tar-
get group (aged 16–29) and for each of three subgroups: teenagers,
those aged 20–24, and those aged 25–29. The only statistically signifi-
cant point estimate, however, is for teenagers, and the point estimate of 
the corresponding elasticity, −0.95, is more than three times the size of 
the largest value in the older consensus range. 
In the second analysis, a synthetic New York is constructed from
the 25 states that had a minimum wage that both remained constant
from 2002 through 2006 and was equal to New York’s ex ante mini-
mum wage of $5.15. This approach relies on calculating, from the 25 
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nontreatment states, a weighted average that very closely matches em-
ployment of the target group in New York for several years before the 
minimum wage increase, and then comparing the two ex post values of 
employment, for New York and synthetic New York. Sabia, Burkhauser, 
and Hansen (2012) instead perform a difference-in-differences analy-
sis, likely because in the synthetic New York, the employment ratio of
those aged 16–29 who did not possess a high school diploma was con-
sistently 0.05 to 0.10 higher than in actual New York, something that
was also true of the original comparison group of neighboring states.
It appears that the synthetic control technique is not a substantial im-
provement over the original analysis, but this is not quite right. Infer-
ence is based on a quasi t-distribution that is derived from pretending 
that each of the 25 nontreatment states, one by one, raises its minimum 
wage in 2005 and 2006, and applying to it the same technique of syn-
thetic comparison groups.32 Because Donald and Lang’s (2007) concern 
is equally an issue for all combinations of states, the quasi t-distribution 
incorporates it and the problem disappears. All point estimates of the 
employment effect using the synthetic control technique are negative,
for the target group as a whole and for each of the three age subgroups
listed above, but when the test statistics are compared to those of the
quasi t-distributions, none are statistically significant.33 
Studies that use simpler data structures. Table 2.3 lists three re-
maining analyses of youth employment and the minimum wage, each 
distinguished by the use of sophisticated statistical techniques in an at-
tempt to extract all the information from data sets with simpler internal 
structures than panels and repeat cross sections. Two, Williams and Mills 
(2001) and Bazen and Marimoutou (2002), analyze aggregate data on 
teenage employment typical of the older literature but use newer, more 
powerful techniques of time-series analysis. The third, Kalenkoski
and Lacombe (2008), applies techniques of spatial econometrics to a 
cross section of counties using data drawn from the 2000 census. 
Williams and Mills (2001) use techniques of time-series analysis 
that have become part of the standard tool kit since the older literature 
on the minimum wage, testing for unit roots and correcting as appropri-
ate, and estimating vector autoregressions (VARs) in order to calculate 
impulse response functions (IRFs) that are estimates of the dynamic 
response to a shock. This allows them to examine how employment 
      
 
48 Table 2.3  Youth (Simpler Data Structures, U.S. Data) 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data Data
Study Effect Novelty groupa period approach observation structure setb 
Bazen and Negative Structural Teenagers 1954–1999 Regression Year Time series Old time-
Marimoutou time-series series data 
(2002) models 
Kalenkoski and Negative Addressing Teenagers 2000 Regression County Cross section Census 
Lacombe geographic 
(2008) correlation 
Williams and Mills Mixed Time-series Teenagers 1954–1993 Regression Quarter Time series Old time-
(2001) issues: unit series data 
roots, VARs 
a Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19. 
b The Current Population Survey is the source for most of this data, but the authors received the data sets from earlier workers in the litera-
ture, which facilitates comparison with prior work. 
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changes over time following a minimum wage increase, something 
more interesting than a typical coefficient estimate. A drawback of IRFs 
is that the results can be sensitive to necessary but arbitrary choices. To 
address this problem, Williams and Mills report results from several 
IRFs, examining in each the employment response to a 10 percent in-
crease in the minimum wage. The results are quite similar, with the teen 
employment ratio decreasing for eight quarters, until it is four to eight 
percentage points lower than it would otherwise be. It remains roughly 
flat for the next four quarters, after which it returns to normal by the 
16th quarter after the increase. Williams and Mills place more faith 
in the smaller estimates of the response, the intermediate drop of four 
rather than eight percentage points. Even according to the generous 90 
percent confidence intervals (corresponding to a test size of 0.10) that 
they report, the decline is significant only in quarters 8 and 12 follow-
ing the increase; this pattern suggests that the apparent statistically sig-
nificant response to the minimum wage may well be due to inadequate 
treatment of seasonality. 
Bazen and Marimoutou (2002) use structural time-series modeling 
techniques based on the Kalman filter, which allows for unusually flex-
ible treatment of trend, seasonality, and business cycles. This approach 
generates estimates of the employment response to the minimum wage 
that are much more stable than was apparent from the accumulated re-
sults of the older literature. They find a statistically significant short-
term elasticity of −0.10 and a long-term elasticity of −0.30, the two 
extremes of the range commonly reported in the older literature. The 
contrast with the results of Williams and Mills (2001), who found a 
large short-term response that, rather than getting larger, disappeared 
over time is worth noting. 
Kalenkoski and Lacombe (2008) apply techniques from spatial 
econometrics that correct for correlation between observations made 
at locations near each other, similar to statistical techniques that correct 
for correlation over time. These tools, which are not in widespread use 
in economics, allow for much finer correction of spatial correlation than 
dummy variables of the sort used to control for state and census-division 
effects. The authors estimate three models of geographic correlation on 
county-level teenage employment ratios. The simplest, analogous to a 
one-period moving average, allows for correlation between adjacent 
counties but not those farther apart. In the intermediate model, analo-
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gous to a first-order serial correlation process, correlations attenuate 
more gradually as the number of counties in between grows. The most 
general version allows for both kinds of correlation. Specification tests 
support the second model. The corresponding minimum wage elasticity 
of teenage employment equals −0.3, at the high end of the range of the 
old consensus range. 
The techniques used in these three pieces efficiently extract in-
formation from the data to which they are applied, but the one-
dimensional nature of the data limit the information that they contain. 
The time-series data obscure much regional variation that is quite im-
portant and illuminating, as the analyses of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 
(2009, 2011) have shown. Because the cross section that Kalenkoski and
Lacombe (2008) analyze consists of only a single period, going beyond 
a very careful study of the correlation between the minimum wage and 
employment is not possible. To draw reliable inferences about causal 
relationships, it is necessary to distinguish carefully what is due to the 
minimum wage and what is due to other, correlated factors, something 
that is exceedingly difficult or impossible with these data. 
Summary of the effect on youth employment. What do studies 
since the last exchange between Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card 
and Krueger (2000) tell us about the response of youth employment to 
the minimum wage? Of the seven discussed based on aggregate panels, 
only Neumark (2001) finds no detectable effect. Three, Sabia (2009a,b) 
and Thompson (2009) find unambiguous negative effects. Two others, 
Bazen and Le Gallo (2009) and Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013), 
find an occasional negative effect that each attributes to the timing of 
increases in the minimum wage. Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) report 
mixed results, negative for teenage boys, but no detectable effect on 
either teenage girls or teenagers as a whole. 
Of the seven studies that use individual-level data, four build on the 
approach that Neumark and Wascher (1992) introduced, which itself 
built on the older time-series approach. Three of these four, Allegretto, 
Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen 
(2012), pay careful attention to the comparison group, essentially the 
counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of a mini-
mum wage increase. They give different answers: Allegretto, Dube, 
and Reich (2009, 2011) report no impact on teenage employment while 
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Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) detect a much stronger one for 
teenagers than is typically reported in this literature. The fourth of these 
studies, Neumark and Wascher (2011), reports a negative employment 
response for teenage girls who are black or Hispanic but not for other 
teenagers. The other three studies—Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels 
(2011), Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2001), and Flinn (2006)—ground 
their analysis in a search model that allows for examination of a vari-
ety of effects on the minimum wage, but because none reports reliable 
standard errors, it is not at all clear how much faith we should place on 
the point estimates of their most interesting results. 
We are left with some interesting hints but nothing definite. It is 
unlikely that increases in the minimum wage that raise wages always 
or even often have negative consequences for youth employment. They 
may, however, perhaps because of poor timing, as Bazen and Le Gallo 
(2009) and Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) suggest, perhaps 
for other reasons such as low education, as is implied by Sabia, Bur-
khauser, and Hansen’s (2012) definition of their target. Or it may be that 
the apparent, occasional negative impact is due to inadequate controls 
for other factors, as Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) argue. 
Other groups 
Table 2.4 lists several studies that consider the effect of minimum 
wage legislation on groups other than young workers. Four of these ap-
peared in the sections on young workers, including three that glanced at 
the response of youth employment response along the way to examin-
ing the effect on other groups, and which are presented in more detail 
below: Orrenius and Zavodny (2008), Neumark and Wascher (2011), 
and Neumark and Nizalova (2007). The fourth, already discussed in 
some detail, is Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011). Two other studies 
are introduced here: Sabia (2008) examines the effect of the minimum 
wage on single mothers, including their employment; and Luttmer 
(2007) uses the rotation structure of the CPS estimate to examine how 
the minimum wage affects the wage and skill structure of the low end 
of the labor market, and the consequent effect on the employment of 
unskilled and low-skilled individuals. 
As poorly educated immigrant populations grow in the United 
States, Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) believe that it is increasingly im-
      
 
52 Table 2.4  Other Groups (U.S. Data) 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of Data
Study Effect Novelty group period approach observation structure standard error seta 
Eckstein, Negative Enforcement White male 1979– Regression Individual- Longitudinal GMM NLSY 
Ge, and of MW in a high school 1996 month 
Petrongolo search model graduates 
(2011) 
Luttmer (2007) Mixed Focus on job Unskilled, 1989– Regression State Cross section Huber-White CPS 
rationing low-skilled 1992 (differences) 
workers 
Neumark and Negative Long-term Adults, 25–29 1979– Regression State-cohort- Panel Clustered CPS 
Nizalova consequences 2001 year (state) 
(2007) 
Neumark and Mixed MW-EITC Low-income, 1997– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered CPS 
Wascher interaction single mothers 2006 month cross section (state) 
(2011) 
Orrenius and Mixed Immigrants Immigrants 1995– Regression State-year Panel Clustered CPS 
Zavodny 2005 (state) 
(2008) 
Sabia (2008) Mixed Focus on Low-income, 1992– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered CPS 
poverty single mothers 2005 year cross section (state) 
Grogger (2003)b,c None Effect on Female heads 1979– Regression Individual Repeated Clustered March 
welfare rolls of families 2000 cross section (state-year) CPS 
Hoffman and Ke None National quasi Low-skill 2009 Quasi Individual- Repeated Conventional CPS 
(2012)b experiment, workers experiment month cross section 
DIDID 
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Hoffman and Negative NJ-PA(1996 Youth and 1996 Quasi Inidividual- Repeated Conventional CPS 
Trace (2009)b increase) those w/low experiment month cross section 
education 
Mastracci and None IN-IL (2004, Low-wage 2003– Quasi Individual- Repeated Conventional CPS 
Persky (2008) (Emp.) 2005 increases workers 2005 experiment year cross section 
b in IL) 
Neumark, Negative Those earning Wage earners 1979– Regression Individual- Longitudinal Robust CPS 
Schweitzer, (much) higher 1997 month 
and  Wascher than minimum 
(2004)b wage 
a NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youths. CPS = Current Population Survey. 
b For repeat cross-section data, clustering within each state and year rather than within each state (over all years) does not resolve serial cor-
relation; much too frequent rejection of the null hypothesis (of no effect) remains a problem (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [2004]). 
c This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang 
(2007). 
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portant to understand the effect of various policies on this group. To 
this end, they construct a state-year panel from the CPS for the years 
1994–2005 to study the minimum wage, focusing on immigrants who 
have not completed high school. They report that the overall response 
of these immigrants’ wages is nearly as large as that of teenagers’
wages, with elasticities in the range of 0.15 to more than 0.20. Wages 
of low-educated immigrant women respond more strongly than those of 
teenage girls. However, Orrenius and Zavodny detect no employment 
effect on these immigrants, neither overall nor for either men or women 
separately. They question whether the absence of an employment effect 
may be due to immigrants’ choosing to avoid or leave states with higher 
minimum wages in the expectation that employment there is harder to 
come by. To explore this, they calculate simple regressions of several 
variables on the minimum wage, including the population shares of 
both native born and immigrants without a high school diploma, the 
average years of education of both these groups, and the fraction of 
each group that lacks a high school diploma. They find that states with 
higher minimum wages have lower proportions of immigrants in their 
populations and suspect that immigrants pay attention not specifically 
to the minimum wage but to the location of appropriate jobs, and that 
firms with such jobs relocate in response to the minimum wage. This 
suggests issues similar to those that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 
2011) raise concerning correlation between economic growth rates and 
the minimum wage across regions of the country, and the need for ap-
propriate controls to disentangle minimum wage effects successfully. 
Using CPS data to construct a state-year panel for 1991–2004, Sa-
bia (2008) studies the effect of the minimum wage on single mothers. 
After concluding that it does not affect whether their income is less than 
the poverty line, he turns to consideration of other outcomes, including 
their employment status. He finds no employment response for either 
the entire sample of single mothers or for those who have high school 
diplomas but does find a substantial employment effect when he nar-
rows his focus to the 20 percent of the sample that have not completed 
high school; the point estimate of the employment elasticity with re-
spect to the minimum wage is −0.9 (he reports no standard error). This 
is quite large, comparable to the elasticity that Sabia, Burkhauser, and 
Hansen (2012) report for youth without a high school diploma. Orre-
nius and Zavodny (2008) report statistically insignificant estimates of 
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the employment elasticity that range between −0.1 and −0.2 for female 
immigrants who lacked high school diplomas. An explanation for these 
divergent effects on different groups of low-educated women is that 
employers do not view single mothers as desirable employees; when 
child care arrangements fall apart or a child is sick, a single mother is 
likely to miss work on short notice. If the minimum wage draws into 
the labor force women who do not have these problems, it is likely that 
employers will substitute toward them (even if there are legal issues 
related to this). It would be useful to know if this is indeed the expla-
nation, or at least to know who replaces less-educated single mothers 
among the employed when the minimum wage rises. 
As previously discussed, Neumark and Wascher (2011) use
individual-level data from the CPS to examine whether and how the 
minimum wage interacts with the EITC.34 The EITC subsidizes the 
earnings of low-income families, primarily those with children. With 
regard to the minimum wage and employment, their analysis considers 
two issues: 
1) Intended effects. If the EITC encourages employment by in-
creasing returns from working, does the minimum wage 
amplify this effect or attenuate it by reducing employment 
opportunities? 
2) Unintended consequences. If the EITC harms others who are 
already in the labor market but ineligible for the EITC by in-
creasing competition for jobs, does the minimum wage amplify 
this by reducing employment opportunities? 
To examine these issues, Neumark and Wascher (2011) run two 
similar sets of regressions, one set for intended effects and one for 
unintended consequences or side effects; within each set, the estima-
tion sample is what distinguishes the results. The first regression for 
examining intended effects uses a sample of all single women aged 
21–44; the next two use two overlapping subsamples: single women 
with no education beyond high school, and black and Hispanic single 
women. The first regression for examining side effects begins with 
a sample of childless individuals, 21–34, “who are not eligible for 
the much more generous EITC available to families with children”
(Neumark and Wascher 2011, Note 5). The sample is then reduced once 
by deleting those who did not go past high school and are neither black 
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nor Hispanic; the treatment group is childless blacks and Hispanics who 
did not go past high school, and the comparison group is childless indi-
viduals who completed high school. It is reduced a second time by de-
leting all black and Hispanics who did not go past high school and were 
not single males; the treatment group is now childless, single black and 
Hispanic men, aged 21–34, who did not go past high school, while the 
comparison group remains childless individuals who completed high 
school. 
For both sets of equations, the dependent variable is a dummy that 
indicates employment status, and the ancillary variables are the state-
year unemployment rate and dummies for a variety of demographic 
traits and state and year effects. The focal variables are the two policy 
variables that measure the minimum wage and EITC, their interaction, 
and interactions of these three variables with a treatment dummy that 
indicates the group of interest in the regression. In the regressions that 
examine intended effects on different groups of single women, the treat-
ment dummy indicates whether the household includes children. Con-
sequently, in each sample considered (all single women, single women 
whose education went no further than completion of high school, or 
black or Hispanic single women), the treatment group is single mothers 
in the sample and the comparison group is single women in the sam-
ple who are not mothers. In the regressions examining the unintended 
consequences on ineligible individuals, the treatment dummy indi-
cates whether education proceeded no further than high school. Con-
sequently, the comparison group in each sample considered is the same: 
all childless men and women aged 21–34 whose education continued 
past high school. In the first sample, the treatment group is all childless 
men and women in this age group whose education went no further than 
high school (designated low-skilled). In the second, the treatment group 
is childless black or Hispanic men and women whose education went 
no further than high school, and the final treatment group is childless 
black or Hispanic single men whose education went no further than 
high school. Neither type of regression includes the treatment dummy 
by itself, without interactions with other policy variables. 
This absence begs the question, “With regard to the interaction
terms between the policy variables and the treatment dummies, do the
coefficient estimates partly reflect the effect of the dummy alone?” If the 
answer is “Yes,” then the estimates do not accurately measure the ef-
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fects of the policies. As specified, each equation is based on an assump-
tion that without the two policies, labor market outcomes of otherwise
identical individuals distinguished only by the dummy variable would
be identical; whether or not they have children, single women would be
expected to have the same employment status but for the EITC and the
minimum wage; similarly, were it not for the EITC and the minimum
wage, otherwise identical ineligible individuals would be expected to
have the same employment status whether or not their education con-
tinued past high school graduation. The statement about single women
seems doubtful as soon as it is stated, and the one about ineligible indi-
viduals seems so after a moment’s thought, since many who continue in
school past high school are out of the labor market in their early twenties
until they leave school.35 
Finally, of interest from the perspective of this survey is the coeffi-
cient of the stand-alone minimum wage term in each equation and some
of the sums of this coefficient and that of the interaction term. While 
point estimates of the sums are easily calculated, standard errors are not,
in the absence of the relevant covariance terms.36 
Turning first to the regressions that examine the intended effects of 
the policies, of those on samples of single women, nearly all reported 
coefficients on the terms of interest (both policy variables, their inter-
action, and all three of these interacted with the treatment dummy) are 
positive, and the three that are not are dwarfed by their standard er-
rors. The only terms that are statistically significant are the minimum 
wage by itself in the regression on those whose education did not go 
beyond high school, and those that include the EITC interacted with 
the treatment dummy (with and without the minimum wage).37 These 
results suggest that, at worst, the minimum wage does not reduce em-
ployment of single women, whether or not they have children, and, at 
best, it slightly increases employment of single women who have no 
more education than high school. Further, the minimum wage and the 
EITC appear to work quite powerfully together to draw single mothers 
into employment. If the equation included a stand-alone dummy for 
children, it is plausible that its coefficient would be negative (single 
mothers are less likely to be employed than childless single women), in 
which case the positive effect of these two policies on the employment 
of single mothers is even larger. 
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In the regressions that examine the unintended consequences of 
these policies, those on samples of childless individuals aged 21–34, 
the overall effect of the minimum wage on employment (to the extent 
that we can tell) appears to be positive. In the largest sample, consider-
ing all childless individuals in this age group, the only statistically sig-
nificant estimate of the six coefficients is the one where the minimum 
wage stands alone, and it is positive. When the sample is reduced so that 
the only people in the sample with no more than a high school educa-
tion are either childless single blacks and Hispanics or childless single 
black and Hispanic men, the story is more complicated. The results 
clearly indicate that the EITC reduces the employment of these groups 
and the minimum wage amplifies this effect, but without the EITC, the 
minimum wage increases their employment. For the two samples re-
stricted to blacks and Hispanics, the statistically significant coefficients 
are precisely the interactions that include the treatment dummy. Un-
like the previous set of regressions where the absence of the treatment 
indicator may well have reduced the size of the estimated effects, here 
it is less clear, which makes it harder to feel confident in these results 
and what they mean. It does not appear that the minimum wage reduced 
employment of low-skilled individuals, certainly not in the absence of 
the EITC, but we cannot be certain. 
Luttmer’s (2007) central concern is whether minimum wage in-
creases disorganize the labor market so much that some individuals 
who are employed have higher reservation wages than some otherwise 
identical people who are not employed; he deems this situation alloca-
tively inefficient. Estimation of reservation wages requires some inge-
nuity, especially with respect to the CPS’s rotation structure in a way 
that may be a step too far. As part of this, he classifies employed indi-
viduals into skill categories according to their wage decile and consid-
ers the effect of the minimum wage on the employment of the unskilled 
and low-skilled, those who are in the bottom two deciles (or would be 
if employed). Luttmer 
find[s] suggestive evidence that the 1990/91 increase in the federal 
minimum wage reduced employment among unskilled workers. 
However, their employment reduction seems to be largely com-
pensated for by increased employment among the next skill group, 
which is likely to be a close substitute. Hence, for a more broadly 
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defined group of less skilled workers, [he does] not find evidence 
of a large negative employment impact. (p. 31)38 
Neumark and Nizalova (2007) raise the possibility of scarring, 
long-term effects on individuals’ employment prospects; if the mini-
mum wage reduces employment among teenagers, they will have less 
opportunity to develop skills and behaviors that will lead to labor mar-
ket success in the long run. Neumark and Nizalova (2007) construct an 
aggregate panel that is similar to those often used to study the minimum 
wage with CPS data, but instead of a single observation for each state-
year combination constructed from the corresponding information for 
teenagers aged 16–19, they construct a separate observation for each 
state-year-age, where age runs from 16 to 29: 15 observations for each 
state and year rather than one. For the equation in which they are most 
interested, they use the observations for ages 25–29. The dependent 
variable of interest here is the employment ratio. They regress this on 
three minimum wage variables and fixed effects for state, year, and each 
age (16, 17, 18, and 19 for teens; 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 for young adults; 
and 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 for adults in their late twenties). The mini-
mum wage variables are the mean value of the minimum wage in the 
current state of residence when individuals of this age were 1) in their 
teens, aged 16–19; 2) young adults, aged 20–24; and 3) aged 25–29. 
The estimated effect on employment for those in their late twenties of 
the mean minimum wage at the time when they were teenagers is nega-
tive and statistically significant. The corresponding employment effect 
on the same age group of the minimum wage when they were in their 
early twenties is negative, statistically significant, and twice as large.39 
One serious problem is that the channel through which this is sup-
posed to work is reduced employment at an early age, which leads to 
less human capital, which in turn reduces employment at a later age. 
As discussed in the earlier brief mention of this article in the section on 
youth, none of the estimated employment effects for teenagers or young 
adults are statistically significant; the contemporaneous minimum wage 
reduces the employment of neither teenagers nor those in their early 
twenties. It is not evident how the minimum wage could then have any 
effect on human capital formation that would have consequences later 
in life, undercutting their explanation for their primary result. 
More important is that the data used are poorly suited to this analy-
sis. With Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS 
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ORG) data, it is possible to track individuals for no more than a year, 
but the analysis is based on relations between variables over periods of 
more than a decade. As a result, very strong assumptions are necessary 
about what happens during periods in which data are not observed. 
In their analysis of the importance of noncompliance with federal 
minimum wage laws, Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) present es-
timates from which it is possible to calculate employment elasticities 
with respect to the minimum wage (but not their standard errors) for 
white male high school graduates. Having already considered those for 
men in the first four years of their work history, roughly older teenagers 
and younger young adults, we now turn to those for somewhat older 
men. For those who graduated between five and nine years ago, the 
elasticity is −0.040 and for those 10–18 years out, it is 0.034. These 
elasticities are both very small and roughly constant after the first year 
in the labor force. 
Of the six studies that have examined the effect of the minimum 
wage on the employment of groups other than the young, Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2008) find no effect on the employment of immigrants who 
have not completed high school. The results of Neumark and Wascher 
(2011) suggest that the minimum wage by itself has a small positive 
effect on the employment of single women, aged 21–44, with no more 
than a high school education; of childless individuals, aged 21–34; and 
of adults who have gone beyond high school, whether single women 
or blacks and Hispanics. Further it amplifies the measured effects of 
the EITC on employment, both positive and negative. Luttmer (2007) 
can find no net employment effect on the lowest skilled workers (as 
defined by position in the wage distribution), although there may be 
some compositional effect. Elasticities for male high school graduates 
in, roughly, their early twenties through mid-thirties can be calculated 
from the numbers that Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2007) report. 
They are negative and quite small. Whether they rise above background 
noise is something that we cannot tell since no standard errors are avail-
able. Neumark and Nizalova (2007) report a long-term scarring effect 
on employment prospects from the minimum wage experienced when 
a teenager and young adult, but there are several problems with these 
results, including both the alleged transmission mechanism and the ap-
propriateness of the data for this analysis. Ultimately, only Sabia (2008) 
finds any adverse effect on employment, a very large one for single 
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mothers who have not completed high school.40 This is not precisely the 
same group that Neumark and Wascher (2011) denote “low-skilled,” 
since their group includes high school graduates, but their results do not 
seem to be consistent with Sabia’s (2008). Further work is necessary 
to determine the source of the differences, whether they are due to the 
varying definitions of “low-skilled” or the specification issues raised in 
this section and elsewhere by Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011). 
Sectoral Studies 
Restaurants (and hotels) 
Table 2.5 lists 11 analyses of the restaurant industry or restaurant 
and hotel industries. Six are regression-based analyses, 5 supplement 
that technique with difference-in-differences analyses, and 1 relies pri-
marily on the response of prices to the minimum wage in the United 
States to infer the employment response. The 3 that rely on the QCEW, 
derived from data collected as part of the unemployment insurance sys-
tem, use county-quarter panels, and the fourth uses a state-quarter panel. 
The 4 based on private surveys have before-and-after observations (or 
occasionally only before) on each establishment. The other data sources 
provide monthly or annual time series at the state-industry level. 
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) follow the approach pioneered by 
Card and Krueger (1994), collecting data and performing a difference-
in-differences analysis of the effect on restaurants: primarily their wages 
and employment. They study the establishment of a citywide minimum 
wage in San Francisco that went into effect in early 2004 for firms with 
at least 10 employees. They divide restaurants into three size categories: 
small (4–8 employees ex ante), midsize (14–35 workers ex ante), and 
larger ones. The treatment group is midsize restaurants in San Francisco 
with at least one employee whose ex ante wage would have to rise in 
response to the new law. Midsize restaurants in nearby communities are 
the primary comparison group, and results from this analysis are subject 
to the problem that Donald and Lang (2007) identify. However, Dube, 
Naidu, and Reich (2007) also report results for two other comparison 
groups of restaurants in San Francisco: small restaurants, which were 
initially excused from the minimum wage, and similar-sized restaurants 
that prior to the law had no employees whose wages would have to be 
raised. In addition, they report regression results where the minimum 
  
 
 
 
 
62 Table 2.5  Restaurants and Hotels (U.S. Data) 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study Effect Novelty Target period approach observation structure error Data seta 
Aaronson and Negative Test output price Restaurant Calibration Labor market — — — 
French (2007) implications industry 
of monopsony 
model 
Addison, None New data source Eating and 1990– Regression County-quarter Panel Clustered QCEW 
Blackburn, and drinking 2005 (state) 
Cotti (2012) establishments 
Addison, Mixed Amplifying effect Eating and 2006– Regression State-year Panel Clustered ACS 
Blackburn, and of recessions? drinking 2009 county-qtr. (state) QCEW
Cotti (2013) establishments 2005– state-month CPS 
2010 
Dube, Lester, and None Addressing Eating and 1990– Quasi County-quarter Panel Clustered QCEW 
Reich (2010) regional drinking 2006 experiment (state) 
heterogeneity establishments 
Dube, Naidu, and None Replicate Card San Francisco 2003– Quasi Firm-year Longitu- Robust Private 
Reich (2007) and Krueger restaurants 2004 experiment dinal survey 
(1994) for SF and regression 
Even and Negative Tip credit Full-service 1990– Regression State-quarter Panel Clustered QCEW, 
Macpherson restaurants 2011 (state) CPS 
(2014) 
Hirsch, Kaufman, None Studying other Fast food 2007– Regression Establishment- Longitu- Clustered Private 
and Zelenska dimensions of restaurants in 2009 month dinal (establish- survey 
(2011) adjustment GA and AL ment) 
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Persky and Mixed IL minimum 
Baiman (2010) wage increases 
Singell and Mixed Loosely modeled 
Terborg (2007) on C&K (1994) 
Powers (2009)b Negative IL minimum 
wage increases 
Ropponen (2011)b Mixed Change-
in-changes 
analysis of C&K 
(1994) and N&W
(2000) data 
IL fast food 
establishments 
SIC 58, 70 
OR, WA 
IL fast food 
establishments 
NJ fast food 
establishments 
2003– Quasi experi- Firm-year Longitu- Conven- Private 
2005 ment (2x2) dinal tional survey 
1994– Regression State-industry Multiple Conven- BLS-
2001 month time series tional CES 
2003– 
2005 
Quasi experi-
ment (2x2) 
Firm-year Longitu-
dinal 
Conven-
tional 
Private 
survey 
1991– 
1992 
Quasi-experi-
ment (2x2) 
Firm-year Longitu-
dinal 
— Private 
surveys 
a QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. ACS = American Community Survey. CPS = Current Population Survey. BLS-
CES = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Current Establishment Survey. 
b This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Donald and Lang (2007). 
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wage variable is the fraction affected (à la Katz and Krueger [1992]), 
and the estimation samples are the union of the treatment group and 
variously defined comparison groups. The discussion below is limited 
to these results, which should be robust to this statistical issue. 
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) detect a wage effect from regres-
sion results except in models that exclude fast food restaurants from the 
treatment group. In the difference-in-differences analysis that neglects 
restaurant closings, three of the four point estimates of the employment 
effect are positive and none are statistically significant. When they take 
account of establishments that closed between the two surveys, which 
occurred at higher rates in both comparison groups, the positive point 
estimates of the employment effect become larger, the negative esti-
mate becomes positive, and all remain statistically not significant. Re-
gression estimates also indicate only employment elasticities that are 
positive and not statistically significant. Dube, Naidu, and Reich con-
clude that there is no evidence of a disemployment effect, and that their 
confidence intervals are sufficiently tight as to rule out relatively large 
effects, both the positive ones of Card and Krueger (1994) and the nega-
tive ones of Neumark and Wascher (2000). 
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2012) perform a regression analy-
sis on a national data set of employment and payroll in eating and drink-
ing establishments for each county in the United States that they created 
from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data for 
1990–2005. They loosely derive their regression equations from simple 
specifications of labor supply and demand and then present results from 
a variety of specifications in order to examine their sensitivity to dif-
ferent modeling choices. Only the sparest specification (the one with 
the fewest controls) indicates a negative employment response. Once 
they begin adding additional controls, in particular allowing for county-
specific trends, they report a statistically significant elasticity of earn-
ings with respect to the minimum wage of about 0.17, but no discern-
ible employment response. 
Powers, Persky, and Baiman (2007) collect data from about 200 fast
food outlets in eastern Illinois and western Indiana to analyze the effects
of the minimum wage increases in Illinois that occurred at the beginning
of 2004 and 2005, à la Card and Krueger (1994). Not reaching agree-
ment on the interpretation of the analysis of the data, they published
two separate reports, Powers (2009) and Persky and Baiman (2010). As
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with Card and Krueger, the central analysis in each uses a difference-in-
differences framework, but both also present alternative analyses of the
employment effect. Persky and Baiman (2010) present results from a re-
gression based on a wage gap to measure the incidence of the minimum
wage that avoids the problems that Donald and Lang (2007) identify,
and Powers (2009) presents results from a D3 analysis that does not
avoid these problems. The D3 analysis splits the sample period into two
parts, comparing the differences from after and in between the minimum
wage increase with those from in between and before. Each of these
difference-in-differences is subject to distinct, independent shocks of the
type that Donald and Lang (2007) identified; the point estimate of the 
D3 value is unbiased and its standard error is inconsistently estimated. 
The definition of the wage gap that Persky and Baiman (2010) use is 
the percentage increase in an Illinois establishment’s 2003 starting wage
that is necessary to bring it up to the 2005 value of the Illinois mini-
mum wage. As dependent variables, they consider both the change in the
number of positions in each establishment and the size-weighted growth
rate (Note 11, p. 135). In different specifications and samples (the differ-
ences are mostly attempts to control for potential data problems), while
most estimated coefficients of the minimum wage are negative, all are 
not statistically significant. 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) present a very rich analysis of 
QCEW data that uses several distinct but closely related frameworks to 
address the most serious criticisms of earlier studies. These frameworks 
allow for close comparison of conflicting findings, which they believe 
are due to several overlooked statistical problems. All of their results 
derive from regressions in which the dependent variable is restaurant 
employment for 1990–2006, and the right-hand-side variables include 
total employment and population in each county, and the effective mini-
mum wage.41 What distinguishes the analyses from one another is the 
sample of counties, dummy variables, and trends. Two important fea-
tures of their work relate to their concern with unobserved heterogene-
ity, and the careful way that they sequentially structure their analyses so 
that the reader can understand the source of differences in results. 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) do not identify a particular source 
of unobserved heterogeneity, instead listing a variety of traits that are 
similar across states within the same region but differ between states 
that are farther apart. Among these are the cost of living, regulation, 
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growth rates, and business cycle behavior and how the local economy 
responds. They observe that 
as recently as 2004, no state in the South had a state minimum 
wage. Yet the South has been growing faster than the rest of the 
nation, for reasons entirely unrelated to the absence of state-based 
minimum wages. . . . By itself, heterogeneity in overall employ-
ment growth may not appear to be a problem, since most estimates 
control for overall unemployment trends. Nonetheless, using states 
with very different overall employment growth as controls is prob-
lematic. The presence of such heterogeneity in overall employ-
ment suggests that controls for low-wage employment using ex-
trapolation, as is the case using traditional fixed effects estimates, 
may be inadequate. (pp. 6–7) 
To address this problem, their regression equations include separate 
dummy variables for each quarter by census division rather than a single 
national dummy for each quarter. As a result, the effect of the minimum 
wage in New York in the first quarter of 2005, when it rose from $5.15 
per hour to $6.00 per hour, is calculated in comparison with only New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania, where it remained at $5.15 per hour, rather 
than all states across the country. 
To make the source of their results transparent, Dube, Lester, and 
Reich (2010) begin with an analysis designed to resemble Neumark 
and Wascher’s (1992, 1994) regression-based studies of teenage em-
ployment.42 They then proceed, step-by-step, to an analysis designed 
to resemble the difference-in-differences studies of Card and Krueger 
(1994, 2000). Along the way, they demonstrate the importance of the 
unobserved heterogeneity described above. The key analyses are the 
first and last pairs.43 
In the first pair of analyses, the sample consists of quarterly ob-
servations of all counties in the continental (contiguous) United States 
from 1990 through the first half of 2006. The first analysis includes 
fixed effects for each county and quarter so that the analysis is similar in 
form to studies of teenage employment based on state-year panels. The 
point estimate of the employment response to the minimum wage is in 
the range of those often reported for teenagers, −0.18, and statistically 
significant. The second specification replaces the aggregate time effects 
with controls for unobserved regional factors, quarterly effects that dif-
fer across each of the nine census divisions. The consequence is a re-
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duction in the employment response by nearly five-sixths, to −0.03, and 
it is now, at about half the size of its standard error, statistically insig-
nificant. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) infer from this pair of analyses 
that the results of studies of the minimum wage and teenage employ-
ment based on the canonical framework of Neumark and Wascher (e.g., 
1992) are due to neglect of unobserved regional heterogeneity. 
In the last pair of analyses, which culminates in a difference-in-
differences analysis, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) reduce their sam-
ple to counties that are within metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
that have more than one minimum wage for at least one quarter during 
the sample period; by and large, the MSAs straddle a state border, and 
these counties are adjacent to each other on opposite sides of the border. 
The first analysis of this pair resembles the first analysis of the previous 
pair, with a set of aggregate quarterly dummies; it indicates a minimum 
wage effect of −0.11, about two-thirds as large as that for the complete 
national sample (−0.18) and statistically significant only at the 0.10 
level. The second analysis in this pair replaces the aggregate quarterly 
dummies with quarterly dummies for each pair of adjacent counties. As 
a consequence, the minimum wage effect is estimated from only mini-
mum wage differences within MSAs, exhibiting a familial resemblance 
to Card and Krueger (1994, 2000). The estimated employment response 
is positive and about half the size of its standard error. 
Following an extensive sensitivity analysis in which they vary the 
specification and industry examined, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) 
offer some suggestions about why the results of studies that examine 
national data on teenage employment differ from those that use local 
data on low-wage sectors. They disagree with the view that it is due to 
the short duration of the samples used in the local studies, which arbi-
trarily cut off the data before the minimum wage has had time to reduce 
employment. Rather, the differences 
result from insufficient controls for unobserved heterogeneity in 
employment growth in the national-level studies using a tradi-
tional fixed-effects specification. The differences do not arise from 
other possible factors, such as using short before-after windows in 
local case studies. . . . The large negative elasticities in the tradi-
tional specification are generated primarily by regional and local 
differences in employment trends that are unrelated to minimum 
wage policies. (p. 962) 
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Singell and Terborg (2007) analyze the experiences of Washington 
and Oregon, adjacent states with similar economies and largely comple-
mentary histories of minimum wage increases for several years begin-
ning in the mid 1990s. The heart of the analysis consists of two multiple 
regression analyses, one of monthly employment data for eating and 
drinking establishments, and another for hotels and lodging that makes 
little use of time-series techniques. They estimate several slightly dif-
ferent equations for monthly employment growth rates in two industries 
in each state. Their results are statistically significant and largely con-
sistent within each industry. For restaurants, the elasticity of employ-
ment growth with respect to minimum wage growth ranges from −0.07, 
when no lag of the minimum wage is in the equation, to −0.20 percent 
when it is. For hotels, the figures are 0.15 and 0.19, which Singell and 
Terborg explain on the grounds that the minimum wage was not binding 
in this industry and that employment was instead responding to other 
factors, especially the health of the economy. This, of course, raises 
questions about the quality of their control variables, since if the mini-
mum wage is not binding, positive estimates are possible but ought not 
be (highly) statistically significant. In addition, residual serial correla-
tion is the norm with time-series data, and if present and not addressed, 
undercuts statistical inference. The authors mention serial correlation 
and refer somewhat vaguely to a test that indicates it is not a problem.44 
The focus of Even and Macpherson’s (2014) study is the tip credit,
which allows employers in full-service restaurants to pay certain employ-
ers a much lower minimum wage under the assumption that tips that
these individuals receive make up at least the difference between the
typical minimum wage and this lower one. The two minimum wages
do not move together, with no increase in the federal level of the tipped
minimum since April 1991, but they report that more than 30 states have
higher tipped minimums. Except for the presence of two contemporane-
ous minimum wage terms, one for the regular minimum wage (hereaf-
ter called “the minimum wage”) and one for the tipped minimum, their
log-log regression equation resembles the canonical model that Neumark
and Wascher (1992) developed to study youth employment. Although
uncomfortable with the use of state-specific trends, they estimate equa-
tions that include them. However, their more interesting method for con-
trolling for state-specific time-varying confounding factors is to perform 
an analysis analogous to the “triple-difference” approach. With data from
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the QCEW, the dependent variable is not the change in employment in
the full-service sector but the difference between the change in employ-
ment in the two sectors—the full-service sector minus the limited-service
sector—where they judge the tipped minimum wage to be almost entirely
irrelevant.45 With data from the CPS, which has occupational informa-
tion, they can distinguish between workers who are likely tipped and oth-
ers who most likely are not; here, the dependent variable is the difference
between change in employment of the two types of workers. 
Even and Macpherson (2014) follow a two-step process, first con-
firming that the minimum wage affects eating and drinking places, then 
studying the effect on employment. They find that the QCEW’s aver-
age weekly earnings in the full-service sector respond to both the tipped
minimum wage and the minimum wage, but those in the limited-service
sector respond only to the latter. The tipped minimum wage reduces em-
ployment in the full-service sector in three of the four sets of estimates,
the exception being that from the full sample when state-specific trends 
are included. The statistically significant elasticities lie in the interval 
[−0.102, −0.029]. They conclude that using QCEW data, their models 
indicate an elasticity of employment with respect to the tipped minimum
wage of less than 0.1 in the full-service sector. When they apply their
analysis to CPS data, they detect no effect of either the minimum wage or
of the tipped minimum wage to either group of workers.46 
A limitation of these four regression-based studies is that, despite 
the length of their data sets—64 quarters in Addison, Blackburn, and 
Cotti (2012), 66 quarters for Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), 88 quar-
ters for Even and Macpherson (2014), and 96 months for Singell and 
Terborg (2007), long enough to model the dynamics of employment us-
ing techniques common in time-series analysis—they neglect the time-
series nature of their data. The econometric model underlying their 
equations includes the explicit assumption that, but for the minimum 
wage (and random noise), the labor market is at equilibrium in every 
period. The location of that equilibrium responds to supply and demand 
factors, but wherever it is, the market always finds itself there (with the 
same proviso concerning the minimum wage). The substantial inertial 
component of employment means that this assumption is unlikely to 
be satisfied, but this need not interfere with estimation of the response 
of employment to the minimum wage if it is appropriately modeled. 
Including lagged employment terms among the regressors or, if neces-
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sary, removing unit roots should address the problem adequately. The 
reporting of standard errors and t-statistics based on clustering at the 
state level goes some way toward mitigating skepticism about statisti-
cal inference in three of these studies. This solution would not be ap-
propriate for the two-state data set of Singell and Terborg (2007), but 
they present no other solution and appear to be unaware of any possible 
problems. 
We have already encountered Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) 
in the section on youth, where they study whether recessions amplify 
the effect of the minimum wage on teenagers’ employment. They per-
form a similar analysis for the restaurant industry using county-level 
data from the QCEW, as well as state-level data from the CPS and the 
ACS, which they examine in their consideration of teenagers. In the 
basic model, which lacks the key variable, the interaction between the 
minimum wage and the unemployment rate, they do not detect any em-
ployment result either for the sector as a whole nor for its constituents, 
full-service restaurants, and limited-service restaurants.47 When they 
include the interaction term, the QCEW data provide clear evidence of 
a small effect in the sector as a whole. Once they look at the two sub-
sectors separately, it is clear that the effect is only in the limited-service 
sector. Although there appears to be a basic effect (one not dependent 
on recessions to amplify it) for the full-service sector in this specifica-
tion, a joint test that the minimum wage terms as a group do not belong 
in this equation is resoundingly not rejected. The CPS data tell a clearer 
story, providing no support for the hypothesis that recessions amplify 
the employment effect of the minimum wage. Addison, Blackburn, and 
Cotti conclude that even for the restaurant sector, recessions do not ap-
pear to amplify any negative employment effects of the minimum wage. 
Aaronson and French (2007) take an ingenious approach, con-
structing a model of the restaurant industry that includes both a labor 
market and an output market. They use this to determine whether the 
restaurant labor market is better described by the competitive or mon-
opsonistic model. Drawing on a variety of estimates for values of the 
model’s parameters, especially on the response of restaurant prices 
to minimum wage increases (Aaronson 2001; Aaronson, French, and 
MacDonald 2008), this analysis works back from the product market 
to the labor market in order to infer the implied response of employ-
ment to the minimum wage. Two key assumptions are that the price 
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and quantity of output vary inversely with each other, and the quantities 
of employment and output vary positively with each other. The logical 
consequence of these assumptions is that a rise in employment follow-
ing a minimum wage increase leads to a rise in output and a decline in 
prices. Because prices in fact rise, both output and employment must 
fall. In each market, they examine the implications of different degrees 
of deviation from perfect competition. After calculations based on a 
range of parameter values, they conclude that the elasticity for total 
employment in the industry is about −0.2, and about −0.3 for the em-
ployment of low-skilled labor. 
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) begin with a statistical anal-
ysis of the employment response to the three increases in the federal 
minimum wage of 2007–2009 using electronic payroll data for 81 fast 
food establishments in Alabama and Georgia, all in the same national 
chain and owned by three franchising corporations. Although their use 
of a wage gap variable rather than a treatment dummy allows them to 
avoid the problems that Donald and Lang (2007) had, the nonrandom
nature of their sample, similar in some regard to that of Neumark and 
Wascher (2000), leads to other problems of inference. However, this 
analysis is merely the stepping off point for a careful consideration of 
how establishments in this industry respond to the minimum wage, 
based on an extensive survey of managers and employees. The authors’
implicit position is that “the minimum wage increases raised operating 
costs, yet employment has not decreased to match. The restaurants must 
have adjusted in other ways. What are they?” The answer, according to 
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska, is higher prices, lower profit margins, 
reduced turnover, higher performance standards, and, in the short to 
medium term, wage compression. This study trades off generality and 
rigor for detail and the possibility of generating useful hypotheses for 
further work, something rarely seen in this literature. 
Beyond the hospitality sector: other low-wage sectors 
Table 2.6 shows nine analyses that examine the employment re-
sponse in various parts of the retail sector. Addison, Blackburn, and 
Cotti (2009) study several low-wage parts of the sector in an analysis 
that parallels their study of the restaurant industry (Addison, Blackburn, 
and Cotti 2012). Sabia (2009a) studies the whole retail sector using a 
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state-quarter panel. Orazem and Mattila (2002) report on a two-part 
analysis of the retail and nonprofessional service sectors in Iowa from 
1989 to 1992, the beginning of a period when the Iowa minimum wage 
exceeded the federal minimum wage. Giuliano (2013) analyzes very 
detailed data from a single company with more than 700 stores through-
out the United States. Finally, the pieces by Belman and Wolfson (2010) 
and Wolfson and Belman (2001, 2004) use current time-series tech-
niques to study employment in a collection of low-wage industries. 
Using quarterly, county-level data from the QCEW, Addison, 
Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) study the effect of the minimum wage on 
both earnings and employment in each of five low-wage retail sectors: 
1) food and beverage stores, 2) supermarkets and other grocery stores, 
3) convenience stores, 4) specialty food stores, and 5) beer, wine, and 
liquor stores. They consider a variety of specifications in order to exam-
ine the sensitivity of their results to their modeling choices. The most 
basic specification suggests that earnings respond to the minimum wage 
in only one industry (beer, wine, and liquor stores), and even here there 
is no indication of an employment response. Once they include county-
specific trends, they also detect earnings responses in convenience 
stores and in specialty food stores, and find positive employment re-
sponses in convenience stores and in beer, wine, and liquor stores; that 
is, in two of the three industries in which they detect a positive wage 
response, they also detect a positive employment response. A Haus-
man specification test strongly favors the model with county-specific 
trends in two of these industries (not beer, wine, and liquor stores), and 
its estimates are more precise than those of the basic model, without 
the trends. A conservative interpretation is that these results indicate 
positive wage responses in all three of the industries mentioned, a posi-
tive employment response in convenience stores, and no employment 
response in any of the remaining industries.48 
Sabia (2009a) constructs a state-month panel from CPS data to 
study the effect of the minimum wage on employment in the retail sec-
tor. As part of a robustness check, he presents a variety of estimates 
based on differences in the sample, estimation technique, way of mea-
suring the minimum wage, and model specification. The last involves 
whether to include a lagged minimum wage term, a correction for serial 
correlation, and/or state-specific trends (à la Dube, Lester, and Reich 
[2010]). The elasticities range from a statistically insignificant 0.07 at 
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Table 2.6  Other Low-Wage Sectors (U.S. Data) 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of Data
Study Effect sector period approach observation structure standard error seta 
Addison, Blackburn, None Low-wage 1990–2005 Regression County-quarter Panel Clustered (state) QCEW 
and Cotti (2009) retail food 
Belman and Wolfson None Low-wage 1972–2003 Regression Industry-month Multiple Conventional BLS-CES 
(2010) time series 
Giuliano (2013) Positive Retail 1996–1998 Regression Establishment- Longitudi- Huber-White Private + 
month nal Robust Census 
Orazem and Mattila Negative Retail, 1989–1992 Regression County-industry- Panel Conventional Various 
(2002) service not quarter 
professional 
Sabia (2009a) Negative Retail workers 1979–2004 Regression State-month Panel Clustered (state) CPS 
Wolfson and Belman None Low-wage 1961–1997 Regression Industry-month multiple Conventional BLS-CES 
(2001) industries time series 
Wolfson and Belman None Low-wage 1947–1997 Regression Industry-month multiple Conventional BLS-CES 
(2004) time series 
Potter (2006)b None All, some 2003–2005 Quasi experi- Firm-year Longitudi- Conventional ES-202 
low-wage ment (2x2) nal 
Dodson (2002)b Negative All jobs 1988–1995 Regression County-year Panel Robust REIS, 
Census 
NOTE: The column for Novelty does not appear because in this table it would largely echo the information in Target sector. 
a QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. BLS-CES = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Current Establishment Survey. REIS = 
Regional Economic Information System. 
b This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang 
(2007). 
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one end, when state-specific trends are included, to a statistically sig-
nificant −0.11 at the other. Most are right around −0.10, the low end of 
the previous consensus (for teenagers, not retail). He gently dismisses 
the positive point estimate on the grounds that “state trends may, in 
fact, be capturing retail employment variation that the model seeks to 
explain” (Sabia 2009a, p. 88). The question, then, is how to account 
for the type of regional factors that Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) and
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2010) show to be of great importance. 
Either trends or annual effects specific to each census division would 
go far to addressing this issue without raising his concerns (and an F-
test would indicate whether they belong in the regression). The neglect 
of time-series issues, already discussed with reference to studies of the 
restaurant and hotel industries, is also problematic in both Addison, 
Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) and this study. 
Iowa established its own minimum wage above the federal mini-
mum wage at the beginning of 1990, and it remained higher until late 
1996. Orazem and Mattila (2002) present two analyses for 1989–1992, 
one based on quarterly data for Iowa counties, the other on data for 
about 170,000 employees that they generated from their own survey of 
retail firms. Both analyses consider retail and nonprofessional services. 
For the county-level analysis, they detect no employment response af-
ter either one quarter or one year. In the second part of their analysis, 
Orazem and Mattila estimate a wage equation as a function of charac-
teristics of the employee, employer, and county of employment, which 
they then use to examine whether, in quarters immediately following 
increases, the minimum wage is higher than an employee’s wage would 
otherwise have been. With this information, they examine the conse-
quent compositional change in firms’ workforces, and consider, cui 
bono, who benefits and who suffers from the minimum wage. For those 
who would otherwise have earned less than the minimum wage, they 
report elasticities of their share in firms’ labor forces of between −0.03 
and −0.10. That is, if 50 percent of a firm’s labor force after a 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum wage consists of workers whose wages 
would otherwise have been less than the new minimum, then without 
the increase, such workers would have instead made up between 50.15 
percent and 50.5 percent of the labor force. 
In what is essentially a statistically oriented case study, Giuliano 
(2013) examines a single retail company that provided 30 months of 
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sales and personnel records (February 1996–July 1998) and descrip-
tive information for each of its more than 700 stores located through-
out the United States. The data are sufficiently rich that she is able 
to verify compliance with the law both before and after the increases 
that she studies—those of the federal minimum wage in 1996 and 
1997. Combining these data with information from the 1990 census, 
she identifies whether each employee lived in a high- or low-income 
zip code and then examines some of the same compositional conse-
quences of the minimum wage as Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels
(2011). 
Using the wage gap to measure the sensitivity of each establishment 
to the minimum wage, Giuliano (2013) compares the first and last six 
months of her sample, two periods that bracket the minimum wage in-
creases. The effect of the increases on wages is very clear. Although the 
mean effect on overall employment is negative, the variance is high— 
enough so that one would be (or should be) unwilling to accept a bet at 
odds of 95 to 5 that for a store selected at random from this sample, the 
employment response is negative (but one should accept the same bet 
that the effect is positive for the share of teenagers in that store’s labor 
force).49 The flip side of these employment results is a decline in adult 
employment.50 An in-depth examination shows that the employment 
share of teenagers from zip codes of all income levels rises, but only 
the increase of those who live in affluent zip codes is worth betting on. 
To make sense of her results, Giuliano (2013) begins by distinguish-
ing between models of dynamic monopsony (Burdett and Mortensen 
1998) and monopsonistic competition (Bhaskar and To 1999) on the 
one hand, and models of search (Flinn 2006) and of adverse selection 
(Akerlof 1970; Drazen 1986) on the other. Models of either type can 
rationalize the rise in teenage employment. That the share of teenagers 
in new hires rose following the minimum wage increase suggests the 
greater appropriateness, she believes, of the second sort of model, with 
its emphasis on induced changes to labor supply. The second group of 
models gains further support from another result: teenagers from afflu-
ent zip codes, who likely had higher opportunity cost of employment, 
increased their share of both teenager hiring and employment. This sug-
gests an increase in their labor force participation at the same time that 
other teens experienced no decline in their share of either overall hiring 
or employment. 
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Wolfson and Belman’s three articles (2001, 2004; Belman and 
Wolfson 2010) all study a variety of low-wage industries in the United 
States, applying techniques of time-series analysis to national monthly 
employment data. In each case, out of concern that the set of industries 
is too broad and may include some that are not sensitive to the mini-
mum wage, the first step is to identify industries that exhibit a wage re-
sponse to the minimum wage. 
Using monthly data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics,
Wolfson and Belman (2001) take Milton Friedman’s methodology of 
positive economics to heart by examining whether including informa-
tion about minimum wage increases in forecasting equations reduces 
the forecast error. Looking separately at each increase in the federal 
minimum wage between 1961 and 1996, and at data for as many as 33 
industries, they find that even in situations where the minimum wage 
improves wage forecasts, it leads to an improvement in the employment 
forecast only half as often as not. They conclude that any link between 
low-wage employment and the minimum wage as historically experi-
enced is tenuous. 
Wolfson and Belman (2004) and Belman and Wolfson (2010) are 
more conventional statistical analyses of the same data that pay careful 
attention to the time-series properties of the data. Examining the impact 
of the federal minimum wage on 23 low-wage industries between the 
mid-1970s and early 2003, they detect a wage response in 17 of the in-
dustries, but an employment response to increases in only 6, 1 of which 
is positive: and an employment response to declines in the real value 
of the minimum wage in only 7, 2 of which are negative. A simulation 
of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage shows that the wage re-
sponse is complete by 24 months, and that no trace of any employment 
is detectable in the four years following the increase. 
Direct estimates of the restaurant sector with reliable standard er-
rors do not indicate that minimum wage increases lead to a decline in 
employment that is different from zero, certainly not substantively dif-
ferent and typically not significantly different statistically. Indirect es-
timates that work back from the behavior of restaurant prices imply a 
demand elasticity for low-skilled labor of −0.3 (Aaronson and French 
2007). While the former should be more reliable, a question remains 
until these differences can be explained. Studies of other sectors give 
results that are all over the map. Paying careful attention to the time-
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series dynamics that confound many studies of this topic, Belman and 
Wolfson (2010) and Wolfson and Belman (2001, 2004) analyze sev-
eral low-wage industries and find no systematic employment response. 
Unfortunately, the nature of their data permits them to study only the 
federal minimum wage, not any of the state minimum wages that are 
important in the later part of the period that they study. Studies of a 
single state, like Orazem and Mattila’s (2002), are even more vulner-
able to the common criticism of Card and Krueger’s (1994) study that it 
was excessively narrow in space and time, focusing on a single episode. 
Sabia (2009a) also reports a negative employment response but does 
not address issues of either regional heterogeneity or time-series dy-
namics. Giuliano’s (2013) analysis is ingenious, and the results are both 
very interesting and strongly suggestive, but in the end it remains a case 
study and it is not obvious that these results hold generally. Finally, in 
their examination of low-wage retail sectors, Addison, Blackburn, and 
Cotti (2009) do not find a negative employment response, but this may 
reflect inadequate treatment of dynamics. 
OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
More than a few studies of the minimum wage and employment that 
use data from developed countries other than the United States have ap-
peared in English during this period. Two differences from studies of 
American data most stand out. One is the much heavier reliance on 
individual-level data, especially longitudinal data (rather than repeated 
cross sections). The other is the frequency with which the focus is on 
bound workers, that is, workers who were employed and earning less 
ex ante than the ex post minimum wage, rather than all members of a 
demographic group or the number of jobs in an industry. 
Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) use 
longitudinal Canadian data to explore the sensitivity of results in quasi 
experiments to the definitions of both the comparison group and the 
policy variable.51 Although both report standard errors that are al-
most certainly biased downward (Moulton 1990), the methodological 
points that they examine are important. Stewart (2002, 2004a) analyzes 
the employment response of bound workers to the imposition of the 
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National Minimum Wage (NMW) in the United Kingdom, after sev-
eral years with no minimum wage, and Stewart (2004b) repeats part 
of the latter study for the first two subsequent increases in the NMW. 
Mulheirn (2008) continues this with a look at the effect of the 2006 
increase. Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) study the 
entire period of the NMW, 1999–2007, using an approach similar to 
Stewart’s (2002). Pereira (2003) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006) ex-
amine very detailed data that the Portuguese tax agency collects on ev-
ery firm in the country to assess the response of employment to the large 
minimum wage increases in the late 1980s. Pinoli (2010) uses Spanish 
data to study an implication of the rational expectations hypothesis, that 
the timing of the employment response may depend on whether a mini-
mum wage increase is anticipated or not. Using quarterly time-series 
data from several Australian states, Lee and Suardi (2011) test employ-
ment equations for parameter instability if minimum wage increases 
are not explicitly modeled, something that would be expected if the 
minimum wage were relevant for employment. Hyslop and Stillman’s 
(2007) analysis of New Zealand’s minimum wage increases early in 
the new millennium is the closest approach to the canonical framework 
of Neumark and Wascher among this group. Pacheco’s (2011) study 
of New Zealand over a longer period adds an ingenuous twist in an 
attempt to focus more carefully on those whom the minimum wage 
directly affects.52 
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) consider a variety of costs that 
French employers incur, including the minimum wage, in their study 
of the employment of low-wage workers. Laroque and Salanie (2002) 
consider a variety of social welfare policies in France, including the 
minimum wage, in their study of employment of married women. For 
Machin and Wilson (2004) and Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003), 
the UK care home industry (similar to the U.S. nursing home industry) 
plays much the same role as the restaurant industry does in analyses of 
U.S. minimum wage policy, a very low-wage industry where employ-
ment should respond to the minimum wage if employment does in any 
industry. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) is an ambitious examina-
tion of the NMW throughout the entire United Kingdom economy that 
ultimately founders on the inadequacy of the data to the task.53 
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Young Workers 
Table 2.7 lists 15 analyses of data from countries other than the 
United States to examine the response of youth employment to the min-
imum wage.54 Although both Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and 
Gunderson (2005a) fall prey to problems with standard errors discussed 
earlier in the chapter (and for this reason appear in the lower part of the 
table), they both raise and address other issues of interest, and the latter 
piece makes itself part of a careful and thoughtful discussion between 
the two. It is therefore worthwhile to start here. 
Canada 
Using 12 quarters of data on each of 9,000 Canadian youth aged 
16–24 at the beginning of the sample, Yuen (2003) shows that the def-
inition of the comparison group can greatly influence the perception 
of the employment response to the minimum wage. After defining his 
treatment group as those who were employed in a province in the quar-
ter before a provincial minimum wage increase and were earning less 
than the ex post minimum wage, he considers two different comparison 
groups. One of the groups, which he describes as similar to those used 
in much prior work, includes all those who are not in the treatment 
group but are employed at the same time as members of the treatment 
group. This comparison group consists of two sets of employed individ-
uals: 1) those in a province-quarter cell that does not include members 
of the treatment group (because the province quarter did not experience 
a minimum wage increase), and 2) those in province-quarter cells that 
did experience a minimum wage increase but whose wage is too high 
for them to be in the treatment group. The other comparison group is 
smaller and includes only low-wage workers who are contemporane-
ously employed in other provinces, where low-wage means a wage no 
more than Can$0.25 above the minimum wage in their own province.55 
Using an at-risk dummy to identify members of the treatment group, 
he reports an estimated effect that is negative and statistically signifi-
cant with the larger comparison group, similar to that in prior work, but 
negative and not statistically significant with the smaller comparison 
group of similarly paid workers. En route to the smaller comparison 
group, he presents another result using the larger, conventional com-
    
 
 
80 Table 2.7  Youth (Other Developed Countries) 
Effect Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data Data
Study novelty Novelty groupa Country period approach observation structure Type of SE setb 
Hyslop and Mixed New Zealand Teenagers New 1997– Quasi Individual- Repeated Clustered HLFS 
Stillman Zealand 2003 experiment year cross sec- (age-
(2007) tion quarter) 
Lee and Suardi None Structural Teenagers Australia 1992– Regression State- Time Conven- LFS 
(2011) breaks in time 2008 quarter series tional 
series 
Pacheco Negative Identify, focus Minimum New 1986– Regression Individual- Repeated Conven- HLFS 
(2011) on minimum 
wage youth, 
wage 
youth 
Zealand 2004 quarter cross 
section 
tional 
IS 
aged 16–29 
Pereira (2003) Negative Portugal Teenage Portugal 1986– Quasi Firm-year Longitu- Conven- QP 
workers 1989 experiment dinal tional 
Pinoli (2010) Mixed Rational Youth Spain 2004, Quasi Individual- Longitu- Conven- EPAS 
expectations 2006 experiment quarter dinal tional 
Portugal and Positive Response to Teenage Portugal 1986– Regression Firm- Longitu- Conven- QP 
Cardoso Pereira (2003) workers 1989 worker-year dinal tional 
(2006) 
Stewart (2002) None The United Bound United 1998– Regression Local area- Panel Clustered LFS, 
Kingdom’s youth Kingdom 1999 year (region) NES 
NMW 
Stewart None The United Bound United Various Quasi Individual- Longitu- Conven- LFS, 
(2004a) Kingdom’s youth Kingdom experiment year dinal tional BHPS, 
NMW NES 
Stewart None The United Bound United 1999– Quasi Individual- Longitu- Robust LFS 
(2004b) Kingdom’s youth Kingdom 2002 experiment year dinal 
NMW 
 
 
 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Böckerman and Mixed Changes Youth in Finland 1991– Quasi Firm year Longitu- Conven- Payroll 
Uusitalo in youth retail 1996 experiment dinal tional records 
(2009)c subminimum 
Campolieti, Negative Response to Bound Canada 1993– Quasi Individual- Longitu- White robust SLID 
Fang, and Yuen (2003) youth 1999 experiment year dinal and clustered 
Gunderson (individual) 
(2005a)c 
Campolieti, Negative N&W 1990s Teenagers Canada 1993– Regression Individual- Longitu- Conven- SLID 
Fang, and study using 1999 year dinal tional 
Gunderson Canadian data 
(2005b)c 
Neumark and Negative Cross-national Youth 17 OECD 1975– Regression Country- Panel Conven- OECD 
Wascher analysis countries 2000 year tional, 
(2004)c GMM 
Shannon None/ Abolishing Aged Canada 1976– Quasi Individual- Repeated Conven- LFS 
(2011)c negative youth 15–16 2003 experiment year cross tional 
subminimums section 
Yuen (2003)c Mixed Importance of Bound Canada 1988– Quasi Individual- Longitu- Conven- LMAS 
comparison youth 1990 experiment quarter dinal tional 
group definition 
aTeenagers refers to those aged 16–19 in Canada, 17–19 in Portugal, and 15–19 in Australia. Young adults refers to those aged 20–24. Youth refers to 
18–21-year-olds in the United Kingdom, teenagers and young adults in Canada, workers younger than 25 years in Finland, individuals aged 16–24 in 
Spain, and 16–29 in New Zealand. In Neumark and Wascher’s (2004) cross-country analysis, the definitions vary from country to country, “but generally 
cover some subset of workers between the ages of 15 and 24” (Neumark and Wascher 2004, Note 1, p. 225). 
bHLFS = (New Zealand) Household Labor Force Survey (quarterly CPS counterpart). LFS = Labor Force Survey. IS = (New Zealand) Income Survey. QP
= (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Records, Portuguese Ministry of Qualification and Employment). NES = (United Kingdom) New Earnings 
Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. EPAS = (Spain) Economically Active Population Survey (quarterly household survey). LMAS = (Ca-
nadian) Labour Market Activity Survey. SLID = (Canadian) Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. Finland’s payroll records come from the Finnish 
employers’ association. 
c This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang (2007) or have other 
data problems. 
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parison group to motivate the switch to the smaller one. For the at-risk 
dummy he substitutes a low-wage dummy that identifies not only those 
in the treatment group but also those in both of the comparison groups 
described above. For both teens and young adults, the estimate for the 
coefficient on the low-wage dummy is negative (though smaller than 
that of the at-risk dummy in the initial regression) and statistically sig-
nificant; low-wage workers have a lower probability of continued em-
ployment whether or not they are subject to a minimum wage increase. 
This is likely part of what the at-risk dummy measures when the sample 
contains the larger comparison group.56 
Analyzing seven years of annual data from the successor to the sur-
vey that Yuen (2003) uses, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) 
begin by replicating Yuen’s results. They next introduce nine interme-
diate comparison groups defined by steps in the wage ceiling that start 
from the ceiling of Yuen’s original narrow comparison group and cul-
minate in his original broad comparison group. Starting from the nar-
row one with the lowest wage ceiling, as the ceiling rises, so too do both 
the point estimate and t-statistic of the employment effect. Both soon 
stabilize within a narrow range about half way through the set of com-
parison groups. The t-statistic (apparently) indicates statistical signifi-
cance of the point estimate. While of interest, this supports rather than 
contradicts Yuen’s emphasis on the definition of the comparison group. 
To capture the intuition that the likelihood of being laid off rises 
with the difference between the ex post minimum wage and the ex ante 
wage, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson’s (2005a) next step is to re-
place the at-risk dummy with a more sensitive measure: the wage gap. 
For individuals in the comparison group, this is zero; for individuals in 
the treatment group, it is the difference between the ex post minimum 
wage and the individual’s ex ante wage. With even with the narrowest 
definition of the comparison group, the specification with the wage gap 
indicates that minimum wage increases reduce the probability of con-
tinued employment, and the size of the employment response is in the 
middle of the range at which it stabilizes when using the at-risk dummy. 
The point estimates remain statistically significant for all broader defi-
nitions of the comparison group. For the broader half of groups, the 
response is about 15 percent larger than for the narrowest one. 
Finally, allowing that the wage gap variable may be picking up 
some purely low-wage effects, they introduce the wage gap variant 
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model. Their approach is problematic; understanding why requires a 
detailed explanation. Their narrowest comparison group is composed 
of individuals who satisfy two conditions. First, they were employed in 
a year after which there was no minimum wage increase in their own 
province but there was in at least one other province. Second, they were 
earning at least the minimum wage in their own province and less than 
that minimum wage plus Can$0.25. The next larger comparison group 
has a $0.50 ceiling instead of a $0.25 ceiling, and so on up to a ceiling 
of $1, then increments of $0.50 rather than $0.25, up to $4 more than 
the minimum wage. For the wage-gap variant model, they introduce 
a new variable (let us call it the low-wage worker variable) to capture 
the effect of all purely low-wage effects on the probability of continued 
employment. For those in the treatment group, the low-wage worker 
variable equals the wage gap. For those who are in the same province 
or provinces as members of the treatment group, but whose wage puts 
them in the comparison group, it is zero. Finally, for members of the 
comparison group who are not in the same provinces as members of the 
treatment group, it is a quasi-wage gap using the ceiling that defines the 
comparison group rather than the minimum wage; it equals the differ-
ence between that ceiling and the individual’s ex ante wage. 
This definition of the low-wage worker variable is sensitive not 
only to the wage ceiling that defines the comparison group but also to 
which group (i.e., province) a worker is in. It would work well if all 
minimum wage increases were roughly the same size. Most of the year-
over-year increases that Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) con-
sider are no more than $0.25. However, several are larger, with the larg-
est being $1.00. Based on this, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson argue 
that a ceiling of $0.25 is too restrictive and prefer one of $0.50, $0.75, 
or $1.00. Consider the situation where the treatment group is defined 
by a $0.25 increase in the minimum wage, and the comparison group is 
defined by a $0.75 wage ceiling. The low-wage worker variable treats 
the following two individuals equivalently: a member of the treatment 
group who had been earning the ex ante minimum wage plus $0.20, 
$0.05 less than the ex post minimum, and a member of the comparison 
group in another province who had been earning $0.70 more than that 
province’s minimum wage, $0.05 less than the wage ceiling used to de-
fine the comparison group. If distinct traits common to low-wage work-
ers do exist, the low-wage worker variable is likely to conflate two (or 
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more) types of worker when the comparison group has a ceiling higher 
than the ex ante minimum wage of the treatment group. 
The results presented suggest that this is indeed happening. When 
the wage-gap variant model is estimated with the narrow comparison 
group, the estimated minimum wage effect is small and not statistically 
significant. As ever broader definitions of the comparison group (and 
of the low-wage worker variable) are used, the estimated size of the 
effect grows almost monotonically until it peaks at the second-most 
broad comparison group (each is statistically significant except when 
the narrowest definition is used). Furthermore, except when using the 
narrowest comparison group, the estimated employment effect of the 
minimum wage from this model is almost as large or larger than the 
estimate from the simple wage-gap model, typically exceeding it by 
20–30 percent. This is the opposite of what would be expected if, ab-
sent the low-wage worker variable, the wage gap alone were reflect-
ing low-wage worker traits. It suggests that the low-wage worker vari-
able is assigning to members of the treatment group traits that belong 
to higher-paid workers, and that the estimated effect of the minimum 
wage increase is having to grow to offset this. 
Neither of these analyses corrects for the source of bias in the 
standard errors that Moulton (1990) identified, undercutting both their 
methodological and substantive results. It is nevertheless worth list-
ing the former, keeping in mind what might have been. Yuen (2003) 
demonstrates the sensitivity of results to the choice of the comparison 
group. Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) show with their wage-
gap model that the use of a more sensitive measure of the treatment 
can offset these problems. Finally, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson’s 
(2005a) attempt to control for low-wage characteristics is ingenious but 
is not successful and causes more problems than it solves. Alternative 
approaches that might well better address the situation include using a 
variable that identifies the provincial wage quantile in which an individ-
ual is located, or performing a difference-in-differences-in-differences 
analysis to control for unsatisfactory fit between treatment and com-
parison groups, à la Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012). It would 
be worth revisiting these issues while simultaneously addressing the 
Moulton problem and, depending on the data used, any other statistical 
issues, for example, serial correlation. 
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The United Kingdom 
Starting early in the twentieth century, the United Kingdom had 
a system of administratively set minimum wages that differed by in-
dustry.57 The Conservative government weakened the system in 1986, 
effectively making minimum wage law one of the issues separating the 
Labour and Conservative parties in the 1992 election. The Conserva-
tives won and abolished the minimum wage altogether in 1993. This 
situation was replayed in 1997, when Labour won and established a 
NMW of £3.60 per hour starting in April 1999. The level has increased 
several times since then. 
As part of his study of the NMW, Stewart (2002, 2004a) looks 
specifically at the employment effect on bound workers, aged 18–21. 
Although the NMW imposed a uniform minimum wage in the United 
Kingdom, local wage distributions varied considerably across the coun-
try just prior to it, especially in the location of the bottom of the distri-
bution relative to the NMW. Across the 140 administrative regions of 
the United Kingdom, the percentage of bound workers varied between 
1 and 12 percent. After confirming that establishment of the NMW 
raised wages of young bound workers, Stewart (2002) presents a vari-
ety of results on employment effects, using regional variation in percent 
of bound workers to measure vulnerability to the NMW.58 Looking at a 
variety of data sources and specifications (e.g., employment ratio, prob-
ability of continued employment), he reports both positive and negative 
employment effects for bound youth, none statistically significant. In 
the later article, Stewart (2004a) examines the same episode with data 
from three different surveys, each with its own relative strengths and 
weaknesses. The New Earnings Survey (NES) collects data from the 
electronic payroll records of 1 percent of all employees every April, 
leading to great confidence in its accuracy. Although quite large, the 
breadth of information it collects leaves something to be desired, as 
does its coverage of very low-paid workers, many of whom are women 
working part time. The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a 
considerably smaller survey that collects more detailed information on 
individuals over many years. Finally, the Labour Force Survey, which 
follows individuals for five consecutive quarters, is smaller than the 
NES but has better coverage of low-paid workers and is larger than the 
BHPS but has less detail. 
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Stewart (2004a) focuses on the probability of continued employ-
ment of young men and women who previously had been earning less 
than the £3 hourly wage set as the youth minimum wage (the adult 
minimum wage was set to £3.60 per hour). In addition to the different 
surveys, he also tries different approaches, including both difference-
in-differences using a comparison group of slightly higher paid work-
ers, and regression analysis where the minimum wage measure is the 
wage gap. He reports effects for young men that are positive but nearly 
all are not statistically significant, and for young women that are gener-
ally positive and never statistically significant. 
Stewart (2004b) extends the analysis of Stewart (2004a) using the 
Labour Force Survey to examine the effects of the increase in 2000. 
The study is fairly elaborate, using pseudo-treatment and pseudo-
comparison groups to correct for the comparison group’s being a less 
than ideal match for the treatment group; this requires finding two ad-
ditional groups that respond similarly to the NMW but whose differ-
ences otherwise parallel those of the original treatment and compari-
son groups. That is, the pseudo groups are otherwise equally less than 
ideal matches as the original groups. Then the difference between the 
pseudo-treatment and pseudo-comparison group can be subtracted from 
the difference between the actual treatment and comparison group, thus 
correcting for the original mismatch. Because the pseudo-groups re-
spond similarly to the minimum wage (presumably, not at all), this en-
tire operation will not mask the estimated minimum wage effect based 
on the original groups. The results resemble those of the two other stud-
ies (Stewart 2002, 2004a): mostly positive point estimates for young 
workers and for adult men, slightly more negative than positive ones for 
adult women, and none at all that are statistically significant. 
Portugal and Spain 
Pereira (2003) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006) study the increase 
in the teenage minimum wage due to repeal of the subminimum wage 
for teenagers in Portugal at the beginning of 1987. This led to an over-
night increase of 50 percent in the effective minimum wage for teen-
agers, and a year-over-year real increase of more than one-third. The 
dependent variable in both studies is the teenage share of firms’ labor 
forces. Both analyses rely on detailed employment data that the govern-
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ment requires firms to report each March. Because the change in policy 
was first broached in August 1986, data from March 1986 should be 
free of any taint if used as the ex ante period for a quasi experiment. 
Pereira (2003) asks, “On average, did Portuguese firms change the 
age structure of their workforce in response to the increase in the rela-
tive cost of young workers?” She answers the question using a sample 
of 30 percent of the firms in the data set. Her treatment group is 18-
and 19-year-olds, and her primary comparison group is young adults, 
20–24-year-olds. Recognizing that older workers are not the best com-
parison group for teenagers, she performs a difference-in-difference-
in-differences analysis, using much older workers, 30–34 years old, as 
controls on the controls. Pereira finds that the answer to her question 
is affirmative: employment shares of both teenagers and young adults 
grew, but growth in the share of young adult employment was much 
larger, and statistically significant, while employment growth of teenag-
ers was not statistically significant. 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) begin with the same data set but con-
struct their sample differently because 
The overall employment trends reported for teenagers in the af-
fected age group—both by the Ministry of Labor, covering the 
population of firms employing wage earners in the private sector, 
and by the National Statistical Office, in its Labor Force Survey— 
are at odds with the ones offered in the study by Pereira. . . . Her 
data set is a nonrandom sample from the Ministry of Labor data; 
this sample is not representative of the population of firms (that 
we use) and, in particular, is severely biased with respect to the 
actual trend in employment for the affected group of workers. (pp. 
994–995) 
They also ask different questions, examining differences in gross 
employment flows of teenagers and adults less than 35, rather than in 
the net change of each group’s employment. 
To understand gross flows into and out of employment, it is neces-
sary to consider each of the following three categories separately: 
1) Entry: new firms that only came into being in the period after 
the minimum wage rose. 
2) Exit: previously existing firms that disappeared in the period 
after the minimum wage rose. 
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3) Survival: previously existing firms that continued following the 
increase. 
Entering firms contribute only to gains in employment and exiting 
ones only to losses, while surviving firms contribute to both gains and 
losses. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) note three responses to the rise in 
the minimum wage for teenagers that separately and together contrib-
uted to a decrease in the employment share of teenagers. First, new 
firms, those that came into existence following the increase, had lower 
shares of teen employees than did new firms before the increase. Sec-
ond, firms that went out of existence following the increase had larger 
shares of teen employees than did exiting firms before the increase. 
Third, at continuing (or surviving) firms, the teen share of hiring de-
clined. However, outweighing all these effects put together was a sharp 
decline in the teen share of separations at continuing firms. As a result, 
teen employment rose both absolutely and relative to adults. That is, 
when the minimum wage increased, those teenagers who were already 
employed hung onto their jobs so tenaciously (or perhaps the firms 
hung onto these employees so tenaciously, or both) as to outweigh the 
other consequences of the minimum wage increases. Among the several 
reasons that Portugal and Cardoso offer for the sharp decline in separa-
tions of teens is the possibility that having hired and trained them, firms 
were reluctant to lay them off because they were at least as productive 
as older workers who would have to be hired, trained, and paid as much. 
They also offer several caveats that limit how much these results can 
reasonably be generalized. 
Pinoli’s (2010) central insight is that those studying the minimum 
wage may be missing its impact because they are looking in the wrong 
place or, rather, at the wrong time. Many minimum wage changes are 
anticipated well in advance, and cost-minimizing firms may well begin 
preparing for them in advance, likely by not replacing employees fol-
lowing separations. Most studies look for the consequences only after 
the increase in the minimum wage, by which time much of the response 
will have already occurred. She uses the search model of Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) to place this idea on a firm theoretical footing 
and then turns to the data to distinguish anticipated from unanticipated 
increases in the minimum wage. Anticipated increases are either an-
nounced well in advance or occur on a regular schedule, while unan-
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ticipated ones satisfy neither of these conditions. The minimum wage 
increase in New Jersey that Card and Krueger (1994) studied, which 
was widely expected about two years before it went into effect, was an 
anticipated increase. So too were the Spanish minimum wage increases 
that went into effect on the first day of each year between 1997 and 
2004. The Spanish minimum wage increase of mid-2004 was an unan-
ticipated increase; it was passed and implemented by a government that 
unexpectedly won an election in March 2004, three days after a major 
terrorist action in Madrid. 
Using individual-level (quarterly) data, Pinoli’s (2010) dependent 
variable is employment status. Her central variables are the percentage 
increase in the minimum wage interacted with dummy variables that 
identify whether the increase is anticipated or unanticipated; the equa-
tion also includes both leads and lags of these variables and control 
variables. She sets up the analysis as a quasi experiment, using various 
demographic groups aged 16–24 in the role of the treatment group, and 
various parts of the adult population aged 25 years and older in the role 
of the comparison group. For all young workers, the unanticipated in-
crease had an effect only following the increase, while the anticipated 
one had an equally large effect only in the period before the increase. 
For young women, the estimates are inconclusive, and for low-educated 
young women, both increases had an effect only following the increase. 
The section late in this chapter on the timing of effects discusses this 
issue further. 
Australia and New Zealand 
At first glance, the approach that Lee and Suardi (2011) take in 
their study of the Australian minimum wage resembles those of both 
the older literature and the aggregate state-year panel framework that 
Neumark and Wascher introduced to this literature, with controls for 
supply and demand factors in the labor market. The important way in 
which Lee and Suardi’s approach differs is that they do not include 
a minimum wage term in their equation, examining instead whether 
point estimates of other coefficients in the equation change coincident 
with increases in the minimum wage. In April 1997, a federal govern-
ment agency in Australia established a minimum wage that was legally 
(though not necessarily economically) binding on all or nearly all em-
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ployees in three states. Lee and Suardi analyze teen employment from 
each state as a separate time series. In no states does the minimum wage 
affect employment or, rather, as they say, employment dynamics (since 
the nature of the data requires that they consider employment growth 
rather than employment itself). They engage in some careful sensitiv-
ity analysis to ensure that their statistical test is reasonably able to find 
no effect when there is none and to detect one when one indeed ex-
ists.59 How well their results generalize is not clear, not only because 
the institutional structure of the minimum wage they study is unusually 
complicated but also because wages well above the minimum wage are 
pegged to the minimum, rising along with it. As a result, firms are less 
likely to substitute higher paid, more-skilled workers for lower-paid, 
less-skilled ones, than in countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada, where the minimum wage directly affects only 
low-paid workers. 
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) perform a difference-in-differences 
analysis of the minimum wage response of teenage employment 
in New Zealand.60 Following an election in late 1999, the new gov-
ernment made large changes in the youth subminimum wage. Start-
ing in March 2001 and continuing through March 2003, in steps well 
announced in advance, the minimum wage was increased by 87 per-
cent between 2000 and 2003 for 18–19-year-olds and by 49 percent 
for 16–17-year-olds. Over the same interval, that for older adults in-
creased only 13 percent. In their analysis, the two treatment groups 
are 16–17-year-olds and 18–19-year-olds, and their main comparison 
group is 20–25-year-olds, though they also look at 20–21-year-olds. 
They compare employment in the five quarters following the last of 
these increases (2002Q2–2003Q3) with the last five quarters before the 
election in 1999 (1998Q2–1999Q3). Relative to the main comparison 
group of 20–25-year-olds, employment increased by a statistically in-
significant amount following the policy reform. 
Pacheco (2011) proposes a solution for a widely perceived issue in 
the minimum wage literature. Although the minimum wage may reduce 
the employment of teenagers as a whole more than that of any other 
easily identified group, defining the treatment group to be all teenagers 
may nevertheless result in estimates of the effect that are so imprecise as 
to be statistically insignificant not because there is no effect but because 
many teenagers may not be so affected (recall the compositional effects 
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that Flinn [2006]; Ahn, Arcidiaco, and Wessels [2011]; and Giuliano 
[2013] report). Relying on the same primary data source as Hyslop and 
Stillman (2007), Pacheco (2011) combines it with an annual supple-
ment to identify those aged 16–29 most likely to be earning at or near 
the minimum wage and to weight the effect of the minimum wage on 
an individual accordingly. This leads not only to a much larger (nega-
tive) estimate of the employment effect in comparison to the estimate 
from a regression without the weights but also one that is statistically 
significant; however, the employment elasticity when considering all 
teenagers only changes from −0.045 to −0.089.61 
Pacheco’s (2011) approach is ingenious but problematic, so it is 
worth considering it in some detail. Rather than consider a few in-
creases in the minimum wage around the turn of the century, as Hyslop 
and Stillman (2007) do, Pacheco (2011) uses data from the beginning of 
the Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS) in the period 1986–2004. It 
contains a wealth of demographic detail but little or nothing with which 
to identify an earned wage level. For that, Pacheco turns to the Income 
Survey, an annual supplement begun in 1997 that collects information 
on pretax income from a variety of sources for individuals in the HLFS. 
For the years 1997–2004, Pacheco (2011) uses the Income Survey to 
create a dummy variable equal to 1 “if the individual is deemed to be af-
fected by increases in the minimum wage. This is the case if they are ei-
ther a sub–minimum or a minimum wage worker” (p. 596). The dummy 
variable is the dependent variable in a probit equation that otherwise 
resembles a wage equation conditional on employment, and the esti-
mated equation is used to generate fitted values for all observations in 
the bigger HLFS sample, for all years and whether or not the individual 
is then employed. The fitted values are the weights used to mediate the 
effect of the minimum wage on the probability of employment in the 
estimated employment equation. To distinguish these two probit equa-
tions, we will designate the first as the minimum wage worker equation 
and the second as the employment equation. 
Pacheco (2011) alludes to two problems with her technique. The 
first is the classic problem of sample selection bias, often referred to as 
the Heckman problem. She writes, 
Assuming no sample selection bias (i.e., that nonworkers and 
workers with the same Xi characteristics face the same probability 
of working at the minimum wage), the coefficients from Equation 
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(2) are used to create a probability of the individual earning the 
minimum wage for all individuals in the 1986–2004 HLFS data 
set (i.e., no longer restricting analysis to only those employed).
(p. 597) 
If they have done nothing else, years of research in labor economics 
have demonstrated the existence of systematic differences in the ex-
pected wages of those not employed and the actual wages of otherwise 
observationally equivalent individuals who are employed. Turning the 
wage equation into a binary variable does not persuasively get around 
this issue. At the very least, test results for sample selection bias would 
be helpful. This problem raises serious questions about the usefulness 
of the calculated weights.62 
The second issue concerns identification of the probability mea-
sure. Pacheco (2011) uses the same demographic variables in both pro-
bit equations, the one used to calculate the probability of being affected 
by the minimum wage and the one estimating the employment effect. 
About this she writes, 
One potential issue with the use of this adjusted policy variable is 
collinearity, because of the similar nature of the variables used to 
construct P^ it and those used as explanatory variables along with 
P^ it in Equation (4). However, this issue is minimised ln RMWi,t − k ^ by the method of constructing Pit , in that the specified characteris-
tics it depends on enter Equation (3) in a nonlinear and multiplica-
tive fashion, and therefore does not result in perfect collinearity in 
Equation (4). (p. 598) 
That there are no variables in the minimum wage worker equation that 
are excluded from the employment equation raises serious issues of 
identification. In his survey of sample selection bias, Vella (1998) dis-
cusses this issue, concluding that “these two-step procedures should 
be treated cautiously when the models are not identified through ex-
clusion restrictions” (p. 135). It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
without any exclusion restrictions, Pacheco’s (2011) approach is not a 
new way of measuring the effect of the minimum wage that allows it 
to vary across individuals but an employment equation that includes in-
teractions between the minimum wage and all the demographic dummy 
variables. 
In Canada, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) detected a 
negative net employment response of young workers to the minimum 
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wage. The studies of the NMW in the United Kingdom find no effect on 
youth employment, and the more reliable of the studies of Portugal re-
ports a net positive effect on employment because previously employed 
teenagers are much more likely to continue in their current employment 
when the minimum wage rises. Pinoli’s (2010) analysis of anticipated 
and unanticipated increases in Spain finds negative effects where she 
expected to when looking at all young workers but was not able to de-
tect any for either young women or for young women with little educa-
tion. The two studies of data from Down Under also found no effects on 
the employment of young workers. That is, except for Pinoli (2010), to 
which we will return in the final section of this chapter, and Campolieti, 
Fang, and Gunderson (2005a), these studies do not contain evidence of 
a negative effect on the employment of the young. Recent work from 
both the United States and from other countries are similar in providing 
no clear consensus about the employment response of youth workers, 
but the trend, certainly in the United States, as various statistical issues 
are recognized and addressed, seems to be fewer and fewer reports of 
statistically significant negative employment responses. 
Other Low-Wage Workers 
Table 2.8 displays information about nine studies of the employ-
ment response of other low-wage groups to the minimum wage in coun-
tries other than the United States (although the multinational data set of 
Addison and Ozturk [2012] includes U.S. data). 
Canada 
Fang and Gunderson (2009) use the same data and approach as 
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) to study the employment re-
sponse of older workers (those at least 50 years old) whose ex ante wage 
was less than the ex post minimum wage. Because of the close similari-
ties, it is not necessary to repeat a description of their framework. Un-
like the earlier piece, they report standard errors clustered by province, 
although with only seven years of data, it is not certain that this correc-
tion is necessary, and with exactly 10 provinces, there is some reason 
for doubting its effectiveness.63 Fang and Gunderson report nearly four 
dozen probit estimates based on three different specifications and many 
definitions of the comparison group, where the dependent variable indi-
      
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
94 Table 2.8  Other Low-Wage Groups (Other Developed Countries) 
Type of 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Novelty group Country period approach observation structure error seta 
Dolton, Rosazza- Mixed, The United Bound United 1999– Regression Region- Panel Clustered NES, 
Bondibene, mostly Kingdom’s workers Kingdom 2007 year (by region) ASHE 
and Wadsworth Positive NMW 
(2012) 
Kramarz and Negative Total employ- Low-wage France 1990– Quasi Individual Repeated Conven- LFS 
Philippon (2001) ment cost workers 1998 experiment cross tional 
section 
Laroque and Salanie Negative Formal model Married France 1997 Regression Individual Cross Conven- LFS 
(2002) of participation, women section tional 
employment 
Mulheirn (2008) None The United Bound United 2005– Quasi Individual- Longitu- Conven- LFS 
Kingdom’s workers Kingdom 2007 experiment year dinal tional 
NMW 
Stewart (2002) None The United Bound United 1998– Quasi Local area- Panel Clustered NES 
Kingdom’s workers, Kingdom 1999 experiment year (by region) 
NMW aged 22–59 
Stewart (2004a) None The United Bound United Various Quasi Individual- Longitu- Conven- LFS 
Kingdom’s workers, Kingdom experiment year dinal tional BHPS 
NMW aged > 21 NES 
Stewart (2004b) None The United Bound United 1999– Quasi Individual- Longitu- Robust LFS 
Kingdom’s workers, Kingdom 2002 experiment year dinal 
NMW aged 22–59 
Fang and Gunderson Positive Older workers Bound Canada 1993– Quasi Individual- Longitu- Clustered SLID 
(2009)b (at least aged 50) older 1999 experiment year dinal (province) 
workers 
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Addison and Negative Cross-national Women OECD 1980s– Regression Country- Panel Huber- OECD 
Ozturk (2012)b analysis 2000s year White robust 
aASHE = (United Kingdom) Annual Survey of Hours and Earning. NES = (United Kingdom) New Earnings Survey. LFS = Labor Force 
Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. SLID = (Canadian) Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. 
b This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang 
(2007). 
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cates whether or not an individual who was employed ex ante remains 
employed ex post. All the point estimates are positive, but few are sta-
tistically significant: 3 of the 11 results for the wage-gap variable and 11 
results for the wage-gap variant variable. They suspect that employers 
are substituting away from young workers toward older ones, but the 
Scotch verdict, not proven, seems most in order. 
The United Kingdom: Bound Workers 
Stewart (2002, 2004a) considers not only bound young workers 
(18–21) but also bound older workers.64 In both studies, Stewart con-
firms that wages of the treatment group rose after the NMW was es-
tablished in April 1999. In neither does he report any adverse effect on 
the employment of bound older workers. Stewart (2002) finds negative 
effects on the employment of various high-risk groups (women, those 
with less than a whole year of tenure, the unskilled, the hotel and res-
taurant industries, and those in industries with a large fraction of bound 
workers). To study the effect of the first two increases in the NMW 
subsequent to its implementation (3 percent in 2000 and 11 percent in 
2001), Stewart (2004b) uses the Labour Force Survey, one of the three 
data sets he analyzed earlier (Stewart 2004a). He concludes that these 
increases also had no effect on the employment of bound workers. 
Mulheirn (2008) repeats Stewart’s (2004b) analysis to examine the 
effect of the 6 percent increase in 2006. He reports results that vary 
by specification, either a simple difference-in-differences framework 
with an at-risk dummy or one that incorporates a wage-gap variable, 
and for men and women combined and for each separately. The only 
statistically significant results—several of those for men—strike him 
as implausible; the probability of separating from a job following the 
increase falls by about four percentage points. Mulheirn warns against 
making too much of this because of the small sample size but is struck 
that the only evidence of an employment effect is that the higher mini-
mum wage leads low-wage men to become more attached to their jobs.65 
Noting that by design this study cannot detect any reduction in hiring 
due to the NMW, Mulheirn (2008) concludes that this increase in the 
NMW did not increase the likelihood of those already employed losing 
their jobs. 
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Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) expand on 
Stewart’s (2002) analysis in three dimensions. They use three different 
measures of the minimum wage, including the fraction affected. They 
use three different definitions of regions, including the local admin-
istrative regions that Stewart (2002) examines. They extend the time 
period to include all the increases in the NMW through 2006; this last 
involves concatenating data from the NES, which Stewart (2002) used, 
to data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Employment, its succes-
sor. In addition to the fraction affected, they also consider the Kaitz in-
dex, despite its problems, so that their results are comparable with other 
work, and the spike, the fraction earning exactly the minimum wage ex 
post. In addition to the local administrative region, they consider both a 
less aggregated and a more aggregated definition of geographic area.66 
The longer sample and the annual increases in the NMW that began 18 
months after the NMW went into effect allow them to do something 
that Stewart (2002) could not: consider the possibility of time-varying 
impacts. However, they first report results that allow only for a constant 
impact; once they include two-way fixed effects and a set of controls, 
the estimated effects are predominantly positive, tiny, and not statisti-
cally significant.67 Estimates from the equation with time-varying em-
ployment effects show a few statistically significant negative point esti-
mates in the early and middle years for the spike measure; however, for 
this measure in the late years (after 2003), for the fraction affected in 
the middle to late years (after 2002), and for the Kaitz index throughout, 
the only statistically significant point estimates are positive.
France 
Laroque and Salanie (2002), like Neumark and Wascher (2011), 
worry that social welfare policies, among them the minimum wage, may 
have unintended consequences in the labor market. Instead of single 
mothers, the demographic group that concerns them is married women. 
They use 1997 data from an annual survey of French households to 
examine this issue. The econometric model is itself fairly simple, but 
its derivation is informed by a sophisticated theoretical model. The first 
part of their model is a wage equation for women aged 25–49 who 
live with a partner (i.e., are considered married). This relates the wage 
that they earn (or would if employed) to personal characteristics. The 
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second equation relates their reservation wage to the wage that the first 
equation predicts, and to a number of household characteristics, includ-
ing the number of children, their husband’s employment status, and the 
total value of income derived from social welfare benefits. 
Laroque and Salanie (2002) distinguish four possible states for each 
woman based on her employment status and the sign of the difference 
between her actual or prospective wage and reservation wage: 
1) employed, in which case her wage exceeds her reservation wage; 
2) voluntarily unemployed if her reservation wage exceeds what 
she could earn; 
3) classically unemployed (one way to be involuntarity unem-
ployed) if the minimum wage exceeds her prospective wage 
and that in turn exceeds her reservation wage, then the mini-
mum wage prices her out of the market; and 
4) otherwise unemployed (all other ways to be involuntarily un-
employed): if her prospective wage exceeds both her reserva-
tion wage and the minimum wage, she is unemployed for other 
reasons, e.g., due to the business cycle or to being between jobs 
while searching for one. 
Between 50 and 60 percent of the married women in Laroque and 
Salanie’s (2002) sample are not employed. Based on their model, they 
estimate that 38 percent of the sample chooses not to be employed, and 
that slightly more than one-half of the remaining unemployed—about 
one-tenth of all married women—are in a situation of classical unem-
ployment, which they attribute to the minimum wage. They estimate an 
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage of −0.7, 
quite large and comparable to Sabia’s (2008) result for a group of single 
mothers in the United States. This is much bigger than other estimates 
for American women or for American teenagers, which is likely due to 
institutional differences between France and the United States. They 
present standard errors of their parameter estimates but not of the de-
rived elasticity estimates. 
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) inform us that in France, the true 
cost of the minimum wage to employers is much higher than its nomi-
nal value because payroll taxes finance mandatory employee benefits. 
Offsetting this are tax exemptions, which differ across the wage dis-
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tribution and have changed over time. Using data primarily from the 
French Labor Force Survey for the years 1990–1998, they define their 
treatment group to be workers whose wages fall between the contem-
poraneous value of the minimum wage and its value in the following 
year (bound workers). The comparison group consists of individuals 
whose wages in the first year are at least as high as the greater of these 
two values of the minimum wage, and no more than 110 percent of 
this value.68 They report a substantial employment effect: a 1 percent 
increase in employment costs due to a minimum wage increase leads to 
a 1.5 percent decrease in the probability of being employed.69 
Taken together, analyses of demographic groups other than youth 
indicate that the minimum wage can have unintended consequences. No 
evidence has come to light that the NMW has reduced the employment 
of previously bound workers, young or old. In France, however, the ef-
fect of the minimum wage appears to generate classical unemployment, 
which employment subsidies reduce to some extent. This contrasts with 
the United States, where the direct effects of the EITC and minimum 
wage complement rather than counteract each other (although the in-
creased competition for jobs that results has adverse spillover effects 
for individuals who are not eligible for the EITC). 
Industry Studies 
Table 2.9 presents information for four studies that consider the 
effect of the minimum wage on industry employment—three use data 
from the United Kingdom and one uses data from Sweden. 
The United Kingdom 
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Machin and Wilson 
(2004) examine the effect of the 1999 introduction of the NMW on 
the British care home industry, a particularly low-wage sector, using 
establishment data collected in surveys in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Machin and Wilson perform several differences analyses that vary 
along several dimensions: the presence or absence of control variables, 
the geographic range of the sample, and whether the fraction affected 
or the wage gap is used to measure the NMW. Machin, Manning, and 
Rahman perform a difference-in-differences analysis by combining the 
data mentioned above with that from an earlier survey that allows them 
   
	
Table 2.9  Studies of Industries (Other Developed Countries) 
Target Sample Analytic Unit of
Study Effect sector Country period approach observation Data structure Type of SE Data seta 
Machin and Negative Home care United 1998–1999 Regression Firm-survey Longitudinal Conventional Private 
Wilson (2004) Kingdom wave survey 
Machin, Manning, Negative Home care United 1992–1999 Quasi Firm-survey Longitudinal Conventional Private 
and Rahman Kingdom experiment wave survey 
(2003) 
Skedinger (2006) Negative Hospitality Sweden 1979–1999 Quasi Individual- Longitudinal Conventional CSE 
sector experiment year 
Galindo-Rueda Negative All firms United 1997–2001 Regression Firm-year Panel Clustered Various 
and Pereira Kingdom (firm) 
(2004) 
100 
NOTE: Galindo-Rueda & Pereira (2004) is included for completeness but not discussed in the text because of severe data problems. 
a CSE = Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. 
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to construct a comparison group with a pseudo–minimum wage at the 
same point of the earlier wage distribution as the NMW falls in the later 
survey and a corresponding pseudo impact.70 Both studies report statis-
tically significant, positive wage responses. 
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) try several minimum wage 
measures and report negative but statistically insignificant employ-
ment responses. However, they present average employment elastici-
ties based only on a differences analysis of the period in which the 
NMW was instituted. These range between −0.14 and −0.38. The larger 
ones are derived from statistically significant point estimates, so it is 
unclear how to reconcile these with the results of the quasi experiment. 
Although in the middle to high end of (what is considered) the consen-
sus range of employment elasticities for American teenagers, Machin, 
Manning, and Rahman believe them to be small relative to the wage 
impact. Because this is one of the lowest-paid industries in the United 
Kingdom, they caution against generalizing these results to the whole 
labor market. 
Machin and Wilson (2004) report statistically significant, negative 
employment responses to the introduction of the NMW for two mini-
mum wage measures (fraction affected and wage gap) in their most 
complete model when they use a sample that covers the entire country. 
However, when they restrict the sample to the South Coast, the wage 
gap (their more sensitive measure of vulnerability to the minimum 
wage) does not generate this effect.71 This result reminds us of the pat-
tern that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester, 
and Reich (2010) report in their explorations of geographic correlation, 
and more broadly the issues that Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, 
and Gunderson (2005a) examine: that when large differences between 
the treatment group and the implicit comparison group make the entire 
sample too heterogeneous, effects of other factors may be attributed to 
the minimum wage. Extending their analysis to the effects of the 2001 
increase in the NMW on the South Coast, Machin and Wilson (2004) 
report a negative but not statistically significant employment effect, 
which is broadly consistent with their results for the introduction of the 
NMW in that area. 
Reconciliation of these two analyses is difficult, one finding a statis-
tically significant employment effect that the authors judge to be small, 
the other finding none. This contrasts with studies of low-wage sectors 
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in the United States, some of the most careful analysis of U.S. data, 
which has, with a few exceptions, reported no effect on employment.72 
THE TIMING OF THE EMPLOYMENT RESPONSE 
Several studies have explored the timing of the employment re-
sponse to minimum wage increases.73 Before the NMWR, the most 
common specification included lags of the minimum wage variable in 
the regression equation, which was estimated on quarterly data (Brown,
Gilroy, and Kohen 1982, p. 507, Note 25). When compared, however, the 
dynamic implications of estimates of this specification with those from 
specifications that included only the contemporaneous term indicated 
little difference, suggesting that the minimum wage had its entire impact 
in the quarter of the increase. In the first decade of the NMWR, concern 
with the presence or absence of a lagged minimum wage term was a by-
product of attempts to reconcile results from examination of aggregate 
panels with those based on other data structures (cross sections in which 
the dependent variable was the change in employment before and after 
a change in the minimum wage, and the two-period panels used in quasi 
experiments). Pinoli (2010) raises the issue from the perspective of the 
rational expectations approach, suggesting that much of the response to 
anticipated increases precedes the increase itself, and several analyses 
tested her claim as part of their robustness check. Two studies relied on 
time-series techniques, which allow for dynamic simulations to study 
the response over time. 
Whether the chosen regression models provide dependable esti-
mates of the dynamic response to the minimum wage is an important 
issue. The body of statistical technique most concerned with estimation 
of dynamics, especially with the problems that arise in estimation, is 
time-series analysis, and it is most thoroughly developed for time-series 
data. Panel data have the potential for more complete examination of 
dynamics, but it presents difficulties of estimation that were until re-
cently considerably less tractable. Perhaps as a result, attempts to study 
dynamics with panel data have rarely relied on time-series techniques 
and more on ad hoc approaches. Because the former are rare in the 
NMWR and ad hoc approaches that use panel data are more numerous, 
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we begin with a discussion of the latter. With one exception, Baker, 
Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), all the studies below have already been 
discussed, and it is the only one that will be examined in detail (except 
as necessary). 
The Early Debate: Panel Studies That Include a Lagged Term
of the Minimum Wage 
Neumark and Wascher (1992) pay a fair amount of attention to ex-
plaining why they detected a statistically significant, negative response 
of employment to the minimum wage, whereas Card (1992a) does not. 
They repeat and extend this effort (Neumark and Wascher 1994) with 
regard to Card, Katz, and Krueger’s (1994) response. They make two 
related points in this discussion that shape later analyses of the timing 
of the employment response: 2) omitted variable bias, and 2) a lengthy 
period for adjusting employment in response to changes in the mini-
mum wage.74 
The omitted variable bias was due to the absence of a lagged mini-
mum wage term in the regressions of Card (1992a) and Card, Katz, 
and Krueger (1994). Although the primary results in Neumark and 
Wascher’s (1991) conference paper are based on regressions that in-
clude only a contemporaneous (same year) minimum wage term, they 
present results from several regressions that include a lagged term, vari-
ously as a robustness check or to reconcile different results. In the re-
vised version published a year later (Neumark and Wascher 1992), they 
rely more heavily on specifications with the lagged term, referring to 
them as “correctly specified models” and writing “that the failure to 
consider lagged effects of minimum wages . . . results in substantial up-
ward bias in the estimated effects of minimum wages on employment, 
leading to elasticities that are too close to zero, and frequently positive” 
(p. 78).75 Under certain conditions for which they present evidence, the 
consequence of omitting a lagged minimum wage term is a finding of 
no effect.76 
Their second, closely related observation is the qualitative differ-
ence in results between those based on a first difference of consecutive 
observations, say 1990 and 1989 (similar to Card [1992a]), and those 
from a first difference of observations further apart, 1998 and 1990, for 
example. Relative to the shorter period, differences over the longer pe-
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riod are shifted to the left, that is, smaller if both are positive or negative 
and farther from zero. 
Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999) substantially clarify mat-
ters when they apply theoretical techniques of time-series analysis to a 
province-by-year panel of Canadian data. Decomposing the minimum 
wage into short-term and long-term components, they demonstrate that 
the lagged term is a rough-and-ready approximation of the long-term 
component. Refining their analysis to identify long-term and short-term 
components more precisely, they conclude that in Canada, it takes at 
least six years for the full effects of the minimum wage to be apparent in 
the teen employment figures. They speculate that this is because of in-
terplay between lags in adjusting capital and the long-run expectations 
about labor costs that are relevant when making investment decisions. 
Unfortunately, the serial correlation that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004) identified as a problem for statistical inference in pan-
els is almost certainly a problem for the analysis of Baker, Benjamin, 
and Stanger (1999). They examine the Canadian counterpart to the U.S. 
data of Neumark and Wascher, and both the outcome and policy vari-
able exhibit serial correlation similar to that in the U.S. data. For the 
initial regression, with only the contemporaneous minimum wage, they 
report standard errors corrected for second-order serial correlation, but 
it is not clear that this solves the problem of exaggerated t-statistics 
(Wolfson 2011). Furthermore, for the regressions based on their time-
series analysis, Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger report only conventional 
standard errors. It is well known that the moving average transforma-
tion that underlies their long-term component creates serial correlation 
where none previously existed and increases it in variables that already 
exhibit positive serial correlation.77 In their more complete decomposi-
tion, Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger distinguish the components more 
finely into five terms ranging from shortest term to longest term. This 
concentrates the serial correlation in the longer-term components more 
completely than the simpler distinction does, causing a greater amount 
of bias in its standard error than in that of the moving average term of 
the simpler decomposition. 
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Does the Response Ever Precede the Increase? 
Pinoli (2010) argues that firms will begin responding to minimum 
wage increases well in advance of their occurrence if they anticipate 
them, because gradual adjustment will minimize the cost of this adjust-
ment. She reports a response to expected increases before they take 
effect. 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) examine this possibility in 
several different ways in their study of teenage employment. Their re-
gression equations include both leads of four and eight quarters of the 
minimum wage, and lags of 4, 8, 12, and 16 quarters. In addition, they 
reestimate their equations both on a sample that excludes automatic 
increases that respond to inflation because they believe that these are 
likely to be well anticipated, and on a sample that excludes states that 
ever indexed their minimum wage, reasoning that this sample should 
further heighten the contrast between anticipated and unanticipated 
minimum wages. They detect no response of employment or hours in 
advance of a minimum wage increase, and neither of their restricted 
samples provides any evidence of a response to unanticipated increases 
after the increase. 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), in their border discontinuity study 
of teenage and restaurant employment, allow for not only a contempo-
raneous response to minimum wage increases but also responses up to 
two years before and up to four years after an increase. They find only 
contemporaneous effects: a decline in separations of both teenagers and 
restaurant workers, an increase in earnings, and a decrease in the overall 
turnover rate. 
Time-Series Studies 
Williams and Mills (2001) rely on time-series techniques to study 
the response to the federal minimum wage of the teenage employment 
ratio, and Belman and Wolfson (2010) do the same for employment 
growth in low-wage industries. Williams and Mills simulate the re-
sponse of the teen employment ratio to a 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage, based on regressions using different minimum wage 
measures. Simulations based on relative minimum wage measures indi-
cate a decrease in the employment ratio that first becomes statistically 
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significant between one and one and a half years after the increase in the 
minimum wage.78 It moves in and out of statistical significance for the 
following two years and disappears altogether after about three years. 
The maximum decline in employment during this interval, relative to 
the initial period just before the increase, is between 4 and 5 percent 
(not percentage points). Simulation results based on the real minimum 
wage are similar; the only statistically significant response is a 5 percent 
decrease (relative to employment in the initial period) 11 quarters after 
the minimum wage increase, and this disappears shortly thereafter. 
In their analysis of 23 low-wage industries, Belman and Wolfson 
(2010) perform a simulation to examine the question, “What would 
have happened to the average wage, the total number of jobs and to-
tal hours if the federal minimum wage had increased by 10 percent in 
September 1998?” For the next 42 months, the simulation tracks the 
difference in outcomes between the hypothesized situation of a 10 per-
cent increase and one of no change.79 The average hourly wage is im-
mediately higher than it would have been by about 1.25 percent, and the 
size of the difference fluctuates in a narrow range, mostly less than 1.25 
percent, until about two years after the increase; at that point it begins 
a slow, steady increase to between about 1.3 percent and 1.4 percent, 
three and a half years after the increase. After about six months, the 
point estimate of the number of jobs is about one-half percent less than 
it would otherwise have been, the difference slowly growing to −0.75 
percent two years after the minimum wage increase, and fluctuating 
around that value for the remaining year and a half of the simulation. 
At no point is the difference statistically significant. The response of 
total hours worked is initially much noisier, and while the difference 
stabilizes after a year at −0.1 percent, it too is not statistically significant 
at any point. 
Summary 
During what interval of time, relative to a change in the minimum 
wage, do the data for employment contain evidence of it? The little 
work that addresses this issue is mixed. Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger 
(1999) is the earliest and by far the most cited study to examine this 
issue; however, their use of conventional standard errors in the canoni-
cal panel framework of Neumark and Wascher leaves it vulnerable to 
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the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), raising seri-
ous questions about the statistical significance of their results. More 
recently, Pinoli (2010) reports that Spanish firms begin preparing or 
responding to minimum wage increases at the earliest moment that it 
is cost effective to do so, once they can reasonably anticipate them. Al-
legretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) 
find no evidence of this phenomenon in U.S. data. While time-series 
analysis of U.S. data picks up an immediate increase in teenagers’
wages that eventually leads to further wage growth after two years, the 
employment data suggest at most a decrease in youth employment af-
ter one year or more, perhaps not until nearly three years. In any case, 
this decrease has disappeared altogether after three years. In low-wage 
industries, it is not possible to reliably detect an employment response 
at any point in the three and a half years following an increase. Finally, 
it is worth observing that not much work considers the timing of the 
response to minimum wage increases. Not only is additional examina-
tion of this point necessary, but it is likely that until the disagreement 
about the existence of a response is settled, questions about its timing 
will also remain unsettled. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the first round of the NMWR, nothing was resolved. 
Although parts of Card and Krueger’s (2000) analysis contain statistical 
problems identified by Moulton (1990) and Donald and Lang (2007), 
other parts remain. Their message is that in the months following the 
1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage, employment at fast food 
establishments there did not suffer in comparison with employment at 
those just across the state border in Pennsylvania. There were criticisms 
of this work: the time period following the increase was too short to cor-
rect and account for long-term employment trends that differed between 
the two states; the time period was too short to capture the employment 
response, much of which occurred after the end of the period; and be-
cause information about the increase was available well in advance, 
much of the adjustment occurred before the beginning of the sample 
period. 
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A further decade of debate has not resolved the disagreements, but 
there has been progress, much based on improvements in technique. 
A significant amount of the earlier work was seen to suffer from mis-
takenly small estimates of standard errors, which implied effects that 
it is now understood were not reliably detected. More recent work is 
better at avoiding this problem. Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and 
Gunderson (2005a) explore the importance of both accurate measures 
of the treatment’s impact and of control groups that are well matched for 
the treatment group under study. With more recently developed aware-
ness of econometric pitfalls, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) 
and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) demonstrate (rather than explore) 
the importance of appropriate control variables to avoid misattribution 
of effects, and show through step-by-step changes in sample and speci-
fication the connection between a conventional regression framework 
and a quasi experiment. The result is convergence, not yet complete, 
between results from best practice in both frameworks. 
What is necessary for the employment response of the minimum 
wage to be better understood? First is more careful technique. The 
longitudinal data sets in increasing use allow more careful attention to 
time-series dynamics, something not previously the case. One conse-
quence would be standard errors that are not only robust to serial cor-
relation but also reliably smaller so that minimum wage impacts can 
be measured more precisely. Similarly important are spatial correlation 
and geographic heterogeneity, not only as in the articles mentioned just 
above, but also using spatial econometric techniques introduced by 
Kalenkoski and Lacombe (2008). 
Second, we need to recognize that studies can come to apparently 
different results without contradicting each other. If employment in 
a demographic group moves in response to the minimum wage, that 
reveals nothing about total employment absent further information; it 
is certainly possible that employers substitute workers from other de-
mographics who are perhaps more skilled than those displaced. Ahn, 
Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2010); Neumark and Wascher (2011); and 
Giuliano (2013) all provide evidence for this sort of offset. Similarly, if 
employment in an industry does not move in response to the minimum 
wage, that reveals nothing about employment elsewhere in the econ-
omy. Although it is certainly possible that employment falls elsewhere, 
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the typical choice of researchers is to examine industries in which em-
ployment is thought to be especially sensitive to the minimum wage. 
Third, the focus on employment, or rather on the number of jobs, is 
perhaps misplaced. It may be that the effect is felt not in employment 
but in hours of work. That is the topic of the next chapter. Another pos-
sibility is that there are changes in the gross flows, in accessions and 
separations that combine to determine changes in employment. If these 
change but in such a way that the net result is zero, that would not show 
up in an employment response as measured in these studies. That, too, 
is the topic of another chapter. 
Finally, some way of summarizing the results would be beneficial. 
The formal body of statistical technique that does this, combining many 
studies into a single result, is known as meta-analysis. One particular 
technique that is especially useful is metaregression. After looking at 
studies that consider hours of employment, we will present results of a 
formal meta-analysis. 
Notes 
1. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982, p. 499) define the Kaitz index as “the ratio of the 
nominal legal minimum wage to average hourly earnings weighted by coverage.” 
2. An older term for individuals who make up the fraction affected is bound workers. 
3. “Proto-” because the article contains none of the formal statistical analysis or hy-
pothesis testing currently characteristic of difference-in-differences analysis. In-
stead, it consists of a very detailed descriptive analysis of a treatment group (Cali-
fornia) and a control group, states chosen to be similar to California in important 
ways but that did not experience a minimum wage increase during the period in 
question. 
4. At the beginning of 1982, only Alaska and Connecticut had minimum wages 
higher than the federal minimum wage (and Connecticut’s was $0.02 higher). By 
the beginning of 1990, 16 states, including all of New England and all the states 
that border the Pacific, had a minimum wage that was higher than the federal 
minimum wage. 
5. In the older time-series literature, the demand side of the list is a business cycle 
indicator; for example, an adult unemployment rate. The variables on the sup-
ply side were the teenage share of the population, and the fractions of teenagers 
who are enrolled in school, in the armed forces, and in government employment 
and training programs (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982, p. 501). Neumark and 
Wascher (1992) include the first three of these variables, the importance of the last 
two having declined considerably since the 1970s. 
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6. Another criticism concerns the definition chosen for school enrollment, a variable 
meant to control for teenage labor supply, and whether it is reasonable to treat any 
measure of school enrollment as exogenous to teenage employment. While this 
generated a flurry of work shortly thereafter, the effect of enrollment on employ-
ment is no longer relevant in this literature. We discuss school enrollment and the 
minimum wage in the chapter on human capital. 
7. Over the business cycle, wages and employment of both adults and teenagers 
move up and down together. During a business cycle expansion, employment of 
both groups rises; so too (in particular) do wages of adults. Because the Kaitz 
index includes the adult wage in its denominator, it falls as teenage employment is 
rising, and this employment growth is credited to the Kaitz index. The unemploy-
ment rate is used to control for business cycle effects, but since the Kaitz index, 
by construction, fluctuates with the business cycle, it will inevitably capture some 
of this variation. Aggravating this phenomenon is that the unemployment rate is a 
lagging indicator of the business cycle. 
8. Known then as the ES-202 file, it is the basis for the currently available Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages. 
9. One difference between Card and Krueger’s (2000) use of this data and Neumark 
and Wascher’s (2000) is worth noting: Card and Krueger (2000) use establish-
ment-level data for the four chains that they had previously studied. Neumark and 
Wascher (2000) aggregate up to the level of each state. 
10. In this way, Card and Krueger (2000) respond to concerns that the unusual results 
in Card and Krueger (1994) were due to employment trends in New Jersey (but 
not Pennsylvania) for which they had not explicitly accounted. The 1996 federal 
minimum increase raised the minimum wage in Pennsylvania but not New Jer-
sey, where the minimum wage was already 6 percent higher than the new federal 
minimum. 
11. The examples that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) consider may suggest 
that their concern is a particular instance of the Moulton problem, one in which a 
group consists of observations of a state over time and the variable that is constant 
within each group is the at-risk dummy, the treatment variable. However, as Han-
sen (2007b) shows, the problem they address persists when the variable of interest 
is not constant but merely exhibits positive serial correlation. 
12. For more detailed discussions of these issues, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, 
section 6.5, “Difference-in-Differences Methods”) and Angrist and Pischke (2009, 
section 8.2, “Clustering and Serial Correlation in Panels”). 
13. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) present numerous possible solutions, at least 
two of which should be effective for Canadian provincial data. 
14. Several of these studies (for example, Mastracci and Persky [2008]) use data that 
would allow them to address the issue that Donald and Lang (2007) raise, with 
multiple states in the comparison group, but do not take advantage of this. 
15. Neumark (2001) makes no correction for serial correction, but the panel he uses is 
short enough that serial correlation is unlikely to be a problem. 
16. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2010) agree with Bazen and Le Gallo (2009) about 
selection bias but disagree about its direction. They report that states that raised 
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their minimum wages had low and declining teenage employment rates in the 
eight quarters before increases. 
17. Thompson (2009) defines teenagers to be those aged 14–18 years old. 
18. Unlike Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), Thomp-
son (2009) does not report the response of the teen share of separations. 
19. Of the four, the only one that is negative is one that includes the state trends, which 
Sabia (2009a, p. 88) objects to (below) in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). 
20. Both of these analyses will be described more fully in later sections, where the 
prime focus of each paper is discussed. 
21. In replicating earlier work, Sabia (2009a,b) also reports one very much smaller 
elasticity estimate, which he refers to as statistically insignificant. Except for three 
point estimates of long-run elasticities, all derived from equations estimated with 
a serial correlation correction and for which Sabia (2009b) reports very high levels 
of statistical significance, the standard errors and significance results that he reports 
are all for the coefficient point estimates rather than the elasticities themselves. 
22. Recall that to be considered unemployed, an individual must have previously de-
cided to participate in the labor market, that is, to engage in search. 
23. Flinn (2006) warns against placing too much weight on implications based on 
minimum wage values well outside the observed range ($4.25 per hour to $5.15 
per hour), pp. 1059–1060. 
24. Calculated from the top panel of Table V in Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011), 
these are the averages of elasticities from increases and decreases to the minimum 
wage. 
25. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) had previously relied on this hypothesis in their 
analysis of employment in restaurants. The discussion of their work includes a 
fuller explanation of sources of geographic correlation. 
26. The wage response is statistically significant whether or not these dummy vari-
ables are included. 
27. For the bulk of their analysis, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) use individual 
data, combining 5 percent samples from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. censuses, with 1 
percent samples from the American Community Surveys of 2005 and 2006. They 
supplement this with a similar analysis of quarterly cross sections of individuals 
from the CPS. It is not possible to apply the commuting zone framework to the 
CPS data, so they cannot run exactly the same regressions, but this allows them to 
compare their results more closely with previous work and demonstrate that they 
are not due to the use of different data.
Following an earlier version of Neumark and Wascher (2011), Allegretto, 
Dube, and Reich (2009) include trends that vary geographically. The issue of 
their use has become increasingly important in recent years. We will see it again 
in Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009, 2012); Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010);
Neumark and Wascher (2004, 2011); and Sabia (2009b). 
28. The EITC subsidizes earnings for low-income households with the goal of en-
couraging labor force participation and employment. The response of teen em-
ployment is of interest because if the interaction of the minimum wage and the 
EITC encourages individuals with few skills to enter the labor force, the greater 
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competition may reduce teen employment. This study is discussed in greater detail 
on pp. 55–58. 
29. Neumark and Wascher (2011) are not clear about their tripartite division that mixes 
ethnic and racial categories, in particular which category includes individuals who 
are both black and Hispanic; this is most likely Hispanic. 
30. Neumark and Wascher (2011) do not present the total minimum wage effect, so 
the numbers here are calculated from their tables. As is conventional, they do not 
display covariances, so the statements here about statistical significance assume 
small or negative covariances between the coefficients that are added to form the 
total effect. 
31. Warren and Halpern-Manners (2007) raise serious questions about the accuracy of 
CPS measures of the educational attainment of teenagers. 
32. This pretense is referred to as a placebo policy. 
33. The synthetic control group was constructed to match New York employment 
trends for everyone without a high school diploma between the ages of 16 and 29; 
it is not obvious that use of the same synthetic control group for hypothesis tests 
concerning age subgroups is appropriate. That is, just because a weighted aver-
age of some states is a good match for the aggregate employment experience of 
16–29-year-olds without a diploma in New York in the years 2002–2004, it is not 
obvious that the same weighted average of states is a good match for the aggregate 
employment experience of 16–19-year-olds without a high school diploma in New 
York in the years 2002–2004. 
34. Neumark and Wascher (2011) mention that they had also considered other social 
welfare policies that may influence labor market outcomes, but preliminary work 
persuaded them to focus on the EITC. The minimum wage and the EITC are often 
discussed together because both are policies intended to ameliorate poverty, and 
proponents see the minimum wage as a tool for ensuring that all benefits of the 
EITC go to workers rather than act as employment subsidies. 
35. This also hints at another issue, which Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011); 
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a); Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010); and 
Yuen (2003) examine, the choice of the comparison group and how this can affect 
the point estimates. 
36. In the absence of elasticity estimates and their standard errors, it is often difficult 
to make comparisons with other results in a way that is both precise and meaning-
ful; for instance, specification differences prevent a direct comparison with Sabia’s 
(2008) coefficient estimates for single mothers that could be circumvented with 
employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage. 
37. In the equation for black and Hispanic single women, the coefficient on the EITC 
variable interacted with the treatment dummy is not statistically significant, only 
the coefficient of the three interaction terms for the EITC variable, treatment 
dummy, and minimum wage variable. 
38. Luttmer (2007) continues, “My findings do not suggest that the minimum wage 
increase led to a more inefficient rationing of jobs among unskilled workers. If 
anything, the allocation of jobs seems to have become relatively more efficient in 
states where the impact of the federal minimum wage increase was larger” (p. 31). 
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39. An issue with the use of the CPS to study the effects of past periods on the pres-
ent is that the CPS provides, at most, one year of retrospective data. As a result, 
Neumark and Nizalova (2007) argue that a large proportion of young workers con-
tinue working in the state in which they grew up and that the history of that state’s 
minimum wages can be used as the history of the individuals’ minimum wages. 
While this assumption tends toward the heroic, it is possible that labor market 
scarring occurs within states, that higher minimum wages do long-term damage 
to the reputation of certain cohorts of young workers, and low-wage employers 
become permanently reluctant to hire individuals from those cohorts. 
40. It may seem peculiar that although Sabia (2008) reports a strong negative effect on 
the employment of single mothers who have not completed high school, he finds 
no effect on their poverty status. This has at least as much to do with peculiari-
ties of the formal definition of poverty as anything else. We address this issue in 
Chapter 7. 
41. Total employment serves as the control for demand factors, i.e., the business cycle, 
and total population as the control for labor supply factors. Because the results 
that they report for both the restaurant industry and the entire private sector are 
qualitatively similar in each specification, only those for the restaurant sector are 
discussed. The calculation of the reported standard errors clusters observations by 
county to allow for both unspecified forms of serial correlation in the residuals and 
unspecified, arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
42. Although they are studying employment in restaurants, not of teenagers, Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2010) believe that sensitivity to the minimum wage should be 
similar because the proportion of workers near the minimum wage is similar in the 
two groups (employed teenagers and employees in the restaurant industry), and the 
two groups overlap substantially. 
43. This discussion elides some intermediate specifications for clarity. For example, 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) highlight the use of state-specific trends in com-
bination with the time effects specific to each census division. We neglect these 
results because they are not statistically significant (although positive), and be-
cause of Sabia’s (2009b) concern that this specification begs the question, “Are 
state-specific trends due at least in part to minimum wage policy?” 
44. The reference, to Durbin’s test, is unsettling because Durbin’s name is associated 
with more than one test for serial correlation, none of which is known specifically 
as Durbin’s test, and they neither elaborate further nor include values of the test 
statistic in their results. 
45. In a different context, Even and Macpherson (2014) mention that “it is possible 
that a higher tipped minimum wage could increase employment at limited-service 
restaurants as customers and/or employers switch from full-service to limited-
service restaurants in response to an increase in the relative cost at full-service 
restaurants” (p. 12). If this does indeed happen, the differencing would overstate 
the impact of the tipped-minimum wage. 
46. Although they did not consider the tipped minimum wage, Addison, Blackburn, 
and Cotti (2012) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), both using QCEW data, and 
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) consider full-service and limited-service sectors 
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separately in some of their analysis and report rather different effects of the mini-
mum wage in both sectors than Even and Macpherson (2014). Recognition and 
discussion of this would have enriched this analysis. 
47. One interesting result is that the point estimates from the CPS data are several 
times as large as those from the QCEW, but so are the standard errors. 
48. We ignore the positive, statistically significant employment response in food and 
beverage stores because the lack of a wage response makes it difficult to understand 
the mechanism through which the minimum wage would influence employment. 
49. Because it is difficult to treat this data set as a sample from an underlying popula-
tion or process, much less a random sample, conventional interpretation of the 
standard errors is not reasonable: thus, this focus on betting. 
50. This result agrees with Yuen’s (2003) findings for teenagers and young adults, 
discussed below. 
51. Recall that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich 
(2010) have also addressed this general problem in a very different situation, that 
of geographic correlation. Fang and Gunderson (2009) use the same data and ana-
lytic framework as Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) to study the employ-
ment response of older workers. 
52. Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005b), in another analysis of longitudinal data 
from Canada, examine the effect of the minimum wage jointly on employment 
and enrollment of teenagers. The key result, the minimum wage elasticity of the 
probability of being employed, is incorrectly calculated from the elasticities of the 
probabilities of being “employed and enrolled” and “employed and not enrolled.” 
Instead of reporting the average weighted by the relative size of each group, they 
sum the two elasticities. 
53. Skedinger (2006) is a very elegant and thorough analysis of the minimum wage 
experience in the Swedish hospitality industry. However, the institutional frame-
work resembles not so much a minimum wage, at least to someone in an English-
speaking country, as an industrywide collective bargaining agreement, with wage 
floors that vary by job classification, the age and experience or job tenure of the 
individual, and, before 1985, region. Consequently, we will pass it by, other than 
to quote briefly from the conclusion: 
Using data from hotels and restaurants over the period 1979–1999, 
we find that job separations tend to increase with rising minimum 
wages (except for teenagers during 1993–1998). The evidence regard-
ing accessions is less conclusive . . . there is some evidence of sup-
ply effects, i.e., increasing accessions as minimum wages rise. This 
is contrary to the assumptions of the underlying model of demand-
determined employment and may be consistent with a monopsony 
model. (p. 287) 
The result for separations is quite different from what others found, e.g., Portugal 
and Cardoso (2006) or Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). 
54. Böckerman and Uusitalo’s (2009) study of Finland is problematic. They report 
decreases in the youth share of employment from both the decline and the increase 
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in the minimum wages, a result they attribute largely to differential trends in la-
bor force participation or employment that they cannot control for in their short 
sample. 
55. Yuen (2003) justifies the Can$0.25 definition because nearly two-thirds of mini-
mum wage increases in his sample period were for precisely this amount. 
56. One explanation for the negative relation between turnover and pay is that em-
ployers can identify and reward desirable characteristics of individuals that are 
invisible in the data available to the econometrician. For more on this relation, see 
Ehrenberg and Smith (2012, especially pages 385–387). 
57. Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) is discussed in the section 
“Other Workers,” but they report that “when the analysis is repeated for youths, 
aged 16 to 24, arguably the age group most likely to be at the margin of adjust-
ment, the point estimates are similar to those for all workers, but are generally 
insignificant, no matter which measure of the bite of the NMW is used” (p. 89). 
58. Stewart (2002) presents results not only from regressions where the percent of 
bound workers measures a region’s sensitivity to the minimum wage but also quasi 
experiments where the control and treatment groups are determined by the percent 
bound measure. Although less likely to suffer from the Moulton problem than 
analyses based on states and provinces in North America, if only because treat-
ment and control regions experience the same minimum wage, this discussion 
takes a conservative approach and considers only results of the quasi experiment 
framework. 
59. Lee and Suardi’s (2011) examination of the power of their approach requires some 
arbitrary choices, specifically about the particular alternative hypothesis that they 
use, which, unfortunately, they neither explain nor justify. 
60. Hyslop and Stillman (2007) also perform several regression analyses that are not 
discussed here because of their vulnerability to the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), unlike the quasi experiment. 
61. Pacheco (2011) does not report these elasticities; however, information that is pre-
sented in the text for calculating elasticities from the estimated contemporaneous 
affect, in combination with other estimates, is sufficient for the reader to calculate 
these values. As is too often usual, no standard errors are available. 
62. A straightforward approach is to estimate a linear wage equation that is corrected 
for selection bias between the employed and the nonemployed. This equation 
(along with estimates of the inverse Mills ratio) can then generate a wage estimate 
for each individual, whether or not employed, and the estimates in turn allow for 
the classification of individuals as minimum wage or above minimum wage. 
63. With 10 clusters, the t-statistics that Fang and Gunderson (2009) report should be 
compared to critical values from the t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom: the 
critical values for a two-sided 0.05 test are –+ t10(0.975) = 2.23. 
64. Both analyses have been described in some detail above, in the section on non-
U.S. studies of youth employment. 
65. Recall that Portugal and Cardoso (2006) found the same effect for teenagers in 
Portugal. 
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66. Data at the more aggregated level are not available throughout their sample period, 
so they relegate those results to the appendix. Point estimates based on the less ag-
gregated definition of regions are generally closer to zero and less often of statisti-
cal significance, something that the authors attribute to greater measurement error. 
67. The controls, listed not in this article but in Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and
Wadsworth (2010), are average age, and the gender and graduate shares. 
68. Recognizing that this comparison group may not be ideal, Kramarz and Philippon 
(2001) develop conditions based on demand and supply elasticities for the two 
groups in which the comparison group as defined is well suited to this role, and 
they state that the conditions are satisfied. 
69. Kramarz and Philippon (2001) report no standard error for this value, although 
they do for the ones on which it is based, and these are statistically significant. 
70. Machin and Manning had conducted an initial pair of surveys in 1992–1993 to 
prepare for the possibility of a Labour electoral victory. 
71. The reason for considering the South Coast separately is that it was the area cov-
ered by the survey of 1992–1993 that was previously mentioned. 
72. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) present an analysis of the economy-wide im-
pact of the introduction of the NMW, but their data are ill suited to their purposes, 
and construction of key variables depends on numerous assumptions and approxi-
mations. Trying hard, and failing, to match individuals across data sets, they find 
that they must impute local industry averages of the fraction affected to individual 
firms. Their conclusion is “that firms thought to be most affected by the introduc-
tion of pay floors (by region and industry) responded to the introduction of a NMW 
by reducing the speed at which they hired new workers” (p. 8, point 18). 
73. As discussed previously, Neumark and Nizalova (2007) examine the long-run im-
pact on individuals’ employment histories, but the phenomenon that they examine, 
scarring, is quite different from that discussed here, a slow response to a policy 
change. 
74. Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) and Card and Krueger (1995) respond to these 
points, reinterpreting them in a way that they clearly thought appropriate for the 
specification and minimum wage variable that they used. Neither their response 
nor their specification had much influence in the subsequent discussion of the tim-
ing of the response, so we skip over it here. 
75. Neumark and Wascher repeat this point in their later discussion (1994; Card, Katz, 
and Krueger 1994), writing that “there is evidence of lagged minimum wage ef-
fects in the data, and . . . the omission of these lagged effects leads to substantial 
upward bias in short first-difference estimates” (p. 508). 
76. The lagged term implies that it takes more than a year for the full impact of the 
minimum wage on teenage employment to play out, due to “hiring and training 
costs, or because of an inability to adjust other inputs quickly” (Neumark and 
Wascher 1992, Note 19). 
77. Sargent (1987) discusses this in section XI.9, crediting Slutsky with the first rec-
ognition of this in economics. 
78. Recall that Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) identify problems with minimum wage 
measures of this type. During a business cycle upturn, both employment and the 
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average wage increase, and the increase in the average wage mechanically causes 
a decrease in the relative wage. In this way, this minimum wage measure auto-
matically has a negative correlation with employment, correlated not through any 
causal relation but through a third variable. 
79. The data sample ends 42 months after September 1998, March 2002, so the simu-
lation comes to a halt there. It is not necessarily the last month in which the mini-
mum wage has an effect. 
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Hours of Employment 
Perhaps evidence for the employment response is weak because of 
the way that employment is being measured—as the number of jobs 
or percent of people with jobs.1 Employees in minimum wage jobs are 
paid by the hour. Unless the number of hours worked is the same in all 
minimum wage jobs, jobs and hours worked are not equivalent mea-
sures of employment. Measuring employment by the number of jobs is 
like measuring the total amount of water in different-sized pitchers by
counting the number of pitchers. Instead, the volume of water should 
be measured directly by adding the amount in each pitcher to get the 
total. If the number of hours that individual employees work varies, 
then measure the number of hours. Perhaps rather than reduce staffing 
in response to the minimum wage, employers should reduce hours of 
some or all employees. 
Underlying this hypothesis is another: that up to a point, hiring and 
firing workers is more difficult or costly than raising and lowering the 
hours that current employees work. Hiring involves some or all of the 
following actions: get the word out about openings, review applications 
to decide whom to interview, interview, check references, evaluate the 
information acquired from the interview, and make a decision. Further,
even if no training is necessary, new hires in many jobs will initially 
be less productive until they become familiar with the particular work-
place and its routines. If employers lay off people when the minimum 
wage rises, they will lose the value in these implicit training costs as 
well as any skills developed on the job. Given this, it seems likely that 
raising and lowering the number of hours individuals work is an easier, 
less expensive way to adjust the amount of paid labor that is employed 
(again, up to a point). 
In the NMWR, Zavodny (2000) was the first to examine whether 
these two measures of employment (jobs and hours) give different an-
swers to the question, “Does the minimum wage (necessarily) reduce 
employment?”2 Coming several years prior to Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), this study does not report a clustered standard, 
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120 Belman and Wolfson 
so we do not include it in the discussion below, but a number of studies 
followed her lead, including several already discussed in Chapter 2.3 
U.S. STUDIES 
Demographic Groups 
Youth 
Table 3.1 shows the five studies that examine the effect of the mini-
mum wage on teenagers’ hours of employment: Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2008) and Sabia (2009a,b), which use state-level panels; and Allegretto,
Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011), which use repeated cross sections of in-
dividual-level data. We will consider first the studies of aggregate data. 
Both Orrenius and Zavodny and Sabia aggregate CPS ORG data to the 
level of the state; the first use annual data and the second monthly, and 
both report results for unconditional average usual hours.4 Sabia also 
reports estimates for conditional usual hours.5 Because a main theme of 
Sabia’s analysis is the resolution of disagreement about the best way to 
control for business cycle effects, he reports several results. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) estimate a conventional equation, 
with two-way fixed effects (for state and year), the adult male unem-
ployment rate and the teenage share of the population as the control 
variables for demand and supply conditions, and one or the other of 
two different minimum wage variables. The first is constructed using 
a deflator that is common to all states in the same year, and the second 
uses the average adult wage in each state and year, which therefore has 
the same endogeneity problems as the Kaitz index (see Chapter 2). On 
the basis of the common deflator, they report a negative response of 
the hours of teenage girls to the minimum wage.6 The elasticity of total 
hours with respect to the minimum wage is −0.31, with a standard error 
of −0.12.7 
Sabia (2009b) presents results for different log-log specifications 
where the list of regressors always includes state and month dummies, 
the adult male unemployment rate, the fraction of 16–64-year-olds who 
are teenagers, and nominal values of the minimum wage and the mean 
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Table 3.1  Youth (U.S. Data) 
Effect: Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity group period approach observation structure Variable 
Allegretto, Dube, and −0.03 (0.03) Teenagers 1990, 2000, Regression, Individual-year Repeated Usual weekly 
Reich (2009) 2005, 2006 QEa cross section hours 
Allegretto, Dube, and −0.03 (0.04) Teenagers 1990–2009 Regression Individual-year Repeated Usual weekly 
Reich (2011) cross section hours 
Orrenius and −0.31 (0.12) Teen girls 1994–2005 Regression State-year Panel Usual weekly 
Zavodny (2008) −0.23 (0.12) hours 
Sabia (2009a) −0.51, −0.37, Teen girls 1979–2004 Regression State-month Panel Usual weekly 
−0.29 hours 
Sabia (2009b) −0.42 Teenagers 1979–2004 Regression State-month Panel Usual weekly 
in retail hours 
Couch and Wittenburg −0.44– Teenagers 1979–1992 Regression State-month Panel Usual weekly 
(2001)b −0.77 hours in
primary job 
Zavodny (2000)b 0.24 (0.12) Teenagers 1979–1993 Regression, State-year and Panel Usual weekly 
−0.11 (0.08) QE individual-year hours (calcs 
cond avg) 
NOTE: Youth refers to those younger than 25; teenagers are 16–19. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Quasi experiment. 
b This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
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adult wage. His specifications differ according to whether they include 
in addition a one-year lag of the minimum wage, and either a set of an-
nual dummy variables or a dummy to indicate whether the economy was 
in recession that month. A hazard of using monthly CPS aggregates is 
the tiny sample sizes underlying some of that state-month observations, 
and Sabia reports results in which he weights each observation by the 
number of respondents on which it is based. His sample is 1979–2004.8 
In all of his specifications for unconditional hours, either the current 
minimum wage or the lagged minimum wage is statistically significant 
(but not both). Sabia (2009b) reports elasticities’ p-values only for the 
two specifications that include the lagged term, and both are statistically 
significant: −0.51 when the equation includes the recession dummy 
rather than the annual dummies, and −0.37 with the annual dummies 
rather than the recession dummy. The effect on conditional hours is 
somewhat less pronounced; in one specification, the minimum wage 
has no effect, and in the others the effect of either the contemporaneous 
or lagged term is much smaller, although one or both remain statisti-
cally significant. The one significant elasticity is much smaller, −0.28 
(with the recession dummy). 
Recall that the focus in both analyses of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 
(2009, 2011) is that the employment response to the minimum wage re-
ported in analyses that rely on the approach introduced by Neumark and 
Wascher (1992) disappears in specifications that include controls for 
factors correlated with but not caused by the minimum wage. Teenag-
ers’ hours of employment is one of the variables that they examine in 
each study. An important difference between the two studies is the data 
used, which requires different control variables: Allegretto, Dube, and 
Reich (2011) use CPS data that allow for sensitivity at a relatively high 
frequency, but not for the fine-grain geographic distinctions that Alle-
gretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) can make using census and related data. 
Neither finds a statistically significant reduction in hours. 
Recall that the focus in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) is on 
economic factors that vary not only over time, which conventional fixed 
time effects would control for, but also regionally over time, so that the 
New England states have their own set of time effects distinct from 
those of the mid-Atlantic states, and so forth. Their hypothesis is the 
existence of important regional differences in cultural traits and insti-
tutions that are both important for economic outcomes and correlated 
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with regional differences in average minimum wages. Controlling for 
these regional differences leaves the minimum wage to account only for 
differences among states in the same region rather than these regional 
differences across the whole country. 
Point estimates from a model designed to resemble the canonical
one of Neumark and Wascher’s extensive oeuvre indicate a negative
response for all teens and especially for teenage girls of usual hours 
worked. However, once the regional controls are included, this effect 
disappears; the hours elasticity is −0.03, with a standard error of 0.04. 
While Allegretto, Dube, and Reich’s (2011) specification addresses 
only the effect on (usual weekly) conditional hours, lack of any detect-
able effect on the number of jobs implies that their result also holds for 
unconditional hours. In response to concerns that the effect of well an-
ticipated increases will be largely complete by the time of the increase 
(recall Pinoli [2010]), they also distinguish between increases that oc-
cur as a result of automatic indexing for inflation, which are likely to 
be anticipated, and other increases that are less likely to be anticipated. 
When Allegretto, Dube, and Reich consider only nonindexed increases 
in the minimum wage, they detect a “modest” and statistically insignifi-
cant negative hours response, with an elasticity of −0.07 (standard error 
equals 0.04). When estimates are allowed to differ among white, black, 
and Hispanic teenagers, they indicate no effect on hours for members 
of the first two groups, but the effect is large and negative for Hispanics 
(with an elasticity of −0.33, and standard error of 0.14). This is puzzling 
since they find no evidence that the minimum wage affects the wages 
of Hispanic teenagers. 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) take a different tack. Fig-
uring that a commuting zone is a (reasonably) unified labor market, 
they compare the experience of teenagers who live in different parts of 
commuting zones, where the different parts simultaneously have more 
than one minimum wage because the zone straddles a state boundary. 
They find a small, negative, and statistically insignificant effect on 
usual hours (an estimated elasticity of −0.031, with a standard error of 
−0.032). Combining this with the absence of any negative jobs effect 
(the response of the number of jobs is positive and statistically insig-
nificant), there appears to be, at worst, no effect on total hours worked. 
Sabia’s (2009a) study of the retail sector includes results for hours 
of teenagers in the retail sector. The most credible point estimate of the 
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elasticity, because it is based on a regression with an autocorrelation 
correction, is a long-run elasticity of −0.42, in the middle of the range 
that Sabia (2009b) reported for all teenagers. The absence of any stan-
dard errors for the elasticity makes it difficult to judge the precision of 
the estimate. 
Other groups 
Table 3.2 lists five studies that present results for the hours of em-
ployment of other demographic groups in the United States. Two of 
these have questionable standard errors, and problems with a third, 
Neumark and Nizalova (2007), are discussed in Chapter 2; two stud-
ies remain.9 The primary concern of Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) is 
the effect of the minimum wage on immigrants who lack a high school 
diploma.10 They detect no effect on immigrants’ hours of work and 
speculate that immigrants may take local labor market conditions into 
account in their location decisions, generating a pattern of location 
choice that obscures the effect of the minimum wage on hours and em-
ployment. Sabia (2008) uses the annual March supplement to the CPS 
to study the effect of the minimum wage on the poverty status of single 
mothers to find very large negative effects on hours worked: −0.92 for 
usual weekly hours, and −0.012 percent for annual hours. While he re-
ports (state-clustered) standard errors for the regression coefficients on 
which these elasticities are based, and they indicate statistical signifi-
cance at a 1 percent level, he does not report them for the elasticities, 
nor does he explain precisely how they are calculated. Although these 
coefficients are statistically significant, the precision of the elasticities 
themselves is not clear. 
Sectoral Studies 
What ties the studies in this section together is that they examine 
the effect of the minimum wage on industries or sectors, rather than on 
demographic groups or groups of employees (see Table 3.3).11 Three 
use the two-by-two quasi experiment framework of Card and Krueger 
(1994) to examine the effect of a local increase in the minimum wage 
on employment in affected restaurants: Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007); 
Persky and Baiman (2010); and Powers (2009). Of course, Donald and 
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Table 3.2  Other Groups (U.S. Data) 
Effect: Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity group period approach observation structure Variable 
Neumark and −0.09 Adults, 25–29 1979–2001 Regression State-year Panel Weekly hours 
Nizalova (2007) −1.2 (3.8) cohort (avg. over all) 
Orrenius and −0.11 (0.08) Immigrants 1994–2005 Regression State-year Panel Usual weekly 
Zavodny (2008) hours 
Sabia (2008) −0.92 Single mothers 1991–2004 Regression Individual-year Repeated Hours worked 
−1.18 with less than high cross section last year 
school degree 
Mastracci and None (Emp.) Low-wage workers 2003–2005 QEa Individual-year Repeated Hours usually 
Persky (2008)b cross section worked 
Neumark, Negative Many wage earners 1979–1997 Regression Individual- Longitudinal Usual weekly 
Schweitzer, and month hours 
Wascher (2004)b 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Quasi experiment. 
b This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
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Table 3.3  Studies of Industries (U.S. Data) 
Effect: Target group or Sample Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity sector period approach observation structure Variable 
Belman and Wolfson −0.01 (0.05) Low-wage 1972–2003 Regression Industry-month Multiple time Avg. monthly 
(2010) industries series hours (calcs. 
total) 
Dube, Naidu, and None San Francisco 2003–2004 QEa and Firm-year Longitudinal FTE based on 
Reich (2007) restaurants regression avg. weekly 
hours 
Even and Macpherson None Full-service 1990–2011 Regression State-quarter Panel Aggregate usual 
(2014) restaurants hours 
Orazem and Mattila −1.10 Retail, service 1989–1992 Regression County-qtr.- Panel — 
(2002) not professional industry 
−1.50 
Persky and Baiman None IL fast food 2003–2005 QE (2×2) and Firm-year Longitudinal FTE hours in 
(2010) establishments regression last pay period 
Powers (2009) None IL fast food 2003–2005 QE (2×2) and Firm-year Longitudinal FTE hours in 
establishments regression last pay period 
Sabia (2009b) −0.1 Retail workers 1979–2004 Regression State-month Panel Weekly hours 
(avg. of all and 
employed) 
Vedder and Gallaway Negative All workers 1959–1999 Regression Country-year, Aggregate time Total hours 
(2002) region-year series 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
aQuasi experiment. 
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Lang (2007) identify serious problems with this framework, but each 
study also contains regression results that are based on either a mea-
sure of the fraction affected or the wage gap, and these do not suffer 
from these problems. Even and Macpherson (2014) use the canonical 
framework of Neumark and Wascher (1992) to study the effect of the 
tipped minimum wage on tipped workers in the restaurant sector; they 
also present estimates of the effect of the nontipped minimum wage on 
this group, as well as the effect of both types of minimum wage on non-
tipped restaurant workers. Vedder and Gallaway (2002) and Belman 
and Wolfson (2010) use U.S. data from the BLS-EEH survey. They dif-
fer in their sample period, in the degree of aggregation used to define 
both the industry and the time period for each observation, and in their 
statistical approaches. Sabia (2009a), which we have already seen in 
this chapter, uses the CPS to construct a state-year panel of retail work-
ers. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Orazem and Mattila 
(2002) both rely on data from privately commissioned surveys of a 
group of business firms.12 
As part of their survey of restaurants in the San Francisco Bay
area, Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) asked about the number of full-
and part-time employees, and the average for each group of the number
of weekly hours worked. From these values, they calculate the total
number of hours for each establishment before and after the minimum
wage increase and divide by 40 to get “full-time equivalent employ-
ment.” To capture the effect of the minimum wage, what they call
“treatment intensity,” they calculate the fraction affected, which was
zero for both restaurants outside San Francisco and small restaurants in
San Francisco. They then regress full-time employment-employment
on treatment intensity. Over a variety of samples (differing primarily
in the restaurants for which treatment intensity is zero, but also consid-
ering full-service and fast food restaurants separately), the estimated
effect is always positive and never statistically significant (indeed, 
rarely as large as the standard error). 
Both Powers (2009) and Persky and Baiman (2010) use data on fast 
food establishments in Indiana and Illinois that they jointly collected 
(Powers, Persky, and Baiman 2007) to study the effects of the Illinois 
increases in the minimum wage of 2004 and 2005. Powers writes, “The 
raison d’être of this project is to collect hours data at the establishment 
level” (p. 377). Both explore this with a wage gap measure, calculated 
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as the percentage increase in ex ante starting wages needed to comply 
with the ex post minimum wage, and Powers also considers the fraction 
affected. Persky and Baiman (2010) consider both the change in full-
time equivalent hours and its establishment size-weighted growth rate 
as dependent variables.13 Powers reports estimates from several closely 
related specifications; the signs on each of the minimum wage measures 
are positive slightly more often than they are negative, and none are sta-
tistically significant. Persky and Baiman report results for each of their 
dependent variables, with and without Indiana in the sample (where 
the establishments were not affected by the minimum wage increases). 
With Indiana in the sample, the coefficients on the minimum wage are 
negative and statistically insignificant for each dependent variable. With 
it removed from the equation, the estimated effect on each dependent 
variable is positive, and in the equation with the growth rate of hours as 
the dependent variable, the coefficient is statistically significant. 
Even and Macpherson (2014) use information in the CPS to identify 
individuals employed in the restaurant industry, distinguishing between 
those likely to be subject to the tipped minimum wage and those subject 
to the regular minimum wage (hereafter, “the minimum wage”). Similar 
to Neumark and Wascher’s approach, they aggregate the data within 
each state and quarter into a single observation and estimate an equation 
that resembles those of Neumark and Wascher (1992), with a similar list 
of controls, except that it includes not one but two contemporaneous 
minimum wage variables, one for each type of minimum wage. Their 
dependent variable is total (usual) hours. To control for time-varying 
state-specific factors, one of their sets of estimates comes from using 
the log-difference of hours between tipped and nontipped workers as 
the dependent variable. Each of their sets of estimates (tipped work-
ers, nontipped workers, and the log-difference) includes a long sample 
(1990:1–2011:4) and a short one (1994:2–2007:3) trimmed to exclude 
the recession at each end of the period. For each sample, Even and 
Macpherson estimate a specification with state-specific time trends and 
another without them because of skepticism that they are appropriate. 
All but one of the point estimates are negative, and most are bigger 
than their counterparts in the employment equation, but only one out 
of the two dozen estimates (2 minimum wage variables × 2 samples × 
2 specifications × 3 dependent variables) is statistically significant: that 
for the tipped minimum wage and tipped workers. This is not especially 
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compelling evidence that the tipped minimum wage is an important in-
fluence on total hours of tipped employees, or that the minimum wage is 
an important influence on total hours worked in the restaurant industry. 
Although we have already touched on Sabia’s (2009a) analysis, its 
primary focus, the retail sector, puts it squarely in this section. For total 
hours in retail, the point estimates of the hours elasticity are roughly 
−0.1, and the regression coefficients on which they are based are statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level in more than half the specifications, 
and at the 0.05 level in all but one of the rest.14 
Recall from Chapter 2 that in their study of the effect of the in-
creases in Iowa’s minimum wage in the early 1990s, Orazem and 
Mattila (2002) analyze two types of data: 1) county-level aggregates 
that the state of Iowa collects in conjunction with the Unemployment 
Insurance program, and 2) data that they themselves collected about 
firms and employees in the retail and nonprofessional services sectors. 
In the former, Orazem and Mattila report moderately elastic responses 
of hours for each part of the sample, roughly −1.1 in each case over 
both one quarter and one year, i.e., 10 times as large as the estimated 
employment elasticities.15 With the individual-level data, they estimate 
a wage equation to measure workers’ to the minimum wage in order to 
identify workers who would be earning less than the minimum wage 
had it not risen. The reported hours elasticities are generally even larger, 
ranging from about −1.1 to −1.5, about two- to three-and-a-half times 
as large as the corresponding employment elasticities. The implication 
of these estimates is that during this period, when the minimum wage in 
Iowa rose by nearly 40 percent, weekly hours of those who would have 
been earning less than $4.65 in 1992 fell by roughly 45 percent to 60 
percent. According to their estimates, some of this occurred through job 
loss, but even for those who remained employed, hours fell (though by 
less than this proportion). They give no indication either in the text or 
the table about the precision of the estimate of hours elasticities. 
Belman and Wolfson (2010) analyze the response of total hours in 
about two dozen low-wage industries to the national minimum wage 
in the United States, using monthly data for the period 1972–1998, 
and giving special attention to modeling the dynamic behavior of the 
series analyzed.16 To summarize the impact, they perform a dynamic 
out-of-sample analysis over all the industries, comparing what actually 
did occur with what their estimates imply would have happened if the 
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minimum wage had increased by 10 percent in September 1998 (from 
$5.15/hour to $5.67/hour). The maximum decline in hours occurs about 
nine months later, −0.5 percent in June 1999, but this rebounds sharply 
the following month to −0.1 percent, and fluctuates close to this value 
for the more than three and a half years that follow. Except for that one 
month, the point estimate is always less than a standard deviation from 
zero. That is, they report a statistically insignificant elasticity of −1 per-
cent four and a half years after the increase and for almost every month 
during this period. 
Vedder and Gallaway (2002) use annual aggregate hours data for 
1959–1999 to gauge the effect of the minimum wage. The three se-
ries they use are total hours in the private, nonagricultural sector of the 
economy, and both total and overtime hours in manufacturing. These 
sectors are considerably broader than those typically studied in the min-
imum wage literature, since it is widely believed that at the historical 
levels of the minimum wage in the United States, effects will be de-
tectible only in relatively homogeneous categories of low-paid workers, 
industries, or demographic groups. They give very little information 
about the time aggregation of the data used, but whether it is annual or 
monthly, one would expect to see testing for unit roots and cointegra-
tion and, depending on the outcomes of the tests, perhaps differencing 
or lagged dependent variables.17 For all three regressions, the minimum 
wage coefficient is both negative and associated with large t-statistics, 
but the lack of information about the data and the estimates themselves 
makes it hard to interpret these results. 
Summary of Results Based on U.S. Data 
Studies of the response of hours worked to the minimum wage 
report results for the United States that are all over the place. For teen-
agers, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) report point estimates 
of elasticities that are both miniscule and statistically insignificant. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) report elasticity point estimates that 
are 5–10 times as large, but only the largest (for teenage girls) are sta-
tistically significant, and Sabia’s (2009a,b) results range in size from 
roughly the largest of Orrenius and Zavodny’s (2008) to more than 
half again as large (all presumably statistically significant). Turning to 
groups other than teenagers, Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) do not detect 
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a statistically significant hours elasticity for immigrants who lack a high 
school diploma; in his study of single mothers who lack a high school 
diploma, Sabia (2008) finds elasticities that are roughly twice the size 
as those he reported for teenagers. The sectoral studies are in nearly as 
much disagreement. The four that examine restaurants (Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich 2007; Even and Macpherson 2014; Persky and Baiman 2010; 
Powers 2009) find no effect on hours. Sabia (2009b) reports a small 
effect in the broader sector of retail, and Orazem and Mattila (2002) 
report very large effects on hours in the even broader sector of retail 
and nonprofessional services. In a collection of low-wage industries 
that overlaps that broader sector (but does not include it), Belman and 
Wolfson (2010) report a tiny negative effect on hours that is statisti-
cally insignificant. Using data for the entire macroeconomy, Vedder and 
Gallaway (2002) report statistically significant, negative coefficients on 
the minimum wage but do not appear to have addressed likely problems 
related to serial correlation. 
OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Types of Workers 
Young workers 
Table 3.4 lists five studies that report estimates of the effect of the 
minimum wage in countries other than the United States on the working 
hours of youth. We limit our discussion to two of these because each of 
the other three has serious problems that undercut any faith in either the 
point estimates or statistical inference based on them. 
In their analysis of the substantial increase in the effective minimum 
wage for teenagers in New Zealand, Hyslop and Stillman (2007) apply 
both a difference-in-differences framework and a regression analysis to 
individual-level data similar to the CPS ORG data. The first indicates 
that employed 16–17-year-olds experienced a 20 percent increase in 
hours worked and those aged 18–19 experienced a 6 percent increase, 
both statistically significant. In combination with the absence of sta-
tistically significant negative employment outcomes, this indicates no 
       
   
  
  
  
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table 3.4  Youth (Foreign Data) 
Effect: Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity (SE) group Country period approach observation structure Variable 
Hyslop and Stillman 0.49 Teenagers New 1998–2003 QEa, Individual- Panel Hours worked 
(2007) Zealand regression year last week 
Pacheco (2011) Negative Minimum New 1986–2004 Regression Individual-qtr. Repeated Usual
wage youth Zealand cross section weekly hours 
Böckerman and None Youth Finland 1991–1996 QE Firm-year Panel Regular weekly
Uusitalo (2009)b workers in working hrs. 
retail trade 
Pereira (2003)c Negative Teenage Portugal 1986–1989 QE Firm-year Panel Average 
workers monthly hours 
Shannon (2011)d None/ 15–16- Canada 1976–2003 QE Individual- Repeated Actual hours 
negative year-olds year cross section worked if 
employed 
132 
NOTE: Youth refers to those younger than 25; teenagers are 16–19. 
a Quasi experiment. 
b Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) doubt that they have adequately controlled for trends in employment and labor force participation. 
c Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report that Pereira (2003) is not representative of the population of firms from which it is drawn, and that 
employment trends of teenagers in the sample and population are quite different. 
d Although Shannon (2011) reports standard errors clustered by province, this technique is ineffective with so few clusters. 
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decrease in total hours. We can put these figures together with the in-
creases in the effective minimum wage, 41 percent for 16–17-year-olds 
and 69 percent for 18–19-year-olds, to derive elasticity measures for 
the hours responses: +0.49 for the younger age group, and +0.09 for the 
older age group (no standard errors available). 
Results from the regression analysis are murkier. Estimates when 
business cycle controls are not included indicate hours effects of similar 
magnitude and degree of statistical significance as the difference-in-
differences analysis. Inclusion of the business cycle variable, which an 
F-test indicates to be appropriate, turns the hours effect negative though 
insignificant for those aged 18–19. For those aged 16–17, the point 
estimates of the effect remain positive, but the only one that remains 
statistically significant is for the year following the second increase; 
those for the years following the first and third increases become much 
smaller, and their standard errors become much larger.18 Combining both 
the absence of an initial employment effect and the eventual small nega-
tive employment effects with the effect on conditional average hours 
leads to the conclusion that total hours increased. Hyslop and Stillman 
(2007) interpret this as a “positive labour supply response by teenagers 
(particularly 16–17-year-olds) to the minimum wage increases that was, 
at best, partially accommodated by the demand side . . .” (p. 227). 
Pacheco’s (2011) analysis, also examined more fully in Chapter 2, 
briefly considers the effect of the minimum wage on hours. She reports 
that for teenagers aged 16–17 who find the minimum wage binding, 
usual weekly hours falls by 19 hours; the figure for the comparable 
group aged 18–19 is 17 hours; for those aged 20–24, 11 hours; and 
those aged 25–29, 27 hours. She does not give enough information to 
calculate the effect either for all teenagers or for all members of any 
of these groups (e.g., for all aged 16–17, not just those for whom the 
minimum wage was binding), and given compositional employment ef-
fects that some studies have reported (also discussed in Chapter 2), it 
is easily conceivable that total hours of work for any of these groups, 
especially those of teenagers, are not affected.19 
Other low-wage workers 
Table 3.5 lists three articles—Connolly and Gregory (2002), 
Stewart and Swaffield (2008), and Robinson and Wadsworth (2007)— 
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that consider several groups of workers in the United Kingdom who 
were earning wages lower than the National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
immediately before it went into effect on April 1, 1999. All three apply 
a difference-in-differences framework to individual-level data, defining 
the treatment group as employed individuals who fit a certain demo-
graphic profile. The comparison groups are defined to be similar to the 
treatment group but not affected by the NMW. All three studies rely on 
usual, not actual, hours of work, and because they compare hours for 
individuals who were employed in both periods, they examine hours 
conditional on employment, which, as previously mentioned, does 
not translate directly to total hours of employment unless there are no 
changes in the number of jobs.20 
Connolly and Gregory (2002) use two annual surveys to study the 
effect on women’s hours of the introduction of the NMW: the New 
Earnings Survey (NES), which, with periodic updates, has used the 
same large sample of workers for many years, gathering information 
from their employers; and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
a smaller survey that tracks the same households across many years. 
They consider data from both surveys because of their complementary 
strengths and weaknesses. The NES, while very broad and inclusive, is 
likely to miss workers who are very low-paid and part time, and those 
who have recently started new jobs. Though smaller, the BHPS is less 
likely to suffer from these particular problems. The data that Connolly 
and Gregory use begin in 1994 and continue through autumn 2000 
for the BHPS, and through spring 2001 for the NES. They compare 
women who had been earning less than the NMW before its introduc-
tion with those who had previously been earning up to 10 percent more 
than the NMW. Once they include the various control variables avail-
able in each data set, they find statistically insignificant effects on hours 
worked (negative in the NHS data, positive in the BHPS data). Other 
studies to which they refer have analyzed these data sets and found no 
effect on the total number of jobs, which suggests that “there was no 
effect on total hours” is a reasonable conclusion. 
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) examine the hours response of low-
paid workers of both sexes and also use two different surveys because 
of complementary features, the annual NES from 1994–2000 and the 
quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1997:Q1–2000:Q3. In this 
case, the complementary features are the greater frequency of the LFS 
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Table 3.5  Other Groups (Foreign Data) 
Effect: Target Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity group Country Sample period approach observation structure Variable 
Connolly and None Women United 1999–2003 QEa Longitudinal Individual Basic hours 
Gregory working Kingdom panel (NES)
(2002) part-time Normal hours 
(BHPS) 
Robinson and Negative Low-wage United 1998–1999 QE Longitudinal Individual Hours worked 
Wadsworth earners Kingdom panel in main job, 
(2007) w/two jobs 2nd job 
Stewart and Negative Low-wage United 1997–2000 QE Longitudinal Individual Paid hours 
Swaffield earners Kingdom panel (standard
(2008) and total) 
aQuasi experiment.
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versus the much larger sample size and greater reliability of data in the 
NES. Each of these surveys includes many if not all of the same indi-
viduals from one period to the next. In the LFS, individuals appear for 
five consecutive quarters, and in each quarterly survey, 20 percent of 
the sample is individuals who appear for the first time, and another 20 
percent is individuals who appear for the last time. This 40 percent of 
the sample is the only part that Stewart and Swaffield use, the first and 
last quarter in which an individual appears in the LFS. Their (primary) 
comparison group is those who were earning between the NMW and 10 
percent more at the time of its introduction, and they use two treatment 
groups: those who were earning less than the NMW at the time of its 
introduction, and the subset who in addition specifically experienced 
wage increases.21 
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) define an initial effect and a lagged 
effect of the NMW for both data sets. The initial effect is calculated 
from the difference between the year’s worth of surveys immediately 
before and the year’s worth immediately after the NMW went into ef-
fect. The lagged effect is based on the first and second years’ worth of 
surveys after the NMW’s effective date. Because of differences in the 
frequency with which the two surveys are administered, this leads to 
differences in the definitions of the measured effect. What are the im-
plications of these differences in how the initial and lagged effects are 
measured? Unless a large part of any response occurs within the first 
month following the implementation of the NMW, the NES-based mea-
sure of its initial effect is more accurately characterized (and referred 
to) as the immediate effect. Both of the LFS-based measures, not only 
the LFS-based lagged effect, are better compared to the NES-lagged 
effect than to the NES-initial effect.22 
For each combination of sex, type of effect, and way of measuring 
hours worked, where sex is male or female, type of effect is initial or 
lagged, and hours measure is total hours or straight time hours (i.e., with 
overtime and without overtime, respectively), Stewart and Swaffield 
(2008) present 8 difference-in-differences point estimates for the NES, 
and 12 for the LFS.23 For men, all but one of the point estimates of 
the immediate effect (i.e., the NES-based measure of the initial effect) 
are positive, and none are statistically significant. For women, all point 
estimates of the immediate effect are negative, all those for total hours 
are statistically significant, and all those for straight-time hours are sta-
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tistically significant when the treatment is limited to those whose wages 
actually rose to be in compliance with the NMW. Based strictly on the 
range of statistically significant point estimates, total hours fell by about 
35 minutes per week for all women previously earning less than the 
NMW, and for those women whose wages rose to be in compliance, 
total hours fell by just a bit more than one hour per week while straight 
time fell by between 40 and 50 minutes per week. 
Over the year following the increase, we can compare difference-
in-differences estimates of the LFS initial effect and the NES lagged 
effect for both sexes. The estimated hours effect for men is predomi-
nantly negative but not statistically significant (based on the LFS) or 
uniformly negative (based on the NES). The NES indicates declines 
over the course of the year of between 80 minutes and 110 minutes per 
week in total hours for all men, and between 75 minutes and nearly 
two hours per week in straight-time hours. For men whose wages rose 
to be in compliance with the NMW, the point estimates of the decline 
range from about 110 minutes per week to 140 minutes per week in 
total hours and from about 100 minutes to 140 minutes per week in 
straight time. For women, the NES point estimates of the lagged effect 
are also statistically significant but smaller in size, perhaps due to the 
considerably larger immediate impact: for all women, declines range 
from about 80 to 90 minutes per week in total hours and from about 65 
to 80 minutes per week in straight-time hours. For women, the point 
estimates from LFS data are negative more often than not, but none are 
statistically significant. 
Finally, the LFS-based difference-in-differences lagged effect is 
mixed. All but two of the point estimates for men are negative (both for 
total hours), but none of those for total hours is statistically significant. 
Nearly all the point estimates of the effect on men’s straight-time hours 
are both negative and statistically significant. These indicate a decline 
in straight time ranging between 2 hours 20 minutes and nearly 3 hours 
40 minutes per week for all men, and between 3.5 and 4.0 hours per 
week for those whose wages rose to be in compliance with the NMW. 
For women, all the LFS-based lagged estimates are negative, but only 
one is statistically significant. 
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) mention some measurement issues 
that raise questions about robustness of the LFS results. They also re-
port estimated impacts on hours based on a wage gap that are roughly 
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the same size, at the average value of the wage gap as those estimated 
by difference-in-differences when the difference-in-differences es-
timates are statistically significant (but are often of the opposite sign 
when the difference-in-differences estimates are not statistically sig-
nificant). Because they believe the wage gap to be more vulnerable to 
measurement errors than mere sorting of individuals into treatment and 
control groups, they interpret the wage-gap results as merely confirm-
ing the difference-in-differences ones. 
How to make sense of this plethora of results? For neither survey 
does the estimate of the most immediate effect indicate a reduction in 
men’s hours, but both do indicate a decline over the half year (LFS) or 
year (NES) after that. For women, there is evidence of an immediate 
decline in their hours (NES), but little thereafter. Stewart and Swaffield 
(2008) conclude that “in broad terms the evidence presented in this pa-
per suggests strongly that the introduction of the minimum wage led 
to a reduction in the paid working hours of both male and female low-
wage workers” (p. 165).24 
Robinson and Wadsworth (2007) use the LFS to focus on the re-
sponse of second-job holding to introduction of the NMW, and along 
the way they also examine the hours response of those who held two 
jobs. Their working hypothesis is that the only reason for holding two 
jobs is that one cannot work as many hours (and earn as much) as de-
sired in only one of the jobs available. When the NMW was introduced, 
several effects were possible. If neither hours nor employment at the 
primary job changed, then those who both worked at two jobs and expe-
rienced a wage increase in the primary job may well have reduced their 
hours at the second one. If hours at the primary job declined (and more 
paid hours at the secondary job were available), then hours worked in 
secondary jobs may have increased. Their analysis compares those who 
earned less than the £3.60 NMW in the year before it became law— 
roughly the lowest decile of wage earners—with those who earned up 
to £4.20—roughly the second decile.25 Robinson and Wadsworth report 
that those in this treatment group worked roughly 1.3 hours less per 
week at the main job than before the NMW (relative to the comparison 
group) whether or not there was a second job. This was about a 5 per-
cent reduction in hours (i.e., average hours before the NMW was about 
26 hours/week for the treatment group) and was statistically significant 
at a 5 percent level. 
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Two of these three studies report small, statistically significant re-
ductions in weekly hours for low-wage workers. With respect to the 
exception, Connolly and Gregory (2002) and Stewart and Swaffield 
(2008) raise the possibility that the treatment group is too broadly de-
fined. When Stewart and Swaffield narrow their treatment group to 
those whose wages actually increased to be in compliance with the 
NMW, those point estimates that were previously statistically signifi-
cant become larger, but the estimates that are not statistically significant 
are largely unaffected by the sample used; this appears to weaken their 
explanation of the difference. All three analyses focus on different 
demographic groups, and the one that Connolly and Gregory (2002) 
examine, low-paid women, is a subset of the one that Stewart and Swaf-
field (2008) study; a priori, it seems likely that hours of low-paid women 
would be more responsive than those of all low-paid workers, not less. 
Sectoral Studies 
Machin, Manning, and Rahman’s (2003) study of the care home 
sector in the United Kingdom, using data for individual establishments, 
has been discussed in Chapter 2. The minimum wage varies only over 
time; to introduce variation across firms, they rely on the number of em-
ployees making less than the minimum wage in each firm. They detect 
a negative hours effect that is about as strong as the jobs effect, sug-
gesting that those still employed are working the same amount and that 
the full adjustment in hours is due to reduction in staffing. As shown 
in Table 3.6, they provide several elasticity estimates (but no standard 
errors for them), and the more reliable ones, because derived from re-
gressions with various control variables, range between −0.2 and −0.4, 
depending on the minimum wage variable used. 
SUMMING UP 
Where does this leave us? The clearest pattern is the negative im-
pact on hours that three of the four studies of the introduction of the 
NMW in the UK report.26 The two studies of low-wage earners find sta-
tistically significant, if small, declines in hours worked. Robinson and 
        
 
	 	
  
Table 3.6  Studies of Industries (Foreign Data) 
Effect: Target Sample Analytic Unit of Data
Study elasticity group Country period approach observation structure Variable 
Machin, Manning, and Negative Home care United 1992–1999 QEa Firm-survey Longitudinal Weekly 
Rahman (2003) −0.2 to −0.4 Kingdom response hours 
140 
aQuasi experiment. 
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Wadsworth (2007) report a decline of about 1.3 hours per week (roughly 
5 percent) among low-wage earners with two jobs in the year follow-
ing the introduction of the NMW. Stewart and Swaffield (2008) report 
a similar figure among all low-wage earners in the two years follow-
ing the introduction. A reasonable conclusion is that the total number 
of hours worked declines. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) is a 
simple, direct study of the minimum wage that uses data constructed for 
precisely the purpose of studying the effects of the minimum wage, and 
it also finds a negative hours response, with average elasticities ranging 
between −0.2 and −0.4 for hours in the home care industry. 
Five studies examine the effect of the minimum wage on the work-
ing hours of youth and two examine the effect on hours of other groups. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) and Sabia (2009a,b) detect negative 
hours responses using the state-level panels and associated analytic 
framework that Neumark and Wascher (1992) introduced to this line 
of research. Orrenius and Zavodny report an elasticity of −0.3 for the 
working hours of teenage girls (but none for either teenage boys or for 
all teenagers), Sabia (2009b) reports somewhat larger effects for the 
hours of all teenagers, as does Sabia (2009a) for the hours of teenag-
ers in the retail sector. Based on repeated cross sections of individuals, 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) report that they too find a sta-
tistically significant, negative response of teenage girls’ working hours 
when they use the same analytic framework, but that when they include 
controls that allow for more careful matching of treatment and control 
regions, the responses become not only not statistically significant but 
also much smaller (i.e., not practically significant). The two analyses of 
other demographic groups report very different results from each other. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) find no effect on the hours of immigrants 
without a high school diploma. Sabia (2008) reports a very large effect 
on hours for single mothers without a high school diploma (estimated 
elasticities of roughly −1.0), an outlier so much larger than any other 
estimates that it needs careful reexamination to understand what under-
lies it. At this point, the balance of results leans slightly toward there 
being no detectible effect on hours of teenagers or other U.S. groups 
studied, weighting more heavily those studies that are both more recent 
and more carefully constructed. 
Of the sectoral studies, Belman and Wolfson (2010) find only a brief 
effect on hours that quickly dissipates. Machin, Manning, and Rahman 
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(2003) report negative elasticities on the hours worked in home care es-
tablishments in the range of −0.2 to −0.4. Vedder and Gallaway (2002) 
report a negative result, but their use of very large aggregates and ap-
parent inattention to serial correlation leaves its reliability up in the air. 
Standard errors do not accompany the elasticity estimates reported in 
Sabia’s (2009a) study of the retail industry or Orazem and Mattila’s 
(2002) study of single-establishment Iowa firms. It appears that in the 
United Kingdom, both employees in at least one low-wage industry 
and members of low-wage groups worked fewer hours following the 
introduction of the NMW. 
In conclusion, it appears that the NMW did lead to reductions in 
hours of various groups in the United Kingdom. It is not evident that 
increases in the minimum wage in the United States have led to simi-
lar effects in recent years, but further work would be necessary before 
accepting this with the level of confidence one would like. A useful 
methodological exercise that would enable better understanding of this 
issue is a careful comparison of the effect of the minimum wage on 
usual hours and hours last week, and in conditional and unconditional 
hours. 
Notes 
1. In this chapter we refer to both of these employment measures as “jobs” to dis-
tinguish them from those measures for which some measure of hours worked is 
central, referred to as “hours.” 
2. Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) consider full-time equivalents (as does Giuliano 
[2013]). This is based not on an underlying measurement of hours but on a for-
mula for aggregating full-time and part-time workers. 
3. Except for Stewart and Swaffield (2008), each study reports that wages did indeed 
rise following the minimum wage increase(s) examined (for Couch and Witten-
burg [2001]), refer to Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg [2000] on this point). 
In what follows, the minimum wage elasticity of hours is included if either the 
authors reported it or it is possible to calculate a meaningful elasticity at average 
values of the relevant variable from reported information. 
4. Conditional hours means average hours conditional on being employed. Uncon-
ditional hours is the average hours worked per teenager for all teenagers, whether 
or not employed. 
5. Sabia (2009b) is not clear about the hours variable used, but Sabia (2009a), a com-
panion piece that includes some of the same results, contains an explicit statement 
to this effect. Since 1994, the CPS has allowed respondents not to specify a value 
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for usual hours but to answer that they vary. In 2012 this group constituted only 
4 percent of the employed labor force but a much larger fraction of the low-wage 
labor force: 10 percent of employees who earned no more than 125 percent of the 
2012 minimum wage. Because those who report variable hours have a missing 
value for this variable, they are effectively excluded from analyses that rely on 
usual hours. This may substantially affect the estimated coefficients if they are the 
group whose working time is reduced in response to the change in the minimum 
wage. Use of the actual hours data—which, in reasonably large samples, would 
be an accurate measure of employee average hours, including those with variable 
hours—would avoid this problem. 
6. This is a bit peculiar when juxtaposed to their employment results; the only nega-
tive employment effect is for teenage boys. Teenage boys lose jobs, but those who 
remain employed experience a (statistically insignificant) rise in hours. Teenage 
girls do not lose (a statistically significant number of) jobs but do experience a 
statistically significant decrease in hours. 
7. This is the effect for all individuals. When they consider the response of average 
hours conditional on employment, they find that those for teenage girls decline but 
that those for teenage boys increase, suggesting some substitution toward teenage 
boys. 
8. Sabia (2009b) does not mention the 1993 survey redesign that resulted in a very 
discontinuous hours variable. To the extent that the redesign resulted only in a 
discontinuity in the variable and not in any other measurement differences, this 
may pose no problems for the specifications. 
9. “Hours” is one of the outcome variables that Neumark and Nizalova (2007) con-
sider. Because of the problems with this analysis that are described in Chapter 2, 
it is not considered further here. 
10. Having described their analysis in detail in Chapter 2 and briefly in the preceding 
section on teenagers, there is no need to repeat it here. 
11. Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) consider hours worked as an outcome 
variable, but because their analysis relies on a convenience sample, it is of ques-
tionable generality. 
12. Refer to the discussion of these studies in Chapter 2 for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the data that they use. 
13. Powers (2009) is not explicit about the dependent variable in her regressions, but 
it appears to be the change in full-time equivalent hours, not the growth rate (p. 
368). 
14. The exception is his most elaborate specification, in which he both controls for 
serial correlation and includes state-specific time trends, as recommended in Al-
legretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2010). Sabia (2009a) is uncomfortable with this 
specification, saying that “state trends may, in fact, be capturing retail employ-
ment variation that the model seeks to explain” (p. 88). 
15. The estimated elasticities are statistically significant, but they do not provide the 
information necessary for us to test the hypothesis that elasticities are (not) larger 
than one in magnitude. 
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16. The use of aggregate hours gets more directly at the volume of employment and 
sidesteps issues raised by the choice of either conditional or unconditional aver-
age hours. 
17. Table 4 in Vedder and Gallaway (2002), which presents the relevant results and 
is labeled “OLS results . . .” contains a row labeled “ARIMA.” This may indicate 
modeling of residual serial correlation but is left unexplained; if it does, then the 
estimation is not OLS, contradicting its labeling. No other residual diagnostics of 
the type one would expect with time-series data are presented. 
18. For this group, the first two minimum wage increases were each nearly 20 percent, 
and the third was much smaller. 
19. In Chapter 2 we discussed some econometric problems with Pacheco’s (2011) 
analysis, and that discussion applies to her estimates of the hours response; they 
are affected by selection bias, and the standard errors have not been adjusted for 
the heteroscedasticity associated with using an estimated value for the likelihood 
of being bound. The failure to allow for selection effects in a sample that includes 
both the employed and the nonemployed may account for the very large impact 
of hours. 
20. Although the British surveys distinguish between usual and actual hours, we do 
not know if they have the same coding rules and issues, as discussed for the stud-
ies using CPS data. 
21. Stewart and Swaffield (2008) are concerned that Connolly and Gregory (2002) 
may have found no hours effects because the treatment group defined to include 
all who were initially earning less than the NMW is too broad. Suspecting less 
than perfect compliance, Stewart and Swaffield restrict the treatment group to be 
those for whom employers’ compliance is not doubted, but it turns out to make no 
important difference to their estimates. 
22. The questions in the annual NES refer to April. The NMW went into effect on 
April 1, 1999. The measurement of the initial effect of the NMW using data from 
the NES is based on the difference between April 1999 and April 1998; i.e., what-
ever change happened within the first month after the NMW went into effect. The 
lagged effect measures any additional response in the year following. As a quar-
terly survey, the LFS-based measurement of the initial effect responds to changes 
over an entire year after the NMW went into effect: the differences between four 
pairs of quarters where each of the quarters within each pair are separated by a 
year and straddle the implementation of the NMW. The first increase in the NMW 
occurred on October 1, 2000. To avoid contaminating measurement of the lagged 
effect of the implementation of the NMW with this first increase, Stewart and 
Swafford (2008) use only two pairs of quarters: 1999Q2 and 2000Q2, and 1999Q3 
and 2000Q3. Thus, the LFS-based initial effect is the average difference in hours 
in the year following the implementation of the NMW compared to hours from the 
year before its implementation, while the NES-based initial effect is the difference 
in the first month after compared to the same month a year earlier. The NES-based 
measure of the lagged effect is the difference in hours in the thirteenth month fol-
lowing implementation and the first month afterward, while the two periods used 
for the LFS-based measure of the lagged effect start at the same time as the cor-
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responding periods in the NES measurement but continue for another five months 
after the NES periods end. As a result of these differences in timing, the two do 
not measure quite the same thing. 
23. These different estimates reflect different definitions of the comparison group, the 
real wage deflator, and so on. The term that Stewart and Swaffield (2008) use for 
straight time is basic paid hours. 
24. Had Stewart and Swaffield (2008) included basic descriptive statistics for each 
data set, at least for average hours and average wage (both straight time and total) 
by sex, it would be easy to calculate the average effect of the NMW on gross 
weekly pay and thus determine whether the NMW was a net benefit for low-wage 
workers. Stewart (2002, 2004b) reports that the introduction of the NMW had no 
apparent impact on employment. 
25. In studying the response of hours, it is not obvious that the usual caveats about 
this comparison group when studying employment are appropriate, that turnover 
of higher-paid workers is typically less than for lower-paid ones. 
26. Connolly and Gregory’s (2002) study of part-time working women is the exception. 
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Meta-Analysis 
Meta-analysis is a body of techniques for combining many statis-
tical studies to determine an overall result. T. D. Stanley has written 
extensively on a particularly useful and straightforward technique, 
metaregression (Stanley 2001, 2005, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos 
2012; Stanley and Jarrell 1989), as well as two recent applications to 
the minimum wage (de Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos 
2013; Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009). This section begins with a brief 
description of the technique, drawing heavily on these articles, fol-
lowed by a discussion of these two recent meta-analyses of minimum 
wage research, and concludes with our own metaregression analysis of 
the literature covered in Chapters 2 and 3. 
When confronted with results from many studies of the same phe-
nomenon, summarizing them or combining them altogether into a sin-
gle overall result can be a challenge. The first problem is that they must 
all be measuring the same thing and all must present the results in the 
same units, or at least in a way that the metaresearcher can put them 
into the same units. Once past this hurdle, an obvious way to aggregate 
results is to calculate their average value, and with some complications, 
this is what metaregression does. The complications arise from recog-
nizing that for a variety of reasons, estimates are not all created equal, 
and that it is therefore not appropriate to give equal weight to all results 
in calculating the average. 
Publication bias, an issue that Card and Krueger (1995) raise in their 
discussion of the earlier pre-NMWR literature on the minimum wage, is 
one reason for not treating all results as equally important. Publication 
bias means that the probability of a paper’s being published depends on 
the results it reports. It can occur for reasons that are nefarious, such as 
journal editors’ refusing to publish papers in which results do not toe 
a party line, or, as is more widely suspected, for reasons that are less 
so, where a scarcity of journal pages leads editors to reject papers as 
uninteresting because their results are indeterminate (i.e., not statisti-
cally significant) or they are deemed too insufficiently novel or inge-
147 
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nious. For whatever reason, attempts to generalize without accounting 
for publication bias give rise to biased meta-estimates of an effect by 
overcounting certain results and excluding others. 
Even absent publication bias, differences in standard errors are 
another reason for not treating all results as equally important. Impre-
cisely estimated values are of less value in understanding and evalu-
ating an effect than those that are measured with greater precision
(Stanley 2001) and should not be given equal weight in any evaluation. 
Finally, estimated effects may differ systematically because of dif-
ferences in statistical framework, data source, data period, unknown 
and unrecognized actions of particular authors in analyzing the data
(Stanley 2001), and others too numerous to mention. Identifying which 
of these factors are important and accounting for them in the meta-
analysis make it possible to understand the source of differences in the 
estimated values. 
We can chart the progress of this argument with a series of equa-
tions, in the process of which the specific technique of metaregression 
will become clear.1 We start with a simple average in Equation (4.1): 
(4.1) Effect = Effect + u =b1 + u ,k k k 
where Effectk is a meta-estimate, an overall estimate of the size of the 
effect in question. In the case of publication bias for statistical signifi-
cance, a correlation will exist between the size of the effect and its stan-
dard error, standard errork in Equation (4.2): 
(4.2) Effect = b + b SE + u .k 1 0 k k 
This equation will remove that form of publication bias from 
the meta-estimate of the effect size. However, it still treats estimates 
equally regardless of their precision. The differences in estimates’ pre-
cision shows up as heteroskesdasticity. A correction for that is to weight 
by the inverse of the standard error, which is equivalent to dividing the 
variables in Equation (4.2) by the standard error, standard errork: 
Effectk b1(4.3a) = + b0 + vk . SEk SEk 
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Dividing the estimate by its standard error turns the variable on 
the left of Equation (4.2) into the t-statistic; that is, Equation (4.3a) 
becomes 
(4.3b) t = b + b precision + v ,k 0 1 k k 
where the precision of an estimate is defined to be the reciprocal of its 
standard error (since this describes how precisely the estimated value 
has been measured. Equation (4.3b) is the basic equation for perform-
ing a metaregression on a set of estimates to derive a meta-estimate.2 
Because of differences in data source and type, analytic framework, 
idiosyncracies of individual researchers, and so forth, Stanley recom-
mends including binary categorical variables to control for these. If 
these variables form a vector, Xk, Equation (4.3b) then becomes 
(4.4) t = b + X B + (b + X B )precision + v ,k 0 k 0 1 k 1 k k 
where B0 and B1 are the metaregression vectors of coefficients for Xk. 
With deviation coding of the Xk variables, b1 remains the meta-estimate
of the average effect.3 Finally, to minimize the role of the meta-
analyst’s judgment in determining the results, Stanley argues for includ-
ing all estimates from each analysis, with dummy variables by study or 
researcher to prevent a large number of estimates from a single source 
from unduly influencing the results. 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF RECENT PRIOR WORK 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) present results of a meta-analysis
of the literature that examines the response of teenage employment 
in the United States to the minimum wage.4 They identify nearly 100 
studies of U.S. employment and the minimum wage between the early 
1960s and 2007, of which they exclude 31 from their analysis either 
because inclusion would have made the sample too heterogeneous 
for their purposes, or because it was not possible to gather both an 
elasticity and its standard error from information in the study. What 
remain are 64 studies with nearly 1,500 point estimates of the employ-
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ment elasticity. They report results from several metaregressions that 
differ in specifications and estimation methods, and whether or not 
they include moderator variables, i.e., control variables. In the simple 
model, without the dummy variables to control for different factors, 
they find strong evidence of publication bias that is large enough, by 
itself, to make the average reported t-statistic negative and signifi-
cant at a 0.1 level. Of greater interest, they find that the (appropriately 
weighted) average employment elasticity is −0.01, or as they put it,
“A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment by 
about 0.10 percent . . . but even if this adverse employment effect were 
true, it would be of no practical relevance. An elasticity of −0.01 has no 
meaningful policy implications. If correct, the minimum wage could be 
doubled and cause only a 1 percent decrease in teenage employment” 
(pp. 415–416). 
Interpreting results from Doucouliagos and Stanley’s (2009) more 
elaborate specifications requires some thought. Their control vari-
ables reflect the type of data used in each analysis as well as modeling 
choices of each analyst. When all of these variables are zero (a not very 
meaningful situation), the immediate employment response reflects a 
statistically significant positive elasticity of about 0.1. A discussion of 
what constitutes “best practice” follows to suggest which control vari-
ables should be taken into account in determining the “best estimate” of 
the elasticity. Varying definitions give meta-estimates of the elasticity 
ranging between −0.003 and 0.065, none of which, they believe, are 
economically meaningful. 
De Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos (2013) perform a 
similar meta-analysis of 16 studies of data from the United Kingdom 
that appeared between 1994 and 2010. From these 16 studies, they 
gather 236 elasticities and standard errors. In addition, they perform a 
parallel analysis based on partial correlation coefficients (PCC), which 
can be derived from t-statistics calculated from OLS standard errors.5 
This allows them to triple the number of observations to 710. Because 
partial correlation coefficients are less familiar than elasticities, it is not 
obvious what is a large value; according to the authors, “Cohen’s [1988] 
guidelines suggest that any correlation less than 0.1 is negligible.” In 
their simplest models, incorporating a correction only for publication 
bias (corresponding to Equation [4.2]), they report a meta-estimated 
employment elasticity of −0.01 that is not statistically significant, and 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Meta-Analysis 151 
a meta-estimated value of the PCC that is roughly one-thirtieth to one-
twentieth the minimum size to be considered of practical significance. 
In a more complicated specification, similar to Equation (4.4) but not 
weighting to correct for heteroskedasticity, they examine a variety of 
dimensions that may systematically affect estimates and conclude that 
the only detectible effect in the United Kingdom of the minimum wage 
on employment is in the care home sector, where it is both statistically 
significant and just barely large enough to pay attention to: a PCC of 
−0.1 in the large sample and an employment elasticity in the older con-
sensus range for teenagers, −0.15. 
Overall, these two meta-analyses of research on the minimum wage 
conclude that the minimum wage has a detectable but negligible effect 
on young workers in the United States and no detectible effect in the 
United Kingdom outside of the care home sector, where it is just large 
enough to notice. 
THE DATA 
We began with the 74 analyses of the employment effect published 
from 2001 onward that are discussed or listed in Chapter 2, and the six 
additional pieces in Chapter 3 that were not also in Chapter 2. From 
these, 23 either had estimates of elasticities and their standard errors, 
or it was possible to calculate them from information in the study, for a 
total of 439 point estimates (see Table 4.1). 
Before turning to further quantitative results, it will be useful to con-
sider some graphs to get a feel for the data. Suppose we have estimates 
and their standard errors from a collection of reasonably well designed 
and executed studies. Absent publication bias, if we were to use each 
estimate’s standard error to standardize it around the true effect and plot 
this value against its degrees of freedom, the resulting graph should 
look like random draws from the family of central t-distributions (the 
specific distribution identified by the number of degrees of freedom). 
As the degrees of freedom increase, the estimates should cluster more 
tightly around the true value, and at each value the estimates should 
be (roughly) normally distributed, symmetric about, and more densely 
clustered near the true value and thinning out away from it. Of course, 
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Table 4.1  Studies Included in the Metaregression 
Number of 
Authors Title observations 
Addison, Blackburn, 
and Cotti (2009) 
Addison, Blackburn, 
and Cotti (2012) 
Addison, Blackburn, 
and Cotti (2013) 
Addison and Ozturk 
(2012) 
Allegretto, Dube, and 
Reich (2009) 
Allegretto, Dube, and 
Reich (2011) 
Dube, Lester, and 
Reich (2010) 
Dube, Naidu, and 
Reich (2007) 
Bazen and Marimoutou 
(2002) 
Belman and Wolfson 
(2010) 
Campolieti, Gunderson, 
and Riddell (2006) 
Dodson (2002) 
Even and Macpherson 
(2014) 
Hyslop and Stillman 
(2007) 
Do Minimum Wages Raise Employment? 28 
Evidence from the U.S. Retail-Trade Sector 
The Effect of Minimum Wages on Labour 6 
Market Outcomes: County-Level Estimates 
from the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 
Minimum Wage Increases in a Recessionary 24 
Environment 
Minimum Wages, Labor Market 4 
Institutions, and Female Employment: A
Cross-Country Analysis 
Spatial Heterogeneity and Minimum Wages: 14 
Employment Estimates for Teens Using 
Cross-State Commuting Zones 
Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce 64 
Teenage Employment? Accounting for 
Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel 
Data 
Minimum Wage Effects across State 27 
Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous 
Counties 
The Economic Effects of a Citywide 30 
Minimum Wage 
Looking for a Needle in a Haystack? 4 
The Effect of Legislated Minimum Wage 68 
Increases on Employment and Hours: A
Dynamic Analysis 
Minimum Wage Impacts from a 30 
Prespecified Research Design: Canada 
1981–1997 
The Impact of the Minimum Wage in West 6 
Virginia: A Test of the Low-Wage-Area 
Theory 
The Effect of Tip Credits on Earnings and 30 
Employment in the U.S. Restaurant Industry 
Youth Minimum Wage reform and the 4 
Labour Market in New Zealand 
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Table 4.1  (continued) 
Number of 
Authors Title observations 
Keil, Robertson, and Univariate Regressions of Employment on 13 
Symons (2009) Minimum Wages in the Panel of U.S. States 
Neumark, Schweitzer, Minimum Wage Effects throughout the 1 
and Wascher (2004) Wage Distribution 
Orazem and Mattila Minimum Wage Effects on Hours, 21 
(2002) Employment, and Number of Firms: The 
Iowa Case 
Orrenius and Zavodny The Effect of Minimum Wages on 36 
(2008) Immigrants’ Employment and Earnings 
Zavodny (2000) The Effect of the Minimum Wage on 4 
Employment and Hours 
Pereira (2003) The Impact of Minimum Wages on Youth 1 
Employment in Portugal 
Potter (2006) Measuring the Employment Impacts of the 5 
Living Wage Ordinance in Santa Fe, New 
Mexico 
Sabia (2009b) The Effects of Minimum Wage Increases 15 
on Retail Employment and Hours: New 
Evidence from the Monthly CPS Data 
Singell and Terborg Employment Effects of Two Northwest 4 
(2007) Minimum Wage Initiatives 
this standardization presumes more knowledge than we have, since the 
true value is unknown. 
In lieu of this, a commonly used graph is the funnel plot, a scat-
terplot in which the dimension of the x-axis is the estimated parameter 
value and the y-axis is the precision.6 If there were no publication bias, 
the estimates should be distributed symmetrically about the true value 
of the measured effect, and the mean should be a good measure of the 
true effect. Because the standard error generates a loose bound on the 
distance an estimate falls from the true effect, more precise estimates 
should be more densely clustered around the mean. The plot should 
roughly resemble an inverted funnel, one resting on its top. In particu-
lar, asymmetry indicates publication bias toward a desired result, while 
thick tails and a thinly populated central section are indicative of a ten-
dency toward rejection of statistically insignificant results. 
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Figure 4.1  Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision 
215 
91 
27 
11 
1 
Figure 4.1 is a simple funnel plot displaying all the estimates used 
in the meta-analysis, using a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis. 
The ticks on the x-axis indicate the raw mean, −0.075, and the mini-
mum and maximum elasticities, −1.49 and 1.44, respectively. Vertical 
dashed lines indicate the mean and the location of +/−1 standard devia-
tion around the mean.7 The ticks on the y-axis indicate the minimum 
precision, 1, the median precision, 11, the values at the 90th and 99th 
percentiles, 27 and 91, respectively, and the maximum precision, 215. 
The raw mean is slightly negative, and with 55 percent of the estimates 
lying to the right of the mean, the median (−0.052) is slightly larger 
than the mean. With only one-sixth of the estimates (74) lying farther 
than one standard deviation from the mean (39 to the left, 35 to the 
right), the distribution is densely populated near its mean. The mean lies 
slightly to the left of the median, indicating a slight asymmetry, a slight 
left skew that reflects not only that more points are far away from the 
mean to the left than to the right but also that these distant points to the 
left are on average somewhat farther from the mean than their counter-
parts to the right. Looking along the y-axis, the minimum precision is 1,
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and half of the estimates have precision less than 11. Only 10 percent 
have precision greater than 27. The most precisely estimated elasticities 
are (with one exception) just to the right of the mean, suggesting that 
the precision-weighted mean is likely to be closer to zero than the raw 
mean. 
The remaining figures use modified funnel plots to display different 
aspects of the data. Figure 4.2 separately identifies estimates with and 
without reliable standard errors, where “unreliable” is taken to mean 
that the critiques of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Don-
ald and Lang (2007) are likely to be pertinent.8 Most of the estimates 
lacking reliable standard errors are less than the mean, and several are 
a standard deviation or more less than the mean. The bulk of the excep-
tions to this statement are a group of very low precision estimates less 
than a standard deviation more than the mean. A handful of the unreli-
able estimates are apparently precisely estimated. Controlling for reli-
ability in the metaregression is likely to reduce the magnitude of the 
average elasticity. 
Figure 4.2  Distinguishing between Reliable and Unreliable Standard 
Errors: Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision 
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Figure 4.3  Eating and Drinking Places and Youth: Employment and 
Hours Elasticities vs. Precision 
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Figure 4.3 compares results from studies of the restaurant industry 
with those of youth employment (studies belonging to neither group 
appear in the background). With 278 observations, these two groups 
make up more than five-eighths of the sample: 165 (three-eighths) 
youth and 113 (one-quarter) eating and drinking establishments. The 
two distributions are somewhat shifted horizontally relative to each 
other, with the distribution of youth estimates to the left of that for esti-
mates of eating and drinking establishments. One hundred of the youth 
estimates are less than the overall unadjusted mean, and only 65 are 
larger than it; 13 are more than 1 standard deviation less, and only 2 are 
more than 1 standard deviation more than the mean. The most precisely 
estimated elasticities belong to the youth group. Eighty-two of the eat-
ing and drinking estimates are larger than the mean, but only 2 are more 
than one standard deviation above the mean, and none are more than 
one standard deviation below the mean. 
Figure 4.4 compares estimates from quasi experiments, which 
have a clearly defined comparison group with those from regressions, 
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Figure 4.4  Distinguishing between Quasi Experiments and (Other) 
Regressions: Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision 
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which do not. At the extreme, the most precisely estimated elasticities 
are from regressions, and moving away from the extreme, very precise 
estimates are more likely to be from regressions. The most extreme 
negative elasticity estimates are entirely from regressions, and the most 
extreme positive elasticity estimates are from quasi experiments. 
Finally, there is some evidence of publication bias due not to a pre-
ferred result but to a preference for statistically significant results (what 
Stanley [2005] designates type II selection). Standardizing the esti-
mates around the true value should result in a t-distribution, symmetric 
and with roughly 5 percent of values greater in absolute value than 1.96. 
Of course, the true value is not known, but we can select some plausi-
ble values: zero, the raw mean, the raw median, the precision-weighted 
mean, and the precision-weighted median. Table 4.2 shows the percent-
age of observations in each tail for each centering value and for each 
way of counting (unweighted and precision-weighted). When zero is 
the centering value, more than 20 percent of the observations are less 
than −1.96, and nearly 6 percent are greater than 1.96; the correspond-
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Table 4.2  Percentage of Observations in the Left and Right Tails 
Precision-weighted Precision-weighted 
Value used to center the elasticities % less than −1.96 % greater than 1.96 less than −1.96 (%) greater than 1.96 (%) 
158 
Zero 22.8 5.9 34.8 4.8 
Raw mean −0.075 10.0 16.2 8.6 32.5 
Raw median −0.054 12.3 12.1 10.8 24.8 
Precision-weighted mean −0.053 12.3 11.4 10.8 23.7 
Precision-weighted median −0.031 15.7 9.3 15.4 18.4 
NOTE: Elasticities have been standardized by centering around the values in the second column and dividing by the estimated standard 
errors. Absent publication selection for statistically significant results, we should expect to see roughly 2.5 percent in at least two adjacent 
cells on one side or the other of the vertical lines. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
   
Meta-Analysis 159 
ing precision-weighted counts are about 35 percent and nearly 5 per-
cent. Of course, this may well be because the true value of the elasticity 
is not zero. However, the other possibilities are little better. With the 
raw mean, more than 25 percent of observations are out beyond these 
two borders (more than 40 percent for precision-weighted counts), and 
at just under 25 percent, the number is little improved for the median 
(the precision-weighted count drops to about 35 percent). Using the 
precision-weighted mean or median generates similar percentages in 
the tails. In no case are roughly 5 percent of observations in any of 
these definitions of the tails, and with a few exceptions, symmetry is not 
apparent. This suggests either that many (not all) editors put a thumb 
on the scale in favor of statistically significant results or at least that 
authors believe this to be the case. 
METAREGRESSIONS—PART 1 
Ensuring the Quality of the Metaregression Estimates 
The actions required to correct the raw sample mean in order to 
derive a meaningful meta-estimate of the effect of the minimum wage 
on employment can be distinguished as either technical or substan-
tive. The primary considerations in the technical category, corrections 
needed for a reliable result, include adjusting for study or author effects, 
for estimates’ precision, and for publication bias. Study (author) effects 
include both lack of independence across estimates from the same 
study (author) and variation in the number of estimates from each study 
(author). The main type of substantive control concerns whether the 
estimated effects for youth and for the food and drink sector differ from 
the overall effect. It will be useful to present these separately so that the 
consequences of the technical factors can be understood. For clarity of 
presentation, new equations will be presented below. 
Equation (4.5a), describing the meta-estimated effect uncorrected 
for anything is the same as Equation (4.1): 
(4.5a) Effectk = Effect + uk = b1 + uk 
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Correcting only for the estimates’ precision gives equation (4.5b):9 
(4.5b) t =b precision + vk 1 k k 
Neither of these two equations corrects for publication bias. Equa-
tion (4.5a) has only a constant term (no standard error term), and when 
that constant term is weighted by precision to generate Equation (4.5b), 
the result is an equation with only one right-hand-side variable, preci-
sion, and in particular, no constant term. The effect of correcting for 
publication bias, which will introduce the standard error into Equation 
(4.5a) and a corresponding constant term in Equation (4.5b), is being 
deferred until after considering the effects of weighting the observa-
tions and of controlling for the imbalance resulting from the widely 
varying number of observations drawn from each study. 
Equations (4.6a) and (4.6b) build on (4.5a) and (4.5b) by adjusting 
for lack of independence among estimates from the same study:10 
S 
(4.6a) Effectk =b1 +∑ csStudys + uk 
s=2 S 
(4.6b) t = b precision + precision c Study + vk 1 k k ∑ s s k 
s= 2 
The Studys variables are indicator variables that are 1 if observa-
tion k comes from study s, −1 if from study 1, and 0 otherwise; that is, 
they are indicator variables for the study, coded in deviation form and 
where the excluded indicator corresponds to the first study. The differ-
ence between Equations (4.5a) and (4.6a) is that (4.6a) includes fixed 
effects for the study. The difference between Equations (4.5b), which 
includes no constant term, and (4.6b) is that (4.6b) includes interactions 
between precision and the study indicator variables. Finally, Equations 
(4.7a) and (4.7b) use random effects (μs ) and random coefficients (ρs), 
respectively, to control for study effects: 
(4.7a) Effect = b + uk , u = µs + ekk 1 k 
(4.7b) t = b precision + v , v = ρ precision + wk 1 k k k s k k 
Table 4.3 presents estimates of b1 from these equations. The raw 
mean, the employment elasticity of the minimum wage as meta-
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Table 4.3  Preliminary Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity, b1 
Equation estimated b1 t 
Equation (4.5a): raw mean 
Equation (4.5b): precision-weighted mean 
Equation (4.6a): (4.5a) + study fixed effects 
Equation (4.6b): precision-weighted (4.6a) 
Equation (4.7a): (4.5a) + study random effects 
Equation (4.7b): precision-weighted (4.7a) 
Mean of the unweighted estimates (4.5a, 4.6a, 4.7a) 
Mean of the precision-weighted estimates (4.5b, 4.6b, 
4.7b) 
Precision-weighted mean of the unweighted estimates 
Precision-weighted mean of the precision-weighted 
estimates 
−0.075 
(0.013) 
−0.034 
(0.004) 
−0.092 
(0.016) 
−0.050 
(0.007) 
−0.099 
(0.037) 
−0.050 
(0.015) 
−0.089 
(0.024) 
−0.044 
(0.010) 
−0.085 
(0.020) 
−0.040 
(0.007) 
−5.77 
−9.57 
−5.76 
−7.04 
−2.67 
−3.30 
−3.62 
−4.52 
−4.25 
−5.60 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
estimated by Equation (4.5a), is −0.075 with a very small standard error 
of 0.013. When precisely estimated values are given more weight, Equa-
tion (4.5b), the effect drops by more than half to −0.034, and the stan-
dard error drops by more than three quarters to 0.004. When we return 
to the unweighted mean but instead control for lack of independence 
within each study using fixed effects (4.6a), the meta-estimated effect 
rises by about one-fourth from the first value of −0.075 to −0.092 (and 
the standard error rises by about the same proportion, to 0.016). The 
corresponding precision-weighted value (4.6b) is −0.050, half again as 
large as the initial weighted mean and one-third less than the initial 
unweighted value; the standard error is about twice as large as that for 
the original weighted value, although the meta-estimate remains sta-
tistically significant by any standard (including particle physics) and 
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is about half that of the raw mean. Using random effects (or random 
coefficients) in place of fixed effects leads to point values of the meta-
estimates that are about the same size as those from the correspond-
ing fixed-effects equations, and to standard errors that are about twice 
as large.11 Despite the increase in the standard errors, the coefficients 
from the specification with random effects are strongly statistically 
significant. 
Two patterns in Table 4.3 stand out. One is that precision weight-
ing reduces the meta-estimated magnitude of the employment effect. 
The other is that identifying estimates that are from the same study and 
accounting for their lack of independence increases the magnitude of 
the meta-estimated effect. The first result is consistent with an edito-
rial preference for statistically significant results, at least when they are 
negative. The second tells us that in this sample, studies that presented a 
large number of usable estimates (usable in that they included both elas-
ticities and their standard errors) had smaller average magnitudes of the 
estimates than those that presented fewer. It may be well be that authors 
of studies that presented evidence against a negative minimum wage 
effect provide a larger set of robustness and sensitivity tests (or their 
editors or referees requested them) than those with more conventional 
results.12 Including study controls will prevent this issue, if it exists, 
from contaminating the metaregression. 
The next step is to incorporate the standard error term into the equa-
tions to control for any bias toward statistically significant results in the 
sample. This gives the following six equations (the first being the same 
as Equation [4.2]): 
OLS models: 
(4.5aʹ)	 Effect = b + b SE + uk 1 0 k k 
(4.5bʹ)	 t = b + b precision + vk 0 1 k k 
Fixed-effects models: 
S 
(4.6aʹ)	 Effect = b + b SEk + c Studys + ukk 1 0 ∑ s 
s= 2 
S 
(4.6bʹ)	 t = b + b precision + precision c Study + vk 0 1 k k ∑ s s k 
s=2 
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Random-effects models: 
(4.7aʹ)	 Effectk = b1 + b SE0 k + uk , uk = µs + ek 
(4.7bʹ)	 t =b + b precision + v , v = ρ precision + wk 0 1 k k k s k k 
In addition, the controls for study should be interacted with standard 
error: 
S S 
(4.6aʹʹ)	 Effect =b +b SEk + c Studyz + SE dsStudy + ukk 1 0 ∑ s k ∑ s 
s=2 s=2 
 S 
(4.6bʹʹ)	 t = b + b precision + precision  c Study k 0 1 k k ∑ s s s=2
S 
+∑ dsStudys + vk 
s=2 
(4.7aʹʹ)	 Effect =b + b SEk + u , uk = µ + γ sSE + ekk 1 0 k s k 
(4.7bʹʹ) t =b + b precision + v , v = ρ precision + δ + wk 0 1 k k k s k s k 
Table 4.4 displays estimates of b1 and b0 from these equations.
13 Start 
with the estimates of b1. In Equations (4.5aʹ)–(4.7bʹ), the patterns iden-
tified in Table 4.3 are present but weaker. With one slight exception in 
each pattern, precision weighting results in meta-estimates of smaller 
magnitude than not weighting, and accounting for the study effects 
raises the meta-estimate.14 Including the standard error in the equa-
tion to control for (some types of) publication bias reduces the meta-
estimate of the effect size in each of these six equations relative to their 
Table 4.3 counterparts. Third, including terms for the interaction of the 
study effects with the standard error, Equations (4.6aʹʹ)–(4.7bʹʹ), has 
little effect on the first of the fixed-effects meta-estimates (compare 
[4.6aʹ] and [4.6aʹʹ]) but increases the precision-weighted fixed-effects 
meta-estimate by a factor of three ([4.6bʹ] and [4.6bʹʹ]). In the random-
effect specifications, this change has little effect on the point values of 
the meta-estimates, although the standard errors drop. The final note-
worthy point is that the only meta-estimates in this table that are not 
statistically significant are three of these last four estimates for b1, those 
that include the fixed-effect interactions, and the unweighted meta-
estimate with the random coefficients for standard error. 
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Table 4.4  Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of Employment,
b1, When a Correction for Publication Bias Is Included 
b (Minimum1 
wage elasticity of 
employment) b0 
Meta- Meta-
estimate t estimate t 
Equation (4.5aʹ) 
Equation (4.5bʹ):	 precision-weighted 
(4.5aʹ) 
Equation (4.6aʹ):	 (4.5aʹ) + study fixed 
effects 
Equation (4.6bʹ):	 precision-weighted 
(4.6aʹ) 
Equation (4.7aʹ):	 (4.5aʹ) + study 
random effects 
Equation (4.7bʹ):	 precision-weighted 
(4.7aʹ) 
Equation (4.6aʹʹ): (4.6aʹ) + fixed 
effects interacted w/standard error 
Equation (4.6bʹʹ): precision-weighted 
(4.6aʹʹ) 
Equation (4.7aʹʹ): (4.7aʹ) + random 
coefs. for standard error 
Equation (4.7bʹʹ): precision-weighted 
(4.7aʹʹ) 
Mean of the unweighted estimates 
(4.5aʹ, 4.6aʹ, 4.7aʹ, 4.6aʹʹ, 4.7aʹʹ) 
Mean of the precision-weighted 
estimates (4.5bʹ, 4.6bʹ, 4.7bʹ, 4.6bʹʹ, 
4.7bʹʹ) 
Precision-weighted mean of the 
unweighted estimates (4.5aʹ, 4.6aʹ, 
4.7aʹ, 4.6aʹʹ, 4.7aʹʹ) 
Precision-weighted mean of the 
precision-weighted estimates (4.5bʹ, 
4.6bʹ, 4.7bʹ, 4.6bʹʹ, 4.7bʹʹ) 
−0.020 
(0.019) 
−0.022 
(0.004) 
−0.059 
(0.020) 
−0.018 
(0.010) 
−0.060 
(0.037) 
−0.022 
(0.017) 
−0.051 
(0.043) 
−0.048 
(0.019) 
−0.059 
(0.020) 
−0.025 
(0.012) 
−0.050 
(0.052) 
−0.027 
(0.029) 
−0.048 
(0.026) 
−0.024 
(0.011) 
−1.05 −0.426 
−5.12 
(0.106) 
−0.487 
−2.96 
(0.111) 
−0.300 
−1.86 
(0.109) 
−0.599 
−1.62 
(0.128) 
−0.341 
−1.32 
(0.108) 
−0.568 
−1.18 
(0.128) 
−0.292 
−2.59 
(0.925) 
0.193 
−2.91 
(0.339) 
−0.276 
−2.03 
(0.277) 
−0.603 
−0.96 
(0.252) 
−0.327 
−0.93 
(0.331) 
−0.413 
(0.515) 
−1.84 −0.345 
(0.215) 
−2.28 −0.487 
(0.173) 
−4.02 
−4.39 
−2.76 
−4.67 
−3.16 
−4.45 
−0.32 
0.57 
−1.00 
−2.39 
−0.99 
−0.80 
−1.60 
2.81 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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So far, we have seen a range of meta-estimates for the minimum 
wage employment effect, from −0.018 to −0.099. Only four of the 
meta-estimates, however, are from equations that control for depen-
dence within study, precision, and (a type of) publication bias: Equa-
tions (4.6bʹ), (4.6bʹʹ), (4.7bʹ), and (4.7bʹʹ). In this group, the range is 
about one-third as large, from −0.022 to −0.048 (Equations [4.7bʹ] and 
[4.6bʹʹ], respectively). The mean of these four is −0.028 (and the preci-
sion-weighted mean is slightly smaller in magnitude, −0.026). 
METAREGRESSIONS—PART 2 
Finally, we turn to equations in which we control for not just the 
study effects but for several other factors that are common to various 
studies and which we suspect may systematically affect the estimated 
elasticities. To this end, we include (deviation coded) indicator vari-
ables for whether the estimates: 
1) have reliable standard errors, i.e., are free of the problems that 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) identified, as well as 
those that Donald and Lang (2007) identified (called reliable); 
2) are based on a quasi experiment or a more conventional regres-
sion framework (called regression); 
3) are based on data from the United States or from other coun-
tries (called USA); 
4) are based on employment or on hours of employment (called 
employment).15 
We present two sets of results, all of which include these variables. 
One set also includes (deviation coded) indicators for whether the esti-
mates are based on data for teenagers and young adults (youth) or for 
eating and drinking places (E&D). 
The addition of the first four variables, but not the last two vari-
ables, Youth and E&D, turns Equations (4.6bʹ), (4.6bʹʹ), (4.7bʹ), and 
(4.7bʹʹ) into (4.8bʹ), (4.8bʹʹ), (4.9bʹ), and (4.9bʹʹ):16 
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Fixed-effects models: 
S 
(4.8bʹ) tk = b0 + b precision1 k + precisionk ∑ csStudys + 
s= 2 
reliable regression b1 reliable × precisionk + b regression × precisionk +k 1 k 
USA employment b USA × precision + b employment × precision + v1 k k 1 k k k 
S S 
(4.8bʹʹ)	 t =b + b precision + precision c Study + d Study +k 0 1 k k ∑ s s ∑ s s 
s= 2 s=2 
reliable regression b1 reliablek × precisionk + b1 regressionk × precisionk + 
USA employment b USA × precision + b employment × precision + v1 k k 1 k k k 
Random-effects models: 
reliable (4.9bʹ) b0 + b precisionk + b1 reliablek × precisionk +1 
regression USA b regression × precision + b USA × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
employment b employment × precision + v1 k k k 
v = ρ precision + wk s k k 
reliable t = b + b precision + b reliable × precision +(4.9bʹʹ) k 0 1 k 1 k k 
regression USA b regression × precision + b USA × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
employment b1 employmentk × precisionk + vk 
v = ρ precision + δ + wk s k s k 
k indexes each estimate (observation) 
s indexes the study from which each estimate is drawn. 
Meta-Estimates of Overall Models 
Although the literature on the minimum wage is particularly con-
cerned with the effect of the minimum wage on young workers and 
on the eating and drinking places, we start with meta-estimates of the 
overall effect, and hold off considering these more specific effects until 
later in this chapter. Table 4.5 provides both coefficient meta-estimates 
and sums of the coefficients for Equations (4.8bʹ)–(4.9bʹʹ). The table 
includes not only the meta-estimates for each equation but also two 
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means of these meta-estimates, the first a simple mean, the second a 
precision-weighted mean.17 Because there are so many meta-estimates, 
and because we are agnostic as to which of the models (4.8bʹ)–(4.9bʹʹ) 
is the “correct” model, our discussion focuses on these means and, 
in particular, the precision-weighted mean. We favor the precision-
weighted mean, as this places the greatest weight on the meta-estimates 
that are estimated with the least variance.18 As it turns out, however, 
there is little difference in the point value or statistical significance 
between the two means. 
Our assessments of statistical significance deviate somewhat from 
the standard we have used elsewhere in this book. To this point we 
have used a two-tailed 0.05 standard to assess the statistical significance 
of estimates. Given that conventional economic theory suggests that 
the minimum wage should have a negative effect on employment and 
hours, and that this view is held by many who follow this topic, we will 
also use a 0.05 test for a negative effect against the null of no effect or 
a positive effect. Using these criteria, we find weak evidence of a small 
negative effect on employment, but even this effect does not appear 
in studies of the United States. In terms of overall effects, the United 
States has a far more favorable situation with respect to the effect of 
the minimum wage on employment than the balance of the countries 
covered by this research. 
Table 4.5 is laid out in two panels. The upper panel, panel A, reports 
point estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics for the coefficients; the 
lower panel, Panel B, reports similar statistics for relevant sums of the 
coefficients. Panel A provides meta-estimates of the average employ-
ment and hours elasticity (hereafter the average elasticity), the addi-
tional response associated with regression-based estimates (in contrast 
with those based on quasi experiments), the additional effect for esti-
mates that likely have reliable standard errors (against those that are 
likely not reliable), the additional effect for those drawn from models 
of employment (vs. models of hours), and the additional effect for those 
drawn from analyses of U.S. data (against the balance of the world). 
The sums in Panel B address issues such as what is the effect of the 
minimum wage on employment and what is the effect of the minimum 
wage on employment in the United States. These sums will be the 
focus of our discussion, but we first need to consider the coefficient 
meta-estimates. 
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Table 4.5  Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of 
Employment and Hours 
4.8b´ 4.8b´´ 4.9b´ 4.9b´´ Mean 
Precision-
weighted 
mean 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates 
b1 
t 
−0.099 
(0.089) 
−1.12 
−0.237 
(0.089) 
−2.65 
−0.041 
(0.019) 
−2.13 
−0.024 
(0.020) 
−1.23 
−0.100 
(0.0645) 
−1.55 
−0.057 
(0.0418) 
−1.37 
regressionb1 
t 
−0.006 
(0.016) 
−0.37 
−0.020 
(0.018) 
−1.13 
−0.018 
(0.011) 
−1.64 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.68 
−0.009 
(0.015) 
−0.59 
−0.009 
(0.014) 
−0.60 
reliableb1 
t 
−0.029 
(0.053) 
−0.56 
0.044 
(0.055) 
0.80 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.87 
0.031 
(0.018) 
1.69 
0.015 
(0.040) 
0.37 
0.019 
(0.031) 
0.60 
employmentb1 
t 
−0.011 
(0.007) 
−1.49 
−0.006 
(0.008) 
−0.81 
−0.013 
(0.007) 
−1.84 
−0.008 
(0.011) 
−0.75 
−0.010 
(0.008) 
−1.14 
−0.010 
(0.008) 
−1.21 
USAb1 
t 
0.147 
(0.106) 
1.39 
0.240 
(0.099) 
2.42 
0.037 
(0.020) 
1.83 
−0.011 
(0.022) 
−0.48 
0.103 
(0.074) 
1.39 
0.045 
(0.047) 
0.97 
Panel B: Sums of coefficients 
b1 
t 
−0.099 
(0.089) 
−1.12 
−0.237 
(0.089) 
−2.65 
−0.041 
(0.019) 
−2.13 
−0.024 
(0.020) 
−1.23 
−0.100 
(0.0645) 
−1.55 
−0.057 
(0.0418) 
−1.37 
employmentb  + b1 1 
t 
−0.110 
(0.089) 
−1.24 
−0.243 
(0.089) 
−2.73 
−0.054 
(0.019) 
−2.88 
−0.032 
(0.019) 
−1.72 
−0.110 
(0.064) 
−1.71 
−0.067 
(0.041) 
−1.63 
USAb + b1 1 
t 
0.048 
(0.037) 
1.29 
0.003 
(0.039) 
0.08 
−0.004 
(0.022) 
−0.19 
−0.035 
(0.022) 
−1.58 
0.003 
(0.031) 
0.10 
−0.003 
(0.029) 
−0.10 
employmentb  + b1 1 
USA+ b1 
0.037 
(0.037) 
1.01 
−0.003 
(0.039) 
−0.08 
−0.017 
(0.021) 
−0.80 
−0.043 
(0.021) 
−2.01 
−0.006 
(0.031) 
−0.21 
−0.013 
(0.028) 
−0.45 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Before discussing this table, it is useful to clarify the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients when the indicators for regression, reliability, 
employments, and USA are meta-estimated in deviation form. The 
overall meta-estimate, b1, is the grand mean across all of the categories 
of controls. Consider the meta-estimate of b1 for Equation (4.8bʹ) in 
the upper left-hand corner of Panel A. Putting aside its lack of statisti-
cal significance, the coefficient of −0.099 indicates that a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage would result in a 0.99 percent reduction 
in employment and hours. If we want to know the effect on employment 
alone, that is, the elasticity drawn only from estimates based on models 
of employment and excluding those drawn from models of hours, we 
employmentneed to add the coefficient on b1 , −0.011, to b1. With this addi-
tion, the mean effect on employment of the 10 percent increase would 
be a 1.1 percent decline in employment. If we wished to know the effect 
on hours, we would subtract the coefficient on b1 
employment to find that the 
effect on hours would be a decline of −0.88 percent. Given this coding, 
we are most interested in the sums of coefficients, and most of our dis-
cussion will be about the sums in Panel B. 
Turning briefly to Panel A, we are faced with five coefficients for 
each of four equations. Although the meta-estimates are often similar 
across equations, this is not always the case. For example, estimates of 
the average elasticity, b 1 , take on the values of −0.099, −0.237, −0.041, 
and −0.024, and the t-statistics range between −2.65 and −1.12. We do 
not have strong priors about which of the equations provide the correct 
meta-estimates, and it therefore seems appropriate to average them. We 
calculate two means: the first a simple average, the second weighted by 
the precision of the meta-estimate. Allowing for statistical significance, 
there are not meaningful differences between the two. 
Considering specific coefficient meta-estimates and their means, 
meta-estimates of the average elasticity show the largest range in both 
coefficients and statistical significance. The fixed-effects models pro-
duce the largest effects, but only the (4.8bʹʹ) coefficient meets the 0.05 
test. The random-effects coefficients are far smaller in magnitude and 
(4.9bʹ) reject the null of no effect, but (4.9bʹʹ) does not. Neither the 
simple mean nor the precision-weighted mean are statistically signifi-
cant, but the simple mean is not greatly below a 0.05 one-tailed test cri-
regression reliable , and b employment—teria. Most of the other coefficients—b1 , b1 1 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  
   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
170 Belman and Wolfson 
are very small, less than 0.01 in absolute value, and not significant; b1 
USA 
is an exception to this statement. 
Consider next the sums reported in Panel B, starting with the elas-
employment 19ticity employment, b1 + b1 . The simple mean indicates that 
employment declines by 1.1 percent when the minimum wage is raised 
by 10 percent and the precision-weighted mean is −0.67 percent; the 
former passes a one-tailed 0.05 test, and the latter is very close to pass-
ing. The meta-analysis then indicates a small negative employment 
effect across all studies without regard to the country of origin. 
The estimates of b1 
USA are considerably different from those for the 
other controls. It is positive in three out of four cases, and in those 
instances it is virtually the mirror image of the average elasticity. This 
is particularly striking for Equation (4.8bʹʹ), in which the meta-estimate 
of b1 is −0.237 and the meta-estimate of b1 
USA is 0.240. Both are statis-
tically significant, and, as a result, when the average elasticity for the 
United States is calculated in Panel B, b1 + b1 
USA, it is a tiny, statistically 
nonsignificant 0.003; in the United States, a 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage is meta-estimated to cause a 0.03 percent decline in 
employment (whether measured by jobs or hours). Both the simple and 
precision-weighted means of b1 
USA are sufficiently similar in absolute 
value but opposite in sign to the b1 means that the meta-estimated elas-
ticity in the United States is, in essence, 0.0. 
These meta-estimates also find that the minimum wage does not 
employ-affect employment in the United States. Meta-estimates of b1 + b1 
ment + b1 
USA, the minimum wage elasticity of employment in the United 
States (i.e., excluding studies of hours), are in the bottom row of Panel 
B. The point estimates range between +0.037 and −0.043; the means 
indicate that a 10 percent rise in the minimum wage would result in 
a change in employment between +0.06 percent and −0.13 percent, 
but neither is close to passing a conventional standard of statistical 
significance. 
The meta-estimates in Table 4.5 show that increases in the mini-
mum wage do not affect employment and hours, but there is evidence 
of a small negative effect on employment alone. This effect is, however, 
an effect in countries other than the United States. The meta-estimated 
effect on employment in the United States, b1 + b1 
USA, is both vanish-
ingly small and not statistically significant in even the most generous 
test. These initial results set the stage for investigating the effect of the 
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minimum wage on two groups of particular interest, younger workers, 
and those working in the eating and drinking places. 
Separating Out the Effects for Youth and Eating and 
Drinking Places 
Next, we include the Youth and E&D variables in the equations to 
allow for different elasticities for young workers and for eating and 
drinking places: 
Fixed-effects models: 
S 
(4.10bʹ) t = b +b precision + precision c Study +k 0 1 k k ∑ s s 
s=2 
reliable regression b reliable × precision + b regression × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
USA employment b1 USA × precisionk +b employment × precisionk +k 1 k 
YouthY E &Db Youth × precision + b E& D × precision + v1 k k 1 k k k 
(4.10bʹʹ) 
 S  S t = b + b precision + precision  c Study  + d Study +k 0 1 k k ∑ s s  ∑ s s s= 2 s= 2 
reliable regression b reliable × precision + b regression × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
USA employment b USA × precision + b employment × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
YouthY E &Db Youth × precisionk + b E& D × precisionk + vk1 k 1 k 
Random-effects models: 
reliable t =b + b precision + b reliable × precision +(4.11bʹ) k 0 1 k 1 k k 
regression USA b regression × precision +b USA × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
employment b employment × precision +1 k k 
YouthY E &Db Youth × precision + b E& D × precision + v1 k k 1 k k k 
vk = ρs precisionk + wk 
			
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
172 Belman and Wolfson 
reliable (4.11bʹʹ) t = b +b precision +b reliable × precision +k 0 1 k 1 k k 
regression USA b regression × precision + b USA × precision +1 k k 1 k k 
employment b1 employmentk × precisionk + 
YouthY E &Db Youth × precision + b E& D × precision + v1 k k 1 k k k 
v = ρ precision + δ + wk s k s k 
Estimates Separating Out the Effect of Youth and Eating and 
Drinking Places 
Table 4.6 presents the coefficient estimates for Equations (4.10bʹ)– 
(4.11bʹʹ). As we are interested in parsing out not only the average elas-
ticity but also the effect on employment of youth and in eating and 
youthdrinking places, Table 4.7 presents sums that include the terms b1 , &D employmentb1 
E , and b1 . 
Parallel to Table 4.5, Table 4.6 presents the estimates for the seven 
youthcoefficients of interest. Estimates of the additional effect on youth, b1 , 
are small, ranging from +0.022 to −0.029, and none are statistically sig-
nificant even in a one-tailed 0.05 test. In contrast, the estimated addi-
tional effect on eating and drinking places, b1 
E&D, which range between 
+0.001 and −0.093, are negative and statistically significant in three of 
the four specifications. The mean values hover around −0.04, and the 
precision-weighted mean is significant in a one-tailed 0.05 test. The 
average elasticity, b1, is marginally more negative compared to the esti-
mates in Table 4.5, which do not include indicator variables for youth 
or eating and drinking places, but the means remain small in magnitude 
and do not achieve statistical significance in a one-tailed 0.05 test. The 
regression reliable employment, and bpoint estimates for b , b , b USA barely move, 1 1 1 1 
with no changes occurring to the left of the second decimal position. 
Panel B1 in Table 4.7 presents the same sums as Panel B in Table 
4.5. As the youth and eating and drinking places indicators are in devia-
tion form, the sums are very similar to those for the same terms in Table 
employment, differ 4.5. The estimates of the employment elasticity, b1 + b1 
from the Table 4.5 estimates at the second or third decimal point, and 
both means are statistically significant in better than a one-tailed 0.05 
test, as before. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is estimated 
to reduce employment between 1 percent and 0.64 percent. Studies of 
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Table 4.6  Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of 
Employment and Hours for Models with Controls for Youth 
and Eating and Drinking Places 
b1 
t 
4.10b´ 
−0.112 
(0.086) 
−1.30 
4.10b´´ 
−0.222 
(0.088) 
−2.53 
4.11b´ 
−0.043 
(0.020) 
−2.16 
4.11b´´ 
−0.035 
(0.022) 
−1.60 
Mean 
−0.103 
(0.063) 
−1.63 
Elasticity-
weighted 
mean 
−0.064 
(0.043) 
−1.50 
regression b1 
t 
−0.006 
(0.015) 
−0.40 
−0.020 
(0.018) 
−1.14 
−0.018 
(0.011) 
−1.61 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.75 
−0.008 
(0.015) 
−0.58 
−0.008 
(0.014) 
−0.59 
reliable b1 
t 
−0.015 
(0.051) 
−0.28 
0.050 
(0.054) 
0.94 
0.017 
(0.017) 
1.00 
0.036 
(0.019) 
1.90 
0.022 
(0.039) 
0.57 
0.024 
(0.031) 
0.78 
employmentb1 
t 
−0.011 
(0.007) 
−1.52 
−0.006 
(0.008) 
−0.77 
−0.012 
(0.007) 
−1.77 
−0.003 
(0.011) 
−0.31 
−0.008 
(0.008) 
−0.96 
−0.009 
(0.008) 
−1.07 
USAb1 
t 
0.148 
(0.103) 
1.44 
0.218 
(0.098) 
2.24 
0.041 
(0.021) 
1.95 
−0.002 
(0.023) 
−0.11 
0.101 
(0.073) 
1.39 
0.049 
(0.047) 
1.06 
youthb1 
t 
0.022 
(0.014) 
1.56 
−0.029 
(0.022) 
−1.33 
−0.011 
(0.011) 
−1.08 
−0.005 
(0.012) 
−0.38 
−0.006 
(0.015) 
−0.38 
−0.004 
(0.014) 
−0.30 
E&Db1 
t 
−0.093 
(0.023) 
−3.98 
0.001 
(0.043) 
0.02 
−0.030 
(0.016) 
−1.92 
−0.037 
(0.018) 
−2.05 
−0.040 
(0.027) 
−1.46 
−0.043 
(0.023) 
−1.84 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
the United States produce much smaller estimates of minimum wage 
effects. The two means of the estimates for b1 + b1 
USA are −0.002 and 
−0.006, and neither is close to statistical significance. The estimates of 
employment + b1the employment-only elasticity, b1 + b1 
USA, are −0.01 for the 
simple mean and 0.014 for the weighted mean; t-statistics for both are 
very small. 
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Table 4.7  Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of 
Employment and Hours for Models with Controls for Youth 
and Eating and Drinking Places 
Panel B1: Employment, hours, and U.S. coefficients 
b1 −0.112 −0.222 −0.043 −0.035 −0.103 −0.064 
(0.086) (0.088) (0.020) (0.022) (0.063) (0.043) 
t −1.30 −2.53 −2.16 −1.60 −1.63 −1.50 
employmentb1 + b1 −0.122 −0.228 −0.055 −0.038 −0.111 −0.070 
(0.086) (0.088) (0.019) (0.020) (0.063) (0.041) 
t −1.42 −2.61 −2.87 −1.94 −1.76 −1.71 
b1 + b1 
USA 0.036 −0.004 −0.003 −0.037 −0.002 −0.006 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.029) 
t 1.00 −0.09 −0.13 −1.62 −0.06 −0.21
 employmentb1 + b1 0.025 −0.010 −0.015 −0.041 −0.010 −0.014 
+ b1 
USA (0.036) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028) 
t 0.71 −0.25 −0.71 −1.86 −0.33 −0.51 
Precision-
weighted 
4.10b´ 4.10b´´ 4.11b´ 4.11b´´ Mean mean 
youthPanel B2: Sums that include the coefficient for youth, b1 
youthb1 + b1 −0.090 −0.251 −0.055 −0.040 −0.109 −0.070 
(0.086) (0.091) (0.020) (0.021) (0.064) (0.043) 
t −1.04 −2.76 −2.68 −1.86 −1.69 −1.64
 employment +b1 + b1 −0.101 −0.257 −0.067 −0.043 −0.117 −0.078
 youthb1 (0.086) (0.091) (0.020) (0.021) (0.064) (0.043) 
t −1.16 −2.84 −3.33 −2.03 −1.82 −1.83
 USA + b youthb1 + b1 1 0.058 −0.033 −0.014 −0.042 −0.008 −0.012 
(0.039) (0.045) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.031) 
t 1.49 −0.73 −0.61 −1.75 −0.23 −0.38
 employment +b1 + b1 0.047 −0.039 −0.026 −0.045 −0.016 −0.020 
youthb1 
USA + b1 (0.038) (0.044) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.031) 
t 1.23 −0.88 −1.14 −1.85 −0.47 −0.63 
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Table 4.7  (continued) 
4.10b´ 4.10b´´ 4.11b´ 4.11b´´ Mean 
Precision-
weighted 
mean 
Panel B3: Sums that include the coefficient for eating and drinking places, b1 
E&D 
E&Db + b1 1 −0.204 −0.221 −0.074 −0.072 −0.143 −0.107 
(0.091) (0.096) (0.028) (0.033) (0.070) (0.053) 
t −2.25 −2.29 −2.61 −2.19 −2.05 −2.01 
employment +b + b1 1 −0.215 −0.227 −0.086 −0.076 −0.151 −0.114 
E&Db1 (0.091) (0.096) (0.027) (0.030) (0.069) (0.052) 
t −2.37 −2.36 −3.14 −2.56 −2.18 −2.21 
USA + b E&Db + b1 1 1 −0.057 −0.003 −0.033 −0.075 −0.042 −0.045 
(0.044) (0.058) (0.028) (0.032) (0.042) (0.039) 
t −1.30 −0.05 −1.21 −2.34 −1.00 −1.17 
employment +b + b1 1 −0.067 −0.009 −0.045 −0.078 −0.050 −0.054 
E&Db USA + b1 1 (0.043) (0.057) (0.027) (0.029) (0.041) (0.037) 
t −1.55 −0.15 −1.69 −2.70 −1.22 −1.46 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
youthThe estimates of b1 
youth are small, and the sums that include b1 
(Table 4.7, Panel B2) are similar to those without it (Table 4.7, Panel 
B1). The means of the estimated elasticities for young workers, b1 + 
b1 
youth, indicate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces 
youth employment by between −0.7 percent and −1.1 percent, their 
t-statistics closely straddling the value that marks a one-tailed 0.05 test 
(the former not passing the test, the latter passing it). Estimates of the 
youthyouth elasticity that do not incorporate analyses of hours data, b1 + b1 
+ b1 
employment, are slightly larger in magnitude and have larger t-statistics. 
For the USA, values of the elasticity for youth, both with and without 
youth + b1 
USAobservations derived from analyses of hours studies, b1 + b1 
youth + b employment + band b  + b USA, indicate that higher minimum wages 1 1 1 1 
do not reduce youth employment. Six of the eight coefficients and all 
of the means are very small. Neither the means nor these six meta-
estimates are statistically significant. The other two meta-estimates are 
negative and statistically significant but not large; a 10 percent increase 
in the minimum wage leads employment to decline by less than 0.5 
percent. Although the minimum wage is estimated to have a small nega-
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tive effect on youth across all studies, this is an issue for countries other 
than the United States. Higher minimum wages are not associated with 
reduced youth employment in the United States. 
The minimum wage is associated with reduced employment in eat-
ing and drinking places in the full sample, but again, there is no effect 
in the United States (Table 4.7, Panel B3). The average elasticity, b1 + 
b1 
E&D, indicates that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would 
result in a decline of 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent in employment and hours; 
employmentthe effect strictly on employment, measured by b1 + b1 
E&D + b1 , 
is slightly greater, ranging from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent. Again, the 
effect on employment and employment and hours is much smaller in 
the United States. Three of the four estimates for the effect on hours and 
employment are not statistically significant in a 0.05 one-tailed test; two 
of the four estimates for the employment effect are likewise not statisti-
employment + b1cally significant. The means for b1 + b1 
E&D + b1 
USA and b1 + 
b1 
E&D + b1 
USA indicate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage 
would cause a decline in the corresponding measure of between 0.42 
percent and 0.54 percent, but none of the means passes a one-tailed 
0.05 test.20 Although the evidence for higher minimum wages being 
associated with reduced employment in eating and drinking places in 
the United States is stronger than the evidence for there being an effect 
on young workers in the United States, it does not meet conventional 
statistical tests and is small in magnitude. 
CONCLUSION 
In what must be the most cited review of research into the employ-
ment effect of the minimum wage, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) 
concluded, “Time series studies typically find that a 10 percent increase 
in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by one to three per-
cent. . . . We believe that the lower half of that range is to be preferred” (p. 
524). Nearly two decades later, Brown (1999) wrote in another review, 
“My reading of the new and old evidence suggests that the short-term 
effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment is small. Time-
series estimates that centered on an elasticity of −0.10 moved closer 
to zero in samples that included the 1980s” (p. 2154). Based on this 
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meta-analysis of results from the most recent work from the NMWR, 
Brown’s judgment concerning the minimum wage elasticity of employ-
ment remains valid, not just for youth but more broadly. 
We have provided a very large number of meta-estimates of the 
employment elasticity. The range of the simplest estimates, found in 
Table 4.3, is [−0.099, −0.034], with the precision-weighted estimates 
falling in the interval [−0.050, −0.034]. Including a correction for pub-
lication bias (Table 4.4) shifts the range toward zero [−0.06, −0.018], 
with the precision-weighted estimates in the interval [−0.048, −0.018]. 
Tables 4.5–4.7 include 64 estimates of employment and employ-
ment/hours effects. Estimates and the statistical significance of the 
estimates vary systematically according to the method of estimation, 
the population under study, the controls, and whether employment or 
employment and hours are considered. Using a weaker but appropri-
ate standard of statistical significance than in the balance of our work, 
we find some evidence that increases in the minimum wage results in 
modest reductions in employment. Applying a one-tailed 0.05 standard 
of significance to our more complete models, we find some evidence 
that increases in the minimum wage result in very small reductions 
in employment. Considering estimates that reflect the effect on both 
employment and hours and on employment alone, a 10 percent increase 
in the minimum wage is associated with a reduction of between 0.0 
percent and −2.6 percent. Somewhat less than half of the estimates are 
statistically significant, and of those, more than half find an employ-
ment decline toward the lower end of a range between −0.1 percent 
and −0.03 percent. Not allowing for differences between studies of the 
United States and other countries, the evidence suggests that there may 
be no effect or a very small negative effect. 
The means, which average across estimation methods, are some-
what easier to summarize because they reduce the sometimes substan-
tial variance in estimates between methods of estimation. Considering 
the 16 means that do not include the U.S. effect, somewhat more than 
half indicate a small but statistically significant effect on employment 
or employment and hours. Seven of the estimates do not meet any cri-
teria for statistical significance, 5 meet a one-tailed 5 percent standard, 
and 4 meet a two-tailed 5 percent standard or better. Statistically signifi-
cant estimates fall in a range from −0.110 to −0.057, with the precision-
weighted mean being consistently smaller than the simple mean. 
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The United States, however, faces a far more favorable situation. 
Considering the 16 means of sums that include the term b1 
USA, a 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum wage is estimated to reduce employment 
between 0.03 percent and 0.6 percent, but none of these estimates pass 
even a one-tailed 0.05 test of statistical significance.21 Bearing in mind 
that the estimates for the United States reflect a historic experience of 
moderate increases in the minimum wage, it appears that if negative 
effects on employment are present, they are too small to be statisti-
cally detectable. Such effects would be too modest to have meaningful 
consequences in the dynamically changing labor markets of the United 
States. 
We must hedge our conclusion because a number of articles could 
not be incorporated into the analysis. Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
excluded about one-third of the 100 studies that they identified, either 
because they would make the sample too heterogeneous to be mean-
ingful or because they lack an important piece of data to enable com-
parison with other studies, i.e., an employment elasticity or its standard 
error. In this analysis, more than two-thirds of the 80 studies could not 
be used. Heterogeneity is the hallmark of the NMWR, and if a common 
measure can be calculated, it would be preferable to control for het-
erogeneity in the metaregression. The problem is that in the minimum 
wage literature, the elasticity couplet (point estimate, standard error) is 
too much a rare bird. One reason is that for some measures of the mini-
mum wage—the fraction affected and the wage gap, which may well be 
better measures in this context than the real minimum wage itself—it 
is necessary to jump through more hoops in order to derive a minimum 
wage elasticity of employment. However, without some common mea-
sure, and an elasticity is surely the most common measure in econom-
ics, it is not possible to compare or aggregate research results. Without 
presenting some common measure as well as an estimate of its preci-
sion, the contribution to empirical knowledge of a particular piece of 
research is self-limiting. 
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Notes 
1. This presentation draws heavily on Stanley (2001, 2005, 2008) and follows the 
order in which he presents the equations. 
2. Notice that with the heteroskedasticity correction, the constant term in Equation 
(4.2) becomes the precision variable in Equation (4.3b), and the standard error 
variable in Equation (4.2) becomes the constant term in Equation (4.3b). If, for 
whatever reason, the metaregression does not include the term that corrects publi-
cation bias for statistical significance, Equation (4.3b) will have no constant term. 
We return to this on p. 159 in the section titled “Metaregressions—Part 1.” 
3. A good discussion of deviation coding is to be found in Chen et al. (2003). 
4. In addition to metaregression, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) present a graphi-
cal analysis that is useful in exploring publication bias. Because this issue is not of 
particular interest here, beyond purging its effect so as not to distort the results of 
meta-analysis, the focus is on their metaregression. � 
5. The formula is � �  ,��� � �� 
where t is the t-value of the estimated coefficient for the minimum wage variable, 
and df is its degrees of freedom. We do not use this approach in our own analysis 
as, according to the derivation in Greene (2011, pp. 36–37), the partial correlation 
coefficient is related to the OLS t-statistic but not to t-statistics based on other 
formulas, e.g., those derived from robust standard errors. 
6. More robust but cruder measures of precision are sometimes used, including sam-
ple size or its square root, and the degrees of freedom, 
7. The terminology begins to be confusing at this point. The primary variable in this 
meta-analysis is a collection of point estimates of an elasticity. A very important 
secondary variable is the collection of standard errors, the standard error associ-
ated with each point estimate: so far, so good. These two variables have a bivari-
ate distribution, and each variable by itself has a mean and a standard deviation. 
Because the point estimates of the elasticities are themselves means, and the stan-
dard deviation of a set of means is a standard error, the one-standard-deviation 
lines in the graph indicate a standard error. This is obviously distinct from the col-
lection of standard errors that make up the important secondary variable. For clar-
ity, although the standard deviation associated with the lines is indeed a standard 
error, that term (standard error) will refer only to the variable in this discussion 
and not to the standard deviation indicated by the lines. 
8. “Reliable” does not mean here that the standard errors are entirely or largely with-
out problem, only that issues that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and 
Donald and Lang (2007) identified give no cause for concern. 
9. Recall Note 4 concerning the source (or, in this case, lack thereof) of a constant 
term in Equation (4.3b). 
10. Two studies, each of which contributes only one elasticity estimate to the sample, 
do not have a corresponding indicator variable in the list {2, 3, ... A}. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
180 Belman and Wolfson 
    Some authors were responsible for more than one study in the sample. Correct-
ing by author-group instead of study has almost no impact on either the point esti-
mates or their standard errors. To avoid overwhelming the reader with redundant 
results, those corrected for study are presented here. 
11.	 Clark and Linzer (2013) make two observations about the choice between fixed 
and random effects, both without any claim of originality. The first is that the 
random effects specification occupies the continuum between two extremes, one 
identified with the pooled model and the other with the fixed-effects model. 
As Gelman and Hill (2007, 258) note, . . . (the random effects estimator) 
is equivalent to . . . (the fixed effects estimator) when we assume that 
αj ~ N(μα,∞)) rather than αj ~ N(μα, σα 2). In other words, the random 
effects specification models the intercepts as arising from a distribution 
with a finite|and estimable|variance sigma-alpha-squared, whereas the 
fixed effects specification assumes the intercepts are distributed with 
infinite variance. The pooled model, by contrast, implicitly assumes 
σ2 α = 0. (p. 4) 
The second observation is the conventional wisdom that “under certain con-
ditions [i.e., correlation between the effects and regressors], random effects mod-
els can introduce bias but reduce the variance of estimates of coefficients of inter-
est. Fixed effects estimates will be unbiased but may be subject to high variance.” 
Two common responses to this conundrum are to abjure bias and stick only to 
fixed effects or to make the decision based on the results of a Hausman test. The 
Hausman test is not ideal for several reasons. Based on results from their Monte 
Carlo simulations, Clark and Linzer (2013) observe that it often lacks power nec-
essary to detect the correlation that it is intended to detect. In our own experience 
below comparing Equations (4.6b) and (4.7b), the difference of the covariance 
matrices that is used to construct the test statistic was not positive definite, and 
consequently, the test statistic could not be calculated. Most persuasively in our 
view, Clark and Linzer remind us that the trade-off between bias and variance is 
pervasive in statistical analysis and that some bias may be a reasonable price cost 
for a sufficiently large reduction in variance; a biased estimate may well be bet-
ter in a finite sample, closer to the true value of the parameter, than an unbiased 
estimate with high variance. Their simulation results provide examples in support 
of this point. 
Rather than choose sides in this argument, we present estimates from both 
fixed- and random-effects specifications, and later fixed- and random-coefficient 
specifications. As we shall see in the results presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, for 
simple models without any control variables for the estimates that make up our 
sample, there is little difference between either the point estimates or their stan-
dard errors for otherwise corresponding models that differ on this dimension. In 
the results with control variables, presented in Tables 4.5–4.7, this pattern changes.
Overall (but not uniformly), results for the parameters of interest from the fixed-
effects and fixed-coefficient specifications are point estimates and standard errors 
that are larger in magnitude, and t-statistics that are smaller in magnitude than 
from the random-effects and random-coefficients specifications. 
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12. In this case, the characterization of the phenomenon in the previous sentence is 
less accurate than “studies with smaller average magnitudes of the estimates pre-
sented more of them, as well as their standard errors.” 
13.	 A Hausman test of the random-effects model, Equation (4.7bʹ), vs. the fixed-
effects model, Equation (6bʹ), was attempted, but as in Table 4.3, the difference of 
the covariance matrices was not positive definite. However, for the corresponding 
test with the more parameterized models, Equations (4.7bʹʹ) and (4.6bʹʹ), the test 
statistic is 2.34 with a p-value of 0.13. This suggests that we have no statistical 
reason for preferring one or the other of Equations (4.6bʹ) and (4.7bʹ). That we do 
not reject the null hypothesis in the test comparing Equations (4.6bʹʹ) and (4.7bʹʹ) 
suggests that the latter, the random-coefficients specification, is to be preferred 
since it is less parameterized and more efficient. Both of the random parameter 
terms in Equation 4.(7bʹʹ) have statistically significant standard deviations, each 
with a t-statistic near 4, which suggests that in the event of a substantive difference 
between Equations (4.7bʹ) and (4.7bʹʹ), the latter is to be preferred on statistical 
grounds. 
14. The exception for the consequence of precision weighting occurs in the equation 
pair (4.5aʹ) and (4.5bʹ), where the magnitude of the precision-weighted estimate 
of the effect, Equation (4.5bʹ), is 10 percent larger than the former. Note that the 
estimate’s standard error falls by 80 percent; the estimate in Equation (4.5aʹ) is 
not statistically significant, while that in Equation (4.5bʹ) is. The exception for the 
consequences of including study effects occurs in the transition from Equation 
(4.5bʹ) to Equation (4.6bʹ), where the point estimate falls by nearly one-fifth and 
the standard error more than doubles. 
15. Because the costs of varying hours of employment may differ from those of vary-
ing the level of employment, the respective elasticities with respect to the mini-
mum wage may differ, and this allows for that possibility. 
16. There are no Equations (4.8a) or (4.8b). We retain the primes and use only b to 
label the equations so that the provenance of each equation is easier to trace. 
17. The standard errors shown beneath each mean are calculated as the square roots 
of the corresponding means of the squared standard errors (i.e., square roots of 
the mean variances) in the row. This assumes that the meta-estimates have zero 
covariance; since the most likely covariance is positive, these values are likely a 
floor. 
18. A primary concern is that many of the point meta-estimates from Equation (8b´´) 
are outliers relative to the corresponding meta-estimates from the other three 
specifications. Ignoring these values entirely in the calculation of the means is 
one response, though perhaps an overreaction. Because the standard errors of 
these meta-estimates are typically quite high, precision weighting is an alternative 
approach that reduces their contributions to the means without throwing them out 
entirely. 
19.	 We do not use the coefficients for regression or reliability in our summed effects, 
as these controls are not of interest in obtaining measures of the impact of the 
minimum wage on employment or hours. They can be of interest in understanding 
any biases associated with econometric techniques. We include the coefficient for 
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the overall effect as the first entry for panel B of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 to facilitate 
comparison with other summed effects. 
20. One can speculate that the effect on youth employment in eating and drinking 
places is quite strong. Because none of the estimates included in this analysis are 
Youth + b1based on that conjecture, sums that include b1 E&D extrapolate outside the 
sample, so we do not pursue this. 
21.	 Of the 32 sums of coefficients themselves, 7 pass this test for statistical signifi-
cance, 6 from random-effects–random-coefficients specifications, and 8 from a 
random-coefficients specification (that does not include random effects). None of 
the 16 fixed-effects specifications, the specifications for which we can be reason-
ably certain are unbiased, are statistically significant. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
5 
Wages and Earnings 
How do increases in the minimum wage affect wages, earnings, 
and income? On its face, the answer is obvious: Those who are earning 
less than the new minimum wage will see their hourly rates rise, and if 
the effect on hours is not too severe, their earnings will also rise, as will 
their household incomes. Once we know the effect on employment and 
hours, straightforward calculations provide the answers to our question 
on wages, earnings, and income. Case closed. Or is it? 
The effect of the minimum wage on earnings may reach further 
into the wage distribution and pose more challenging measurement is-
sues. For example, does the minimum wage affect the earnings of those 
who, prior to the increase, earned slightly more than the new minimum? 
Are their wages unchanged, or do they too rise with the increase in the 
minimum wage? Another issue is whether increases in the minimum 
wage have a meaningful effect over time on the earnings of those af-
fected by the minimum wage. If the pay of those at the minimum wage 
rises rapidly after they are first hired, then the minimum wage can only 
modestly improve their earnings trajectories and incomes over time. If 
the wages of those earning the minimum wage remain close to the mini-
mum for extended periods, an increase in the minimum wage will result 
in a meaningful increase in both current and future earnings. There are 
a number of such issues, and, as a result, the case is not quite as easy to 
close as it seemed initially. 
Our discussion of wage effects is organized around six questions: 
1) How is the average wage affected by the minimum wage? 
2) How does the minimum wage affect the wages of those who are 
at or below the new minimum wage? 
3) How does the minimum wage affect the wages of those who, 
prior to an increase, were earning more than the new minimum 
wage? 
4) What are the dynamics of wage increases of those who are at or 
are close to the minimum wage? 
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184 Belman and Wolfson 
5) How does the minimum wage affect the distribution of earnings? 
6) How does the minimum wage affect the income of low-income 
households, particularly those at or near the poverty line? 
Answers to these questions provide a comprehensive portrait of the 
impact of the minimum wage on wages, earnings, and income. In this 
chapter we limit ourselves to the first three questions; the questions on 
wage dynamics, wage growth, inequality, and poverty are addressed 
in later chapters. Before turning to these three questions, we address 
issues regarding measurement of wage effects and introduce some data 
on the minimum wage in the United States. 
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
The interest of readers is seldom peaked with substantive discus-
sion of definitions. However, the terms wages and earnings are used 
inconsistently across studies, and it is often challenging to know what is 
being measured. In order to better navigate the rough semantic terrain, 
we have to define how these terms will be used in this review, and then 
we discuss each of the studies using our terminology. For the purposes 
of this review, wage rate refers to the straight-time hourly wage an in-
dividual is paid. Earnings is the pretax amount an employee receives in 
her paychecks over some period. For those paid weekly (or biweekly or 
monthly), hourly earnings would be the amount they are paid per week 
(or fortnight or month) divided by the number of hours they worked that 
week (or fortnight or month). For those paid by the hour, hourly earn-
ings might also be their wage rate, but if they worked overtime at time 
and one-half or better, hourly earnings might be greater than their wage 
rate. While earnings can be computed for all employees, wage rates are 
only available for those who are paid by the hour.1 In this review, we use 
wages as a general term referring to employee pay. It encompasses both 
wage rates and earnings, but, unlike wage rates or earnings, it is not a 
specific measure. Payments for benefits and for the employer share of 
payroll taxes are not included in any of these measures.2 
A challenge to measuring the effect of the minimum wage on wages 
is that observed and average wages, whether measured as wage rates or 
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earnings, will almost certainly increase whether or not an increase in the 
minimum wage causes any individual’s wage to increase. If wages rise 
in response to an increase in the minimum wage, and if the minimum 
wage is not so far below the market rate that no workers are bound by 
the increase, two outcomes are possible, and both result in the minimum 
wage becoming the floor on the wage structure. First, if the increase in 
the minimum wage does not cause employers to lay off workers, the 
case when the labor demand curve is entirely inelastic, then workers 
who previously earned less than the new minimum wage have their 
wages boosted to that minimum wage. Their wage rate rises, and, if 
working hours are not reduced, weekly and monthly earnings also rise. 
Average hourly wage rates and earnings increase. 
The second, opposite case can be derived from an economic model 
of a single labor market with workers of varying productivity. In the 
extreme, an increase in the minimum wage would cause the layoff of 
workers whose productivity was less than the new minimum wage, 
all of the workers bound by the new minimum wage.3 As in the first 
case, the new minimum wage is now the lowest wage rate in the labor 
market. The average wage rate and hourly earnings will also have in-
creased, and the average wage will be higher than in the case with no 
layoffs. However, none of the previously bound workers will be better 
off, as they are all without employment. We cannot then simply assume 
that a rise in wage rates and hourly earnings following an increase in 
the minimum wage corresponds to an increase in individuals’ wages.4 
What would be evidence that the minimum wage increases work-
ers’ wages and earnings? This depends in part on the structure of the 
data. Longitudinal data enable the analyst to follow individuals across 
minimum wage increases and to estimate the effect of the minimum on 
both wage and employment outcomes for bound workers (Currie and 
Fallick 1996). Both cross-sectional surveys of individuals and data ag-
gregated by city, county, or state pose greater challenges because there 
is no inherent connection between the before and after group in studies 
over time, or the low and high minimum wage group in studies across 
places. An increase in average wages cannot be taken as evidence that 
any person is actually better off. One approach to this challenge has 
been to estimate both employment and wage effects. The estimates 
of employment effects can be used to determine the degree to which 
higher average ex post wages are due to disemployment, rather than 
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to higher wages for bound workers. If employment effects are small or 
entirely missing, then the effect of the minimum wage is due in large 
part to increases in wages for bound workers.5 Wolfson and Belman 
(2004, 2010) explicitly consider the effects of the minimum wage on 
wages, employment, and hours. This allows them to both focus on those 
industries in which there is a wage effect and consider the degree to 
which any wage effects are offset by declines in employment. In their 
most recent study, they find that increases in the federal minimum wage 
had a positive and significant effect on the average wage in 16 of 23 
low-wage industries (70 percent), with little evidence of an employ-
ment effect. 
Another approach to determining the effect on bound workers is 
to compare the distribution of hourly wages before and after a change 
in the minimum wage.6 Absent clumping in the distribution of indi-
vidual productivity, wage distributions should be reasonably smooth 
with little clumping of observations at any particular wage rate. This is 
not entirely the case in survey data, because employers tend to pay in 
round increments, and respondents tend to round their hourly earnings 
to even dollar amounts. Consequently, mass points or “spikes” occur at 
even dollar amounts. If an increase in the minimum wage causes bound 
workers to lose their employment, then we would expect the distribu-
tion to be truncated at the new minimum wage with little or no spiking 
at the point. If, on the other hand, those who are bound are moved up 
to the new minimum wage, and retain their job, we would expect a 
spike at the minimum wage. This occurs because employers who move 
lower-wage employees up in response to the minimum wage are likely 
to pay them at or close to the minimum no matter how far below the 
new minimum they previously were. 
WAGE DISTRIBUTION 
Measurement of wage distributions is central to much of this chap-
ter, and it is useful to define this concept, provide background on current 
wage distributions, and consider descriptive evidence on spikes in re-
cent and past distributions. A wage distribution charts the relationship 
between a wage, or range of wages, and the proportion of the employed 
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labor force earning that wage. Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present these dif-
ferent ways of considering hourly earnings for those earning between 
$3.00 and $100 per hour in 2010.7 Table 5.1, a cumulative distribu-
tion, reports the percentage of workers earning less than a given dollar 
amount. The first two columns report these percentages for all respon-
dents who report working for pay; the third and fourth column exclude 
those aged 16–24 who report being enrolled in school. Within each pair 
Table 5.1  The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings by 
Dollar Amount, 2010 
Exclude full- and 
All compensated employees part-time students 
Percent of Percent below Percent of Percent below 
those paid including those paid including 
hourly earnings salaried hourly earnings salaried 
Earnings ($) below workers below workers 
< 7 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.8
 <= 7.50 6.0 5.0 4.7 4.1 
(minimum 
wage)a 
< 8 9.4 7.4 7.3 6.0 
< 9 20.3 14.8 16.9 12.5 
< 10 28.3 20.4 24.7 17.8 
< 12 44.1 32.1 40.6 29.3 
< 14 56.3 42.0 53.2 39.4 
<15 61.0 46.2 58.2 43.7 
<16 66.7 51.0 64.1 48.7 
< 18 73.6 58.1 71.6 56.1 
< 20 78.6 64.1 77.0 62.4 
< 25 87.7 76.0 86.7 74.7 
< 30 93.1 84.3 92.5 83.5 
< 50 98.9 97.0 98.7 96.9 
>= 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a The minimum wage is $7.25. Following conventional practice to allow for measure-
ment error (i.e., inaccurate reporting), any wage reported to be between $7 and $7.50 
is considered to be at the minimum wage . 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average 
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report vari-
able hours. 
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of columns, the first reports the distribution of wage rates for only those 
who are paid by the hour; the second includes individuals who are paid 
weekly, biweekly, or monthly and for whom average hourly earnings 
can be computed. Hourly earnings in columns two and four are com-
puted as the ratio of average weekly earnings to average weekly hours.8 
The difference between these measures can be illustrated by look-
ing at the row for the federal minimum wage (<= $7.50).9 Following 
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011), we address reporting error by 
creating a “thick” band that extends from $7.00 to $7.50. If we consider 
those who are paid hourly without regard to whether they are enrolled 
in school, 6.0 percent of workers are paid at or below the minimum 
wage.10 This declines to 4.7 percent if we exclude students from the 
sample (column 3). We can broaden our sample by moving from in-
dividuals who are paid hourly to all employees, including those paid 
a salary. Considering the full workforce, 5.0 percent of the workforce 
earns the minimum wage or less; if we exclude students, then this de-
clines to 4.1 percent. Inclusion of the salaried workforce consistently 
reduces the proportion of the workforce at a given pay level as sala-
ried workers tend to earn more on an hourly basis than employees who 
are paid by the hour; how many doctors are paid hourly? Although the 
proportion working at or below the minimum varies across the four 
samples, we can summarize by saying about 1 in 20 employees earns 
the minimum wage or less. 
What happens as we move up the wage distribution? Between one 
in eight (12.5 percent) and one in five (20 percent) workers earn no 
more than $9.00, $1.50 above the (thick) minimum wage band. From 
one in six (18 percent) to one in four (28 percent) employees earn no 
more than $10.00, $2.50 above the minimum wage. We complete our 
tour of Table 5.1 at $14.00, almost twice the minimum wage. Between 
39 percent and 56 percent of employees are paid no more than $14.00. 
Even at the low end of these estimates, in excess of two in every five 
employees earn no more than twice the federal minimum wage. 
Table 5.2 provides another cut on this data. Here, we calculate the 
wage or hourly earnings at a given percentile of the wage distribution. 
Five percent of all workers who are paid by the hour earn no more than 
the federal minimum wage. If we exclude students, the 5 percent cut-
off rises to $7.50. Eight dollars per hour cuts off 10 percent of hourly 
employees both when students are, and are not, part of the sample. Ten 
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Table 5.2  The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings by 
Percentile, 2010 
Exclude full- and
All compensated employees part-time students 
Highest wage, 
Highest wage including Highest wage Highest wage, 
for those paid salaried for those paid including sala-
Percentile hourly workers hourly ried workers 
5th 7.25 7.50 7.50 7.50 
10th 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.50 
20th 9.00 10.00 9.25 10.00 
30th 10.00 11.54 10.25 12.00 
40th 11.25 13.60 12.00 14.00 
50th (median) 13.00 15.85 13.50 16.34 
60th 15.00 18.70 15.00 19.23 
70th 17.00 22.00 17.50 22.67 
80th 20.00 26.92 21.00 27.60 
90th 26.00 35.19 27.00 36.05 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average 
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report vari-
able hours. 
percent of all employees inclusive of salaried employees also earn no 
more than $8.00 per hour, but this rises to $8.50 when students are ex-
cluded (fourth column). The ceiling for the 20th percentile is between 
the hourly wages of $9.00 and $10.00, and for the 30th percentile, 
between $10.00 and $12.00. The median splits the paid workforce into 
two equally large parts. Half of the hourly workforce earns less than 
twice the federal minimum wage. If we include salaried workers, the 
median earner is paid between 210 and 220 percent of the minimum 
wage. Although a small minority of workers earn close to the minimum 
wage, the federal minimum is not far from the wages of 30 percent of 
the labor force. 
The measure used for Table 5.3 accounts for state minimum wages 
in excess of the federal minimum and provides a more comprehensive 
measure of the fraction of the workforce that is “close to” the applicable 
minimum wage. For this table, we first calculate the ratio of an indi-
vidual’s wage to the higher of the federal wage or the minimum wage 
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Table 5.3  The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Earnings Relative to 
the Minimum Wage, 2010 
Exclude full- and 
All compensated employees part-time students 
Percent of those Percent below Percent of those Percent below 
paid hourly including sala- paid hourly including sala-
earnings below ried workers earnings below ried workers 
Less than the mini- 3.7 3.6 2.9 3.0 
mum wage 
At the minimum 7.4 5.9 5.9 4.8 
wage 
Less than 110% of 13.3 9.9 10.7 8.1 
the minimum 
wage 
Less than 120% of 21.8 15.6 18.3 13.2 
the minimum 
wage 
No more than 40.2 28.9 36.4 26.0 
150% of the 
minimum wage 
No more than 52.1 38.5 48.7 35.7 
175% of the 
minimum wage 
No more than 61.5 46.6 58.7 44.1 
200% of the 
minimum wage 
No more than 84.3 70.8 83.0 69.4 
300% of the 
minimum wage 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average 
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report vari-
able hours. 
of the state in which they live and then form the distribution from this 
ratio. The table is organized similarly to Table 5.1 but uses these ratios 
instead of dollar amounts: those earning no more than the minimum 
wage (up to 103 percent of the minimum wage to allow for reporting 
error), those earning no more than 110 percent of the minimum, those 
earning no more than 120 percent of the minimum, and so on. The col-
umns of Table 5.3 are arranged in the same manner as Tables 5.1 and 
5.2. 
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The fraction of the workforce that earns no more than the appli-
cable minimum varies from 1 in 20 (5 percent) to 1 in 14 (7 percent). 
The higher estimate includes all hourly paid workers without regard to 
educational status, and the low estimate includes all salaried and hourly 
workers except students. Moving up the distribution, the fraction of 
workers earning close to the minimum wage rises substantially relative 
to Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Between one in eight (13 percent) and one in five 
(22 percent) employees earn no more than 120 percent of the applicable 
minimum. At 150 percent of the minimum wage, the ratio varies be-
tween two in eight (26 percent) and two in five (40 percent), depending 
on how the sample is defined. At twice the minimum wage, the smallest 
estimate, 44 percent, is close to half the workforce, while the largest is 
greater than 60 percent. 
What conclusions can we draw from these tables? First, that a mod-
est but nontrivial fraction of the workforce is paid no more than the 
minimum wage. Table 5.3 indicates that between 4.8 percent and 7.4 
percent of the workforce, at least 1 in 20 workers, earn no more than 
the higher of the federal or state minimum wage. Second, the hourly 
earnings of a large fraction of the workforce is not greatly above the 
minimum wage. Between 13 percent and 20 percent of workers earn no 
more than $1.50 above the federal minimum wage (Table 5.1). Between 
18 percent and 28 percent earn no more than $2.50 above the federal 
minimum wage (Table 5.1), and between 13 percent and 22 percent 
earn no more than 150 percent of the applicable federal or state mini-
mum wage (Table 5.3). Third, increases in the minimum wage likely 
reach a considerable proportion of the labor force. Research discussed 
below suggests that the minimum wage boosts the earnings not only of 
those of who were bound by the new minimum but also of those who 
previously earned more than the new minimum. This increase in the 
earnings of those already above the new minimum is termed a “spill-
over effect.” Spillovers may reach as high as the third decile of the 
wage distribution, positively affecting the earnings of workers earning 
between $10.00 and $12.00 per hour. The minimum is then not simply a 
very low wage reserved for teenagers and workers with impossibly low 
productivity and poor work habits, irrelevant to the overwhelming ma-
jority of the workforce. Rather, for large proportions of the labor force, 
the minimum wage is closer than it appears. 
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Spikes in the Wage Distribution 
The next issue is whether there is a spike at the minimum wage. 
One of our issues is whether “those bound by the new minimum lose 
their jobs or do they receive wage increases?” If the latter, then there 
will be a spike at the new minimum as employers move bound work-
ers up to but no further than the new minimum. If the former, if bound 
workers are dismissed, then the distribution should be relatively smooth 
and there shouldn’t be a pronounced spike. Evidence of a spike can be 
found in Table 5.3. Between 1.8 and 3.7 percent of the workforce was 
paid exactly the applicable minimum wage (the difference between the 
proportion of workers earning no more than the minimum wage, row 
2 in the table, and the proportion earning less than the minimum wage, 
row 1). 
The period 2006–2010 is good for examining the effects of the min-
imum wage visually. The minimum wage remained at $5.15 per hour 
from September 1, 1997, until July 23, 2007. It rose to $5.85 on July 
24, 2007, to $6.55 a year later and finally to $7.25 on July 24, 2009. 
With a low inflation during this period, we would not expect wages to 
be rising rapidly. 
What Happened to the Distribution of Wages over This Period? 
We present nominal and relative dollar wage distributions com-
puted from the outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). Both are computed for average hourly earnings, the ratio of av-
erage weekly earnings to average weekly hours.11 In both Figures 5.1 
and 5.2, the upper panels are the year prior to the 2007 federal increase, 
and the lower panels are the year following the 2009 federal increase. 
The distribution is formed using a kernel density smoothing process.12 
Figure 5.1 represents the distribution of hourly earnings in nominal 
dollars. The minimum wage line only references the federal minimum 
wage; state minimum wage in excess of the federal minimum is not 
depicted. Figure 5.2 compares the ratio of individual hourly earnings to 
the applicable minimum wage, the higher of the state or federal mini-
mum wage, for the same two periods. A ratio of 1 means the individual 
earned exactly the applicable minimum wage for the individual’s state 
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Figure 5.1  Kernel Density Estimate of Hourly Earnings 
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of residence; a value of greater than 1 indicates the individual earned 
more than the minimum wage. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the distribution of nominal hourly wages be-
tween $3 and $25. The wages are on the horizontal axis, and the density 
(proportional to the fraction of the labor force earning near that wage) is 
on the vertical axis. The upper panel depicts the distribution for July 1, 
2006, through June 30, 2007, prior to the first of the recent increases in 
the minimum wage. There are numerous spikes in the wage distribution, 
typically, but not always, at even dollar amounts, and large spikes at 
$7.00, $11.00, $12.00, and $16.00. A small spike at $5.15, then the fed-
eral minimum wage, is consistent with the view that the minimum wage 
causes employers to pay more for workers who, absent the minimum 
wage, would receive less. The story that emerges from this distribution 
is that, although there is a spike at the federal minimum, the minimum 
wage is not having much effect by 2007. The labor market had passed 
it by during its seven-year sojourn at $5.15. 
The lower panel depicts the wage distribution in the year following 
the 2009 increase in the federal minimum wage. Here the new minimum 
wage, $7.25 per hour, is close to an inflection point in the second-largest 
spike in the wage distribution, but the peak of the spike is at $7.90 
per hour. Although the wage distribution is not the cliff followed by a 
smooth distribution that would occur if all bound workers were disem-
ployed, neither is the minimum wage the spike’s peak, as would be the 
case if most bound workers received an increase to precisely the mini-
mum wage. Again, as this is the nominal minimum wage, we cannot be 
sure if the spike at $7.90 is due to the presence of higher state minimum 
wages or some other factor. 
Figure 5.2, which measures individuals’ hourly earnings relative 
to the higher of the applicable state or federal minimum, provides ad-
ditional insights. The upper panel again depicts the year prior to the 
federal 2007 increase. There is an inflection point at a value of 1, the 
ratio at which the individual’s hourly earnings are exactly equal to the 
minimum wage, and a more marked inflection point at 1.1, where the 
distribution flattens out. The lower panel, the 2009–2010 relative mini-
mum wage distribution, has a marked inflection point slightly above 
1.0 (at 1.02) and achieves an absolute peak at 1.09 times the appli-
cable minimum wage. This is evidence of some change in the effect of 
the state and federal minimum wage on the wage distribution. Rather 
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Figure 5.2  Kernel Density Estimates of the Ratio of Hourly Earnings to 
the Applicable Minimum Wage 
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than just creating a single large spike at the minimum wage, it appears 
that the minimum wage is affecting wages that are above the applicable 
minimum. 
An initial conclusion emerging from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is that 
while both the nominal and relative wage distributions are useful to 
chart the effect of the minimum wage, with the increasing number of 
states with minimum wages above the federal minimum, the relative 
distributions better portray the effect of the applicable minimum wage. 
Second, Figure 5.2 indicates that state minimum wages matter. Third, 
the increases in federal and state minimum wages during this period 
caused a large spike to form close to, but not at, the minimum wage. 
The effect of the upward movement of the minimum wage is appar-
ent from comparing the two panels in Figure 5.2. While the peak in 
the distribution in the upper panel, prior to the increase in the federal 
minimum wage, is at about 1.5 times the applicable minimum wage, the 
peak in the lower panel, after the federal minimum wage had been in-
creased to $7.25, is only 1.1 times the applicable minimum wage. This 
is consistent with minimum wage increases altering the distribution in a 
fashion that market forces, by themselves, would not have done. 
Why is the peak often some distance above the minimum wage? 
At one time, there was a very sharp peak immediately at the federal 
minimum wage. Figure 5.3 is a kernel density estimate of the hourly 
wage rate of those paid by the hour in 1981 following the increase in 
the federal minimum wage to $3.35 on January 1.13 Here the peak of the 
distribution is just to the right of the reference line at the federal mini-
mum wage, and the distribution quickly flattens above the minimum 
wage. Why the difference between this 1981 result, where the minimum 
wage is the largest spike, and the results for 2009–2010, where the peak 
is above (although still close to) the applicable minimum wage? Re-
sults from experimental economics suggest that the minimum wage has 
become a benchmark from which a minimally acceptable wage is de-
termined. Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) argue that the minimum wage 
is currently viewed as the wage that anyone can earn without serious 
work effort or application. To motivate workers, employers must pay 
them above the minimum wage, if by only a small amount. Consistent 
with this interpretation, experiments indicate that when informed about 
a minimum wage, participants set their desired wage just a bit above 
the minimum wage. Why would these perceptions affect labor market 
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Figure 5.3  Kernel Density Estimate of Average Hourly Earnings, 1981 
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outcomes in 2010 but not 1981? Perhaps because the minimum wage 
was increased annually or biannually from 1961 to 1981, keeping pace 
with trends in the labor market, it was considered a reasonable entry-
level wage. The two extended periods in which the federal minimum 
wage remained fixed between 1981 and 2007, each about a decade long, 
may have altered perceptions, turning the minimum wage from an ac-
ceptable entry wage to a benchmark from which the lowest acceptable 
wage is determined. 
Having seen this initial evidence that the minimum wage raises the 
floor on the wage distribution, we now turn to the literature on the effect 
of the minimum wage on wage rates and earnings. In the following sec-
tions we consider how the minimum wage affects those bound by the 
minimum wage, and how it affects those earning above the minimum 
wage. 
The average wage 
How the minimum wage affects the average wage is often the first 
question in minimum wage analysis. If the average wage does not re-
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spond, and in the same direction as the minimum wage, then it is likely 
that the latter is set too low to affect the labor market.14 In addition, if 
the average wage does not respond, it is hard to argue that the minimum 
wage improves outcomes for any workers. 
The employees in a labor market are readily divided into those who 
were earning between the previous and the current minimum wage, 
workers bound by the new minimum, and those who were previously 
earning more than the current minimum wage. Economic theory has 
focused much of its attention on the effect on the bound workers, as it 
is their earnings and employment that are most obviously affected by 
the new minimum. The second group is less obviously affected, as their 
employment is not in doubt, and any effects on their earnings could 
only occur if the rise in wages of the less-skilled increases demand for, 
and thus the wages of, the more-skilled and already better-paid employ-
ees. While a minimum wage increase could affect the wages of those 
earning above the new minimum, such cross-price effects are viewed as 
relatively small in magnitude and secondary in interest when addressed 
at all. 
The effects of an increase in the minimum wage on the wages of 
both bound and higher-paid workers are captured in studies of the effect 
of the minimum wage on average wages. As discussed in the beginning 
of this chapter, there is no simple correspondence that assures that an 
increase in the average wage is associated with individuals receiving 
higher earnings. Although we would expect at least some employees 
to receive higher wages even when there is job loss, it is not possible a 
priori to determine how much of a change in the average wage is due to 
higher wages for previously bound workers and how much is due to job 
loss among the previously bound. Additional evidence about the pres-
ence and size of the employment loss is needed to interpret an increase 
in the average wage. 
Mindful of Galbraith’s (1972) observation that an advantage of 
writing nonfiction is that one need not maintain suspense, we venture 
our own observation that almost every study of average wages finds that 
increases in the minimum wage result in higher earnings. There is very 
strong evidence that higher minimum wages are associated with higher 
individual earnings even after sorting out the studies where, because of 
the limitations of the average wage measure, it is not possible to entirely 
know the effect of the minimum on individuals’ earnings.15 We present 
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31 studies of the effect of the minimum wage. To facilitate the discus-
sion and provide an orange-to-tangerine comparison, we first consider 
several hypothetical examples to explore how change in the average 
wage depends on the level of job loss for bound workers. This provides 
some useful background for trying to interpret the results in the work 
that we survey. Only after having considered these examples do we turn 
to the literature, studies of vulnerable groups, and especially of teens.16 
We then move on to sectoral and industry studies and end with studies 
of the United Kingdom. 
What happens to the average wage following a boost in the 
minimum wage? 
Consider a simple hypothetical example. Suppose we have an econ-
omy in which half the workforce earns $10.00 per hour and half earns 
$5 per hour. The average wage would be $7.50 per hour. Next, suppose 
that the minimum wage rises to $7.50 per hour. If all of the lower-paid 
workers remain employed and their hourly wage rises from $5.00 to 
$7.50, then the new average would be $8.75 per hour. However, if all 
bound workers were laid off, the new average wage would be $10.00 
per hour. If some but not all bound workers lose their jobs, the average 
wage will end up somewhere between $8.75 and $10.00. The smaller 
the job loss, the lower the ex post average wage. 
Let us now complicate this a bit and consider only teens. Assume 
a national labor market in which the minimum wage is $5.00 per hour, 
to be raised by 10 percent to $5.50 per hour. Twenty percent of teens 
are bound by the new minimum, earning between $5.00 and $5.49 per 
hour, and the remaining 80 percent earn at least $5.50 but no more 
than $10 per hour. Also assume that the teens are uniformly distributed 
within the low-wage and high-wage groupings. Under these assump-
tions low-wage teens are overrepresented, comprising 20 rather than 
the 10 percent of employment they would represent if earnings were 
completely uniformly distributed between $5.00 and $10.00. The av-
erage wage of the low-wage group is $5.25, the average wage of the 
high-wage group is $7.75; the overall average is $7.25. 
What happens to the average wage when the minimum wage rises
to $5.50/hour? In minimum wage studies that focus on teenagers, the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage varies 
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between 0 and −0.3, with statistically significant elasticities between
−0.2 and −0.3.17 According to these latter figures, a 10 percent increase 
in the minimum wage results in employment declines between 2 and 3 
percent; limiting these job losses to the lowest-paid bound workers in 
our example implies that 10–15 percent of the low-wage labor force 
would lose their positions, and 85–90 percent would receive wage in-
creases of between $0.01 and $0.39 per hour.18 Allowing for layoffs, 
the average wage would rise to $7.34 when the employment elasticity 
is −0.2, or $7.36 when the employment elasticity is −0.3. This suggests 
an elasticity of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage 
between 0.12 and 0.15. In contrast, were all bound workers to remain 
employed and earning the new minimum of $5.50, the average wage 
would rise only to $7.30 and the elasticity would be only 0.07. 
Having explored these hypothetical examples, we now turn to a 
realistic situation using data on teens from the 2010 CPS, when the 
minimum wage was $7.25, and the average wage of teens was $8.89. 
Forty percent of teens earned $7.99 or less, and 60 percent earned $8.00 
or more. Some teens earn less than the adult minimum wage as employ-
ers may pay those under age 20 as little as $4.25 per hour for the first 
90 calendar days following initial employment.19 A 10 percent increase 
in the minimum wage would result in a new minimum of $8.00.20 With 
a negative employment elasticity of −0.2, teens earning $6.75 or less 
would become unemployed, and teen employment among the bound 
would decline by 5.0 percent. With an employment elasticity of −0.3, 
teens earning $6.99 or less would lose their positions, and bound teen 
employment would fall by 7.5 percent.21 
As relatively few individuals would lose their positions, more than 
92 percent of those bound would benefit from the new higher minimum 
wage. The average wage following the 7.5 percent layoffs under the 
new minimum wage would be between $9.20 and $9.21. The elasticity 
of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage would be 0.35. 
Absent layoffs, the average wage would rise to $9.18, and the average 
wage elasticity would be 0.32; if all bound working teens lost their 
jobs, then the average wage would rise to $9.96, and the wage elasticity 
would be 1.2. 
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Studies of vulnerable groups 
Teens. In contrast to research on employment, research on the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on wages is not as dominated by a focus on 
the experience on teens. Nonetheless, there are more studies of teen 
wages, nine in all, than any of the other groups that we review in this 
chapter. In all instances, higher minimum wages resulted in higher aver-
age wages. In most cases in which elasticities were provided, they were 
quite large. 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011); Dube, Lester, and Reich 
(2011); Thompson (2009); Sabia (2009); Orrenius and Zavodny (2008); 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006); and Neumark and Wascher (2011) each 
use state-by-time panels or repeated cross sections to estimate wage 
equations in which the average teen wage is a function of state and 
federal minimum wages along with a set of controls (see Table 5.4). 
All of the studies cluster observations by state when calculating stan-
dard errors to address the issue of serial correlation and avoid down-
ward-biased estimates of standard errors. The studies consider different 
time periods and use similar but not identical specifications. Sabia and 
Thompson both report large and significant average earning elasticities, 
ranging between 0.16 and 0.5 for Sabia and 0.4 and 0.6 for Thompson. 
(Thompson argues that the large wage effect found in his work reflects 
compositional change in the minimum wage labor force.) Both also re-
port negative employment effects for employment (Sabia) or employ-
ment share (Thompson) with elasticities in the range of −0.2 to −0.3. 
Neumark and Wascher report a positive and significant relationship 
between the minimum wage and the hourly earnings, but no effect on 
either weekly earnings or employment.22 Elasticity of average earnings 
ranges from 0.22 to 0.37 when considering all teens and teens other 
than Hispanic and black.23 The positive elasticity for women is partially 
offset by a negative and significant interaction between the minimum 
wage and eligibility for the earned income tax credit. Allegretto, Dube, 
and Reich (2011), whose work parallels that of Sabia and Thompson but 
better controls for heterogeneity in spatial-employment patterns, report 
smaller but still highly significant earnings elasticities, with a preferred 
value of 0.15, and no employment effects. Dube, Lester, and Reich es-
timate the effect of the minimum wage on teens and on employment in 
eating and drinking places. Using Quarterly Workforce Indicators for 
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Table 5.4  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages, Vulnerable Groups: Teens 
Type 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data of standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta 
Allegretto, Dube, 
and Reich 
(2011) 
Dube, Lester, and 
Reich (2010) 
Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2008) 
Portugal and 
Cardoso (2006) 
The average wage elastic- Teenagers United Various Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered 
ity ranges from 0.07 to States quarter cross (state) 
0.22, with a favored value section 
of 0.149. Effects larger 
for women than men. No 
wage effect for Hispanic, 
but there is an effect for 
white, non-
Hispanic, and black. 
The elasticity of the aver- Teenagers United 1995– Regression State-year Panel Clustered 
age wage is 0.18 for teens States 2005 (state) 
Extension of the mini- Teenage Portu- 1986– Regression Firm- Panel Conven-
mum wage in Portugal workers gal 1989 worker-year tional 
(1987) to 17-year-olds 
and then to those 16 
and younger in 1988 
resulted in both higher 
wages and higher wage 
growth. Wage growth 
of 18–19-year-olds also 
raised their wages (1987) 
Census, 
BLS-
EEH, 
ACS 
CPS 
QP 
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Neumark and A positive and significant Women, United Regres- Individual- Repeated Clustered Various, 
Wascher (2011) relationship with hourly single States sion month cross (state) incl. CPS 
earnings but no effect on mothers, section 
weekly earnings and less-
educated 
women 
a BLS-EEH = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Employee Earnings and Hours. ACS = American Community Survey. QWI = Quarterly Work-
force Indicators. CPS = Current Population Survey. QP = QP (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (personnel records, Portuguese Ministry of 
Qualification and Employment. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
204 Belman and Wolfson 
2001–2009, they find that higher minimum wages are associated with 
higher monthly earnings for teens, with elasticities varying from 0.11 
to 0.14.24 Orrenius and Zavodny estimate an average earnings equation 
for teens aged 16–19 as a benchmark for the effect of the minimum 
wage on less-educated immigrant and native-born workers. Using a 
state-by-year panel, reporting clustered errors 1994–2005 and includ-
ing controls for business cycle effects, their estimated elasticity, 0.18, 
is significant in better than a 1 percent test. When separated by gender, 
the earnings elasticities are 0.22 for men and 0.14 for women; both are 
significant at the 0.01 level. Portugal and Cardoso (2006), in a study of 
the minimum wage in Portugal, find that extending the minimum wage 
to teens aged 16–17 and increasing the minimum wage of those aged 
18–19 raised average wages.25 
Each of these studies finds a positive wage effect, but three also find 
a negative and significant employment effect. Can these latter studies 
be taken as evidence that increases in the minimum wage increase the 
wages of individuals? As the hypothetical examples show, the estimates 
of the elasticity of the average wage obtained from these studies are 
more consistent with significant numbers of bound workers receiving a 
higher wage than with most of the change in the average wage resulting 
from the loss of employment. 
The less educated. Teens are not the only group that is potentially 
vulnerable to the employment effects of an increase in the minimum 
wage. Those with less education and fewer skills have been singled out 
as potentially vulnerable, as have single women (see Table 5.5 for ar-
ticle summaries for each of these groups). Three articles address the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on the less educated, two of which—Easton 
(2006) and Krashinsky (2008)—find that higher minimum wages are 
unambiguously associated with higher earnings. Neumark and Wascher 
(2011), who allow for complex interactions between the minimum 
wage and other federal income assistance programs, find the minimum 
wage has a positive direct effect. The effect net of the interactions with 
other federal income policies is however, difficult to parse given the 
available information. 
Running regressions on cross sections of CPS data for 1990, 1994, 
and 1999, Easton (2006) considers the effect of the minimum wage on 
the earnings of those who live in metropolitan areas and have no more 
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than a high school education. Each regression includes controls for 
individual characteristics as well as the wage and industrial character-
istics of the urban areas. The less educated are divided between those 
with less than a high school education and those whose education ended 
with a high school degree. The minimum wage is measured both as a 
level and as change from the prior minimum wage. 
Estimates across all metropolitan areas are strictly positive but vary 
considerably with respect to statistical significance by gender, year, 
educational attainment, and measure of the minimum wage. However, 
when the sample is limited to metropolitan areas for which there are at 
least 36 observations, the combined effect of the two minimum wage 
measures in all three years is positive, large, and statistically significant 
in a 5 percent or better test for each gender and level of education at-
tainment. The effect of the minimum wage on average wages persists 
for some years after the increase, although the persistence is weaker for 
those without a high school degree than for those with one. For men and 
women with less than a high school education, Easton estimates that the 
elasticity of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage ranges 
from 0.1 to 0.5. The elasticities are smaller for those with no more than 
a high school degree, with statistically significant estimates ranging be-
tween 0.06 and 0.14. Easton provides no employment elasticities, so it 
is not clear who in particular benefits from higher wages. 
Krashinsky (2008) finds that the decline in the real minimum wage 
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s reduced the earnings of less-
educated men working as employees—those with a high school degree 
or less—relative to similarly educated men who were self-employed. In 
the United States, employees are protected by a range of laws regarding 
minimum wage, overtime, union organization, unemployment insur-
ance, and workers’ compensation. The self-employed are, in contrast, 
not subject to these laws. All else constant, changes in the labor laws 
should change the position of employees relative to their self-employed 
counterparts. Using data on white males with no more than a high school 
diploma for 1979–1991, the author estimates the effect of the minimum 
wage on the ratio of the annual median earnings of the self-employed 
to the annual median earnings of wage and salary workers. This is 
benchmarked to the corresponding ratio for men with college degrees, 
a group less affected by changes in the minimum wage and other labor 
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Table 5.5  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages, Vulnerable Groups: Other 
Type of 
Coun- Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target try period approach observation structure error set 
Easton (2006) Higher minimum Less- United 1986, Two-stage Individuals Cross Weighted CPS 
wages and growth educated States 1990, regression in first stage/ section least ORG 
of minimum wages workers 1994, allowing for MSAs with squares files 
were associated with 1999 spatial auto- 250+ observa-
higher wages among correlation tions in second 
less-educated women within a metro- stage 
in urban areas; only politan area 
the change in the 
minimum wage 
affected men’s 
earnings. 
Krashinsky (2008) The decline in the Prime- United 1979– Two-stage First stage is State-by- White CPS 
minimum wage from age white States 1991 regression with individual, the industry corrected ORG, 
the 1970s to the males, industry fixed second stage is cross March 
1990s reduced the salary effects and state-industry section CPS, and 
earnings of less- and wage kernel density Census 
educated men. earners vs. estimates 
the self-
employed 
Sabia (2008) The elasticity of Low- United 1991– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered CPS 
annual earnings of income States 2004 year cross (state) 
single mothers with single section 
less than a high mothers 
school degree is 
close to 1 but is not 
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significant when 
estimated for all 
single mothers, or 
women with at least 
a HS degree. With 
controls, there is no 
effect even for the 
less educated. 
Neumark and Minimum wage is ei- Women, United 1976– Regression Individual- Repeated Clustered Various, 
Wascher (2011) ther not significant or single States 2007 month cross (state) incl. CPS 
positive, interaction mothers section 
with EITC and kids and less-
is positive for single educated 
women 21–44 women 
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market institutions. For those without a high school degree, the ratio of 
the median wage of the self-employed to the median wage of wage and 
salary workers rose steadily in the 1980s and reached equality in 1991. 
This ratio also rose for those with high school degrees but did not reach 
equality by 1991. In contrast, the ratio fell to equality for those with a 
college degree. Regression estimates suggest that both the level and the 
change in the minimum wage between 1979 and 1991 were negatively 
and significantly related to the ratio both for those with less than a high 
school and those with a high school degree. Fifteen to 16 percent of the 
decline in the relative wages of the less educated of wage and salary 
earners can be attributed to the decline in the real minimum wage (see 
Table 5.6). In contrast, the minimum wage did not affect the ratio for 
those with some college education or a college degree. 
Neumark and Wascher (2011) report that higher minimum wages 
increase the wages of less-educated individuals, but find there is a com-
plex interaction with the earned income tax credit. The model, which 
uses CPS ORG data for individuals aged 21–44 for 1997–2006, is es-
timated in the state-by-year panel framework they pioneered in the 
NMWR and clusters errors by state. Estimates for all childless less-
educated individuals suggests that the minimum wage has a positive 
and significant direct effect on hourly earnings. This is at least partially 
offset by a negative and statistically significant interaction between the 
minimum wage and EITC eligibility that, in its turn, may be offset by a 
positive interaction between the minimum wage, EITC, and having no 
more than a high school degree. Similarly complex patterns are found 
for black and Hispanic individuals and for black and Hispanic males.26 
Because of the complexity of these factors, it is not possible to be cer-
tain of the minimum wage’s net effect on hourly or annual earnings. 
Single women. Another group of interest to minimum wage re-
searchers are women, particularly single women. The income of sin-
gle women and especially single women with children is low relative 
to many other groups in the population; spells of unemployment and 
low earnings that place them in poverty are relatively frequent for this 
group. Compared to other groups, the effects of the minimum wage on 
the earnings of single women are less certain, with an even division of 
articles between no effect and a positive effect. 
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Table 5.6  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error Data seta 
Wolfson and Increases in the mini- Low-wage United 1947–1997 Regression Industry- Multiple Conven- BLS-EEH 
Belman mum wage are as- industries States month panel time tional 
(2004) sociated with higher series 
average wages in 
low-wage industries 
Belman and Increases in the Low-wage United 1972–2003 Regression Industry- Panel time Conven- BLS-EEH 
Wolfson minimum wage industries States month series tional 
(2010) are associated with 
higher average wages 
in 16 of 23 low-wage 
industries 
Dickens et al. Increases in the Agricultural United 1954–1991 Contempo- Country Univariate Variety of 
(1995) agricultural minimum workers Kingdom rary time (England, time series govern-
wage boost both the series Wales, and mental data 
average wage and Northern sources 
the wage at the lower Ireland; 
deciles of the wage Scotland), 
distribution by year
a BLS-EEH: Bureau of Labor Statistics-Employee Earnings and Hours. 
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Studies of single women are not entirely comparable with the other 
studies as they consider annual earnings, rather than hourly or weekly 
earnings, and include those who have no annual earnings in the esti-
mates. Sabia (2008) finds that, between 1992 and 2005, increases in the 
minimum wage had no effect on the annual income of either all single 
women or single women with at least a high school education. Higher 
minimum wages had a positive effect on the annual earnings of single 
women with less than a high school education (the estimated elastic-
ity is 0.992), but this effect vanishes in a regression with conventional 
controls. Neumark and Wascher (2011) permit the minimum wage to 
affect the earnings of single women directly, and with interactions with 
the presence of children, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and both of 
these factors. The estimated pattern of interaction is complex both with 
respect to sign, magnitude, and significance. The authors summarize 
their findings: “These results suggest that the combination of an EITC 
and a higher minimum wage may be especially powerful in raising the 
employment and earnings of low-skilled single mothers. However, the 
estimates also hint at the possibility that the positive labor supply re-
sponse of single mothers eligible for the EITC may reduce employment 
and earnings among low-educated or minority single women without 
children” (p. 730).27 In some instances, the minimum wage only has an 
effect through an interaction with the EITC. The estimates of the elas-
ticity of annual earnings with respect to the minimum wage of women 
with children relative to those without are consistently statistically sig-
nificant and positive, but are quite small, likely because of the inclusion 
of those who report no earnings. 
Summary 
What preliminary summary can we make of the studies by demo-
graphic group? Of the 12 studies reviewed, all but 1 report that the 
minimum wage has a positive and significant effect on the measures of 
earnings of vulnerable groups. Further, even where there was evidence 
of a negative employment effect, our analysis suggests that the disem-
ployment effect is moderate in size, and that a very substantial majority 
of bound workers benefit from the minimum wage increase. Our initial 
conclusion is that higher minimum wages raise the wage of many mem-
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bers of vulnerable groups, although the evidence on annual earnings of 
single mothers is mixed. 
SECTORAL AND INDUSTRY STUDIES 
Studies focused on sectors, industries, and occupations bring ad-
vantages and disadvantages. They can incorporate detail about the 
industries or occupations and better control for factors affecting wages 
and employment than typical demographic studies, which omit industry 
and occupational detail. Their implications are potentially more limited, 
as care is needed in generalizing beyond the sectors, industries, and oc-
cupations under study. 
Multi-Industry Studies 
While most of these studies consider particular sectors or indus-
tries, Belman and Wolfson (2004, 2010) apply time-series methods to 
wage, employment, and hours data to a varying set of low-wage in-
dustries (see Table 5.6 for a summary of multi-industry studies). The 
employment chapter presents this work in detail, and so we limit our 
discussion to our wage estimates. In the earlier of these studies, all but 
a handful of the 120 estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on 
average wages are positive, and about half are statistically significant 
in a 5 percent test or better. The median elasticity of the average wage 
with respect to the minimum wage is between 0.02 and 0.05, depending 
on the panel. The later article, which applies a more flexible estimation 
method to a single panel of data, and which allows for changes in hours 
as well as employment, produces stronger evidence for a positive rela-
tionship between the minimum wage and average wage in low-wage 
industries. Estimates for 16 of 23 low-wage industries are positive and 
significant in a 5 percent test, with elasticities that range from 0.05 to 
0.4. Taken together, these estimates suggest that, although increases in 
the minimum wage do not affect the average wage in all low-wage in-
dustries, they boost wages in a majority of these industries. 
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Restaurants 
The food and beverage service industry, consisting of eating and 
drinking establishments, has been closely studied because much of its 
labor force is paid close to the minimum wage (see Table 5.7). 
The work on fast food establishments (Card and Kreuger 1994, 
2000; Katz and Kreuger 1992) is well known. Three of the four studies 
of the restaurant industry that predate the NMWR find that the mini-
mum wage increases the average wage in the industry. 
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) perform an analysis similar to that 
of Card and Krueger (1994), modified to reflect criticisms of the earlier 
work, of the 2004–2005 increase in San Francisco’s minimum wage on 
the restaurant industry. The city of San Francisco increased its citywide 
minimum wage for midsize employers to $8.50 in 2004, exempting 
small employers until 2005. Using data from a sample of restaurants 
in San Francisco and the East Bay, the authors compare the change in 
wages of affected restaurants—those that are midsize with at least some 
employees earning less than the new minimum wage—with three com-
parison groups: midsize restaurants in the East Bay, small restaurants in 
San Francisco, and midsize San Francisco restaurants with no employ-
ees earning below the new minimum ex ante. 
The models were estimated with two distinct dependent variables: 
1) the average wage of the establishment, and 2) the percentage of 
workers at an establishment earning below $8.50, the new minimum 
wage (the percent below $8.50 will vary systematically by time and 
type of restaurant in San Fransisco and by location between San Fran-
sisco and the East Bay). Difference-in-differences estimates of the 
effect of the minimum wage increase indicate that it was associated 
with a statistically significant increase in the average wage relative to 
East Bay restaurants, with an effect that was significant in a 5 percent 
test, and relative to midsize unaffected San Francisco restaurants, with 
an effect that was significant in a 10 percent test but not relative to small 
San Francisco restaurants. 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) use data from the Quarterly Cen-
sus of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the effect of the 
minimum wage on earnings and employment in restaurants and other 
low-wage sectors from 1990 to 2006. Panel regressions are estimated 
for all U.S. counties, as well as for pairs of adjacent counties on opposite 
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sides of state lines. This pairing is designed to control for an economic 
climate that is, presumably, similar in small adjacent regions. The pair-
ings of interest are those in which the applicable minimum wages in 
each county of a pair differ. The pairing of counties does not have a 
large effect on earnings estimates; the elasticity of the minimum wage 
on earnings varies between 0.15 and 0.22 when models are estimated 
with all counties and between 0.19 and 0.23 when only paired counties 
are used. Significance is likewise not affected; standard errors allow 
for rejection of the null in better than a 1 percent test for all earnings 
elasticities. Further estimates find no evidence that the minimum wage 
spills over from one county to the wages of the other in the county pairs. 
The authors broaden their paired county work on restaurants by 
using Quarterly Workforce Indicators for 2001–2009 to consider the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on not only average wages and employment 
but also on hires, separations and turnover rates by age, and type of res-
taurant (Dube, Lester, and Reich 2011). Panel regressions are estimated 
for all U.S. counties, as well as for pairs of counties that are adjacent to 
each other but on opposite sides of state lines. The estimated effect of 
the minimum wage on average wages is consistently positive and sta-
tistically significant for teens and young adults working in restaurants 
as well as for restaurant workers as a whole. The estimated elastici-
ties range from 0.17 to 0.22, depending on specification and sample; 
the elasticities tend to be larger for estimates with paired counties than 
for the full sample, suggesting that omitted variable bias may be re-
ducing the magnitude of the minimum wage effect in the all-county 
sample. The estimated effect on the average wage is also strictly posi-
tive and significant for both limited- and full-service restaurants for the 
workforce as a whole. When broken down by age, the estimates show 
a positive and significant effect on the wages of teens, of young adults, 
and of all women, but none on those of adults 25 or older, nor those of 
men (without regard to age). 
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2012) use quarterly data from the 
QCEW to measure the effect of the minimum wage on both limited- and 
full-service restaurants from 1990 to 2005. These data, which are de-
rived from firms’ unemployment insurance filings, cover 98 percent of 
the labor force, have far more complete coverage than any other survey, 
and have sufficient observations to allow the study of industries at the 
county level. This study demonstrates the importance of allowing for 
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Table 5.7  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Restaurants 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error Data seta 
Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich 
(2007) 
Dube, Lester, 
and Reich 
(2010)
Addison, 
Blackburn, 
and Cotti 
(2012) 
The increase in the San 
Francisco (SF) minimum 
wage in 2004 increased 
the average wage in SF 
restaurants relative to 
East Bay restaurants 
and “high wage” SF 
restaurants 
There is a positive effect 
on the quarterly earn-
ings of teens and young 
adults but not adults 25+ 
in full- and limited-
service restaurants with 
elasticities of 0.3 to 0.5. 
There is a positive effect 
on women but no effect 
on men. The average 
elasticity ranges from 
0.17 to 0.22. 
Higher minimum wages 
are associated with 
higher county-industry 
average weekly compen-
sation in the restaurant 
San Fran- United 
cisco States 
restaurants 
Restaurants United 
States 
Restaurants United 
States 
2003– Quasi Firm-year Firm panel 
2004 experiment 
1990– Quasi County- Aggregate 
2006 experiment quarter panel with 
county 
pairing 
in some 
estimates 
1990– Regression County- Aggregate 
2005 quarter panel 
Robust Private 
survey 
Clustered QCEW 
(state) 
Clustered QCEW 
(state) 
 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
  
 
215 
industry. The effect is 
smaller in counties with 
higher average wages. 
Weekly earnings are 
higher when limited to 
counties that had mini-
mum wage above the 
federal level. 
Anderson and 
Bodvarsson 
(2005) 
Servers’ and bartenders’
wages are increased by 
state minimum wages 
set higher than the 
federal level but are not 
Servers 
and 
bartenders 
United 
States 
1999 Regression, 
some with 
selection cor-
rection 
State Cross 
section 
Conven-
tional 
benefitted by less gener-
ous tip credit rules 
Even and 
MacPherson 
(2014) 
Higher cash wages and 
higher minimum wages 
are associated with in-
creased weekly earnings 
Full- and 
limited-
service 
restaurants 
United 
States 
1990:1– 
2011: 4 
Regression State-
quarter and 
individual-
month 
Aggregate 
panel 
Clustered 
(state) 
Con-
structed 
from 
BLS, 
BEA, and 
National 
Restau-
rant As-
sociation 
data 
QCEW
and CPS 
a QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. CPS = Current Population Survey. 
  
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
216 Belman and Wolfson 
county-level trends in the estimation of the employment effect of the 
minimum wage. The estimates almost universally indicate that higher
minimum wages are associated with higher weekly compensation 
among restaurant workers.28 Elasticities in linear models vary between 
0.17 and 0.22; more elaborate models suggest a nonlinear relationship 
between the minimum wage and compensation, as well as possible in-
teractions between the minimum wage and both county unemployment 
and weekly earnings. The effect of the minimum wage on the earnings 
of restaurant workers was larger in limited-service than in full-service 
restaurants: the estimated elasticities were 0.25 and 0.14, respectively. 
Food service workers may receive substantial tip income. Under 
federal law, employers may pay as little as $2.30 per hour to tipped 
employees, so long as tip income makes up the difference between this 
amount and the federal minimum wage.29 Some states also allow for 
“tip credits,” but there is considerable difference in state policies. An-
derson and Bodvarsson (2005) consider the effect of state minimum 
wage and tip credit legislation on the hourly earnings of wait staff and 
bartenders. Although the authors divide the states into five categories 
based on the level of the state minimum wage and the state tip credit, 
the broad coverage of the federal minimum wage reduces this to three 
operative categories: those that have no requirements beyond federal 
requirements, those where the tip credit and/or the state minimum wage 
is more generous than the federal policy, and those with no tip credit 
but with a minimum wage above the federal level. It would be expected 
that servers and bartenders would have higher average wages in states 
that exceeded federal requirements in one dimension or another. The 
authors report that there is no gain in the hourly earnings of bartend-
ers and servers in states where tip and/or minimum wage policies are 
more generous than the federal policy. However, with controls for se-
lection into differing legal regimes, waitstaff and bartenders in states 
with minimum wages above the federal minimum (and no tip credit) are 
estimated to earn an additional $1.34 an hour relative to states with laws 
that are no stronger than the federal requirements.30 
Even and Macpherson (2014) provide a more recent and sophis-
ticated analysis of the effect of the minimum wage and tip credits on 
restaurant employees’ earnings.  Using quarter-by-state observations 
aggregated from the QCEW, they examine the response of earnings of 
employees of full- and limited-service restaurants to both state treat-
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ment of tipped income and state and federal changes in the minimum 
wage during 1990:1 to 2011:4 and 1994:1 to 2007:3.31 The models 
include state demographic and economic controls and state fixed 
effects, and they are estimated both with and without state-specific time 
trends.  Increases in the tipped wage are estimated to increase average 
weekly wages for employees in full-service restaurants, where tipping 
is common, but not in limited-service restaurants, where tipping is un-
common. A 10 percent increase in the tipped wage is estimated to raise 
weekly earnings between 0.3 and 0.5 percent. Higher minimum wages 
are associated with increased average weekly earnings in both full-
service and limited-service restaurants. A 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage is estimated to increase weekly earnings of employees 
in full-service restaurants by 1.3 percent and 1.5 percent, and from 1.5 
to 2.2 percent in limited-service restaurants.32 
Other retail industries in the United States 
While the early NMWR focused on restaurants as a low-wage sec-
tor, more recent work has branched out to retail industries, another large 
employer of low-wage labor. Of the four studies of retail, three find 
positive wage effects, and the fourth finds large negative wage effects 
(see Table 5.8). 
The work of Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) is particularly 
interesting because of its nuance and creativity in investigating the in-
teraction between the minimum wage and other state employment laws. 
Paralleling their work on the restaurant industry, they consider the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on industries within retail trade, again using 
county-by-quarter data from the QCEW for 1990–2005.33 Initial panel 
regressions indicate that the minimum wage has a positive and statisti-
cally significant effect on wages for only beer, wine, and liquor stores, 
with an elasticity of 0.17. With controls for county-level trends similar 
to those of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011), there are posi-
tive earnings effects for convenience stores; specialty food stores; and 
beer, wine, and liquor stores but not for supermarkets or for food and 
beverage stores as a whole. Moving beyond food and beverage stores, 
they find positive earnings effects for gasoline stations, sporting goods 
stores, general merchandise stores, department stores, and miscella-
neous store retailers. 
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Table 5.8  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Service Industries 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta 
Addison, The average wages of Retail trade United 1990– Regression County- Aggregate Clustered QCEW 
Blackburn, many sectors within retail States 2005 quarter panel by state 
and Cotti trade increase when the 
(2009) minimum wage increases. 
There is an effect in right-
to-work states but not in 
non-right-to-work states. 
Orazem and Earnings elasticities are Retail, Iowa 1989– Regression County-qtr.- Aggregate 
Mattila negative, ranging from service, not 1992 industry panel 
(2002) −0.14 to −0.16. profes-
sional 
Sabia Elasticity ranges from All teens, United 1979– Regression State-month Aggregate Clustered CPS 
(2008) 0.13 to 0.18 for all work- and in retail States 2004 panel (state) 
ers in retail; from 0.32 to 
0.38 for teens. 
Giuliano For the 1996 increase in Teens in United 1996– Regression Establish- Panel Conven- Private + 
(2013) the minimum wage, the retail States 1998 ment-period tional census 
elasticity of the average 
wage with respect to the 
wage gap was 0.75. The 
effect declines over time 
as wage trends catch up 
with the minimum wage. 
a QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. CPS = Current Population Survey. 
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The authors take this research further by distinguishing between 
right-to-work and non-right-to-work states. In right-to-work states, 
they find that the minimum wage has a positive effect on the average 
wage for food and beverage stores as a whole and for supermarkets and 
convenience stores in particular (they did not report other industries in 
these estimates) but no wage effect in states without right-to-work laws. 
Further, for the industries under study, either the presence of unions or 
a union threat effect mitigates the effect of minimum wages on earnings 
and employment.34 These findings suggest that state minimum wage 
laws interact with other state employment laws and with the institu-
tional characteristics of state labor markets. 
Orazem and Mattila (2002), Sabia (2009), and Giuliano (2013) each 
consider the effect of the minimum wage on retail earnings. Orazem 
and Mattila report a large and significant negative elasticity of quarterly 
earnings with respect to the minimum wage in a model using county-
by-quarter and county-by-year regressions for Iowa for 1989–1992; 
estimated elasticities range from −0.14 to −0.16. Sabia uses a state-by-
month panel for 1979–2004 to estimate the effect of the minimum wage 
on retail earnings and employment for the sector as a whole as well as 
for teens. Depending on the specification, the elasticity of the average 
wage with respect to the minimum wage varies from 0.13 to 0.18; the 
elasticity for teens ranges from 0.32 to 0.38. Guiliano’s (2013) study of 
a single retail firm with more than 700 establishments considers the ef-
fect of the average wage gap—the proportional increase in the average 
wage required to bring all workers up to the new minimum wage—to 
estimate the effect of the increase in the federal minimum wage in 1996 
on average wages. As the firm has stores in many states, wage gaps vary 
systematically with the state minimum wage. Guiliano reports that a 10 
percent increase in a store’s wage gap resulted in 7–8 percent growth in 
average wages over two years following the 1996 increase. 
British nursing homes 
The residential care home industry (nursing homes in the United 
States) is one of the larger low-wage industries in the United Kingdom, 
and, as a result, it plays a role in studies of the minimum wage similar 
to that of teenagers or the restaurant industry in studies of U.S. data. 
In 1999, the United Kingdom implemented its NMW, which has since 
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been increased several times. Each of the three articles on care homes 
discussed below find that the implementation of, and increases in, the 
minimum wage raised wages (see Table 5.9). 
Machin, Manning, and Rahmin (2003) surveyed residential care 
homes before and after the implementation of the NMW.35 Care as-
sistants are among the most common and lowest-paid workers in 
residential care homes; in all homes in the pre-NMW sample, 32–38 
percent of them were bound by the minimum wage. On average, their 
earnings were 4–5 percent below the NMW. Following implementa-
tion, average earnings of care assistants rose by 6 percent. Regression 
estimates indicate that average hourly and weekly earnings grew faster 
in homes with a larger fraction of care assistants bound by the NMW, 
and in homes where there was a larger difference between the minimum 
wage and the average earnings of care assistants. Further, the growth of 
earnings accelerated relative to an earlier period before the NMW was 
implemented. The authors indicate that there was “some evidence” of 
reductions in employment and hours subsequent to the implementation 
of the NMW.36 
Machin and Wilson (2004) extended this work with a survey of 
residential care homes along the South Coast of England to examine the 
2001 increase in the NMW. Consistent with prior studies, they found 
larger increases in the average wage in homes that had more work-
ers bound by the minimum wage during the 1999 implementation and 
2001 increase in the minimum wage. In addition, there was a statisti-
cally significant decline in employment in care homes following the 
implementation of the NMW, but not in response to the 2001 increase.37 
The pattern of employment decline suggests that the initial increase in 
the average wage was due to both employment decline and an increase 
in wages for those bound workers who kept their jobs, but that the sub-
sequent average wage increase reflected solely an increase in wages. 
As part of a broader study of the effect of the NMW on care homes, 
Georgiadis (2008) revisited the same survey data on the 1999 imple-
mentation of the NMW. Regression estimates indicate that the increase 
in the average earnings in a care home was positively and significantly 
related to both the proportion of staff bound by the new minimum wage 
or by the wage gap—the proportional increase in earnings needed to 
bring all workers to the new minimum wage. Wage-gap elasticities— 
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Table 5.9  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Studies of the United Kingdom 
Study Effect Target Country 
Sample 
period 
Analytic
approach 
Unit of
observation 
Data
structure 
Type of 
standard 
error 
Data
set 
Care homes 
Machin, Manning, Implementation of the NMW
and Rahman increased the average wages 
(2003) of care assistants, with the 
largest increases in homes 
with the largest proportion of 
care assistants bound by the 
minimum wage. 
Home 
care 
United 
King-
dom 
1992– 
1999 
Quasi Firm-survey 
experiment response 
Two-
period 
panel 
Conven-
tional 
Private 
survey 
Machin and 
Wilson (2004) 
Average wages of cared assis-
tants in care homes rose most 
rapidly in homes with larger 
numbers of bound workers. 
Home 
care 
United 
King-
dom 
1998– 
1999 
Regression Firm-survey 
response 
Two-
period 
panel 
Conven-
tional 
Private 
survey 
Georgiadis (2006) A positive relationship be-
tween the proportion of work-
ers bound by the minimum 
wage and the increase in the 
average wage in care homes. 
Home 
care 
United 
King-
dom 
1999– 
2001 
Care home Care home 
by year 
Conven-
tional 
Private 
survey 
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the change in average earnings associated with a 1 percent decline in an 
establishment’s wage gap—are close to 0.9. 
Summary 
Research on the effect of the minimum wage on average wages is 
surprisingly strong, given the divided results obtained for other out-
comes; higher minimum wages are associated with higher average 
wages. Of the 29 empirical articles on the effect of the minimum wage 
on average wages, 26 report that higher minimum wages or increases in 
the minimum wage result in a higher average wage. Nine of 10 articles 
on teens and vulnerable groups report a positive wage effect; the one 
contrary article (Sabia 2008) estimates the effect on the unconditional 
average annual wage as the dependent variable (that is, the average 
wage is calculated over all single women rather than the employed). 
Twelve of 14 articles on industries and sectors report that a higher mini-
mum wage is associated with higher average wages. 
This is not to assert that the effect of the minimum wage is consis-
tent across all groups and industries. For example, Belman and Wolfson 
(2010) find positive and significant effects in 16 of 23 low-wage indus-
tries, suggesting that there is no effect in some low-wage industries. 
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) find that the minimum wage does 
not affect weekly earnings of service industry employees in states with-
out right-to-work legislation but does have a large effect in states with 
such laws. Sabia (2008) finds that increases in the minimum wage do 
not improve the unconditional annual earnings of single women. Nu-
ance is then the order of the day. The evidence also indicates that the 
increase in the average wage is benefitting a substantial majority of 
bound workers and may raise the wages of those who were already 
earning more than the new minimum wage. Results from studies that 
consider both employment and the average wage do not suggest that the 
increase in the latter is simply due to job loss among bound workers. 
Some studies report no employment effect, but even where negative 
employment elasticities are found, they are consistent with large ma-
jorities of bound workers retaining their positions and receiving higher 
wages because of the increase in the minimum wage. Estimates of the 
average wage elasticity are sufficiently large that wages of workers not 
previously bound are, in all likelihood, also rising. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Wages and Earnings  223 
WORKERS WHO ARE BOUND BY THE NEW
MINIMUM WAGE 
To this point, we have considered the overall effect of the mini-
mum wage on the wages of the whole labor force. We now consider 
our second question, does an increase in the minimum wage raise the 
hourly earnings of those who had been earning less than the new value? 
Differing from much of the work in this chapter and book, some of this 
research is descriptive, rather than organizing itself around hypotheses. 
The richness of the description and care taken in consideration of both 
employment and earnings issues make it useful for understanding the 
impact of the minimum wage on bound workers. All but one of these 
descriptive studies are from the United Kingdom. All provide strong 
evidence that a higher minimum wage raises the earnings of those pre-
viously bound by the minimum wage. We finish this discussion with 
three articles using longitudinal data to formally test the impact of in-
creases in the minimum wage on the wages of bound workers (see Table 
5.10). 
Descriptive Studies 
Reich and Hall (2001) describe the effects of the increase in the 
federal and California minimum wages from 1994 to 1999 on wages 
and employment. In 1994, both the federal and California minimum 
wage stood at $4.25. They both rose to $4.75 in 1996 and then to $5.15 
in 1997. The California minimum wage rose again in 1998 to $5.75. 
In 1994, prior to the increase in the minimum wage, 11.7 percent of 
wage and salary earners in California were earning less than $5.75. In 
contrast, in 1999 only 3.9 percent were earning less than $5.75 (their 
Table 10, reprinted as Table 5.11).38 Reich and Hall’s employment 
analysis finds that the increase in the minimum wage did not depress 
employment or employment growth. Consequently, the increases in the 
minimum wage should have benefitted bound workers. 
Was this improvement in the earnings of lower-wage Californians 
truly due to the minimum wage, or was it something that would have 
occurred regardless of changes in the minimum wage, perhaps because 
the California economy was booming through this period? If a strong 
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Table 5.10  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Bound by the New Minimum Wage 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error Data set Comments 
Reich and 
Hall 
(2001) 
Burton and 
Dorset 
(2001) 
Dickens 
and 
Manning 
(2004) 
Wages of those 
bound by the 
minimum wage 
and those at 
low wages were 
increased. 
But for the agri-
cultural minimum 
wage, about half 
of English and 
Welsh agricultural 
workers would 
have earned less 
than the minimum 
wage. 
The imposition 
of the NMW
raised the wage 
of the lowest-paid 
workers, about 
6–7% of the labor 
force. 
California 
labor force 
Agricultural 
labor force 
Adult popula-
tion 22 and 
older 
United 
States 
England 
and 
Wales 
United 
King-
dom 
1994– 
1999 
1991– 
1995 
1999– 
2001 
Descrip-
tive 
Regression 
corrected 
for selec-
tion 
Estimated 
density 
functions 
Individuals Description 
statistics 
from suc-
cessive 
cross sec-
tions 
Individuals Multiple 
cross sec-
tions 
Individuals Cross 
section 
n/a CPS 
Outgoing 
Rotation 
Group 
Selec- Survey 
tion cor- of Earn-
rected ings and 
Hours 
n/a Labor 
Force 
Survey 
Only provides 
descriptive statistics, 
but the magnitude 
of the changes and 
size of the samples 
would likely result 
in significant tests 
of appropriate 
hypothesis. 
Study considers 
the effect of the 
Agricultural Wages 
Boards, a regime 
that has since been 
supplanted by the 
NMW. 
The NMW had no 
detectable effect on 
earnings at the 10th 
percentile, possibly 
because the initial 
level was deliber-
ately set very low. 
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Lam et al. 
(2006) 
Butcher 
(2005) 
Implementation Individuals United 1998– Descrip- Individuals Descriptive n/a Annual 
and increase in earning within King- 2004 tive in employer statistics Survey of 
the NMW caused £3 of the dom survey from cross Hours and 
distinct spikes NMW section and Earnings 
in the earnings longitudinal 
distribution. data 
Wage growth of Low-wage United 1998– Descrip- Individuals Cross n/a New 
individuals in the workers rela- King- 2003 tive section Earnings 
lower part of UK tive to balance dom Survey 
earnings distribu- of employed 
tion accelerated workers 
following imple-
mentation of the 
NMW. 
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Table 5.11  The Effects of Minimum Wage Increases in California, 
1994–1999 
Percentage earning below ($): 
5.75 6.50 7.25 
1994 11.7 15.0 21.2 
1995 12.8 17.9 21.7 
1996 11.8 18.2 21.8 
1997 10.9 16.9 20.4 
1998 5.8 14.9 20.8 
1999 3.9 13.7 20.6 
Change 1994–1999 7.8 1.3 0.6 
NOTE: The California minimum wage rose from $4.25 in 1995 to $5.75 in 1998. Reich 
and Hall measure change from 1995, the year prior to the first increase in the mini-
mum wage, to 1999, the year following the increase in the minimum wage. We have 
recalculated the result using 1994 as the base year, as there was a bump up in the per-
cent of workers at below $5.75 and $6.50 in 1995. By starting in 1994, we avoid using 
1995, with Reich and Hall’s (2001) “bump up” as a base. The choice of base year does 
not materially affect description of the effect of the minimum wage. 
SOURCE: Reich and Hall (2001, Table 10), using data from CPS ORG. 
economy were the cause of the reduction in the proportion of individu-
als working at very low wages, one would expect that the entire lower 
end of the wage distribution would have shifted up. This did not hap-
pen. The fraction of workers earning less than $6.50 declined by 1.3 
percentage points from 1995 to 1999, about one-sixth the decline in the 
fraction below the 1999 minimum wage ($5.75), and there was virtu-
ally no decline in the percent earning less than $7.25. Reich and Hall 
(2001) report that while the wage at the 5th percentile of the income 
distribution rose by 19 percent, from $4.85 in 1995 to $5.75 in 1999, the 
increase at the 10th percentile was half as large, 10 percent, from $5.49 
to $6.04: at the median (50th percentile) the increase was $0.37 (less 
than 3 percent), from $12.63 to $13.00. There was then no large, general 
upward movement in the lower half of the wage distribution. For bound 
workers, those directly affected by the new minimum wage, the shift 
was substantially larger than for those higher up the wage distribution. 
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Several Studies from Overseas 
While studies of effects of the minimum wage on bound workers 
are relatively rare in the United States, four European studies have ex-
amined this issue. This greater interest may reflect recent changes in 
European minimum wage policies. In contrast with the United States, 
where the minimum wage has been in place for more than 70 years and 
has risen in modest increments in the last several decades, the British 
implemented an entirely new minimum wage system in 1999. Several 
other European countries have recently raised their minimum wages 
proportionally more than the United States has ever done. 
Studying the earnings of English and Welch agricultural workers 
in 1991–1994 under the supplanted Agricultural Wage Board system,
Burton and Dorsett (2001) find distinct spikes among the different grades 
of agricultural workers, with each spike corresponding to the minimum 
wage for a particular grade of worker. Forty percent of “craft” workers 
and 20 percent of ungraded workers earned exactly the minimum wage 
in their “grade” in 1991–1992. Selection adjustment is a technique 
that corrects for the change in the characteristics of workers caused by
minimum-wage-induced job loss.39 Using data on agricultural workers 
from the Survey of Earnings and Hours from 1991–1995 and making 
this adjustment, the authors estimate that without the minimum wage, 
half or more of the agricultural labor force would have earned less than 
the applicable minimum.40 Based on work that was particularly attentive 
to limitations of United Kingdom data, Dickens and Manning (2004a) 
find that increases in the minimum wage increased the earnings of those 
directly affected, between 6 and 7 percent of the employed. 
In a dramatic policy change, the United Kingdom implemented an 
economy-wide minimum wage, an NMW of £3.60/hour in April 1999. 
The NMW was further increased to £3.70 in 2001, £4.10 in 2002, £4.20 
in 2003, and £4.50 in 2004. The initial NMW was intentionally set 
relatively low so as not to impose too great a burden on industry. Subse-
quent increases raised the NMW to a level at which it might be expected 
to affect a larger proportion of individuals. While it is unlikely that the 
reasons for implementation included creation of an opportunity for re-
search, several seized this unique chance, providing detailed descriptive
studies of both the implementation and initial increases in the NMW;
Lam et al. (2006) and Butcher (2005), all associated with governmental
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organizations in the United Kingdom, report faster wage growth at the
bottom of the wage distribution due to the NMW. 
Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), Lam et 
al. (2006) construct distributions of straight-time hourly earnings for a 
range of £0–£3 above the NMW for the period 1998–2004.41 The data 
demonstrate increasingly large spikes at the applicable NMW following 
the 1999 implementation and the 2003 and 2004 increases in the NMW, 
as increases in the NMW affect increasing numbers of workers (Lam et 
al. 2006, see Figure 5.4). 
There is a distinct spike at the NMW in the 1999 data, the year 
in which the NMW was implemented, which is higher than any other 
spike that year. The spike at the NMW in 2003 is also distinct but be-
low the spikes at £5 and £6. This changes in 2004, when the spike at 
£4.5, the NMW, is well above any of the other spikes in the data. The 
spikes at the NMW are consistent with employers upgrading bound 
workers to, but not beyond, the required minimum wage. Lam et al.’s 
Figure 5.4  Distribution of Hourly Wages in the United Kingdom, 
1998–2004 
3000 
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
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SOURCE: Lam et al. (2006). 
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(2006) findings are particularly interesting because they are obtained 
from employer data. A concern with household data is that spikes may 
be the result of rounding by respondents rather than the actual distribu-
tion of wages. Because data from employer surveys come from payroll 
records, spikes in employer data are more likely to reflect the true dis-
tribution of earnings. 
Butcher (2005) takes a different approach to measuring the impact 
of the NMW, comparing wage growth by percentile under the NMW
to wage growth in the period before implementation. Using data from 
the New Earnings Survey, an employer-based longitudinal survey, 
Butcher calculates the growth of hourly earnings, excluding overtime, 
throughout the earnings distribution for the period 1992–1997, prior to 
the implementation of the NMW, and for 1998–2003. Economy-wide 
economic trends are incorporated by subtracting the growth rate of the 
median earnings from the growth rate at each percentile in the earnings 
distribution. Earnings growth relative to the growth of median earnings 
is graphed by percentile of the earnings distribution and the period in 
which the NMW was implemented and increased compared to the pe-
riod prior to the implementation. 
Prior to the implementation of the NMW, there was a simple positive 
relationship between an individual’s position in the earnings distribu-
tion and earnings growth. The higher one’s place in the distribution, 
the faster one’s earnings grew relative to median growth. The distinctly 
slower growth of those at the bottom of the distribution is apparent in 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The growth in earnings of both men and women 
in the lowest 10 percent of the wage distribution is notably slower than 
growth at the median of the wage distribution. The reduced rate of wage 
growth at the low end is visible up to the 30th percentile of the wage 
distribution. In contrast, in the period following the implementation of 
the NMW, wage growth at the bottom of the wage distribution is very 
high relative to growth at the median. It is perhaps as much as 5 percent 
faster than median wage growth at the 5th percentile for women, and up 
to the 20th percentile for both women and men, it is higher or equal to 
growth at the median. Parallel results are found for both part-time and 
full-time employees (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6), and when those employ-
ees are distinguished by gender (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). 
Although this analysis does not include measures of statistical sig-
nificance or go beyond using the median to control for other conditions 
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Figure 5.5  Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding 
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Male Employees 
(Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003 
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Figure 5.6  Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding 
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Female Employees 
(Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003 
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Figure 5.7  Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding 
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Full-Time 
Employees (Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003 
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Figure 5.8  Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding 
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Part-Time 
Employees (Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003 
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affecting the growth of hourly earnings, both the magnitude of the ef-
fect and its size in the lowest-earnings deciles suggest that increases in 
the minimum wage have a large effect on the earnings growth of those 
at the lowest-earnings levels.42 
Longitudinal Studies 
A challenge in measuring the effect of the minimum wage on bound 
workers is that most surveys do not follow the same individuals across 
changes in the minimum wage. As a result, although researchers are able 
to measure the effect of the minimum wage on similar workers prior to 
and after a change in the minimum wage, they rarely observe the expe-
rience of bound workers across the change. Longitudinal data, which 
follow individuals over time, sometimes over many years, open the 
possibility for following the same bound individuals through changes
in the minimum wage. It also makes it possible to remove unobserved 
individual characteristics that may affect individuals’ employability and 
earnings, thereby getting a better measure of the effect of the minimum 
wage on wage and employment outcomes. (Longitudinal studies are 
summarized in Table 5.12.) Currie and Fallick (1996), Zavodny (2000), 
and Stewart (2004b) each estimate models of the effect of the minimum 
wage on wages and employment with longitudinal data. While the latter 
two studies find that higher minimum wages are associated with higher 
earnings, Currie and Fallick’s work, which covers a period of peak in-
flation in the United States, suggests either a negative or nonsignificant 
relationship. A synthesis of these studies provides a window into the 
effect of the minimum wage during periods of high and low inflation. 
As part of a study of the effect of the minimum wage on the employ-
ment of teens and young workers, Currie and Fallick (1996) estimate 
the effect of the minimum wage on earnings. They follow individuals 
who were between 14 and 21 years old in 1979 through the 1979 and 
1980 increases in the minimum wage. Individuals’ wages, the depen-
dent variable, are measured as the level and the change in log wage 
(which is a good approximation of wage growth). The wage gap, the 
difference between an individual’s ex ante wage and the new minimum 
wage, is used as the measure of the magnitude of the effect of the mini-
mum wage.43 
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Table 5.12  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Bound by the New Minimum Longitudinal Studies 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of stan- Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure dard error seta 
Currie and Increases in the Bound United 1979–1987 OLS and 
Fallick minimum reduce the workers States fixed effect 
(1996) real earnings of bound regression 
workers. 
Zavodny Larger wage gaps are Teenagers United 1979–1993 Regression, 
(2000) associated with larger States D-D 
increases in post–min-
imum wage increase 
wages. At the mean 
wage gap for bound 
workers, those who 
are bound have wage 
increases of $0.50 to 
$0.55 more per hour 
than the unbound. 
Stewart Wage growth is Bound United Various Quasi-
(2004b) considerably higher workers Kingdom experiment 
for bound employees 
than for those earning 
above the NMW. 
Individual Longitudinal Conventional NLSY 
State- Panel and Conventional CPS 
year and longitudinal 
individual-
year 
Individual- Panel Conventional Matched 
year LFS, 
BHPS, 
NES 
a NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. CPS = Current Population Survey. LFS = Labour Force Survey. BHPS = British House-
hold Panel Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey. 
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Consistent with the expectations of economic theory, Currie and 
Fallick (1996) find that higher minimum wages reduce employment. 
Their initial estimates for wage increases are, on their face, counterin-
tuitive: higher minimum wages do not affect the rate of wage change 
and have a negative effect on the level of the wage. This changes con-
siderably when individuals with unusually high wage growth between 
any two years, 100 percent or more, are excluded from the sample.44 
With this exclusion, there is a large and statistically significant relation-
ship between the wage gap and the change in the wage. Those with 
larger wage gaps have faster wage growth following an increase in 
the minimum wage. The coefficient on the wage-gap measure remains 
negative in the model in which the wage (rather than wage growth) is 
the dependent variable, but it is far from statistically significant. The 
results are, in the end, puzzling and difficult to reconcile. The authors 
raise some doubts about the accuracy of National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY) wage data and conclude that their estimates must be 
interpreted with caution, as coefficient estimates are sensitive to outliers 
and changes in specification. 
Building on this approach, Zavodny (2000) estimates a model of 
employment, hours, and hourly earnings for teens between 1979 and 
1993 using CPS data matched across years to create longitudinal data 
consisting of two observations on each person. Utilizing a specification 
similar to that of Currie and Fallick (1996), she finds that each $0.01 in-
crease in the wage gap results in a $0.023 additional increase in hourly 
earnings following an increase in the minimum wage. Zavodny then 
constructs a comparison group of teens who earn close to but above 
the minimum wage in periods in which inflation is relatively low. She 
compares the effect of a minimum wage increase on this group to the 
effect of the increase in the minimum wage on the bound group and on 
a group of high-wage teenagers. She finds that while the average wage 
of bound teens rose by $0.57 relative to the high-wage group following 
a minimum wage increase, the wage of the comparison group of low-
wage but unbound teens rose by $0.36 cents following the increase in 
the minimum wage. 
Stewart (2004) also adopted Currie and Fallick’s method for longi-
tudinal models of the effect of the implementation of the NMW in the 
United Kingdom. Three sets of difference-in-differences, each relying 
on a different survey (the British Labour Force Survey, the New Eco-
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nomic Survey, and the British Household Panel Survey), indicate that 
the group of workers bound by the minimum wage increase experienced 
a 4–10 percent faster wage growth than a control group composed of in-
dividuals previously earning just above the new minimum wage. While 
the magnitude of the effect varied between surveys, results were invari-
ant to use of a wage gap measure or a variable that simply indicated 
whether an individual was bound by the minimum wage (and invariant 
to controls for additional factors). 
The three longitudinal studies point in somewhat different direc-
tions. While Currie and Fallick (1996) suggest that the minimum wage 
has an uncertain effect on the wages of the bound, both Zavodny (2000) 
and Stewart (2004) find a strong positive effect. How might these dif-
ferences be explained, particularly given the similarity in methods? 
While it may lie in part in differences between countries, or differences 
in implementing and raising a minimum wage, the economic circum-
stances of the studies are quite different. Currie and Fallick focus on 
minimum wage changes during a period of rapid inflation. While this 
period is part of Zavodny’s study, her work also includes increases in a 
period of stable prices. Stewart’s study covers a period of price stabil-
ity in the United Kingdom. Inflation is then a prime suspect; it was so 
rapid from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s that, in an attempt at least 
to keep pace with inflation, the minimum wage was raised annually for 
eight years. From 1979 to 1982, the period considered by Currie and 
Fallick, the minimum wage rose by 14 percent, consumer prices rose by 
33 percent, and the wages of production and nonsupervisory workers 
by 25 percent. As earnings of those whose wages were determined by 
the minimum wage fell behind wages in the broader economy, Currie 
and Fallick’s finding of an uncertain relationship between the wage gap, 
wages, and wage growth is not surprising. 
In contrast, in periods of price and relative wage stability, which 
characterize the period studied by Stewart (2004b) and much of the 
period studied by Zavodny (2000), legislated increases in the minimum 
wage often substantially exceed price and average wage growth. In 
such periods, we would expect to find a positive relationship between 
minimum wage increases and wage growth for bound workers. 
Current research does not provide a clear answer with respect to 
the relationship between inflation, the average wage, and the minimum 
wage. These three studies suggest that, in periods of moderate price 
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inflation, increases in the minimum wage have a substantial positive 
effect on the wages and wage growth of bound workers, but that this 
does not hold in periods of rapid inflation. In such periods, those whose 
wages are determined by the minimum wage are likely to lag both infla-
tion and general wage growth.45 
Inclusive of the longitudinal studies, eight examine how the earnings 
of bound workers respond to the level, the increase, or the imposition 
of a minimum wage. Of these, seven find a positive effect and one finds 
a mixed effect; this last appears to be a product of a macroeconomic 
climate characterized by rapid inflation in which, as a consequence, the 
minimum wage was lagging the inflation-driven increases in the wage 
structure. 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
Does the minimum wage affect only those who were bound by the 
new minimum wage, or is there also a pay increase for those who were 
previously earning more than the new minimum? If it affects this group, 
how far up the wage distribution does it extend? 
The possibility that minimum wage increases raise the wages of 
those already earning above the new minimum wage, referred to as a 
spillover effect, has been part of the discussion of minimum wages since 
before passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. Why would 
there be spillover effects? In a neoclassical model, the wages of those 
earning above the new minimum may increase if these workers are sub-
stitutes for workers bound by the minimum wage. When the minimum 
wage rises, employers substitute capital and more productive, higher-
wage workers for those whose productivity is below the new minimum. 
The increased demand for higher-wage workers will increase their 
equilibrium wage. This increase will depend on the size of the increase 
in demand for their labor, which in turn depends on the degree to which 
they are close—good—substitutes, and the degree to which their wage 
rises in response to the additional demand. Grossman (1983) styles this 
market-driven increase as an indirect effect, as employers are respond-
ing to market forces rather than directly to the legislated increase in the 
minimum wage. 
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Some economists—particularly those associated with the institution-
alist, neoinstitutionalist, and behavioral streams of economics, but also 
some more neoclassically oriented—locate the source of the spillover 
effect in the way workers and their employers determine their appro-
priate wages and in the functioning of competitive markets. Although 
each study—from Commons and Andrews (1916) and Webb and Webb 
(1897) to Dunlop (1950) and Ross (1948) and on to Grossman (1983); 
Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006); Falk and Huffman (2007); Spriggs 
(1994); and Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011)—has a different 
explanation of the wage structures and linkages that underlie spillover 
effects, broad agreement exists that workers form their expectations of 
wages and wage increases through comparison with other workers.46 
The importance of comparing wages is variously attributed to work-
ers’ desire to maintain their social status, to psychological processes, or 
the method workers use to collect information about reasonable wage 
increases. In a world in which workers form their wage expectations 
from the wage improvements of a self-defined peer group, an increase 
in the minimum wage will cause an upward revision in the wage expec-
tations of those ex ante earning not far above the new minimum wage. 
These higher expectations place pressure on employers, since failure to 
meet such expectations may result in being viewed as unfair, with con-
sequences for labor efficiency and turnover (Grossman 1983, p. 360). 
The importance of comparison in forming a view of a reasonable wage 
is not limited to individual comparisons; Ross’s (1948) description of 
“orbits of coercive comparison” and their impact on wage formation is 
another example of the view that comparison permeates wage setting 
institutions. 
This logic is supported by experimental economics. The minimum 
wage creates a target that workers use to judge the adequacy of their 
wage. When everyone is assured a minimum wage, the minimum is 
identified as the wage that even the least capable employee is paid. 
Those who identify themselves as better than minimum wage workers 
adopt a reservation wage above the minimum wage (Falk, Fehr, and 
Zehnder 2006).47 When the minimum wage is raised, employers who 
wish to maintain morale and productivity must raise the wages of em-
ployees who use the minimum as a benchmark. 
Several studies have searched for evidence of spillover effects, 
some in particular industries or occupations, others at the national 
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level. Evidence on spillovers from industry- and occupation-specific 
studies is mixed, with the balance tending against there being meaning-
ful spillover effects. Broader studies of the U.S. labor market suggest 
the presence of spillover effects, particularly for women. Studies of the 
United Kingdom find large spillovers for both sexes that reach a consid-
erable distance up the wage distribution. 
Industry- and Occupation-Specific Studies 
If the spillover effect of the minimum wage operates through the 
expectations of employees who, ex ante, earn the minimum wage, then 
it will only appear ex post, when substantial groups of employees as-
sociate with or compare themselves to minimum wage workers. One 
might expect the minimum wage to have a large effect in establishments 
where many workers earn the minimum wage or close to the minimum 
wage (e.g., restaurants and fast food establishments), but little effect in 
establishments where the minimum wage is far from binding. Spriggs 
(1994) investigates this in a survey of restaurants in Greensboro, North 
Carolina, and Jackson, Mississippi, two states with relatively low wage 
structures before and after the 1991 increase in the minimum wage. 
(Studies of spillover effects are summarized in Table 5.13.) 
The survey suggests that restaurants can be divided into three broad 
categories with respect to wage policies: 1) those that pay high wages 
and whose wage structure is not influenced by increases in the mini-
mum wage; 2) those for which the minimum wage is a key or focal 
wage, and which respond to increases in the minimum wage by moving 
up their entire wage distribution; and 3) those that choose to minimize 
wage costs by increasing the wages only of those for whom it is legally 
required.48 The 1991 increase in the minimum wage caused wage in-
creases for bound workers in which the minimum wage is a key wage, 
and for those who view the minimum wage as a narrow legal require-
ment. The wages also rose for many workers in restaurants in which 
the minimum wage is a key wage, creating some degree of spillover 
in the industry. The wage difference between high-wage restaurants, 
which ignored the increase altogether, and low-wage restaurants de-
clined. Overall, spillover effects dominated, and the average restaurant 
wage rose by between the amount that would occur if the typical restau-
rant increased the wage of each employee by $0.45, the increase in the 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Wages and Earnings  239 
nominal minimum wage, and that which would occur if the typical res-
taurant increased all wages by 12 percent, the proportional increase in 
the minimum wage (Spriggs 1994, p. 227). The increase in wages was 
affected by the proportion of workers below the new minimum wage 
but not by the average difference between bound workers’ wages and 
the new minimum wage. Spriggs also finds that the wages of restaurants 
with a larger proportion of African Americans in their workforces in-
creased less than those with a smaller proportion of African Americans. 
Although primarily interested in the effect of the 2007–2009 in-
creases in the minimum wage on employment, Hirsch, Kaufman, 
and Zelenska’s (2011) study of three quick-food restaurant chains in 
Georgia and Alabama addresses issues similar to those considered by 
Spriggs (1994). They report that the increase in the minimum wage 
resulted in increased wage compression. While wages of workers 
bound by the increase in the minimum wage rose, employees earning 
more than the new minimum wage received smaller than normal (or 
no) wage increases. Compression was limited by the effect on the mo-
rale of the higher-paid workers, who were generally more experienced 
and better-performing employees. Consistent with Spriggs’s research, 
the employees of these chains were heavily African American (64 per-
cent).49 Grossman (1983) studied the effect of minimum wage increases 
on nine blue- and white-collar occupations earning slightly above the 
minimum wage in 16 cities between 1960 and 1975. 
Wages among white-collar workers were compressed for a time 
after a minimum wage increase, as lower-wage white-collar occupa-
tions realize larger increases in earnings than higher-wage white-collar 
workers. However, within a year and a half of the increase, the relative 
distribution of earnings among white-collar occupations was largely 
restored. Four of the six white-collar occupations realized earnings 
increases associated with minimum wage increases one year after the 
increase, and only two of the six still realized increases after an addi-
tional six months. There is no evidence that the minimum wage affects 
the nonproduction blue-collar occupations of laborer, janitor, and order 
filler.50 
Dickens and Manning (2004a,b) find little to no evidence of spill-
over effects associated with the implementation of the NMW in 1999. 
Using their survey of care homes, they find that home care workers 
who earned more than the NMW prior to its implementation realized a 
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Table 5.13  Spillover Effects: The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Earning More but Close to the New
Minimum Wage 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta Comments 
Falk, Fehr, The minimum University Switzer- Experi- Regres- Individuals Regression Robust Data There may be an 
and wage serves as students land mental in sion clustered collected issue with non-
Zehnder a benchmark the 2000s on sessions from 240 independence 
(2006) for low-wage subjects of observations, 
workers and in 10 ex- as the number 
employers perimental of reported ob-
to set wages simula- servations, up to 
rather than a tions 5,400, substan-
floor. tially exceeds 
the number of 
subjects (240). 
Spriggs Increases in Restaurant United 1991 Regres- Restaurants Regression Conven- Private 
(1994) the minimum industry in States increase sion tional survey of 
wage affected low-wage in the restaurants 
earnings of areas minimum in two 
those above the wage southern 
minimum in towns 
particular types 
of restaurants. 
Hirsch, Increases in the Fast food United 2007– Regres- Individual Longitu- Clustered 81 quick-
Kaufman, minimum wage market States 2009 sion employee dinal by service 
and resulted in (Georgia restaurant restaurants 
Zelenska increased wage and 
(2011) compression. Alabama) 
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as employees 
earning above 
the minimum 
received small-
er increases 
than those 
inbound. 
Grossman 
(1983) 
Increases in the 
minimum wage 
initially causes 
wage compres-
sion among 
white-collar 
workers, but 
Labor force United 
States 
1960– 
1975 
Time 
series re-
gression 
with a lag 
structure 
on wages 
SMSA
(metro area) 
City-by-
year panel 
wage relativi-
ties are restored 
within 18 
months. 
Dickens and 
Manning 
(2004a) 
Very modest 
spillover, in the 
range of 1% to 
2.4%. 
Care home 
workers 
United 
Kingdom 
1999 Regres-
sion 
Care home Cross sec-
tion with 
pre- and 
post-obser-
vations on 
care homes 
Conven-
tional 
(considered 
appropriate 
at the time) 
Conven-
tional 
BLS Area 
Wage 
Survey 
Private 
postal 
survey 
(continued) 
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Table 5.13  (continued) 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta Comments 
Dickens and The imposition 
Manning of the NMW
(2004b) raised the wage 
of the lowest-
paid workers, 
about 6–7% of 
the labor force, 
but there was 
no spillover 
effect. 
Harvey and Increases in 
Bernstein the minimum 
(2003) wage affect the 
first two deciles 
of the female 
wage distribu-
tion but not 
the first decile 
of the male 
distribution. 
Luttmer Increases in the 
(2007) minimum wage 
affect workers 
up to $1.75 
above the new 
minimum. 
Adult United 1999– Estimated Individuals Cross n/a LFS The NMW had 
population Kingdom 2001 density section no detectable 
aged 22 and functions effect on earn-
older ings at the 10th 
percentile ,pos-
sibly because 
the initial level 
was deliberately 
set very low. 
Individuals United 1979– Contem- Individuals Quarterly Appropri- CPS 
aged 18–64 States 2002 porary wage de- ate to con-
time ciles derived temporary 
series from the time-series 
CPS methods 
Individuals United 1989– Regres- Individuals Short panels Robust CPS 
aged States 1992 sion used (two peri-
16–65 to group ods) 
observa-
tions by 
skill 
 	 	
  
 
 
 
Reich and 
Hall 
(2001) 
Aaronson, 
Agarwal, 
and 
French 
(2007, 
2011) 
Butcher 
(2005) 
Stewart 
(2004a) 
An increase in 
the minimum 
wage pushes 
up the lower 
part of the 
wage distribu-
tion, including 
some earning 
above the new 
minimum. 
Increases 
wages of work-
ers earning 
between 120 
and 200% of 
the minimum. 
NMW affected 
wages up to 
the third decile 
of the wage 
distribution. 
Wage growth 
increases 
among those 
whose initial 
wage was above 
the NMW, but 
it is slower than 
that of bound 
workers. 
California United 
labor force States 
Households United 
States 
Employed United 
labor force Kingdom 
Low-wage United 
workers Kingdom 
1994– 
1999 
1979– 
2008 
1992– 
2003 
Various 
Descrip-
tive 
Regres-
sion 
Descrip-
tive 
Quasi 
experi-
ment 
Individuals Description 
statistics 
from suc-
cessive 
cross sec-
tions 
Individual Repeat cross 
section or 
longitudinal,
depending 
on the data 
set 
Individuals Series of 
cross sec-
tions 
Individual- Panel 
year 
n/a 
Cluster 
corrected 
by house-
hold 
Conven-
tional 
Conven-
tional 
CPS 
ORG 
SIPP, CPS, 
and CES 
NES 
Matched 
LFS,
BHPS,
NES 
Only provides 
descriptive 
statistics, but 
the magnitude 
of the changes 
and size of the 
samples would 
likely result in 
significant tests 
of appropriate 
hypothesis. 
(continued) 
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Table 5.13  (continued) 
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Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta Comments 
Lam et al. Spillover Adult United 1998– Descrip- Individual Series of Conven- Annual 
(2006) effects were workers Kingdom 2004 tive cross sec- tional Survey of 
observed up aged 22 statistics tions (uncertain) Hours and 
to £6.50 for or older and re- Earnings 
minimum wage gression 
increases of up 
to £4.50.
a LFS = Labour Force Survey. CPS = Current Population Survey. ORG = Outgoing Rotation Groups. SIPP = Survey of Income and 
Program Participation. CES = Consumer Expenditure Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. 
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substantial wage gain afterwards, between 6 and 8 percent. However, 
once adjustment is made for normal wage growth, estimated spillover 
effect ranges between 1 and 2.5 percent; the lower estimate is not statis-
tically significant in even a 10 percent test. In their work with national 
United Kingdom data (2004b), they report that despite an increase in 
the earnings of those bound by the NMW due to its implementation, 
there was not a statistically significant spillover effect. They conclude 
that the NMW had little effect on the overall wage distribution because 
relatively few employees were directly affected. 
If firms’ wage distributions change differently in response to in-
creases in the minimum wage, even within an industry, as Spriggs 
suggests, what additional issues need to be addressed in investigating 
spillover effects? One is whether there is evidence of broad spillover 
effects throughout the labor market. Is it isolated to a few firms or indus-
tries, or does it substantially affect the wages of many of those earning 
above the new minimum wage? If there is a spillover effect, where are 
we likely to find it? Which workers are likely to gain from spillovers, 
and which firms are likely to increase the wages of their employees 
who were previously earning more than the new legally mandated mini-
mum? Finally, how high up the wage distribution do spillover effects 
reach? No one article addresses all of these questions, but answers can 
be synthesized from the articles that address some of these issues. 
The U.S. Experience 
Many studies limit their inquiry to specific industries or occu-
pations, but several consider national wage structures. Harvey and 
Bernstein (2003) consider the impact of the minimum wage on the 
trends in hourly wage deciles from 1979 to 2000 using modern time-
series methods. They find a wage spillover effect in the first and second 
deciles of the female wage distribution but no evidence of a spillover 
even within the first male decile. Luttmer’s (2007) examination of the 
effect of the minimum wage on employment by skill group finds that 
the 1990–1991 increase in the federal minimum wage to $4.25 resulted 
in higher rates of wage increase for workers whose ex ante wage was 
as high as $6 per hour (see Figure 5.2 and discussion). Reich and Hall 
(2001, Table 10) provide evidence for both spillover and compression 
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(a narrowing of wage differences) following the rise in the minimum 
wage to $5.75 in the mid-1990s. 
This suggests that although the bottom of the California wage struc-
ture moved up considerably between 1995 and 1999, there was little or 
no movement of wages above the top of the 2nd decile (20th percen-
tile). Any spillover effects were occurring within the first two deciles.51 
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) find that minimum wage 
increases are associated with detectable increases in the earnings of 
workers making between 120 percent and 300 percent of the mini-
mum wage.52 The authors analyze the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) for 1986–2007, the CPS for 1979–2007, and the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1983–2008. The estimate models of 
family income in which pretax nonasset income is determined by leads 
and lags on the effective minimum wage (the higher of the state or fed-
eral minimum wage), a fixed family effect, and dummies for year and 
quarter.53 The regressions are also organized by the proportion of fam-
ily income originating from minimum wage employment: those with no 
minimum wage income, those with some family income (but less than 
20 percent) originating from minimum wage employment, and those 
families for which at least 20 percent of family income originates from 
minimum wage jobs. Although this research considers the effect of the 
minimum wage on family income rather than individual earnings, the 
link between individual earnings and family income is sufficiently di-
rect and these results sufficiently useful in understanding of the effect 
of the minimum wage on earnings to consider in this part of the review. 
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) report, unsurprisingly, that 
the income of families with no income from the minimum wage is not 
affected by changes in the minimum wage. When the sample is lim-
ited to families with some of their income originating from a minimum 
wage job, the average effect was $255 per quarter, significant in a 1 
percent test.54 When limited to families that obtain at least 20 percent of 
their income from minimum wage employment, the weighted average 
effect was $209, again significant in a 1 percent test. 
More relevant to the measure of spillover effects, the models dif-
ferentiate among families that receive income from an adult earning an 
hourly wage within 120 percent of the new minimum, and between 120 
and 300 percent of the new minimum. They further subdivide this lat-
ter broad category into smaller bands of 120–200 percent and 200–300 
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percent of the new minimum.55 Considering families that have at least 
some income from the minimum wage and an adult earning between 
120 and 300 percent of the highest applicable minimum, the weighted
average effect is small in magnitude, $58 per quarter, and does not 
satisfy a 5 percent significance test. Similar results are obtained when 
the estimates are limited to families that obtain at least 20 percent of 
their income from minimum wage employment. When this group is 
divided into those earning 120–200 percent and 200–300 percent of 
the minimum, the effect estimated for the latter group is very small 
in magnitude and far from being statistically significant. The effect of 
a higher minimum wage on families with members earning 120–200 
percent of the minimum wage are both larger and statistically signifi-
cant. Higher minimum wages are associated with an additional $110 per 
quarter for families with some minimum wage income, and $123 higher 
for families for which a minimum wage job provides at least 20 percent 
of family income. Both weighted estimates are significant in a 5 percent 
test. If we convert these findings from “individuals’ wages as a percent 
of the minimum” to “percentiles of the wage distribution (for those who 
are not enrolled in high school or college),” the group earning no more 
than 120 percent ($6.18) of the minimum wage in 2000 composed 8 
percent of the employed population, while those earning 120–200 per-
cent ($10.30) of the minimum wage composed an additional 30 percent 
of the employed workforce. In this study, the effect of the minimum 
wage reaches beyond the first decile, but not as high as the fourth de-
cile, of the wage distribution. 
The United Kingdom Experience 
Butcher (2005) finds that the NMW affected the growth of wages 
of men and women up to the third decile of the earnings distribution. 
While wage growth of the first three deciles of the British wage dis-
tribution was less than the growth of the median wage between 1992 
and 1997, it exceeded that figure from 1998 to 2003. The gain in wage 
growth was larger and it extended further up the wage distribution for 
full-time than for part-time employees. 
According to Stewart’s (2004a) study of the introduction of the 
NMW in 1999, wage growth among bound workers accelerated sub-
stantially following implementation. Wage growth among those who 
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were ex ante earning more than the NMW, between £4.00 and £5.00, 
also accelerated following implementation, but by a smaller amount. 
There is some ambiguity about the effect on those whose ex ante wages 
were between £3.60 and £4.00. 
Lam et al. (2006) find that spillover effects reached as high as £6.50 
following the implementation of the NMW in 1999 and its subsequent 
increases through 2004. In the absence of a spillover effect, ongoing 
increases in the minimum wage would gather an increasing fraction of 
the labor force in a spike at the new minimum.56 However, the spike 
at the minimum wage that occurred with the imposition of the NMW
in 1999 did not become ever larger with successive increases in the 
minimum. Instead, the spike represented a relatively constant propor-
tion of the population with low earnings throughout the increases in 
2001–2004. Following the 2003 and 2004 increases, the distribution of 
earnings above the NMW remained similar to that observed after the 
1999 imposition of the NMW. 
The clumping of observations at focal values of earnings, such as 
between £1.00 and £1.50 more than the NMW, remained roughly similar 
in 2003 and 2004 to what it had been in 1999. The fraction of workers at 
round numbers such as £5.00, £5.50, and £6.00 becomes more marked 
over time with the upward movement of the NMW, suggesting that the 
earnings structure was stable relative to the NMW, with earnings above 
the minimum rising with the successive increases in the minimum. 
Further evidence that the low-wage market as a whole adjusts to in-
creases in the minimum wage is provided by regressions for individuals 
earning up to £2.00 more than the contemporaneous value of the NMW. 
The greater an individual’s wage relative to the contemporaneous value 
of the NMW, the larger his relative wage in the following year. For ex-
ample, those earning £1.00 more than the NMW in 1999, 2000, 2001, 
and 2003 were, on average, earning between £1.25 and £1.50 above 
the new value of the NMW in the following year. Those at £1.50 more 
than the minimum in those years earned, on average, between £1.70 
and £2.10 in the following year. Lam et al. (2006) report that the likeli-
hood of receiving a wage increase of a given size relative to the value 
of the NMW in the following year stays constant over time, providing 
additional evidence that the minimum wage serves as a benchmark for 
the lower part of the wage distribution.57 
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Summary
In the modest number of studies of spillover effects, the reported 
outcomes are less cohesive than those of studies of the average wage 
or wages of bound workers. Of the 10 nonexperimental studies, 8 re-
port at least some evidence of spillovers at or above the 10th decile 
of the earnings distribution. The magnitude of spillovers, how far they 
extend up the wage distribution, and the groups, occupations, and in-
dustries where they exist, are less certain. There is broad evidence of 
spillovers in the United States. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) 
and Luttmer (2007) both find spillovers for employed workers. Harvey 
and Bernstein (2003) report a spillover effect up to the 3rd decile for 
women, but no spillover effect for men. Spriggs (1993–94) finds evi-
dence of spillovers for U.S. restaurants, and Grossman’s work suggests 
spillovers for some white-collar occupations for a year following the 
increase. 
The evidence for the United Kingdom is mixed, with disagreement 
over whether the introduction of the NMW spilled over into the wages
of those not directly affected. Dickens and Manning (2004) find no 
spillovers in their national data and very small effects in their care home 
data. Stewart (2004a), Lam et al. (2006), and Butcher (2005) each sug-
gest some spillover in response to implementation. Research on later 
increases by Lam et al. and Butcher provide considerable evidence of 
spillovers as the NMW continued to rise in 2003 and 2004. 
It then appears that spillover effects occur, but we are uncertain 
about what groups realize spillover effects, which demographic groups, 
occupations and industries they are likely to affect, or the magnitude of 
the increase in the minimum wage that would initiate spillovers. It may 
be that, as both Spriggs and Grossman suggest, more detailed studies of 
specific wage and employment structures are needed to determine when 
and where spillovers occur. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this chapter with three questions about the effect of the 
minimum wage on wages: 1) does the minimum wage affect the earn-
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ings of bound workers, 2) are there spillover effects, and 3) does the 
minimum wage affect average wages? Summed over the three clas-
sifications of articles, and permitting double counting where articles 
address multiple issues, 37 of 41 studies of average wages, bound 
workers, and spillovers reviewed in this chapter indicate a positive re-
lationship between the minimum wage and some aspect of wages. 
Although the results are not one-sided, the preponderance of evi-
dence is that higher minimum wages raise the wages of both bound 
workers and workers who had previously been earning above but close 
to the new minimum. Average wages are almost always estimated to 
rise in response to increases in the minimum wage. Even where higher 
minimum wages are found to cause the loss of jobs, large majorities of 
bound workers benefitted from the increase in the minimum wage. The 
impact of spillovers varies considerably by study, but they may reach as 
high as or beyond the 20th percentile of the wage distribution. 
Several patterns emerge from this research. First, minimum wages 
and minimum wage increases have a greater impact on women than on 
men. Minimum wage increases are estimated to reach further in wom-
en’s wage distributions than men’s. Some studies indicate that up to 
20 percent of women are affected by increases in the minimum wage, 
but likely only 10 percent of men. This result should not be surprising 
given the lower earnings of women, but the difference in the fractions 
of women and men affected is very large. The minimum wage is then 
particularly important to women’s earnings. 
Second, there is evidence that the effect of the minimum wage has 
become more complex over time in the United States. While at one 
time the minimum wage was the entry wage for many workers, it has 
evolved into a benchmark used to establish an acceptable entry wage 
for workers who have completed their schooling. The spike in the wage 
distribution that was formerly at the minimum wage is now somewhat 
above the applicable minimum wage. As Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) 
suggest, this change is consistent with workers’ seeing the minimum as 
the wage paid to anyone who is employable. Inducing more than mini-
mal work effort from employees requires the employer to demonstrate 
that employees are not viewed as plain vanilla minimum wage workers, 
by paying more than the minimum. This change in the psychology of 
the minimum wage might be caused by the decline in its real value over 
the last 50 years. What was once a substantial wage is now too low to 
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call forth effort in jobs in which employee effort is important, and this, 
in turn, transforms the minimum wage into a benchmark rather than a 
true floor. 
There is also diversity and richness in the results, particularly when 
specific industries and occupations are considered. Spriggs (1994) 
suggests that restaurants’ response to increases in the minimum wage 
depend on their work organization and salary structure. Further, restau-
rants that have found other ways to achieve productivity goals increase 
only the wages of bound workers when the minimum wage increases. 
This parallels the finding that the implementation of the NMW only 
moved bound workers at care homes up to the NMW and did not affect 
the wages of those earning above the NMW (Dickens and Manning 
2004a). 
The implication is that differences in the work organization of 
low-wage firms lead to differences both in response to increases in 
the minimum wage, and in the number of workers affected by those 
minimum wages. Similarly, Belman and Wolfson’s (2004, 2010) work 
suggests that the average wage of many low-wage industries rises in re-
sponse to increases in the minimum wage, but that this is not universal. 
Besides finding differences in the wage response of detailed industries 
within the food and beverage industry, Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti 
2009) find differences in the impact of the minimum wage on wages 
between states with and without right-to-work laws. 
Notes 
1. An additional problem, mentioned in Chapter 3, is that the CPS does not collect
hours data for those who report that their hours vary, that is, that they have no usual
hours. A measure of the wage, and thus of hourly earnings, is still available for those
who report being paid hourly. It is not possible, however, to calculate hourly earn-
ings for those who are both paid by the week or month and report variable usual
hours. 
2. When based on data gathered from the employee in a household survey such as
the CPS, the earnings distribution exhibits spikes not seen in data gathered from
employers and tax records—that is, data gathered from employees are less smooth
and more concentrated at certain values. It is believed that this is due to rounding
or the use of proxy respondents. Figures gathered from tax or employer records are
considered to be more accurate. In the United States, spikes appear in household
survey data at even dollar amounts or figures evenly divisible by $0.25. 
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3. We abstract from diminishing marginal returns for this example. In a more realis-
tic world, in which the reduction in the workforce resulted in rising productivity, 
some of the previously bound workers would remain employed as the marginal 
product of the labor force rose in response to layoffs. 
4. A third possibility is that no workers are bound by the increase in the minimum 
wage. In this instance, an increase in the minimum wage would have no effect on 
employment, and neither wage rates nor earnings would be affected. Economic 
theory suggests that, if labor demand curves are neither infinitely elastic nor com-
pletely inelastic, then there will be a mix of some layoffs and some bound workers 
moving up to the new minimum wage. 
5. In addition, finding a wage effect is necessary for there to be an employment ef-
fect. If the minimum wage doesn’t have a detectable effect on wages, then we 
would not expect it to affect employment. We return to the effect of the minimum 
wage on the average wage in the next section of the chapter. 
6. Or between high- and low-minimum-wage locations. 
7. The tables are computed from the Outgoing Rotation files of the Current Popula-
tion Survey. The tables use wage rates for individuals who report being paid by 
the hour, and average hourly earnings when samples include both those paid by 
the hour and those paid on some other basis. 
8. The organization of the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 does not allow us to adjust for 
those instances in which the state minimum wage exceeds the federal minimum. 
9. The federal minimum wage was $7.25/hour in 2010. 
10. Because the minimum wage is supposed to be the lowest wage that can be paid 
to employees, the reader deserves some explanation of the less than minimum 
wage grouping. We use the applicable federal minimum wage for Tables 5.1 and 
5.2, and certain groups of employees, domestics, those in agriculture, and those 
working for small firms that are deemed not to be engaged in interstate commerce, 
can be paid less than the minimum wage. The federal minimum wage for tipped 
workers permits part of the value of the tips received to be counted against the 
employers’ minimum wage requirement. As a result, employers only need to pay 
tipped employees $2.30 per hour, so long as their tips make up the difference be-
tween $2.30 and the applicable minimum wage. Mistakes in reporting by tipped 
employees, in which these employees only report the employer portion of their 
pay, and employees’ reluctance to inform employers when tips do not fully top up 
the earnings of tipped employees, is another source of individuals’ reporting earn-
ings less than the minimum wage. Finally, not all employers obey the law and pay 
the full minimum to their employees. 
11. The estimates with wage rates are visually similar to those obtained using aver-
age hourly earnings. For all figures, the data used in their construction run from 
August through July. Because the data in the CPS refer to a week in the middle 
of the month, the data for the year preceding the 2007 increases do not straddle 
that increase. 
12. The parameters for the kernel density smoothing are taken from Neumark, 
Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004). 
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13. At this time, only Alaska and Connecticut had state minimum wages in excess of 
the $3.35 federal minimum. Alaska’s minimum was $3.85, and Connecticut’s was 
$3.37, $0.02 above federal minimum. 
14. As a mathematical possibility, increases in the wages of low-paid workers and de-
creases in those of higher-paid workers can offset each other to leave the average 
wage unchanged. The literature offers neither evidence nor explanation for such 
an outcome, so we do not take it up. 
15. In this review of the literature, we generally do not discuss articles in which 
the empirical results were found to be suspect. These include Böckerman and 
Uusitalo (2009); Neumark and Nizalova (2007); Neumark, Schweitzer, and 
Wascher (2004); and Pereira (2003). In addition, we mention, but do not place 
great weight on, state-by-time panels that do not cluster their errors by state 
and find a significant relationship between the minimum and average wage.
This is not the case for state-by-time panels that do not cluster and do not 
find an effect. As discussed in the employment chapter, the downward bias in 
the estimate of standard errors results in rejecting the hypothesis of no effect too 
frequently. Given the bias against finding “no effect,” such studies can dependably 
be used when the hypothesis of no effect is not rejected. 
16. The differences between studies are sufficient that, even with topical grouping, it 
is difficult to argue we are making an apples-to-apples comparison. However, the 
flavor and color are sufficiently similar within topics that an orange-to-tangerine 
comparison is possible. 
17. The −0.2 to −0.3 range is the top of the range obtained from the older minimum 
wage research. Using this high a figure, which is considerably larger in magni-
tude than obtained from the new minimum wage research, suffices for the current 
computation work. 
18. If we suppose that those bound workers who are laid off were all previously paid 
less than those who kept their jobs, then those who had been earning $5.10 or less 
lose their positions, when the elasticity is −0.2. With an elasticity of −0.3, those 
who had earned no more than $5.15 lose their jobs. The maximum wage increase 
for those retaining their positions is then $0.39 per hour. 
19. See http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs32.htm (accessed August 9, 
2012). 
20. Actually, $7.98, but we use $8.00 for simplicity. 
21. We assume that all currently employed teens will complete their 90 days of em-
ployment at the youth subminimum wage and, if they remain employed, have their 
wage increased to the full adult minimum wage. We also assume that teens will be 
laid off in order from lowest to highest paid. 
22. The lack of any effect on weekly earnings is likely related to including the unem-
ployed and those not in the labor force in the calculation of weekly earnings, and 
defining those individuals’ weekly earnings to be zero. 
23. Although there is still no employment effect for male or female black or Hispanic 
teens, the minimum wage is negatively and significantly associated with aver-
age hourly earnings and very negatively associated with average weekly earnings 
for males. For black or Hispanic women, a higher minimum wage is associated 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
  
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
254 Belman and Wolfson 
with higher average hourly earnings, but it does not affect weekly earnings except 
through a negative interaction with the EITC. 
24. When the model is estimated for teens who have been employed for more than one 
quarter, there is not a statistically significant effect on monthly earnings for the 
all-county sample but a positive and significant effect when controls for omitted 
economic variables in spatially separated countries are implemented. 
25. Other studies also find that a higher minimum wage is associated with higher 
average wages for teens (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg 2000; Campolieti, 
Gunderson, and Riddell 2006). However, as the errors are not clustered, we cannot 
tell whether their findings pass a 5 percent test for statistical significance. 
26. The minimum wage generally is positively related to employment, but its in-
teraction with the EITC is negatively related to employment for less-educated 
individuals who are not eligible for the EITC. The minimum wage is found to have 
a positive effect on weekly earnings, where weekly earnings includes nonworking 
individuals who are assigned a zero for earnings, but the interaction between the 
minimum wage and EITC is strongly negative. In net, the authors calculate that a 
10 percent increase in the minimum wage has no effect on weekly labor earnings. 
27. Because Neumark and Wascher (2011) use the logarithm of the wage as their 
dependant variable, they assign values of $1 to hourly earnings for those who 
have no earnings because of unemployment or not being in the labor force. Sabia 
(2008) follows this approach in including those who are not employed in his esti-
mates of annual income. 
28. The QCEW provides data on quarterly payroll inclusive of direct hourly pay, over-
time, tips, bonuses, stock options, and employer contributions to retirement funds. 
Payroll is divided by total employment during the quarter to provide a measure of 
average (weekly) earnings per employee. As such, the compensation measure used 
in this study is considerably broader than the typical measure of earnings. 
29. When first applied to restaurant employees, employers of tipped employees were 
required to pay half of the minimum wage to employees, if the balance were made 
up by tip income. However, since the 1990s, the minimum required pay for tipped 
employees has remained at $2.30. This may reflect the influence of the restaurant 
and bar industry in obtaining a quid pro quo for not strongly opposing increases 
in these requirements. 
30. There is a positive but nonsignificant effect in models that do not allow for selec-
tion. Anderson and Bodvarsson’s (2005) approach to classification, which mixes 
the tip credit and level of the minimum wage laws, makes it difficult to distinguish 
the effect of these two aspects of minimum wage policy. In addition, the data are 
a cross section of states for 1999 with two observations per state, one each for 
servers and bartenders, so there are only 100 observations that are pairwise non-
independent. Standard errors are then likely to be large relative to other studies 
reported in this review and may be mismeasured, as the nonindependence is not 
accounted for. 
31. The shorter sample excludes the recessions at the beginning and end of the longer 
sample. 
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32. A limitation of this study is the failure to allow for the time-series structure of the 
QCEW data. It assumes that effects are contemporaneous and that there is no in-
ertia in economic processes. Although the clustering of the standard error by state 
addresses the issue of serial correlation, equally important issues with unit roots 
and cointegration are not addressed. 
33. As the standard errors are clustered by state, there are not issues of an under-
estimate of standard errors. 
34. An advantage of the QCEW is illustrated in these latter estimates. The county-
level detail provides many more observations than the more frequently analyzed 
state-by-time panel, and this detail may be critical to obtaining precise estimates 
of the interaction between the minimum wage and right-to-work laws. 
35. Earlier work on the effect of minimum wages in the United Kingdom includes 
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003), who report that between 1950 and 1980, 
the elasticity of average earnings with respect to the minimum wage was 0.4– 
0.5 in England and Wales and 0.6–1.0 in Scotland and Ireland, with no effect on 
employment. 
36. Wage data from the 1999 survey were reanalyzed as part of a study on the effect of 
the implementation of the NMW on care home profitability and survival (Draca, 
Machin, and Van Reenen 2011). The authors report that the implementation of the 
NMW had a large positive effect on average wages, and that a 10 percent wage 
gap was associated with an 8.86 percent increase in the average wage in a regres-
sion with controls. The magnitude of wage change was substantially larger than 
in an equivalent period in which there was no increase in the minimum wage (pp. 
13–14). 
37. Although the authors do not suggest this, the pattern is consistent with there be-
ing a “shock” effect associated with the implementation of the new wage—firms 
reconfigure their workforces in response to the initial implementation of new labor 
regulations. However, the reconfiguration is a one-time event, and further increases
in the minimum wage do not result in as large a displacement of workers. 
38. Reich and Hall (2001, p. 9) indicate that the spike associated with the minimum 
wage moved up with increases in the minimum wage. 
39. Economic models suggest that the least-productive individuals would not be 
employed when a sufficiently high minimum wage is in place because their mar-
ginal product would be less than the minimum wage. If the wage equation were 
straightforwardly estimated with only the currently employed, it would be biased 
by the exclusion of the lower-productivity workers and would provide an inac-
curate estimate of the wage equation that would apply if the lower-productivity 
workers remained employed. Selection correction allows estimation of a wage 
equation appropriate to the workforce that would be employed in the absence of 
a minimum wage. 
40. Burton and Dorsett (2001, Figure 3) provide data for the income distribution with-
out a minimum wage but do not calculate the proportion of the labor force that 
would be earning less than the minimum. Examination of the figures suggests 
that half or more of the labor force would have earnings below the minimum. The 
 
  
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	
 
 
256 Belman and Wolfson 
absence of formal testing of the effect of the minimum wage on the estimated 
proportion earning below the minimum is a limitation of this study. 
41. Wage rates are straight-time hourly pay. 
42. The evidence that the effect on wage growth extends as far up as the 20th percen-
tile of earners will be addressed in the section on wage spillovers. 
43. The wage-gap variable takes a value of zero if the individual’s wage is equal to 
or greater than the new minimum wage. Currie and Fallick (1996) do not indicate 
whether they use the wage rate or hourly earnings measures for their wage and 
wage-gap calculations. 
44. Currie and Fallick (1996) find that excluding the small number of high-growth 
outliers greatly affects the regression coefficients but not the standard errors (pp. 
415–416). 
45. This is similar to the finding that union/nonunion wage gaps close during periods 
of inflation and tight labor markets, when market-determined nonunion wages 
move upward rapidly while contractually determined union wages adjust slowly. 
46. A detailed and useful explication of, broadly defined, institutional economists’ 
views of the minimum wage and the role it plays in labor markets and the econ-
omy is found in Kaufman (2007). It explicitly develops Commons’s, Perlman’s 
and many less well-known institutionalists’ views. This article is recommended 
for those who are interested in a deeper understanding of theories of economics 
as these apply to labor markets and a thoughtful contrast between neoclassical 
and other economic theories with regard to the minimum wage. It is particularly 
enlightening in developing the institutional economists’ self-understanding that 
they were explicating the framework within which neoclassical markets operated, 
rather than developing an alternative to a neoclassical theory. 
47. Experimental research also indicates that the effect of minimum wage boosts are 
not reversible—once the minimum wage has created a standard for the wage, re-
moval of the minimum wage does not automatically reduce workers’ expectations 
about an appropriate wage. 
48. Spriggs (1994) speculates that there may be a group of low-wage-restaurant firms 
that can maintain productivity without maintaining their intra-firm wage structure. 
49. Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) find considerable evidence that these res-
taurants adjust employment in ways consistent with institutionalist views. While 
part of the adjustment took place through modest increases in prices, a consider-
able part of the adjustment resulted from taking advantage of reduced turnover 
and improved human resource practices. The latter, in particular, is consistent with 
a shock effect. 
50. Grossman (1983) notes that this must be taken with some caution, as the data set 
is small and the standard errors are large. The techniques used in this study, ap-
propriate for when it was conducted but currently dated, also suggest the need for 
caution in interpreting these findings. 
51. Reich and Hall (2001) investigate and reject the hypotheses that increases in the 
minimum wage adversely affected employment. Their observed change in the 
wage distribution was therefore not due to truncation. 
52. We also cite estimates provided by the authors but not incorporated into the paper. 
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53. Families are referred to as units in this study; we use the term family for clarity 
about the “unit of observation.” 
54. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) estimate their models with three different 
surveys and report the estimates from each survey and calculate a cross-survey 
weighted estimate and standard error. We report the cross-survey effect, as this 
uses the largest sample and greatest range of data. The estimated effect based on 
data from the CPS declines from $311 to $218 per quarter when the sample is 
restricted to families receiving at least 20 percent of their income from minimum 
wage jobs. There is also a modest decline in the CEX coefficient but an increase in 
the coefficient for the SIPP, which becomes significant in a 10 percent test. 
55. For the purposes of measuring spillover effects, treating those earning up to 
120 percent of the minimum wage as minimum wage workers potentially re-
sults in some spillover effects being attributed to those earning the minimum 
wage. We thank Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) for providing their es-
timates of the effect from 120–200 percent, and 200–300 percent of the new 
minimum, as these do not appear in the 2011 version of the paper.
The estimates of these effects are sensitive to the period under study. In the 
prior paper, in which data series ended in 2005 rather than 2008, CPS estimates 
ranged from $336 to $419, and SIPP estimates ranged from $195 to $210, both 
with statistically significant estimates in a 5 percent test. In this study, the CPS 
estimates ranged from $45 to $83, with the lower estimate far from significant; 
SIPP estimates ranged from $110 to $123 and were significant in a 1 percent test. 
56. Inflation was very low during this period, averaging 1.2 percent annually. Any 
effect it had on upward movement of the lower part of the wage distribution was 
likely to be very small and would not substantially complicate this descriptive 
analysis. 
57. As these changes are not compared to wage growth prior to the implementation of 
the NMW, it was unfortunately not possible to distinguish the portion that might 
be attributed to “regular” wage growth from that attributable to spillover effects. 

 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
6 
Human Capital 
While research on the minimum wage most often examines its con-
sequences for employment and wages, the minimum wage also poten-
tially affects decisions about schooling, training, and the provision of 
nonwage benefits. The largest body of research on these decisions con-
siders the effect of the minimum wage on education and training—the 
accumulation of human capital. Behind this is the concern that teenag-
ers may discontinue their education to pursue the improved earnings 
afforded by increased minimum wages, and that employers will reduce 
the training they provide to employees. Furthermore, a reduction in the 
development of skills might have negative consequences for individu-
als and society, as it would reduce future productivity and earnings, 
particularly for low-wage workers. 
This concern originates in the predictions of human capital theory. 
Individuals’ productivity—their capacity to produce goods and ser-
vices—is closely related to their knowledge, skills, and abilities. Al-
though some part of an individual’s productivity is associated with 
innate abilities, their productivity can be increased through education, 
training, and work experience. This investment requires both time and 
money, and individuals’ choices about investing in themselves through 
education and training can be framed in a fashion parallel to investing 
in physical capital. Developing human capital has a direct cost: money 
invested in education and training, and an indirect cost, the earnings and 
output forgone while the individual trains. The gain from these costs 
is the increase in future output and earnings associated with improved 
human capital. With this conceptualization of education and training, 
the logic used to evaluate investments in physical capital can be applied 
to investments in human capital. It is possible to compare the costs of 
a particular investment in human capital to the discounted increase in 
income associated with the investment. Alternative investments in hu-
man capital can be compared to one another, and to the returns from 
an investment of the same resources in other markets. One might, for 
instance, compare the return on a college degree with the income that 
would otherwise be earned from starting work after high school. 
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Human capital theory can be used to evaluate the effects of social 
policies on human capital formation and economic welfare. For exam-
ple, laws that limit the types of work in which children can engage alter 
the returns to leaving school at a young age. As children’s employment 
opportunities are restricted, and their wages decline with the demand 
for their labor, the cost of remaining in school declines, and returns to 
continued investment in human capital rise. This would, in turn, result 
in increased school attendance, the development of additional human 
capital in society as a whole, and perhaps in an increase in national 
income in the long term. A wide range of government policies, includ-
ing those on college loans and grants, training, and subsidies to educa-
tional institutions, affect individuals’ and firms’ returns to investments 
in human capital and their choices about such investments. By altering 
the wages individuals and firms face, labor market policies change the 
costs and returns to investments in human capital, possibly in a com-
plex fashion. 
The effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the accumulation 
of human capital cannot be derived from theory alone. An increased 
minimum wage may tempt low-performing high school students to 
leave school because of the greater income available from working. If 
employers are, however, less willing to employ teenagers at the new 
higher minimum wage, the reduced likelihood of employment may in-
stead cause the teen to reassess the decision to leave high school. A
minimum wage increase may cause a high school graduate to forgo 
further education and training or may provide the income needed to 
support improvements in their human capital. As theory does not posit a 
certain outcome, the effects of changes in the minimum wage on human 
capital are, in the end, an empirical issue. 
THE LOGIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND FIRM INVESTMENT
IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
Both individuals and firms invest in human capital. The issues fac-
ing individuals and firms are different, and we develop the individual’s 
decision before turning to the firm’s decision. For the individual, the 
decision about investing in human capital, either in the form of educa-
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tion or more specific training, is one of comparing direct and indirect 
current costs in the present with the discounted increase in future in-
come. The costs associated with investment in human capital are both 
the direct costs of the training and the income that is forgone as training 
time displaces paid employment. The gains are the improved earnings 
realized by the individual in the future. Because the gains are in the fu-
ture, they need to be discounted to reflect their current value. In making 
decisions about investing in themselves, individuals compare the costs 
of obtaining a particular form of human capital to the discounted gain in 
earnings associated with that investment. If the net benefit is positive, it 
is economically rational to undertake the investment. However, before 
deciding on a course of action, individuals will compare various human 
capital investments and choose among them based on their net return, 
their rate of return, and other relevant criteria, choosing the one provid-
ing the largest net benefit. 
Firms also invest in human capital to improve the productivity of 
their employees and processes. Such investments make the firm more 
efficient and profitable, and firms will invest as long as the discounted 
net benefit is positive and better than other available investments. 
Firms face a somewhat different problem than individuals in mak-
ing decisions about investing in human capital.1 When people invest in 
themselves, there is no question about who will benefit from that invest-
ment. Because there is no certainty that individuals will remain with 
the firm, there is no assurance that the firm will reap the benefits of in-
vestments in their employees. From the firm’s perspective, investments 
in employees range along a continuum from investments that improve 
employee productivity in any setting, such as developing reading and 
math skills, to investments that improve only employee productivity 
with their current employer. The former is termed general human capi-
tal, the latter is firm-specific human capital. 
The problem facing the firm is that the benefits of its investments 
in general human capital may not accrue to employers. If a firm is to 
invest in an employee’s general human capital, it must be able to recoup 
the investment through the employee’s increased productivity. Even if 
the firm shares some of the return with the employee, the firm cannot 
share too much if it is to benefit from the investment. The wage paid 
to the employee needs to be below, possibly substantially below, the 
value produced by the employee so that the firm can realize a reason-
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able return on its investment. Firms that do not invest in training are in 
a position to entice a trained employee away by offering a wage more 
in line with the employee’s improved productivity. They can do this be-
cause they do not need to recover training costs. Because of the problem 
of recapturing their investments, firms rarely invest in general human 
capital. An exception occurs when an employee is willing to accept a 
reduced wage in return for general training, in which case the employee 
and not the employer is funding the training.2 
The same problem is not present with firm-specific training. This 
training, such as training on firm-specific machinery or procedures, is 
not useful to other firms, and no incentive exists for other firms to of-
fer the employee a wage greater than the employee’s current one. The 
firm that provides the training captures the gains as long as the worker 
remains an employee of the firm. It may choose to share some of the 
productivity gain with the employee, setting his wage above what he 
could earn from other employers, to reduce the likelihood that he will 
leave the firm. 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE MINIMUM WAGE 
Changes in the minimum wage may affect decisions of individuals 
and firms to invest in human capital. The effects of an increase in the 
minimum wage are potentially complex and may occur among different 
types of employees. While a higher minimum wage may induce a teen 
to abandon school to pursue a job at the now higher wage, it might also 
induce retired workers to invest in training that would enable them to 
qualify for jobs. Although the effects of the minimum wage on training 
might occur throughout the labor force, the literature has focused its ef-
fect on the decisions of teenagers to remain in school, and its effect on 
the training decisions of firms. 
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THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT: THEORY AND FINDINGS 
Economic theory provides no certain prediction about the effect of 
increases in the minimum wage on teen school enrollment. Individu-
als are assumed to maximize their lifetime earnings by balancing the 
present discounted value of the gains from additional education against 
the costs of that additional education, mostly forgone earnings while in 
school. Increases in the minimum wage compress the lower end of the 
earnings distribution in a fashion favorable to low-wage workers. For 
teens who can find employment following a minimum wage increase, 
it raises the cost of forgone earnings, reduces the net benefit of continu-
ing in school, and, where the net benefit becomes a net cost, induces 
leaving school. However, if a higher minimum wage results in employ-
ers requiring higher productivity from their now more expensive low-
wage employees and reducing the number of low-wage jobs available 
to teens, then teens are less likely to find employment, the cost of for-
gone work declines, and the returns to schooling increase. The return to 
schooling rises further if additional schooling increases the likelihood 
of being hired into a job at the new higher minimum wage in the future. 
If these factors sufficiently increase the net benefit of continued school-
ing sufficiently, increases in the minimum wage could be associated 
with increased school attendance.3 
Empirical Work on the Effect of Minimum Wage Increases
on School Enrollment 
In The New Industrial State (1972), John Kenneth Galbraith indi-
cated that an advantage of writing nonfiction is an absence of a need 
to maintain suspense. We follow that dictum. Although the effect of 
the minimum wage on schooling is an important topic and has been 
addressed in 14 articles published between 1981 and 2007, conceptual 
and methodological problems are sufficiently pervasive that little can 
be concluded (see Table 6.1 for a summary of these studies).4 
A pervasive methodological issue is that almost all of the recent 
articles predate the work by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
and use panel structures likely subject to serial correlation. Standard 
 
 
	
 
 
 
    
  
264   
Table 6.1  Schooling and Human Capital 
Study Effect Country Target Data Data structure Period Comments 
Ehrenberg 
and 
Marcus 
(1982) 
Mattila 
(1981) 
Cunningham 
(1981) 
Higher relative minimum 
wages cause white males 
and white females in low-
income families to shift 
from enrolled/employed 
to full-time schooling. Re-
sults for nonwhites are not 
statistically significant. 
Increases in the minimum 
wage positively 
affect enrollment for both 
genders and both age cat-
egories. 
Effect varies systematically 
by race and age group 
United 
States 
United
States 
United
States 
Males and 
females, 
14–19 
Teenagers,
14–17 and 
18–19, by 
gender 
Teens and 
young adults 
National 
Labour 
Force Survey 
October, 
CPS 
Education 
Supplement, 
1947–1977 
1960 
and 1970 
census 
Cross sectional 
Annual observations 
from October CPS 
with correction for 
autocorrelation 
Cross section with 
1970 state enrollment 
and employment 
outcomes a func-
tion of the change in 
the minimum wage, 
adjusted 1960 state 
outcomes, and other 
state characteristics 
1966 
(male) 
and 
1968 
(female) 
1947–
1977 
1970 
A 10% increase in the minimum wage 
would be associated with a 0.7 to 0.8% 
increase in the enrollment of 14–17-year 
olds and a 1.3 to 1.4 % increase in the 
enrollment of 18–19-year-olds. The es-
timates are adjusted for auto correlation. 
There is generally a positive effect on em-
ployment for those in school and a nega-
tive effect for those not in school. 
Higher minimum wages reduce school 
enrollment for white teens 16–19 but do 
not affect white 20–24-year-olds. Enroll-
ments for black teens is increased by 
higher minimum wages. When the model 
for the white population is estimated 
distinguishing between covered and un-
covered sectors, there is no effect on teens 
or young adults who are in school but not 
employed, but a negative effect on enroll-
ment of teens who are in school and in 
covered employment. 
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Neumark and Higher minimum wage United Teenagers CPS State-by-year panel 1978– As with other state-by-year research prior 
Wascher results in a greater fraction States and young 1989 to 2004, there are issues of significance 
(1995a) of teens in the not enrolled/ adults tests being biased toward rejecting the 
not employed status. null. Although there is clear evidence that 
the fraction of teens in the not enrolled/ 
not employed category rises, the mini-
mum wage does not have statistically 
significant negative effects in other cate-
gories, complicating the understanding of 
whether the increase affects enrollment, 
employment, or both. 
Neumark and Increases the likelihood United Teens 16–19 Matched Matched individual 1977– This article is greatly expanded in Neu-
Wascher that teens move into the States CPS observations in a 1989 mark and Wascher (1996). 
(1995b) not enrolled/not employed state-by-year panel 
category 
Neumark and Increases the likelihood United Teens 16–19 Match CPS Matched Individual 1979– The estimates are rich and varied accord-
Wascher that teens move into the States observations in a 1992 ing to time period, sample, and estimation 
(1996) not enrolled/not employed state-by-year panel method. In general, only the transition 
category but effects vary estimated by multino- into not enrolled/not employed is statisti-
greatly by period, age, and mial logit cally significant, leaving questions about 
initial wage level. whether the measured effect is an enroll-
ment or employment effect or both. The 
estimated effect is large and significant 
for the 1980–1984 period, but is not for 
1985–1992. The RCS structure raises 
issues with downward bias in estimated 
standard errors. 
(continued) 
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Table 6.1  (continued) 
Study Effect Country Target Data Data structure Period Comments 
Neumark and Higher minimum wage United Teenagers CPS State-by-year panel 1978– Results generally show that an increase 
Wascher results in greater fraction States 1989, in the minimum wage increases the frac-
(2003) of teens in not enrolled/not 1980– tion of teens who are not enrolled/not 
employed status 1989, employed but doesn’t have a statistically 
1980– significant effect on other categories. 
1998 Results are sensitive to the period under 
consideration and the error structure. 
Concerns about the downward bias of 
estimated standard errors in state-by-year 
panels apply to this research. 
Campolieti, Increases in the minimum Canada Teens 16–19 Survey of Matched individual 1993– Builds on Neumark and Wascher (1995b, 
Fang, and wage do not affect school Labour and observations in a 1999 1996). 
Gunderson enrollment. Income Dy- province and year 
(2005b) namics panel estimated with 
multinomial logit. 
Baker (2005) No effect on enrollment for Canada 15–24- Canadian Province-by-year 1983– 
those aged 15–19 or 20–24 year-olds Labour Force panel 2000 
Survey 
Hyslop and The minimum wage does New Teenagers New Zealand Individual-annual 1997– Once business cycle controls are in-
Stillman not systematically affect Zealand Household panel 2003 cluded, of the nine estimates of minimum 
(2007) enrollments, but some sig- Labour wage effects, there are significant effects 
nificant effects are found Force Survey for 16–17-year-olds in 2002 and for 
for particular age groups 20–21-year-olds in 2001. 
and years. 
Pacheco and Increased coverage increas- New Teens 16–19 New Zea- Year-by-age group 1986– Unpacks the effect of coverage, which 
Cruick- es school enrollment, while Zealand and young land Labour panels 2004 is positive, from the effect of increases 
shank increases in the real mini- adults Force Survey in the real minimum wage, which is 
(2007) mum wage reduce school 20–24 combined negative. As with other work with unit-
enrollment for 16–19-year- with school by-time panels, there may be issues with 
olds. There is no effect on enrollment under estimation of the standard errors. 
20–24-year-olds. data 
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Landon Increases in the provincial Canada 16- and Assembled Year-by-province 1975– Differs from most other studies in using 
(1997) minimum wage reduce 17-year-old from a panel 1989 education, rather than labor force data and 
school enrollments for males and variety of focusing on high school enrollment. 
16-year-old males and females in Canadian 
17-year-old males and fe- six Canadian Education 
males. A $0.50 increase in provinces and Labour 
the relative minimum wage Market data 
would sources 
reduce enrollment by about 
0.7 percent. 
Chaplin, Increased minimum wages United High school Common State-by-year panels 1989– Differs from most other studies in using 
Turner, are associated with lower States students core data 1990 to a school-based education rather than a la-
and Pape continuation ratios in states from the 1996– bor market data set and focusing on high 
(2003) that allow school leaving at U.S. Depart- 1997 school education. 
age 16 and younger. There ment of Edu- school 
is no effect on states that cation year 
do not allow school leav-
ing after age 17. 
Warren and Although the minimum United High school Common State-by-year panels 1982– 
Hamrock wage is never significant States students core data 2005 
(2010) of itself, the elasticity of 
the interaction with the 
state unemployment rate is 
negative and significant. 
Crofton, The level of the minimum United High school Maryland County-by-year 1993– 
Anderson, wage does not affect drop- States students Report Card panels 2004 
and Rawe out rates for all high school  (Mary- (http://www 
(2009) students or any subgroup land) .mdreport
except Hispanics. The er- card.org) 
rors are not clustered, so 
significance may be over 
stated. 
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errors are never clustered by cross-sectional unit: state, province, or 
age. This would not be an issue if the data were not serially correlated. 
However, there is reason to believe, and perhaps hope, that there is con-
siderable inertia, and therefore serial correlation, in enrollment ratios or 
other measures of schooling.5 The Pearson correlation of the enrollment 
to population ratio between its current value and its first lag is 0.99 in 
U.S. national data for 14–17-year-olds between 1900 and 2000; both 
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin tests indicate unit roots in enrollment to population ra-
tios. Although not necessarily determinative for state data, the factors 
that cause such a high level of serial correlation in the national data also 
characterize state data. As the errors are not clustered, the standard er-
rors of all but short panels will be systematically underestimated, and 
the null hypothesis, that the minimum wage has no effect on enroll-
ment, will be rejected too frequently. Given this problem, the estimates 
are reliable only when they do not reject the null, but they are unreliable 
when they do. Of the 15 articles on this topic listed in Table 6.1, only 
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) and Hyslop and Stillman (2007) provide 
reliable hypothesis tests. 
A second issue, one that is important to future research, concerns the 
differences in approach arising from analysts’ home disciplines, labor 
economics, and education. Labor economists have tended to approach 
enrollment models as extensions of their employment models. The most 
serious consequence of this has been conflation of the decision about 
remaining in high school with that of going to college. Dividing popu-
lations into teens aged 16–19 and young adults aged 20–24 is standard 
in labor market studies, but it is not consistent with decisions about 
schooling. Most students complete high school at age 18 and, if they 
choose, enter college at age 18 or 19. By constructing samples of teens 
16–19, the research mixes decisions about remaining in high school 
with the decision to continue education beyond high school. Mixing 
these decisions complicates measurement issues, estimation, and ap-
plication of findings to policy decisions. 
Evidence for differences between these decisions can be found in 
Neumark and Wascher (1996). Although the authors do not get beyond 
descriptive statistics that distinguish outcomes for 16- and 17-year-olds 
from 18- and 19-year-olds, their data suggest considerable differences in 
the responses of enrollment for the two age groups to a higher minimum 
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wage. Research that distinguishes the effects of the minimum wage on 
decisions about staying in high school and entering college will be more 
interesting and more useful than much of the current research. 
The failure to embed studies of the effect of the minimum wage 
on enrollment in generally accepted models of school staying or col-
lege entrance also raises issues about research originating in the labor 
economic tradition. Although fixed effects by year and state control for 
many factors, it is not reasonable to assert that such models can capture 
the effect of state minimum wage variables on enrollment without also 
allowing that state education requirements, finance, and related factors 
should not also be incorporated into these models. There has been prog-
ress on this over time. Some of the work of Neumark and Wascher, 
and the research by Baker (2005), Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003), 
Landon (1997), and Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) make important 
contributions to a specification that integrates the factors favored by 
labor economists with those that education scholars believe to be im-
portant in the determination of enrollment and graduation. 
A final issue is that, despite the small number of articles, it is dif-
ficult to synthesize the results because of differences in definitions, 
groups under consideration, methods, and the period studied. Where 
findings differ, it is challenging to determine the source of differences 
among articles. As current researchers seldom embed their work in 
specifications used by prior researchers, one is unsure whether differ-
ences emerge because of the use of data for different time periods, dif-
ferent model specifications, different measures of the minimum wage, 
or other sources. Most researchers wish to make their particular mark, 
to bring their insight to an issue; this creativity is central to the evolu-
tion of research. This drive toward originality should not preclude ex-
plicit exploration of the sources of differences between earlier work and 
their own; indeed, it highlights their contribution. 
Early Research 
Research on school attendance and the minimum wage first ap-
peared in 1979 in papers presented at a conference on the minimum 
wage at the American Enterprise Institute. Establishing a pattern for 
future research, the studies by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981) 
reached opposite conclusions. Mattila’s time-series models of the en-
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rollment rate of men and women aged 14–17 and 18–19 from 1947 to 
1977 find a consistent positive relationship between the minimum wage 
index and school enrollment. Cunningham uses 1960 and 1970 census 
data aggregated by state to consider the effect of the increase in the 
level and coverage of the minimum wage between 1960 and 1970 on 
youth school enrollment and employment. Estimates from models with 
extensive controls for changes in demographic, economic, and indus-
trial characteristics of states find that the minimum wage is associated 
with a modest decline in the fraction of white male and female teens 
not in school but does not affect the schooling decisions of 20–24-year-
olds. The elasticity for white male teens is −0.15, −0.21 for white fe-
male teens. The effect on black youth is quite different: the minimum 
wage has a statistically significant positive effect on the enrollment of 
black male teens and no effect on other black populations.6 
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) provide many of the concepts and 
methods used in more recent research on whether the minimum wage 
has different effects on teens from high- and low-income families, and
on the relationship between the minimum wage, employment, and 
schooling and initiated work. They divide 1966 and 1968 NLS respon-
dents aged 16–19 into four statuses: 1) those who are enrolled in school 
but are not employed (ENE); 2) those who are enrolled and employed 
(EE); 3) those who are not enrolled but employed (NEE); and 4) those 
who are neither enrolled nor employed (NENE). The probability that 
an individual is in one of the EE, NEE, or NENE categories relative to 
being in ENE is determined by the relative coverage-adjusted minimum 
wage and control variables. The effect of the minimum wage on indi-
viduals from households with an annual income no greater than $4,000 
is compared to those from households with incomes of at least $8,000.7 
Higher relative minimum wages induce white females to move from 
working to not working while enrolled in school (from EE to ENE); 
this same effect is found for white males from high-income families. 
The relative minimum wage has no effect on the behavior of nonwhite 
females, but it induces ENE nonwhite males to move out of school into 
employment (from ENE to NEE). Broadly, higher minimum wages ei-
ther do not affect enrollment outcomes or encourage greater schooling 
among white teenagers. Results for nonwhites are distinct, with higher 
minimum wages inducing black male teens, but not black female teens, 
to leave school for employment. 
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The work by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981) has not aged 
as well as might be hoped, and their methods are, for the most part, no 
longer used. They are then more suggestive than conclusive. In con-
trast, Ehrenberg and Marcus’s (1982) work provides a foundation for 
much of the research of the 1990s and 2000s. 
Contemporary Research 
Neumark and Wascher are the most prolific authors on this topic, 
having published four articles on the relationship between the mini-
mum wage and school enrollments. Their work builds on Ehrenberg 
and Marcus (1982) but adds a time dimension by using state-by-year 
aggregate panels or repeat cross sections. As these articles all predate 
the work of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), errors are not 
clustered by state, and hypothesis tests may be biased toward rejecting 
the null hypothesis. We first consider the two articles using aggregate 
panels. 
Neumark and Wascher’s initial work (1995a) adapts the approach 
of Ehrenberg and Marcus to aggregate panel data. The CPS is used to 
calculate annual values of the fraction of teens aged 16–19 in each state 
who are in each of the four enrollment/employment categories (EE, ENE, 
NEE, and NENE) between 1977 and 1989. The fraction of each state’s 
teens in each of these four categories is determined by the coverage-
adjusted effective relative minimum wage and its lagged value; the 
fraction of the population aged 16–19; the prime-age male unemploy-
ment rate; a set of dummies indicating whether students are allowed 
to leave school without graduating if they are less than 16, if they are 
17, and if they are 18; and average teacher salaries by state along with 
year and state fixed effect.8 Other than the minimum wage, only the 
adult male unemployment rate has a statistically significant effect on 
enrollment/employment status: it is positively related to the teens’ be-
ing enrolled and not employed (ENE) and negatively associated with 
employment outcomes (both EE and NEE). Neither enrollment laws 
nor teacher salaries affect the outcomes. 
The effect of the minimum wage on enrollment is not certain. Put-
ting aside the issue of bias in hypothesis testing, only the elasticity of 
the NENE outcome with respect to the minimum wage is substantially 
larger than its estimated standard error in Neumark and Wascher’s 
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(1995a) preferred model. A 10 percent increase in the relative mini-
mum wage would increase the fraction of teens who were neither in 
school nor employed by 6.4 percent. While elasticities of enrollment 
for both the EE and ENE, the two outcomes related to school enroll-
ment, are negative, they are small in magnitude and far from statisti-
cal significance.9 In 10 additional estimates, the elasticity of ENE with 
respect to the minimum wage is smaller than its standard error in eight 
estimates and never achieves 5 percent significance standard in any es-
timate. Only 2 of the 10 estimates of the elasticity of the EE outcome 
meet a 5 percent test of significance. When the minimum wage is mea-
sured relative to inflation, rather than the state average wage, all decline 
elasticities fall in magnitude and none approach 5 percent significance. 
Responding to issues raised by Evans and Turner (1995), Neumark 
and Wascher (2003) further update and expand their 1995 work. A
number of estimates use the more reliable measures of enrollment pro-
vided by the CPS October school enrollment supplement. Models are 
estimated for 1979–1989 and for 1980–1998. Results for the four-way 
division of outcomes are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the 
1995 work. Although the elasticity of NENE is positive and significant, 
albeit biased, neither EE nor the ENE outcome is affected by the mini-
mum wage. Coefficients are small in magnitude and do not achieve a 5 
percent level of significance across eight variants in specification and 
sample. 
More relevant to the issues of this chapter, the authors also estimate 
models of enrollment without respect to employment. Twelve variants 
of the model are estimated with models differing by period, error struc-
ture, and measure of enrollment. All 12 estimates find that the minimum 
wage has negative effects on enrollment, but only 5 are significant in a 5 
percent test. There is some evidence in additional models that state laws 
that establish the age at which teens can leave high school moderate the 
effect of the minimum wage, with the minimum wage effect attenuating 
as the age of leaving is increased. However, given the problems with 
hypothesis testing in this work, the interaction between the minimum 
wage and state enrollment laws is only suggestive of issues to be pur-
sued in future research. 
Neumark and Wascher’s (1995b, 1996) second approach takes ad-
vantage of the rotation of CPS respondents to examine the work and 
schooling transitions among teenagers between 1979 and 1992.10 Indi-
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viduals’ observations can be matched between their fourth and eighth 
month in the survey, a one-year interval, in the outgoing rotation files of 
the CPS. Although there is some loss in respondents between the fourth 
and eighth month, most individuals’ transitions between employment 
and unemployment and between school enrollment and nonenrollment 
can be observed. Using the four employment enrollment categories, in-
dividuals’ second-year outcomes are modeled as an outcome of their 
category in the first year, the contemporaneous and lagged level of the 
effective relative minimum wage, and controls for adult unemploy-
ment, age, race, and sex as well as state and year fixed effects. More 
than 36,000 records on teens can be matched between 1979 and 1992. 
Neumark and Wascher estimate a number of models, and the effect 
of the minimum wage varies considerably by specification. The vari-
ants that are most similar to their prior work find that higher minimum 
wages are associated with a transition from EE to NENE, but they do 
not affect other outcomes. When controls for unobserved individual 
characteristics, individual fixed effects, are incorporated, the minimum 
wage no longer has a statistically significant effect on schooling or la-
bor market transitions. Although the authors express doubts about the 
value of this estimate, the results suggest that unobserved individual 
characteristics impact the estimates. Additional estimates by level of 
schooling, age, period, race and ethnicity, and the level of the initial 
wage suggest considerable variation in the effect of the minimum wage 
on enrollment. The negative effect of higher minimum wages on enroll-
ment and employment are larger for black and Hispanic teens than other 
teens; black and Hispanic teens are at greater risk for transitioning into 
NENE. 
Estimates are sensitive to the study period and initial wage. The 
authors estimate a number of models, dividing the data into 1980–1984 
and 1985–1992, roughly the period affected by the double-dip reces-
sion of the early 1980s, and the period of strong growth following that 
recession. During the recessionary period, the estimated likelihood of 
transitioning into NENE is large in magnitude and generally consid-
erably larger than its standard error. In contrast, the size of the effect 
of the minimum wage on the transition between enrollment status and 
labor market status is consistently small and small relative to its stan-
dard error, in the latter period. This suggests that estimates in the earlier 
period are affected by the depth of the recession. We may be observing 
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the transition of teens who entered a particularly difficult job market 
upon graduating high school. 
Where does Neumark and Wascher’s extensive and vigorous in-
vestigation leave us? The lack of reliable hypothesis tests limits what 
may be concluded. If the minimum wage has an effect, it is likely on 
the movement of those who are in school and employed to being out 
of school and out of employment, from EE to NENE. Nonwhite teens 
appear more vulnerable to the effects of the minimum wage than white 
teens. The effect of the minimum wage on enrollment and employ-
ment may be limited to, or greatly exacerbated by, deep recession and 
unemployment. Although the models included a control for adult un-
employment, the marked difference in the 1980–1984 and 1985–1992 
results suggests that the effect of macroeconomic performance was not 
fully controlled and that the performance of the U.S. economy is an 
important moderator of the impact of the minimum wage. Finally, and 
perhaps most important, the estimates with matched data suggest that 
the minimum wage measure is picking up unobserved characteristics 
that affect individual transitions from enrollment and employment into 
nonenrollment and nonemployment, from EE to NENE. Further inves-
tigation with a data set, such as the NLSY, which is better adapted to 
controlling for unobserved individual characteristics, may produce in-
teresting findings. Although this prolific and interesting work has not 
accomplished as much as the authors had hoped in answering questions 
about how the minimum wage affected school enrollments, it has pro-
vided a foundation for further inquiry. 
Studies of Other Countries 
Economic research on other countries builds on the work of Neu-
mark and Wascher. In addition to providing estimates for other coun-
tries, it innovates with a more sophisticated approach to modeling school 
policies and financing and household factors. Campolieti, Fang, and 
Gunderson (2005b) use longitudinal data, with which they can follow 
individuals over time, to study the experience of Canadian teens, aged 
16–19 from 1993 to 1999. Baker (2005) uses a province-by-year panel 
for 1983–2000 to consider similar issues. Hyslop and Stillman (2007) 
consider the effect of the 2001 increase in the New Zealand minimum 
wage on the enrollment of individuals aged 16–17, 18–19, and 20–21 
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in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Building on Hyslop and Stillman, Pacheco 
and Cruickshank (2007) combine data from the Ministry of Education 
and the LFS to construct an age-by-year panel of 16–24-year-olds for 
1986–2004 to distinguish the effect of broadening minimum wage cov-
erage from the effect of changes in the real minimum wage. 
In Canada the minimum wage is determined solely by provincial 
legislation. Lacking a national floor on the minimum wage, statutory 
minimum wages in Canada have greater variation than their U.S. coun-
terparts. The greater variation can improve the precision of estimates. 
The specification adopted by Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005b) 
is also a step forward in incorporating a wider set of individual factors 
that likely affect enrollment decisions such as household income. The 
estimated elasticity of school enrollment with respect to the minimum 
wage index is positive but not significant, and the authors conclude that, 
at least in the Canadian case, the provincial minimum wage does not af-
fect school enrollments.11 Baker (2005) also finds that provincial mini-
mum wages do not affect school enrollment in Canada. 
New Zealand introduced a minimum wage for those aged 20 and 
older in 1983 and extended coverage, at rates below the adult rate, to 
16–19-year-olds in 1994. In 2001, the rate for 18–19-year-olds was in-
creased from 60 percent of the adult wage to the full adult minimum. 
The wage for those younger than 18 was raised to 80 percent of the 
adult wage. These reforms raised the minimum wage by 69 percent 
for 18–19-year-olds, and by 41 percent for younger workers. These 
substantial increases provided an opportunity to consider the effect of 
both the extension of coverage and large increases to employment and 
schooling outcomes of young workers in New Zealand. Hyslop and 
Stillman (2007) construct a panel of age-by-quarter cells from 1997 to 
2003 from the New Zealand Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) 
of those aged 16–25. Four of the six enrollment elasticities were not 
statistically significant in a model with controls for business cycle ef-
fects. Enrollment among 16–17-year-olds was estimated to decline by 
3 percent in 2002, while it fell by 4 percent among 20–21-year-olds in 
2000.12 
Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) find that the 1994 extension of 
coverage increased the enrollment of those 16–19 by 1.1 to 1.5 percent, 
while changes in the real minimum wage had no effect on enrollments 
in the full sample. When the sample was limited to 16–19-year-olds, 
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broadening coverage raised enrollments, but the real minimum wage 
itself was negatively related to enrollments, with an elasticity of −0.15. 
Projections from these estimates found that the introduction of the min-
imum wage for teenagers resulted in a permanent increase in enroll-
ments of between 1 and 1.5 percent, while the 2001 increase in the 
minimum wage reduced enrollments of 18–19-year-olds by 10 percent, 
and of 16–17-year-olds by 6 percent.13 
Studies Informed by Research on Education 
The work reviewed to this point is anchored in labor economics and 
has been little influenced by the education literature on school enroll-
ment. The definition of samples, specification models, and the data sets 
used to construct variables reflect this approach. In particular, samples 
that conflate the decision to remain in high school with the decision 
to go to college, and equations that include no more than the minimal 
controls for the state education policies, raise the possibility of omitted 
variable bias and render it challenging to sort out the policy implica-
tions of the research. 
Baker (2005); Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003); Crofton, Ander-
son and Rawe (2009); Landon (1997); and Warren and Hamrock (2010) 
take important steps toward a more interdisciplinary approach to the 
minimum wage enrollment issue. Landon estimates a province-by-year 
model of enrollment of 16–17-year-olds for six Canadian provinces for 
1975–1998. The sample of 16–17-year-olds focuses the research on 
the decision to remain in high school. The use of enrollment data from 
educational databases rather than from surveys with a primary focus 
on labor market issues improves our confidence in the accuracy of the 
enrollment measures. In addition to conventional economic controls, 
Landon incorporates five measures of school finance; three measures of 
educational characteristics, including the average number of pupils per 
school; and demographic controls, including divorce rates, the percent-
age of immigrants, the fraction of provincial GDP from agriculture, and 
real per capita income. The minimum wage is measured as the ratio of 
the provincial minimum wage to the average hourly wage. We focus on 
the estimates that include province and year fixed effects.14 Landon esti-
mates separate equations by age and gender, resulting in four estimates 
of the effect of the minimum wage. 
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Higher minimum wages were associated with lower enrollment 
levels for three of the four groups studied, but the magnitude of the 
effect is small, and, because the standard errors are not corrected for 
serial correlation, the statistical significance is uncertain.15 The elastici-
ties of enrollment with respect to the minimum wage range from −0.08 
(for 16-year-old males) to −0.17 (17-year-old males). Landon (1997) 
calculates that a $0.50 wage increase in 1989 would have resulted in 
a decline in enrollment of 3,074 students across six provinces (out of 
about 475,000 students total), between 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent of 
16–17-year-olds. 
Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003) examine the effect of the mini-
mum wage and its interaction with laws regulating when students can 
leave high school with a state-by-year panel. The dependent variable, 
the proportion of high school students completing their degrees by state, 
is constructed from the common core of data, an annual survey of all 
public schools conducted by the U.S. Department of Education, for the 
1989–1990 to 1996–1997 school years. As the data pertain only to high 
school students, the study avoids conflating decisions about leaving high 
school and entering college. Measures of state policies on school leav-
ing—the age at which teens are allowed to leave school, whether the 
state requires an exit examination for graduation, and total school credits 
required in high school—are included in the model, and the real effec-
tive minimum wage is interacted with the age-of-leaving indicator vari-
ables. As with other work predating Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004), the errors are not clustered. 
Higher minimum wages are associated with reduced continuation 
rates among states that allow students to leave school at age 16. In these 
states, the elasticity of continuation with respect to the minimum wage 
ranged from −0.042 to −0.057.16 However, the minimum wage does not 
affect continuation rates among states that only allow school leaving 
at age 17 or age 18. These results are consistent with the findings from 
Neumark and Wascher (2003)—that the minimum wage did not affect 
enrollment in states in which students could not leave high school until 
age 18—but not with Neumark and Wascher (1995a), which finds that 
legal restrictions on when students could leave school did not affect 
enrollments. 
Baker (2005) reports that higher provincial minimum wages are not 
associated with reduced enrollments. Although this study conflates the 
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decision to leave high school with that of entering college, it is other-
wise especially thoughtful in synthesizing the economic and education 
variables incorporated in panel data studies. 
Warren and Hamrock (2010) add to this literature with a broad 
discussion of factors affecting graduation as understood in economics 
and education, better measures of state high school completion rates, 
and more extensive controls for graduation requirements. Educational 
theories of high school completion are structured around push and pull 
factors as well as psychological processes. Push factors include a range 
of state education policies, while pull factors include labor market con-
ditions and family and peer influences. These factors are embedded in a 
developmental process that is affected by success and failure in school; 
student psychological orientations toward school, work, and family; 
and other individual-level factors. In this context, the effect of the push-
pull factors are contingent. 
The data for the model are structured as a state-by-year panel with 
year and state fixed effects. Explanatory variables include not only the 
usual suspects (measures of the minimum wage and state unemploy-
ment rates) but also measures of compulsory school attendance ages, 
the presence and stringency of graduation exams, and the courses re-
quired for graduation measured in Carnegie units.17 The dependent vari-
able is a cohort-specific measure of the percent of 9th graders in public 
high school who complete high school from 1982 to 2005.18 Errors are 
clustered by state. 
To allow for contingency, Warren and Hamrock (2010) estimate 
five models, four of which allow the minimum wage to interact with 
education policy variables or the unemployment rate. The coefficient 
on the uninteracted minimum wage term is small in magnitude and 
never statistically significant, with a standard error that is 2–10 times 
the magnitude of the point estimate. The interaction of the minimum 
wage with the state unemployment rate is negative and significant in 
a 0.05 test. In this variant of the model, a 10 percent increase of the 
mean minimum wage would result in a 1 percent decline in high school 
completion. Other specifications in which the minimum wage is inter-
acted with compulsory schooling laws and graduation requirements are 
not statistically significant.19 
The one state-specific study, an estimate of the effect of the mini-
mum wage on dropout rates by county in Maryland between 1993 and 
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2004, finds no relationship between the real minimum wage and drop-
out rates for their full sample or for the white, African American, or 
Asian samples, but it finds a large negative effect for Hispanics (Crof-
ton, Anderson, and Rawe 2009).20 An interesting addition to this panel 
data model is a control for teen pregnancy rates, which has a strongly 
significant positive effect on dropout rates. 
The Minimum Wage and School Enrollment 
Where do we then stand with respect to understanding the effect 
of the minimum wage on school enrollment? One possible conclusion 
is that we know little or nothing. Because of the likely problem with 
rejecting the null hypothesis (of no effect) too frequently, most recent 
studies cannot be used with any assurance to determine whether the 
minimum wage affects schooling. Three of the remaining four studies, 
Mattile (1981), Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), and Hyslop and Stillman 
(2007), generally find that the minimum wage does not affect enroll-
ment, but Cunningham (1981) finds the opposite. A number of the stud-
ies for which there are issues with bias find no statistically significant 
effect, and in those instances we can accept the result. In contrast, we 
cannot know with certainty whether the studies that find a negative ef-
fect would, once estimated correctly, continue to find that effect. We are 
left with a suspicion that there is likely no effect, but, as so much of the 
evidence cannot be used, what appears to be reliable is not sufficiently 
conclusive to argue against an effect with confidence. 
Research on the effect of the minimum wage on enrollment and 
attainment has advanced over the last decade, but it has not provided a 
definitive answer about the effects of the minimum wage. Past research 
has shown how to synthesize economic and education approaches. We 
know that we need to distinguish between the decisions to remain in 
high school and to enter college. We know that we need to address se-
rial correlation by clustering observations when calculating standard 
errors where appropriate, and by other approaches where clustering is 
not appropriate, in order to get accurate hypothesis tests. Prior research 
has also provided a considerable range of controls that should be con-
sidered for inclusion in empirical models. Building on this knowledge, 
it should be possible to obtain useful estimates of the effect of the mini-
mum wage on schooling. 
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THE MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYER-SUPPLIED
TRAINING: THEORY AND FINDINGS 
As discussed, firms will not provide general training to employees 
unless the employees pay for that training, possibly by accepting lower 
wages. This insight is readily incorporated into a model of compen-
sation by stylizing general training as a fringe benefit, a component 
of total compensation. Employers offer some package of direct wages, 
fringe benefits, and training to workers of a given marginal productiv-
ity. Packages with more general training will have lower levels of other 
compensation. Workers choose the package that maximizes their life-
time discounted income (utility) by choosing among employers, but the 
value of the package, total compensation, is fixed by their productivity. 
Employees who place greater value on future income chose compensa-
tion packages that provide training and higher future income. Move-
ment away from their voluntary choice can only, in an economic model, 
make the employee worse off. 
Increases in the minimum wage potentially move employees away 
from their “preferred’’ mix of wages, training, and other fringes. Higher 
minimum wages increase direct wages as a share of total compensation. 
Unless a higher minimum wage results in greater productivity, employ-
ers will reduce the value of voluntary fringes, such as training.21 The 
reduction in employee training reduces employees’ future productivity 
and earnings. A higher minimum wage would then be associated with 
less general training, reduced earnings growth, and lower levels of fu-
ture income. 
Although not specifically considered in the literature, increases in 
the minimum wage may also cause firms to reduce firm-specific train-
ing. Specific training is more analogous to other forms of capital invest-
ment than general training, as there is no incentive for other firms to 
poach these employees. Even if the firm shares some of the gains with 
workers, it captures the lion’s share of productivity gains. As with in-
creases in the price of other capital goods, by lowering the rate of return 
on specific training, increases in the minimum wage would cause firms 
to reduce investment in specific training. 
When labor markets are not fully competitive, firms may respond to 
higher minimum wages by increasing training (Acemoglu and Pischke 
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1999, 2003). An increase in the minimum wage compresses wages 
and sets the wage above the marginal revenue product of less-skilled 
workers. In a competitive market, firms will lay off workers whose pro-
ductivity is less than the minimum wage. Where labor markets are not 
fully competitive, and firms earn rents, it may be profitable to hire less-
productive workers and provide training.22 As long as training costs are 
less than the rents earned from a worker, firms will employ and train 
workers; the training becomes a form of rent sharing. 
Institutionalist theories also suggest a positive relationship between 
the minimum wage and firm-supplied training. Constrained from using 
low-cost labor, firms can only maintain their output and profitability 
through better management of labor and improving its productivity. 
Although firms can take many steps to improve labor performance, in-
creased training plays an important role in these steps. 
The “Old” New Minimum Wage Research 
Just as the minimum wage increases of 1990 and 1991 spurred the 
“new” minimum wage research, the increases in the minimum wage 
and expansion of coverage in 1967 and 1968 was followed by a burst 
of research. This work was creative and wide ranging, addressing 
many issues revisited in the “new” minimum wage research, including 
school enrollment and on-the-job training. The expansion of coverage 
to smaller retail establishments raised concerns about the effect on posi-
tions that provide entry to employment and the development of on-the-
job human capital.23 A particular concern was whether the combination 
of reduced employment opportunities and firms’ reduction in the pro-
vision of training to early-career employees would reduce employees’
earnings throughout their careers. Hashimoto’s (1982) work provides 
the most developed theory linking higher minimum wages to reductions 
in employer-provided general training and, in turn, to reduced earnings 
growth. The effect of the minimum wage on training and wage growth 
depends on the magnitude of the difference between the wage the indi-
vidual would receive absent the minimum wage and the minimum wage 
itself. Those with the largest differences suffer the largest reductions in 
training and wage growth. 
The early research on training followed two broad paths. Research-
ers with data on training measured the relationship between the mini-
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mum wage and training directly. Those without training data measured 
the response of wage growth to the minimum wage and, like Hashimoto 
(1982), relied on economic theory to link results to training. We focus 
our discussion on the former work, as the relationship is direct and less 
dependent on theory to link the minimum wage and training. (A sum-
mary of articles on the minimum wage and training is found in Table 
6.2.24) 
Both the NLSY and PSID ask respondents about training, the for-
mer about whether the employer provided formal training, the latter 
about whether skills learned in the current job would be useful in future 
jobs. Leighton and Mincer (1981) use both to directly estimate the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on training. Few of the estimates are statisti-
cally significant: only 1 of 5 PSID and 2 of 14 with NLSY estimates 
approach 5 percent significance.25 As part of his work with the NLSY, 
Schiller (1994) finds limited evidence that higher minimum wages re-
duce training. Although only 1 out of 8 of the minimum wage workers 
perceived a total lack of training, regression with controls for age, gen-
der, marital and minority status, academic enrollment and achievement, 
intelligence, location, firm size and broad industry group find a weak, 
negative relationship, only significant in a 10 percent test, between be-
ing employed at exactly the minimum wage and training. 
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) provide the most explicit examina-
tion of the minimum wage’s effect on training, and the relationship be-
tween the minimum wage, training, and wage growth. They adopt a dif-
ference-in-difference regression methodology, dividing employees into 
three groups: 1) those hired at the minimum wage, 2) those hired above 
but no more than $0.25 above the new minimum, and 3) those hired at 
higher wages. Comparisons between those hired at the minimum wage 
and those hired at low but above the minimum wage determine whether 
the minimum wage’s hires are less likely to obtain training than other 
low-wage workers. Comparison between the high-wage group and 
these two low-wage groups further delineates the impact of wages on 
training. While being hired at the minimum wage was associated with 
lower wage growth, it was not associated with reduced hours of train-
ing.26 Those hired at the minimum wage and those hired at low wages 
received less training than those hired at high wages, but training hours 
were not significantly different between the minimum-wage and low-
wage workers. Lower levels of training for men seems to be an outcome 
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of being hired at low wages rather than the minimum wage.For women, 
starting at the minimum wage does not affect training hours relative to 
the low-wage or high-wage group.27 Although Grossberg and Sicilian’s 
(1999) work supports the view that the minimum wage is associated 
with slower growth of wages, their work casts doubt on there being a 
link from the minimum wage through training to slower wage growth. 
More recent studies of training effects include the work of Acemo-
glu and Pischke (2003); Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004); Baker 
(2005); Fairris and Pedace (2004); and Neumark and Wascher (2001). 
Neumark and Wascher use the 1983 and 1991 CPS, which include ques-
tions about formal and informal training, to estimate the effect of the 
minimum wage on employer-provided training and on pre-job train-
ing undertaken by individuals. The analysis of the 1991 data compares 
individuals aged 16–24 with those aged 35–54. The joint analysis of 
data from 1991 and 1983 compares 16–24-year-olds in 1991 with those 
in the 1983 survey. Individuals’ training outcomes are modeled as a 
function of the individual characteristics, state indicator variables, an 
age indicator variable, and the average ratio of the state to the federal 
minimum wage by year interacted with age.28 
The comparison of younger and older workers in 1991 finds no 
connection between the minimum wage ratio and training, whether 
training is measured as a whole or disaggregated into formal and infor-
mal training. Disaggregating teens and young adults finds no effect on 
teens, but a 10 percent higher minimum wage is associated with a 1.8 
percent reduction in the formal training for young adults aged 20–24. 
Higher minimum wages are associated with lower levels of training 
when younger workers are compared between 1991 and 1983. A 10 
percent higher state relative minimum wage causes a 1.2 percent reduc-
tion in the likelihood of training among those 16–24 and a 1.8 percent 
reduction in the likelihood of formal training among those 20–24. There 
is no effect on informal training for the any-age group. Estimates are 
robust with respect to the period over which the minimum wage is aver-
aged but are sensitive to the CPS survey used for the estimates.29 There 
is no evidence that higher minimum wages cause individuals to seek 
more pre-job training to qualify for a position.30 
Baker (2005) considers the minimum wage/training relationship in 
Canada with the 1992, 1994, and 1998 Adult Education and Training 
Survey.31 The model incorporates controls for individual, province, and 
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Table 6.2  Firm-Provided Training 
Data
Study Effect Country Target Data structure Period Comments 
Hashimoto The effect on training is measured United White males NLSY Cross section 1966–1969 
(1982) indirectly through the effect on wage States age 14 to 24 of change in 
growth. The minimum wage, measured in 1966 who wages between 
as the ratio of the effective minimum were not 1966 and 1969 
wage to the wage the individual would enrolled in 
have earned absent the minimum wage, school in 1966 
is not significant in the OLS model. or 1969 
With selection correction, the minimum 
wage has a large negative and signifi-
cant effect on training, while its interac-
tion with experience is large, positive, 
and significant. The implied elasticity 
of training with respect to the minimum 
wage is between −0.3 and −1.6. 
Leighton and When measured indirectly through the United White and PSID and Cross section 1973 and 
Mincer effect on wage growth, PSID estimates States black men. NLSY of individu- 1975 
(1981) find a significant negative effect. NLSY NLSY com- als; NLSY is PSID; 
estimates find a significant negative ef- prises younger younger work- 1967–1971 
fect for white males in 1969–1971, but workers; PSID ers NLSY 
not in the earlier period. There is no is a cross sec-
effect on black males. When the effect tion of the 
on training is measured directly, PSID population. 
estimates are mixed with most being 
nonsignificant. There is no evidence of 
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an effect on white males in the NLSY, 
but some evidence of an effect on black 
males in the 1967–1969 panel but not in 
the later panel. 
Baker (2005) No effect in a difference-in-differences Canada Workers aged Adult Repeat cross 1992–1998 
specification, some evidence in a nega- 17–24 Educa- sections for 
tive effect for younger workers but it is tion and 1992, 1994, 
not statistically different than that for Training and 1998 
older workers. Survey 
Arulampalam, Possible positive effect on training, United Workers aged British Waves 8–10 of 1998–2000 
Booth, no evidence of a negative effect King- 18–60 House- BHPS. Model 
and Bryan dom hold Panel estimated with 
(2004) Survey control for 
unobserved 
individual ef-
fects. 
Acemoglu and No effect on training United Bound work- NLSY 1988–1992 Both dif-
Pischke States ers and work- ference-in-
(1999, ers earning up differences 
2003) to 150 percent and simple 
of minimum regressions 
wage, aged 
24–34 
Fairris and No effect on training hours, mixed and United Establishments National Cross-sectional 1997 
Pedace problematic estimates for likelihood of States Employer regression 
(2004) training Survey 
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year effects; the minimum wage is measured as the ratio of the provin-
cial minimum wage to the average industrial wage for the province. 
While there is evidence of a negative relationship between the mini-
mum wage and training in the 1994 and 1998 data for those aged 17–24, 
the measured effect is not different from that of those aged 35–44, a 
group unlikely to be greatly affected by the minimum wage. Baker con-
cludes that “a prudent conclusion would be at this stage the analysis is 
uniformative about the relationship between minimum wages and train-
ing” (p. 40). 
Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004) find no evidence that the 
United Kingdom’s introduction of the NMW in 1999 led to a decline 
in training, and some evidence that training of those aged 18–60 in-
creased. This main result, the absence of a negative effect, was robust 
to distinctions between changes in both the provision and the intensity 
of training and to the definition of the treatment group. 
Fairris and Pedace (2004) use a difference-in-difference approach 
with establishment data from the 1997 National Employer Survey to 
measure the effect of state relative minimum wages on the likelihood of 
employees’ receiving training and the average hours of training. Higher 
minimum wages reduce the likelihood of training within establish-
ments. However, when the sample is disaggregated by broad occupa-
tion, there is no difference in the effect of the minimum wage on the 
likelihood of training between frontline workers, support staff, techni-
cal, and supervisory and managerial workers. The authors suggest that, 
as the training of managerial and supervisory workers is unlikely to be 
affected by the minimum wage, it is likely that the negative training ef-
fect of the minimum wage is proxying other factors affecting training 
within establishments. When the minimum wage is measured as the 
ratio of the effective minimum wage to the establishment-specific occu-
pational wage, there is a large negative and significant effect for support 
staff and for supervisory workers but no effect on frontline or technical 
workers.32 The effect of the minimum wage on average hours of train-
ing is never significant in any specification. The authors conclude that 
the evidence on the provision of training is mixed and problematic for 
the provision of training, but that there is no effect on hours of training. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003) theorize that higher minimum 
wages are associated with increased training in less-competitive labor 
markets. They use the 1988–1992 NLSY to examine this with longitu-
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dinal data on those aged 24–34 with no more than a high school degree. 
Difference-in-difference estimates with several definitions of the treat-
ment group are positive but far from significant. The estimates from 
simple regressions are more varied but are qualitatively similar. Of es-
timates from 40 specifications that are differentiated by the definition 
of the affected group of workers, the way in which the minimum wage 
is deflated and the control variables, only 9 are significant in a 5 per-
cent test. Of these, 3 are negative and 6 positive. Given little reason to 
prefer one regression estimate over another, and the lack of statistical 
significance of the difference-in-difference estimates, the authors con-
clude that there is not sufficient evidence for establishing a systematic 
relationship between the minimum wage and training. 
Little empirical work explicitly addresses institutionalist hypoth-
eses about the minimum wage and training. Hirsch, Kaufman, and 
Zelenska (2011) report that 68 percent of managers at the quick-food 
restaurants in their survey indicated that cross-training workers for
multitasking was a very important part of their response to the increase 
in the minimum wage. McLaughlin’s (2009) qualitative comparison be-
tween Denmark’s and New Zealand’s training responses to increased 
minimum wages suggests that whether small- and medium-sized em-
ployers respond to such increases with increased training depends very 
much on the legal and institutional framework in which the increase 
occurs. Minimum wage increases are more likely to occur and be more 
robust in coordinated market economies such as Denmark than in lib-
eral market economies such as New Zealand, which depend on firms’ 
individually making training decisions. 
Summary 
What does the current research say about the effect of the minimum 
wage on firm-provided training?33 Leighton and Mincer’s (1981) re-
search is sensitive to data set, with those based on the PSID indicating 
a negative relationship and those derived from the NLSY generally not. 
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) find that for men the apparent negative 
relationship between the minimum wage and training is, in fact, a nega-
tive relationship between low-wage employment and training. They find 
no evidence of higher minimum wages’ reducing training for women. 
More recent work generally but not universally finds no relationship be-
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tween the minimum wage and training. Neumark and Wascher (2001) 
report that based on comparisons of young adults to older workers, 
higher minimum wages reduce formal training for those aged 20–24 but 
do not affect formal training for teen or informal training for any age 
group; they also report stronger evidence that higher minimum wages 
between 1983 and 1991 reduced training of those aged 16–24.34 In con-
trast, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003); Arulampalam, Booth, and 
Bryan (2004); Baker (2005); and Fairris and Pedace (2004) report little 
or no evidence that higher minimum wages are associated with reduced 
training. The mixed evidence on the proposition that higher minimum 
wages induce firms to provide less training supports a verdict of “not 
proven” and perhaps “not guilty.” There is less support for the view that 
higher minimum wages result in increased training. 
THE MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYER-PROVIDED
BENEFITS: HEALTH CARE AND PENSIONS 
Although wages constitute the lion’s share of low-wage employ-
ees’ compensation, some receive benefits such as health insurance, 
pensions, holidays and vacations, and, of course, training. Economic 
theory suggests that the composition of the compensation packages will 
be determined by the reconciliation of employer and employee prefer-
ences through markets. The result is an optimal combination of wages 
and fringe benefits. 
When the only form of compensation is the wage, employers’ re-
sponse to the imposition or increase in the minimum wage is, in an 
economic model, to reduce employment to a level where the marginal 
revenue product of the marginal worker is equal to the minimum wage. 
Other margins of adjustment become available once the compensation 
package includes voluntary benefits. Suppose an employer provides 
$5.00 in total compensation for each hour worked, of which $4.00 are 
direct wages and $1.00 are voluntary fringe benefits. In this situation, 
the imposition of a $4.50 per hour minimum wage leaves the employer 
with a range of responses. At one extreme, the employer can continue to 
pay the same fringe benefits and reduce employment to the point where 
marginal revenue product equals $5.50/hour; compensation rises by the 
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difference between the new minimum wage and ex ante direct wages. 
At the other extreme, the employer can maintain ex ante employment 
and reduce voluntary fringe benefits by $0.50 per hour, leaving the 
value of the compensation package at $5.00 per hour. The first situation 
is the familiar one where the minimum wage improves the situation for 
those who remain employed, but those who are unemployed yet willing 
and qualified to work at the original level of compensation are worse 
off. In comparison, the second situation appears harmless since none 
lose jobs, but employees are moved away from their optimal compensa-
tion package to another that is overweighted toward direct wages and 
underweighted toward benefits. Where compensation packages include 
voluntary fringe benefits, the adverse effects of the minimum wage may 
not show up in reduction in employment but rather in the modification 
of compensation packages. 
Firms’ability to alter fringe benefits is limited. Employers cannot re-
duce contributions to legally mandated fringe benefits, including Social 
Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensa-
tion. Employers may also be reluctant to reduce voluntary benefits such 
as health insurance and pensions. Under IRS regulations, these benefits 
have to be provided in a nondiscriminatory fashion to qualify for pretax 
treatment.35 Firms with large numbers of non–minimum wage workers 
may find that withdrawing benefits from minimum wage workers, and 
losing the privileged tax treatment for their other workers, is very ex-
pensive. Other benefits, such as training, holidays, vacation, and sick 
pay are not regulated and could be reduced without tax consequences.36 
Early Research 
In his book on the minimum wage in the restaurant industry, Alpert 
(1986) investigates the effect of the minimum wage on fringe benefits. 
He uses data from the Employer Expenditures from Selected Compen-
sation Practices survey, a rich source of measures of fringe benefits de-
veloped by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Table 6.3 for a summary 
of the articles on the minimum wage and benefits).37 The 20 benefits in 
the series are merged with demographic variables from the CPS to form 
short time series in which each benefit is measured on both a per-hour 
and an annual per-firm basis. Four of the 40 estimates were significant 
in a 5 percent test or better. The real minimum wage had a negative 
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and significant effect on vacation expenditures and on total leave hours 
when these were measured on a per-hour basis and on severance pay 
and shift premiums when measured on an annual-firm basis. In a less 
wide-ranging study, Card and Krueger (1994) find that fast food res-
taurants did not respond to minimum wage increases by limiting the 
provision of meals at reduced prices. 
Recent Research 
Two more recent studies, Simon and Kaestner (2004) and Marks 
(2011), use the Annual Demographic Files in the March CPS to study 
different aspects of the relationship between the minimum wage and 
health and pension benefits.38 These surveys collect retrospective in-
formation on pension and health insurance eligibility and coverage 
at the firm where the employee spent the most time in the prior year. 
The surveys include questions on whether workers participate in their 
employers’ plan, whether they participate in a family health insurance 
plan, whether the employer pays the full cost of the health insurance, 
and whether the respondent participated in a pension plan sponsored 
by their employer.39 The survey also includes a question on firm size, a 
measure central to Marks’s (2011) work concerns. 
Simon and Kaestner (2004) hypothesize that if the minimum wage 
affects benefits, the effect should be smaller for better-educated and 
higher-income workers. They use a quasi-experimental design, with 
treatment and comparison groups defined by education or income, and 
estimate models for 1979–1986, a period in which there was little state 
variation in minimum wages, and 1987–2000, when there was con-
siderable variation in state minimum wages. They find no evidence 
that higher minimum wages resulted in worse outcomes for the treat-
ment group with respect to whether the individual participates in an 
employer-provided health insurance plan, whether they participate in a 
family health insurance plan, whether the employer pays the full cost of 
the health insurance, and whether the respondent participated in a pen-
sion plan sponsored by their employer.40 
For more than 100 years, economists have noted that larger firms 
pay higher wages and benefits to their employees and debated why this 
is the case.41 One reason may be differences in the legal treatment of 
large and small firms with respect to labor market regulation.42 Recog-
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nizing this, Marks (2011) extends Simon and Kaestner’s (2004) work 
by investigating the interaction between minimum wages, benefits, 
educational attainment, and firm size. Although building on Simon and 
Kaestner’s issues and the March CPS, she uses a regression methodol-
ogy that includes a sample of the employed 18–64-year-olds in place of 
Simon and Kaestner’s quasi experiment. The periods under examina-
tion, 1988–1993 and 1998–2005, overlap but differ from Simon and 
Kaestner.43 
Marks (2011) finds that the minimum wage influences the provi-
sion of health benefits at small, but not large, firms; this does not occur 
with pension benefits for which the small and large firms face similar 
regulation. In models that do not divide the sample by educational at-
tainment, the minimum wage does not have a statistically significant 
effect on health insurance provision in either large or small firms. When 
the minimum wage is interacted with educational attainment, less than 
high school, high school degree, and more than high school, there is 
still no relationship between the minimum wage and health insurance 
coverage for any group at large firms. There is, however, a negative and 
significant relationship between a higher real minimum wage and the 
provision of health insurance for those without high school degrees at 
small firms.44 The elasticity of the health insurance coverage with re-
spect to the real minimum wage at small firms is 0.13 in 1988–1993 and 
0.10 in 1998–2005.45 A higher real minimum wage is also associated 
with a reduced probability that employers would fully cover the cost of 
health plans of less-educated employees at small firms; the minimum 
wage had no effect on the likelihood of full coverage of any employees 
at larger firms.46 
The effect of the minimum wage on pension coverage is markedly 
different. Small firms are not exempt from nondiscrimination standards 
with respect to pension participation. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms are constrained by the effects of regulations that restrict dis-
crimination against lower-earning workers, higher minimum wages are 
not associated with a reduction in pension participation among less-
educated workers in smaller firms.47 
Although Marks (2011) builds on Simon and Kaestner (2004), dif-
ferences in methodologies reduce certainty about why the estimates are 
different. Simon and Kaestner find no difference in the effect of the 
minimum wage on whether an employer provides health insurance be-
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Table 6.3  The Minimum Wage and Benefits 
Data
Study Effect Country Target Data structure Period Comments 
Alpert (1986) Four of 20 estimates find 
that higher real minimum 
wages are associated with 
reduced provision of par-
ticular benefits 
Simon and Using a difference-in-
Kaestner differences approach, 
(2004) there is no difference in 
health and pension cover-
age between the group 
affected by the minimum 
wage and the comparison 
group.
Marks (2011) Higher state real mini-
mum wages are associat-
ed with lower health care 
coverage for employees 
with less than a high 
school degree at firms 
United 
States 
United 
States 
United 
States 
Restaurant 
industry 
U.S. 
workforce 
U.S. 
employed 
workforce 
Combined 
CPS and 
employer 
expenditures 
on selected 
compensation 
practices 
Annual demo-
graphic files 
of the CPS 
Annual 
Demographic 
Files of the 
CPS 
Time series 
A difference-
in-differences 
approach 
using annual 
repeat cross 
section of in-
dividuals with 
state and year 
fixed effects 
A regression 
model using 
annual repeat 
cross section 
with 
1970– 
1977 
1979– 
2000 
1988– 
1993 
1998– 
2005 
The strength of this study is 
the use of a data set with con-
siderable detail on the types 
of fringe benefits available. A 
limitation is that there are few 
observations, 32, for each type 
of fringe benefit. The author as-
sumes first-order auto correla-
tion but does not test for the ap-
propriateness of this structure. 
Estimates are corrected for 
clustering by state, addressing 
the bias in hypothesis tests of 
unclustered estimates. 
Estimates are corrected for 
clustering by state, addressing 
the bias in hypothesis testing of 
unclustered samples. The aver-
age minimum-wage induced 
decline in health insurance cov-
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with fewer than 500 em-
ployees. Other groups are 
unaffected. The reverse 
state and year 
fixed effects 
and a time 
trend 
erage over the period covered 
by the sample is in the range of 
2%.
effect is found with pen-
sion coverage, firms with 
500 or more employees 
are likely to reduce pen-
sion coverage of their 
lowest-educated em-
ployees in response to an 
increase in the minimum 
wage, but there is no ef-
fect on small firms. 
Dube, Naidu, Increases in the minimum 
and Reich 
(2007) 
wage in San Francisco 
did not affect health in-
surance coverage in res-
taurants. 
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tween those with less than a high school degree and those with a high 
school degree. In a model that also does not distinguish outcomes by 
firm size, Marks finds a negative relationship between the minimum 
wage and health insurance coverage for the least-educated workers. 
Given this difference in outcome, it may be that the differences between 
Simon and Kaestner’s and Marks’s results originate in differences in the 
periods under study, or between a quasi-experimental and regression 
methodology rather than in allowing for the effects of firm size. Resolu-
tion of this matter is necessary before conclusions can be drawn about 
the impact of the minimum wage on benefit coverage or the effects of 
firm size. 
The San Francisco Minimum Wage 
In their quasi-experimental study of the effects of the San Fran-
cisco minimum wage, described in detail in Chapter 2, Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich (2007) examine the impact of the minimum wage on health 
insurance coverage. Although the coefficients on the minimum wage 
term are positive (with one exception), the standard errors are usually as 
large or larger than the coefficients. The increase in the minimum wage 
in San Francisco does not appear to have reduced or improved health 
insurance coverage in restaurants. 
SUMMARY 
As with many of the topics other than employment and wages, re-
search on the effect of the minimum wage on fringe benefits is thin. 
Alpert’s (1986) work suggests that, in restaurants, there may be some 
effect on some voluntary fringes, leave, shift pay, and severance pay. 
More recent work finds that although there is not an effect on health 
insurance across all firms, there may be a negative relationship between 
the minimum wage and health insurance for firms with fewer than 500 
employees. There appears to be no effect on pension coverage, even 
among small firms. However, findings for San Fransisco restaurants, a 
small part of the national small-firm universe, also suggest no effect on 
health insurance. 
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Our ability to reach a conclusion is limited by authors’ not building 
explicitly on the work of prior authors. The work of Simon and Kaest-
ner (2004) and Marks (2011) is a case in point. Marks’s work builds on 
Simon and Kaestner and uses the same survey. However, Marks uses 
different time periods and a simple regression rather than a difference-
in-differences regression. As a result, it cannot be said with certainty 
whether the difference in Marks’s results are to be attributed to her in-
novation, distinguishing the effect of the minimum wage by firm size 
and education, or differences in samples and methods. Authors should 
not be bound by prior work—they need to follow the logic of their 
work and creativity. Taking a page or two to systematically investigate 
whether, using the same approach as prior researchers, the innovations 
developed in the current research would have the anticipated effect 
would do much to fill the gaps in our knowledge. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, the discussion of firm human capital decision in Ehrenberg and 
Smith (2012, pp. 152–156). Rosen (1972) laid the foundations for the current 
approach. 
2. An alternative is for the employee to agree to work off the training debt by remain-
ing with the firm for a fixed period after completing the training. This has been 
used by trucking firms that train employees to drive large trucks. The employee 
incurs a “debt” for the training, which is then paid down as the employee drives 
for the firm. If they leave the firm before the debt is paid, they are required to pay 
the remaining debt. 
3. This assumes that there is a close connection between worker productivity and 
wages and an understanding by workers that additional education will improve 
their likelihood of gaining employment at the higher minimum wage (Ravn and 
Sorensen 1997). 
4. Because the literature studying the effect of the minimum wage on schooling is 
small relative to the employment and wage literature, we review articles as early 
as 1981. 
5. The enrollment ratio is the ratio of the population enrolled in school relative to the 
population. As with the employment ratio, the enrollment ratio can be calculated 
for specific demographic groups such as teens. 
6. Although at the time, work by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981) represented 
estimates and hypothesis tests that are subject to question. The time-series meth-
ods used by Mattila have largely been superseded. There are reasons to be con-
cerned that Cunningham’s adjustments to the 1960 census data and other variables 
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have induced forms of heteroskedasticity that are not accounted for in the error, 
throwing off the hypothesis testing. 
7. Those from families with incomes of $4,001–$7,999 are excluded from the sam-
ple. The model includes controls for a variety of demographic and labor market 
factors. The inclusion of a control for whether the individual has graduated from 
high school helps resolve the problem of mixing the decision to remain in high 
school from entering college. 
8. Neumark and Wascher (1995a) use two specifications of the outcomes, one that ag-
gregates the EE and NEE category into a single employed group, and one that uses 
all four categories. We use the latter, as it better addresses the issue of enrollment. 
9. Neither is sufficiently large relative to the standard error to reject the null of no 
effect in a 5 percent test. Neumark and Wascher (1995a) do not provide a joint 
enrollment elasticity or include the weights needed to construct such an elasticity. 
10. Neumark and Wascher (1996) is more fully developed than the 1995 paper, and 
we draw on it for this discussion. 
11. As with other state-by-year panels, there may be an issue with downward-biased 
standard errors. However, given that the null is not rejected, it is reasonable to 
believe this result would have been obtained in a model with errors that were com-
puted correctly. The problem of computation of the elasticities without weights 
applies to the enrollment as well as employment results. 
12. Both New Zealand studies use a time-by-cross-sectional-unit data structure and, 
as a result, may be biased toward rejecting the null of no effect. Lacking informa-
tion on whether the New Zealand real minimum wage or enrollments by age are 
characterized by serial correlation, and the lack of clustering, we cannot be certain 
about the presence of bias. As Hyslop and Stillman (2007) use relatively short 
panels, 1996–2004, there is less likelihood of bias than Pacheco and Cruickshank 
(2007), whose work covers 18 years. 
13. Because 20–24-year-olds were already covered by the minimum wage during the 
estimation period, the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage cannot be 
estimated for that group. 
14. Landon’s (1997) time indicators cover two years, an unusual and unexplained 
choice. 
15. Because of the small number of provinces, clustering does not resolve the issue 
of serial correlation. 
16. Further estimates with grade-specific continuation ratios suggest that the effect of 
the minimum wage occurs between the 9th and 10th grades. 
17. Models were also estimated with variants on the minimum wage, including the 
average of the minimum wage in the students’ junior and senior year, a four-year 
average, or an indicator for any change in the minimum wage during the junior 
and senior year or during the four years of high school. Estimates were not quali-
tatively sensitive to the minimum wage. A Carnegie Unit is 120 hours of class time 
over the course of a year at the secondary (U.S. high school) level. 
18. The Warren and Hamrock (2010) measure of completion is constructed from the 
Common Core data (CCD), but the authors adjust that data for net migration and 
student’s repetition of grades. Warren has previously written about the accuracy 
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of CPS and CCD measures of high school completion. He reports that the CPS 
overestimates completion because of adult respondent’s tendency to report enroll-
ment or completion when children have left school without a degree (Warren and 
Halpern-Manners 2007). He also finds that the CCD is biased by net migration and 
retention of students (Warren 2003). 
19. Warren and Hamrock (2010) argue that the positive effect of unemployment on 
completion is convex and that the interaction with the minimum wage is picking 
up this convexity. This might be resolved by including the squares of both the 
unemployment and minimum wage terms as well as their interaction, thereby dis-
tinguishing nonlinearities from interactions. 
20. As errors are not clustered by county, the significance for Hispanics may be 
overstated. 
21. The phenomenon of worker productivity rising with the minimum wage is known 
as the shock effect and is not part of the conventional analysis. 
22. See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a search model in which labor market out-
comes are not fully competitive. 
23. See Rottenberg (1981) for a broad-ranging set of papers on the effects of the mini-
mum wage. 
24. Grossberg and Sicilian (1999), Hashimoto (1982), and Leighton and Mincer 
(1981) measure the effect of the minimum wage on training through the indirect 
approach suggested by Hashimoto. Using the NLSY to study young white males 
who had completed their education, Hashimoto finds no effect when his model 
was estimated with OLS, but once corrected for sample selection, higher mini-
mum wages are associated with reduced wage growth and training. Using NLSY
and PSID for young white and black males under age 25, Leighton and Mincer 
find higher minimum wages are associated with lower wage growth for white, but 
not black males. Using the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project data on the 
last employee hired by a firm between 1980 and 1982, Grossberg and Sicilian also 
find that the wages of men hired at the minimum wage grew more slowly than 
the wages of those hired at low but above minimum wages and 47 percent more 
slowly than the wages of those hired at high wages. Women’s wage growth was 
not influenced by the wage at which they were hired. Schiller (1994) finds that 
higher minimum wages are associated with higher wage growth among individu-
als aged 15–23. 
25. The authors also estimate a series of models that incorporate the effect of state 
minimum wage levels and distinguish the effects of coverage and the level of 
the minimum wage. The results are again mixed and somewhat confusing. The 
standardized minimum wage generally has a positive or nonsignificant effect on 
wage growth, while coverage is negative or nonsignificant. With respect to job 
tenure, the effects of coverage and the standardized minimum wage are opposite 
signed in the PSID; the standardized wage effect is generally not significant in 
the NLSY estimates, the effect of coverage is generally significant, but opposite 
signed between the white and black equations. Results from the training equations 
are equally mixed. 
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26. As Leighton and Mincer (1981) provide only the coefficients for the logistic re-
gressions, it is not possible to determine the reduced likelihood of training that 
those at the minimum wage experience. 
27. Grossberg and Sicilian’s (1999) wage growth results are discussed in Chapter 7. 
28. The estimates include controls for firm-side measures, including firm size, weekly 
hours, whether the individual was in a permanent job, and industry of employ-
ment, and individual measures, including related experience, union membership, 
hours of work, occupation, job complexity, the firm’s capital stock, and whether 
the individual had been employed for more than three months. The models are 
estimated in a Tobit model, which allows for the part of the sample that received 
no training. 
29. See Table 8 of Neumark and Wascher (2001). Both coefficients and standard er-
rors shift, and the estimated effects are no longer statistically significant if the 
model uses the outgoing rotation file rather than the full training file. Given that 
even the smallest sample has more than 2,000 observations, the shifts in magni-
tude and standard errors is unexpected. 
30. The rigor of the assumptions and magnitude of the effects is critically discussed 
by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, p. 131 and Note 8). 
31. The Adult Education and Training Survey is a Canadian survey intended to cap-
ture all types of training received by 17–24-year-olds in the previous year. The 
survey asks whether the individual received any training, whether they received 
employer-supported education or training, and the type of employer-provided 
training received. It is similar but not identical to the CPS training supplement 
survey. 
32. Estimates with establishment-specific wages are instrumented because of the en-
dogeneity of the establishment wage. 
33. We do not place great weight on older indirect approaches to measuring training 
effects, as Grossberg and Sicilian’s (1999) research calls into question whether 
there is an empirical linkage between the wage growth and training and because 
there are now sufficient direct estimates of the minimum wage/training relation-
ship to reduce the need for indirect approaches. 
34. As with all state-by-year panels prior to 2004, the bias of the hypothesis tests 
toward rejecting the null makes the results difficult to interpret. 
35. Employee pretax benefits are not counted as part of employee income and are not 
subject to income tax. This tax treatment makes them valued by employees, and it 
reduces employer tax liability, as they do not pay social security, unemployment, 
workers’ compensation, or other taxes on these benefits. 
36. Simon and Kaestner (2004) suggest that firms may be reluctant to adjust fringe 
benefits packages if, because of inflation, the increase in the real minimum wage 
is temporary and there are costs associated with ending and starting fringe benefit 
programs. Minimum enrollment requirements of insurance firms may also limit 
smaller firms’ ability to reduce fringe benefit coverage, particularly health insur-
ance (see Simon and Kaestner [2004]). However, firms that are not self-insured 
for health insurance are not covered by the IRS regulations on nondiscrimination 
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and therefore may be in a better position to withdraw or reduce health insurance 
coverage of minimum wage employees (Marks 2011). 
37. The list is long and includes the value of private fringes; overtime pay; pension 
expense; holiday expenditures; health, accident and life insurance expenditures; 
severance pay; shift premiums; sick pay; other private fringes; and a measure of 
total hours of leave 
38. An unpublished article by Royalty (2001) is cited in some research on this topic. 
She finds a negative relationship between higher minimum wages, and pension 
and health coverage. There are issues with the methodology, specification, and 
interpretation. It has not been published to date, and we do not include it in our 
discussion. 
39. Other measures might include whether a respondent works for an employer that 
offers a plan or has coverage through a spouse or some other plan, such as veter-
ans’ benefits. Measures of participation in one’s employer plan best measures the 
effect of the minimum wage. 
40. The models are estimated with between 24,500 and 255,000 observations, de-
pending on the outcome, group, and period; standard errors are clustered by state. 
41. For a discussion of this literature through 1998, see Belman and Groshen (1998). 
42. Marks (2011) suggests that one cause may be differences in the legal treatment of 
large and small firms with respect to regulation of working conditions. Under In-
ternal Revenue Service codes, the health plans of self-insured firms, a type of plan 
found mainly among larger firms, must not discriminate in favor of highly compen-
sated employees. These rules do not apply to firms that purchase insurance, mainly 
smaller firms, and they are permitted to discriminate in their provision of insurance.
The nondiscrimination requirement increases the cost of excluding low-wage 
employees, including those hired at the minimum wage. Particularly for those 
firms with large numbers of higher-wage employees who expect health insurance 
coverage, the cost of excluding lower-wage employees from health insurance is 
very high. For firms not covered by such requirements, the cost of discrimination 
is lower, and we might expect to see them reducing health insurance coverage of 
its lower-wage workforce in the face of higher minimum wages. 
43. There are about 183,000 individuals in Marks’s (2011) large-firm sample and 
244,000 individuals in the small-firm sample. The sample does not include the 
self-employed and students. 
44. Although the coefficient is significant in a 5 percent test, this standard may not be 
sufficiently stringent for a sample with almost one-quarter million observations. 
45. The elasticities are calculated at the average real minimum wage of $2.97 reported 
by Marks (2011) for her sample. 
46. Similar results are found with measures of the state relative minimum wage, the 
ratio of the state minimum wage to the median wage for workers with a high 
school degree or less. The effect on health insurance coverage is more marked 
when the sample is limited to industries in which at least 20 percent of the labor 
force has less than a high school degree. The elasticity of health insurance cover-
age for the less educated ranged from 0.18 to 0.23, depending on time period. 
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47. There is, however, evidence that both the least- and highest-educated workers 
in large firms and the highest-educated workers in small firms have lower prob-
abilities of pension coverage when the minimum wage is higher. The cause of the 
negative relationship between the minimum wage and pension plan participation 
among the best-educated workers is uncertain; it may be proxying effects of other 
variables related to the minimum wage. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
7 
Poverty and Inequality 
An intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act and preceding state mini-
mum wage laws was to assure that those who worked were able to af-
ford a modest lifestyle. In this chapter we review the literature on how 
the minimum wage affects both the absolute and relative standard of 
living of those at the lower end of the income distribution in the United 
States. We begin with the research on the effect of the minimum wage 
on income inequality, the relative standard of living. Researchers are 
unanimous in finding that increases in the minimum wage act to re-
duce income inequality. The results with respect to absolute standards 
of living are less sanguine, as current research does not indicate that the 
minimum wage affects the number of individuals living in poverty. This 
may be due to the loose attachment of many of the low-income families 
to the labor force. 
INEQUALITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 
Reversing a trend that started during the Great Depression, wage 
and income inequality in the United States has increased over the last 
four decades. The greatest changes have been the divergence in the up-
per and lower ends of the income distribution. In the later 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, the mean household income of the 5 percent of 
families with the most income was 16 times the mean of the 20 percent 
of families with the least income. This ratio began to rise in the 1980s, 
when it averaged 18, continued to rise into the 1990s, when it averaged 
22, and rose again in the 2000s, averaging 26. The ratio peaked in 2011 
at 28 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). The growth of inequality has been 
due mainly to the rapid growth in the income of the highest earning 
families. Between 1979 and 2007, the top 1 percent of families captured 
60 percent of income gains, while the bottom 90 percent received about 
9 percent of income gains (see, for example, Bivens [2011]). 
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The rise in inequality has become a topic of public controversy and 
academic discussion.1 Recent research has both documented the change 
and examined plausible causes. Many have been considered, but most 
attention has been on differential change in levels of education and skill 
across demographic groups, on shifts in the supply and demand for dif-
ferent types of labor, on the effects of technology and of international 
trade, and on the change in the industrial and occupational structure of 
the economy. Changes in labor market institutions have also received 
attention as important causal factors in the increase in inequality. At is-
sue is whether the weakening of labor market institutions, specifically 
declines in both the real minimum wage and the bargaining power of 
unions, has been an important factor in the relative decrease in wages 
and incomes of those in the lower tail of the income distribution. In the 
context of this study, we are interested in what the research says about 
the effect of changes in the minimum wage on lower-wage workers, as 
well as the channels through which these increases raise the wages of 
bound workers and near minimum wage workers. 
The issues raised by this research revolve around how increases 
in the minimum wage affect wages, particularly in the lower ranges of 
the wage distribution. Does an increase in the minimum wage result in 
a compression of the wage structure, thereby reducing inequality, or 
does the wage structure as a whole move up, leaving inequality unaf-
fected? We discussed the effect of the minimum wage on the earnings 
of low-wage workers in Chapter 5, and we limit the current discussion 
to research that addresses inequality directly. 
Economists use many different measures to gauge inequality. In-
equality, or change in inequality, can be measured by comparing the 
income of individuals at different points in the earnings distribution. 
For example, the 50/10 ratio is the ratio of the earnings of an individual 
at the 50th percentile of the earnings distribution to the earnings of an 
individual at the 10th percentile. This ratio is used to measure how the 
bottom of the earnings distribution is doing relative to an individual in 
the middle of the distribution. The 90/10 ratio is the ratio of the earn-
ings of individuals at the 90th percentile to those at the 10th percentile. 
It measures how well those close to the top of the earnings distribution 
are doing relative to those toward the bottom. By considering these two 
measures, along with the 90/50 ratio, we can form a clear idea of not 
only how the overall distribution of earnings is shifting but also how 
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individuals at various points in the distribution are doing relative to 
one another. The more commonly used ratios are 90/10, 90/50, 50/10, 
and 75/25. The last ratio measures how the middle of the lower half 
of the earnings distribution is doing relative to the middle of the up-
per half. Measures of variance are also used; higher variance in earn-
ings corresponds to greater income inequality. Variance measures can 
be decomposed to allow changes in variance over time to be associated 
with particular sources of change, such as the minimum wage. Decom-
position of variance allows us to understand both the magnitude of the 
effect of individual factors and the relative magnitude of the factors 
affecting earnings inequality. Other measures, such as the difference in 
earnings between those with only a high school degree and those with 
a college degree, provide another approach to measuring changes in 
earnings inequality. 
Current research supports the view that the minimum wage reduces 
inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution through raising the 
minimum wage relative to the mean or median wage. (Table 7.1 pro-
vides information on the 8 studies of inequality.) There is considerably 
less agreement about the size of the effect, and whether there is an effect 
for men. The initial research, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), 
focuses on the effect of labor market institutions on wage distributions 
between 1973 and 1992. Using CPS data and controlling for the effects 
on the distribution of wages of individual attributes such as education 
and age, macroeconomic factors such as shocks to supply and demand, 
and institutional factors including unionization and the minimum wage, 
the authors report that the decline in the real minimum wage between 
1979 and 1988 accounted for about one-quarter of the increase in the 
standard deviation of men’s wages, and nearly one-third of the increase 
in the standard deviation of women’s wages. Other factors individually 
contributed considerably less to the rise in inequality. Changes with re-
spect to unions and individual attributes each accounted for about one-
seventh of the increase in standard deviation, and supply and demand 
for two-ninths for men. For women, the corresponding figures were 
one-thirtieth, one-quarter, and nearly one-fifth. 
The minimum wage mainly affected the lower tail of both the male 
and female wage distributions. The decline in the real minimum wage 
accounts for between 45 and 60 percent of the increase in the difference 
in earnings between the 10th and 50th percentiles of the male distribu-
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Table 7.1  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Distribution of Wages 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard Data
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error seta 
DiNardo, The decline in the 
Fortin, and real minimum wage 
Lemieux was the source of 
(1996) one quarter of the in-
crease in inequality. 
Lee (1999) Lower minimum 
wages are associ-
ated with greater 
wage inequality in 
the lower tail of the 
wage distribution, 
particularly among 
women. 
Card and A simple model 
DiNardo finds that 90% of the 
(2002) change in the 90/10 
wage gap is due to a 
declining real mini-
mum wage. 
Lemieux (2002) Minimum wages 
affect the wage 
distribution; higher 
minimum wages 
are associated with 
reduced inequality in 
the lower tail of the 
wage distribution. 
Labor 
force 
Labor 
force 
Employed 
labor 
force 
Employed 
labor 
force 
United 
States 
United 
States 
United 
States 
Canada 
and 
United 
States 
1973–1992 Kernel 
density 
1979–1989 Regression 
1973–2000 Regression 
2000 for Regression 
Canada; supple-
mented by 
1973, a logistic 
1979, or probit 
1989, 1999 
Individual 
Individual 
aggregated 
to state 
Individual 
Individual 
Cross 
sectional 
State-by-
year panel 
Series of 
cross sec-
tions
 Cross 
sections 
n/a May CPS 
and CPS 
ORG 
Hetero- CPS ORG 
skedasticity 
adjusted 
and clus-
tered by 
state 
n/a March CPS 
and CPS 
ORG 
n/a Canadian 
LFS for 
Alberta and 
BC; May 
CPS and 
CPS ORG 
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Lemieux (2006) The decline in the Employed United 1973–1993 Reweight- Individual Cross sec- n/a May CPS 
real minimum wage labor States ing of tions and CPS 
was an important force residual ORG 
source of increased wage vari-
inequality. ance 
Autor, Katz, 23% of the increase College United 1963–2005 Regression Experience Time Conven- March CPS 
and Kearney in the 50/10 wage high States group by series tional 
(2008) gap is attributable school year 
to the declining real wage gap 
minimum wage. 
Autor, Manning, If the real minimum Labor United 1979–2009 Regres- State-by- State-by- Clustered CPS ORG 
Smith (2010) wage had stayed at force States sion; year year panel by state 
its 1979 level, 50/10 18–64 quantile 
inequality would and two 
have been 28 to 39% stage 
smaller. 
Dolton, The deeper the “bite” Bound United 1999–2007 Incremen- Region- Aggregate Clustered NES and 
Rosazza, and of the minimum workers King- tal differ- year panel by region ASHE 
Wadsworth wage, the greater the dom ence-in-
(2012) reduction in lower differences 
tail inequality. regression 
aCPS ORG = Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups. LFS = Labour Force Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey.
ASHE = Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. 
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tion, and 57–66 percent of the increase in the difference in women’s 
50/10 ratio. It has had a very small effect on the 75/25 ratio for the 
wages of men, and it accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase 
in the 75/25 ratio for women.2 Consistent with the discussion of wage 
spillovers, the influence of the minimum wage does not reach as high as 
the 25th percentile for men but has some effect at the 25th percentile 
for women. Examination of data for 1973–1979, a period when the real 
minimum wage rose, suggests that the minimum wage accounted for 
between 25 and 33 percent of the decline in the standard deviation of 
women’s wages and 33 percent of the decline in the standard deviation 
of men’s wages. The minimum wage had a larger effect on the ratios of 
those with no more than a high school degree than those with a college 
degree for both genders in both 1973–1979 and 1979–1988. 
Using a technique that better accounted for differences in labor 
market performance among the states in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Lee (1999) finds that the decline in the minimum wage relative to state 
mean and median wages accounted for at least 70 percent of the growth 
in earnings inequality in the 50/10 ratio for women, and 70 percent of 
the growth in the 50/10 and 25 percent of the growth in the 50/25 ratio 
for men. Consistent with spillover effects occurring above the level of 
the binding minimum wage, the minimum wage reduced female wage 
inequality relative to the median as high as the third decile; the effect 
on men does not extend as high and is more sensitive to specification. 
Nevertheless, the effect on the 50/25 ratio for men suggests some spill-
over effect for men. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage rela-
tive to a state’s mean earnings is estimated to reduce women’s 50/10 
ratio by between 3 and 6 percent; for men the reduction is between 1 
and 4 percent, but it is estimated with little precision.3 
Additional research by Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux 
(2002, 2006) provides further evidence that a higher minimum wage 
raises the bottom of the wage distribution and reduces wage inequality 
in the lower tail of that distribution. In an analysis that they describe as 
“somewhat informal,” Card and DiNardo suggest that factors such as 
the decline in the real minimum wage played an important role in the 17 
percent rise in the 90/10 wage gap between 1979 and 1999. Using a va-
riety of measures and techniques, Lemieux (2002) finds that relative to 
Alberta, British Columbia’s higher minimum wage was associated with 
smaller wage inequality in 2000. The increase in the U.S. minimum 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Poverty and Inequality 307 
wage in the early 1990s similarly reduced inequality in the lower half 
of the wage distribution. Lemieux (2006) finds that, after adjusting for 
changes in workforce characteristics between 1972 and 2003, changes 
in the minimum wage accounted for 80 percent of the change in male 
inequality and 90 percent of the change in female inequality. 
More recent work by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) and Autor,
Manning, and Smith (2010) suggests that the minimum wage has a 
smaller but still substantial effect on wage inequality. The first analy-
sis measures the effects of the minimum wage, of supply and demand 
factors, and of unemployment on the ratio the wages of college gradu-
ates to those of high school graduates wages 1963 to 2005. A 10 per-
cent higher real minimum wage is estimated to reduce the college/high 
school wage ratio by less than 1 percent; one-tenth the magnitude of 
that of aggregate labor supply conditions. There is also evidence that 
the minimum wage only affects the college/high school wage ratio for 
the initial 20 years after an individual’s education is completed. Models 
that estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the 50/10 wage ratio 
without regard to educational attainment suggest that the decline in the 
real minimum wage from 1973 to 2005 accounted for 23 percent of the 
increase in inequality over the period. 
The second study addresses concerns with measures used by Lee 
(1999). These estimates indicate that from 1979 to 2009, the decline 
in the minimum wage was associated with a third of the 11 percent 
increase in 50/10 inequality. This contrasts with Lee’s method, which 
attributes all of the increase in inequality to the declining minimum 
wage. Effects differ considerably by gender. Had the minimum wage 
remained at its 1979 level, women’s 50/10 ratio would have been 38 
percent lower, while male inequality would have remained unchanged 
between 1979 and 2009. 
Although considerably smaller than those reported by Lee (1999), 
the magnitude of the effect remains substantial—too large to be ex-
plained only by the effect of the minimum wage on bound workers. 
Separate regressions for different percentiles of the wage distribution 
indicate that the effect of the minimum wage extends up to the 30th 
percentile of the female wage distribution but only up through the 10th 
percentile of the male wage distribution. Again, the male result in par-
ticular contrasts with Lee, who finds effects in the male 50/25 ratio. 
The authors indicate that spillovers account for half of the effect of the 
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minimum wage on wage inequality and provide some evidence that the 
spillover effect is larger in periods in which the real minimum wage 
falls. However, because of issues with self-reported wages, the degree 
to which the estimated spillover is due to reporting errors is uncertain. 
As part of an analysis of the regional effect of the NMW in Eng-
land, Scotland, and Wales, Dolton, Rosazza, and Wadsworth (2012) 
consider the effect of the NMW on lower-tail inequality.4 They apply an 
incremental difference-in-differences estimator to earnings measures 
from the New Earnings Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings from 1999 to 2007 to estimate whether the 5/50 and 10/50 
income ratio has responded to changes in the NMW. Their regressions, 
structured as a geographic area-by-year panel, include a variety of con-
trols as well as year and area effects, and the reported standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and unspecified serial correlation. 
They report that an increase in the proportion paid at or below the mini-
mum wage was associated with reduced lower-tail inequality and that 
the effect became more pronounced with the increases in the NMW
between 1999 and 2007. 
THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON POVERTY
AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
As articulated in the preamble to the Fair Labor Standards Act, a 
central goal of the minimum wage is to assure that low-wage workers 
have sufficient earnings to support a modest standard of living. While 
the minimum wage targets low-wage workers (and firms), what we ul-
timately want to know about the minimum wage is whether it improves 
the lot of low-income workers—are they better off than they would oth-
erwise be because of the minimum wage or an increase in the minimum 
wage? Are they absolutely better off? Are they better off in comparison 
with other, higher-income workers? Does the minimum wage raise liv-
ing standards for those whose living standards are below average? If 
so, does it do this as a stand-alone policy or in combination with other 
policies? Does it enable them to afford better housing, diet, health care, 
or any of the other things that together make up a standard of living? 
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It is surprising how little work on this issue exists. Most of the 
literature considers one of two issues. The first is the relationship be-
tween the minimum wage and poverty, in particular, how the minimum 
wage affects either transitions of households into and out of poverty or, 
at a more aggregate level, how it affects the poverty rate. The second 
issue concerns interactions between the minimum wage and other anti-
poverty policies. 
To understand the first strand, it is necessary to know what is meant 
by poverty. The colloquial meaning is a bit vague, but dictionaries give 
the following definitions: 
 The state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable 
amount of money or material possessions. Poverty may cover a 
range from extreme want of necessities to absence of material 
comforts.5 
 The condition of having little or no wealth or few material pos-
sessions; indigence, destitution.6 
Neither definition provides the quantitative precision that statistical 
analysis typically requires, but both suggest that what is considered to 
be poverty can change over time. 
In the United States, there is a widely accepted definition of what it 
means to be in poverty that varies over time and with the size and struc-
ture of the household.7 In the 1950s, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) developed four different food plans, with the least expen-
sive one known as the “thrifty food plan.” In the mid-1960s, Orshansky 
(1963, 1965) determined the cost of this plan and extrapolated that to 
total household income based on results from the 1955 Household Food 
Consumption Survey (also of the USDA), which indicated that families 
of three or more spent about one-third of their annual income on food 
(Fisher 1992). Families with incomes less than three times the amount 
needed to buy the thrifty food plan were judged to be in poverty. 
The definition of poverty-level income has been a contentious, 
heavily politicized issue, as it can lead to sound bites about increases or 
decreases in the poverty rate during politicians’ tenure in office. Since 
originally defined, poverty-level income has been updated only for in-
flation, and it has not been adjusted for changes in spending patterns on 
food, other consumer goods, or changes in housing and commuting pat-
terns, in particular, the growth of suburbs. Correcting for these would 
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substantially raise the level of income needed to be above the poverty 
line. The income share of food expenditures had already fallen from 
one-third to one-quarter by 1965, and, had the poverty-level income 
been adjusted, the poverty line would have been one-third more than 
it was. By 2007 food expenditures had declined to one-tenth of family 
income; adjusting the definition for this change would have raised the 
poverty line to three times its then current level (Clauson 2008). Income 
used to calculate the poverty line also does not include many govern-
ment transfers, which would either reduce the income needed to escape 
poverty or increase the amount of income attributed to many house-
holds, in either case reducing the number of households in poverty. 
While the poverty line may have reflected reality when first defined, it 
does not any longer.8 
Table 7.2 shows the minimum levels of income needed for families 
of different sizes to be classified as being above poverty. A family of 
one adult and two children would be considered not to be in poverty 
if annual income exceeds $17,568, while one of two adults and two 
children requires a minimum of $22,113. The poverty line defines a 
very low standard of living, possibly destitution. For example, working 
single parents almost always require child care. According to the Na-
tional Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies (2011, 
p. 23), in 2010, the average cost of child care for two children (an infant 
and a four-year-old) in Mississippi, the least expensive state, would be 
at least $7,280, more than 40 percent of the poverty-level income of 
$15,030.9 There would be little income for anything else. 
The poverty line(s) and the minimum wage make almost no contact 
with each other. First consider a single-parent family with one or two 
children. In each case, the 2010 poverty line is $17,552 and $17,568, re-
spectively. If this parent worked full time at minimum wage, she would 
earn $14,500, not enough for the family income to exceed the poverty 
line. The minimum wage, which was $7.25 per hour at the time of writ-
ing, would have to rise by more than $1.50/hour, in excess of 20 per-
cent, to bring this household to the poverty line. None of the increases 
in the federal minimum wage since the Korean War, except for those of 
1956 and 1974, have been as large as 20 percent, and most have been 
about half that. 
Next, consider two-parent families. If both parents work full time at 
the minimum wage, annual income is $29,000/year. Unless the family 
311 
Table 7.2  Poverty Thresholds for 2010 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children under 18 Years ($, 2010) 
Related children under 18 years 
Eight or 
Size of family unit None One Two Three Four Five Six Seven more 
One person (unrelated 
individual) 
Under 65 years 11,344 
65 years and over 10,458 
Two people 
Householder under 65 14,602 15,030 
years 
Householder 65 years 13,180 14,973 
and over 
Three people 17,057 17,552 17,568 
Four people 22,491 22,859 22,113 22,190 
Five people 27,123 27,518 26,675 26,023 25,625 
Six people 31,197 31,320 30,675 30,056 29,137 28,591 
Seven people 35,896 36,120 35,347 34,809 33,805 32,635 31,351 
Eight people 40,146 40,501 39,772 39,133 38,227 37,076 35,879 35,575 
Nine people or more 48,293 48,527 47,882 47,340 46,451 45,227 44,120 43,845 42,156 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh10.xls, (accessed August 24, 2011). 
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has more than three children, this is above the poverty line and would 
require that the minimum wage drop to $6.50 an hour (a decline of 
more than 10 percent) for the family to be at the poverty line if it has 
three children, and to about $5.50/hour for a family with two children 
(the federal minimum wage has not declined in dollar terms since it was 
first established). If the family has more than three children, it would 
be $137 below the poverty income with two full-time minimum wage 
workers. An increase in the minimum wage of less than a nickel would 
bring this family to the poverty line. Larger families would require in-
creases in the minimum wage between $0.90 and $2.75 (between 12 
and 38 percent) to earn more than a poverty-level income. 
Transitions across the officially defined poverty line are too crude a 
measure to discern the effect of the minimum wage. Although the mini-
mum wage may affect the standard of living of low-income families 
that include a bound worker, the definition of the poverty line and the 
size of a typical minimum wage increase make it unlikely that changes 
in the minimum wage will succeed in moving families out of poverty 
as officially defined. 
A second reason not to expect those in poverty to benefit from the 
minimum wage is their low employment and labor force participation 
rates. Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1995, Table 4) report that in 1989, 
a quarter of households below the poverty line had no employed work-
ers. Using data from the 2006 CPS, the last full year of the CPS prior 
to the start of the Great Recession, Table 7.3 displays the percentage of 
households in each of 16 income categories and tabulates the percent-
age in which at least one adult was employed, and if not employed, 
whether at least one was nevertheless in the labor force (i.e., unem-
ployed, defined as not employed but actively looking for work). The 
first two columns define the income categories for family income over 
the prior 12 months: the first one shows the percentage of households in 
each income category, and the next displays the cumulative percentage 
in that income category or a lower one. The next three columns give in-
formation about labor force status—whether anyone in the household is 
employed, and if not, whether anyone is actively looking for work and 
thus counted as unemployed; if no one is employed or unemployed, the 
household is classified as having no one in the labor force. 
Only half (51 percent) of the households in the lowest income cat-
egories had any members employed at the time they were surveyed 
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by the CPS. As we go up the (2006) income distribution, this fraction 
increases until, near the top, virtually all households have at least one 
employed member. The percentage of households that had nobody em-
ployed but somebody unemployed falls from 12 percent at the lowest 
income levels to nearly zero. The combination of these two categories 
is households that had at least one member who was in the labor force. 
If we consider the percentage of households with no labor force par-
ticipants, we see that it falls from a high value of 45 percent in house-
holds with a family income over the last 12 months between $5,000 and 
$7,499 to a low of 3 percent in households with a 12-month income 
between $100,000 and $149,999. Sixty-two percent of households with 
incomes less than $25,000 had any earner; in families that make at 
least $25,000, 92 percent include someone who is employed. Given the 
low level of employment among households that earned income under 
$20,000 annually, opportunities for the minimum wage to affect house-
hold income are limited. 
The last four columns in Table 7.3 highlight other differences be-
tween low- and higher-income households. Not only is it the case that 
higher-income households are more likely to have at least one em-
ployed person, but as household income rises, so too do both the av-
erage number of employed individuals in households and the average 
number of paid hours per household. In 2006, the federal minimum 
wage was $5.15 per hour, and the poverty line for a single parent of two 
children was an annual income of $16,242 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). 
The parents would have had to work more than 60 hours per week at a 
minimum wage job for the whole year to exceed that level. More than 
half of households with 2005 incomes below $20,000 worked no more 
than 40 hours per week in the week before the survey. Too many low-
income households have no one in the labor force, much less employed, 
for the minimum wage to have much effect on poverty. Even for those 
that do, the minimum wage is too low and households work too few 
hours for an increase to change poverty status. 
Empirical Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty 
Table 7.4 lists more than a dozen statistical analyses of the response 
of poverty to the minimum wage. In this group, there are four data struc-
tures, the most common of which is a state-year panel (or province-year 
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Table 7.3  Labor Force Status in 2006 by Family Income in 2005 
Labor force status 
No earners (%) Number of earners Hours last week 
Share of None in 
Total family income 
in 2006 ($) 
labor force
(%) 
Cumulative 
share (%) 
Unemployed
Earner (%) (at least 1) 
the labor 
force Mean Median Meana Medianb 
Less than 5,000 2.8 2.8 51 12.0 37.0 0.72 1 52 40 
5,000–7,499 2.1 4.8 47 7.7 45.0 0.67 0 52 40 
7,500–9,999 2.2 6.8 49 6.2 45.0 0.68 0 51 40 
10,000–12,499 3.0 10.0 56 6.2 38.0 0.78 1 53 40 
12,500–14,999 2.8 12.8 61 5.9 33.0 0.89 1 57 40 
15,000–19,999 4.7 17.5 69 3.7 27.0 0.98 1 56 40 
20,000–24,999 5.6 23.2 74 2.9 23.0 1.10 1 59 46 
25,000–29,999 6.0 29.0 80 2.3 18.0 1.20 1 62 52 
30,000–34,999 6.5 35.6 84 1.6 14.0 1.40 1 65 60 
35,000–39,999 5.8 41.4 87 1.0 12.0 1.50 1 67 63 
40,000–49,999 9.1 50.5 90 1.1 9.3 1.60 2 71 70 
50,000–59,999 9.2 59.6 91 0.8 7.8 1.70 2 75 78 
60,000–74,999 10.9 70.5 94 0.6 5.7 1.80 2 81 80 
75,000–99,999 12.2 82.7 96 0.4 3.9 1.90 2 83 80 
100,000–149,999 10.2 92.9 97 0.2 3.0 2.00 2 87 80 
At least 150,000 7.1 100.0 97 0.2 3.1 1.90 2 88 83 
Overall mean/median 85 1.9 13.0 1.50 2 74 75 
Less than 15,000 12.8 12.8 54 7.6 39.0 0.76 1 53 40 
Less than 25,000 23.2 23.2 62 5.6 33.0 0.89 1 55 43 
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Greater than 10,000 17.0 83.0 97 0.2 3.0 2.00 2 88 
a Approximately one-sixth of respondents did not provide an answer to the income category question. The figures for total and cumulative 
total are calculated with reference to the remaining 83% of the sample. 
b Calculated only over households with at least one earner last week. 
SOURCE: 2006 CPS ORG files. 
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panels in the case of Sen, Rybczynski, and Van de Waal [2011] and 
Campolieti, Gunderson, and Lee [2012]). 
The other three structures are a state-year repeat cross section 
(Sabia 2008), an aggregate time series (Vedder and Gallaway 2002), 
and longitudinal panels (Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2005; 
Sabia and Nielsen 2013). Of these last two studies, the former has two 
observations per family, while the latter is a more conventional lon-
gitudinal structure with considerably more observations on each indi-
vidual and a variety of outcome measures. Except for three studies, 
those that use a state-year panel or aggregate time series relate poverty 
rates to the minimum wage, and the one based on a repeated cross sec-
tion is conceptually similar, relating a family’s poverty status to the 
minimum wage and other factors. The panel with two observations on 
each family, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2005), relates transi-
tions into and out of poverty to the minimum wage and other factors in a
difference-in-differences framework. The analyses of Gundersen (2006) 
and Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), both of which use state-by-year pan-
els, are unusual in that they consider not only the poverty status of fami-
lies (i.e., changes in the poverty rate) but also the severity of poverty, 
that is, whether families below the poverty line move closer to it while 
nevertheless remaining in poverty. Sabia and Neilsen (2013) are like-
wise unusual in going beyond poverty status to consider effects on the 
income-to-poverty ratio and material hardship. The three exceptions 
mentioned above are Grogger (2003, 2004), who relates the minimum 
wage to whether families receive welfare benefits, and Page, Spetz, and 
Millar (2005), who relate it to welfare caseloads. 
Those studies in the first panel in Table 7.4 are, with the exception 
of Sabia and Nielsen (2013), all vulnerable to the critique of Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). This has no consequences for findings 
of no relationship between the minimum wage and poverty, but it raises 
doubts about the reliability of any results reported to be statistically sig-
nificant:Addison and Blackburn (1999); DeFina (2008); Grogger (2003, 
2004); Gundersen and Ziliak (2004); Gundersen (2006); Neumark and 
Wascher (2002); Page, Spetz, and Millar (2005); Morgan and Kickham 
(2001); and Stevans and Sessions (2001). Four of the remaining re-
gression analyses find no response of poverty to the minimum wage. 
Two find that the poverty rate rises when the minimum wage is higher, 
but both are problematic. Vedder and Gallaway (2002) are markedly 
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nonchalant about the serial correlation that is almost certainly a part of 
the aggregate time series that they analyze. (This analysis is treated in 
slightly more detail in Chapter 3.) The difficulties of Sen, Rybczynski, 
and Van de Waal’s (2011) analysis are more interesting. They analyze 
a 25-year-long panel of nine Canadian provinces and present standard 
errors that are clustered by both province and year in the calculation. 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) document that clustering 
does not resolve the problem of serial correlation when the number of 
clusters is too small; in their Monte Carlo example, nearly 11 percent 
of their simulations using only 10 clusters (corresponding to states or 
provinces) incorrectly reject the null of no effect at test size of 0.05, and 
more than 15 percent using only 6 clusters do so. (Hansen [2007b] and 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2008] confirm this result.) 
Sabia and Nielsen (2013) are among the more interesting analyses 
of the effect of the minimum wage on poverty. Using the Survey of 
Income Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal survey with exten-
sive information on sources of income and participation in welfare and 
income maintenance programs, the authors estimate the relationship 
between federal and state minimum wages and poverty, material hard-
ship, and income for the years 1996–2007. Models are estimated for all 
workers aged 16–64, for the employed, for those aged 16–29 without a 
high school diploma, for blacks aged 16–24, and, as a falsification test, 
for individuals aged 30–54 with a high school degree or better. The esti-
mates of standard errors in the regression models are clustered by state. 
Estimates for poverty and income take advantage of the longitudinal 
structure to control for individual heterogeneity. 
The authors find little or no evidence that the minimum wage is 
related to any of the outcomes. In their sample with all individuals aged 
16–64, the coefficient on the minimum wage is very small and never 
significant for indicator measures of being below poverty, or of being 
within 125 percent or 150 percent of the poverty line. It is also not 
significant for either the ratio of income to poverty or being below pov-
erty inclusive of transfer payments. Similar results are obtained with 
the subsamples of workers, of those aged 16–29 without a high school 
diploma, and for blacks aged 16–24. However, several estimates with 
state time trends find that a higher minimum wage increases the likeli-
hood that 16–29-year-olds with a high school diploma will be below 
125 percent and 150 percent of poverty. 
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Table 7.4  Statistical Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty 
Minimum wage Type of 
and poverty Target Sample Unit of Data Analytic standard Data
Study relationship group Country period observation structure approach error seta 
Addison and Negative Teens, young United 1983– State State-year Regression Conven- March CPS 
Blackburn adults, States 1996 panel tional 
(1999) jr. high dropouts 
Burkhauser and None Individuals in United 1989– State State-year Regression + PCSEc March CPS 
Sabia (2007) poverty States 2003 panel simulationb 
DeFina (2008) Negative Kids in female- United 1992– State State-year (Robust) Conven- CPS 
headed households States 2003 panel Regression tional 
Grogger (2003)d Varies with age Female-headed United 1979– Family Repeated Regression Clustered March CPS 
of children families States 2000 cross (state-
section year) 
Grogger (2004)d Contradictory, Female-headed United 1979– Family Repeated Regression Clustered March CPS 
varies by families States 2000 cross (state-
specification section year) 
Gundersen and Negative to Families (2+ re- United 1981– State State-year Regression Robust  March CPS 
Ziliak (2004) none lated individuals) States 2000 panel 
Gundersen (2006) None except + Families (2+ re- United 1988– State State-year Regression Conven- March CPS 
for metro area lated individuals) States 2003 panel tional 
female-headed 
households 
Neumark and Net small Families with United 1986– Family State-year Diff-in-diff. Conven- March CPS 
Wascher positive income < 2 × States 1995 panel and tional 
(2002) poverty level regression 
  
 
 
 
Page, Spetz, and Positive Individuals on United 1983– State State-year Regression Newey- Various 
Millar (2005)d Welfare States 1996 panel West 
HAC SEse 
Morgan and Negative Children United 1987– State State-year Regression PCSEc CPS 
Kickham (in poverty) States 1996 panel 
(2001) 
Stevans and None to Families United 1984– State State-year Regression Conven- CPS 
Sessions negative States 1998 panel tional 
(2001) 
Sabia (2008) None Single mothers United 1992– Individual State-year Regression Clustered March CPS 
States 2005 RCSf 
Sabia and None Families in United 2003– State State-year Regression + Clustered March CPS 
Burkhauser poverty States 2007 panel simulationb 
(2010) 
Sen, Rybczynski, Positive All families Canada 1981– Province Province- Regression Two-way Statistics 
and Van de 2004 year panel clusteredg Canada 
Waal (2011) 
Vedder and None to positive Full-time workers United 1966– U.S. Aggregate Regression Conven- Census data 
Gallaway States 1998 time tional 
(2002) series 
Neumark, None Families with United 1986– Family Two- Diff-in-diff. Boot- March CPS 
Schweitzer, income < 6 × States 1995 period / kernel strapped 
and Wascher poverty level panel regression 
(2005) 
Campolieti, None Families at the Canada 1979– Province Province- Regression Conven- SLID 
Gunderson, and LICO, 1.25 and 1.5 2007 by-year tional 
Lee (2012)g times the LICOh panel 
(continued) 
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Table 7.4  (continued) 
Minimum wage 
and poverty Target Sample Unit of Data Analytic Type of Data
Authors relationship group Country period observation structure approach SE set 
Sabia and Nielsen 
(2013) 
Maloney and 
Pacheco 
(2012) 
Increases in the United 1996– Individual Longitu- Regression Clustered SIPP 
minimum wage States 2007 dinal 
do not influence 
the likelihood of 
being in poverty 
or the income-to-
poverty ratio. 
Increases in the Minimum wage New 1997– Individual Repeat Probit and Conven- Annual in-
MW raise the employees Zealand 2008 cross multinomial tional come supple-
likelihood that section logit ment to the 
a MW worker Household 
will be in lower- Labour Force 
income deciles. Survey 
a Note that the March Current Population Survey (CPS) refers to data for the previous year. Thus, 2003–2007 data are for the period 
2002–2006, and similarly for other periods. SLID = Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program 
Participation. 
b The simulation uses the regression results to estimate the effects of a proposed increase in the minimum wage. 
c Panel-corrected standard errors. 
d This article looks not at poverty but at whether the minimum wage moves families onto or off welfare rolls (Grogger 2003, 2004) or af-
fects the size of welfare caseloads (Page, Spetz, and Millar 2005). 
e Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. 
f Repeated cross section. 
g Clustering is unlikely to address the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mallainathan issue for Canadian province-year panels because there are too few 
provinces. See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mallainathan (2004). 
h Low-income cut-off. 
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As we have indicated, we are unconvinced that estimates of 
whether the minimum wage moves individuals across arbitrary thresh-
olds provide useful insights. The estimates with the income-to-poverty 
ratios move closer to addressing how the minimum wage affects low-
income employees and families. Sabia and Nielsen’s (2013) specifica-
tion may, however, be submerging the effect of the minimum wage in 
an overly broad sample.10 If, for example, the impact of the minimum 
wage on family income occurred in the second and third decile of the 
income distribution, the effect of minimum wage increases on income 
may be difficult to detect with a linear specification across all income 
deciles. The narrowing of the sample by age and high school gradua-
tion improves this but does not focus sufficiently tightly on the relevant 
sample. Despite this, there is evidence that a 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage would be associated with a 5.7 percent increase in the 
income-to-poverty ratio of individuals aged 16–29 who do not have a 
high school degree. It would be better to divide the sample by income 
quintile or decile and estimate the effects within those samples.11 
Simulation Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty 
Table 7.5 lists six studies that simulate the response of poverty or 
poverty status to the minimum wage. Using estimates of disemployment 
effects and wage increases from a number of nonsimulation studies, 
each of these six studies derives estimates for the number of households 
that a specific minimum wage increase would raise above the poverty 
threshold and the number that it would move below it. Neumark and 
Wascher (2008, Section 5.2.3) detail a number of problems that make 
it difficult to express confidence in the conclusions drawn from these 
simulations. Briefly, they generally must rely on estimates of minimum 
wage effects on groups other than poor households, and they ignore the 
possibility of a variety of behavioral responses to the minimum wage. 
In both cases, the reason for doing this is that the estimates necessary 
for avoiding these practices do not exist. Because of the shakiness of 
the conclusions, we do not discuss the simulation studies. 
Both the statistical and simulation studies of the relationship be-
tween the minimum wage and poverty leave us where we started, with-
out any strong evidence that the minimum wage affects the poverty rate 
one way or the other. 
    
 
Table 7.5  Simulation Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty 
322
Minimum wage 
and poverty Sample Unit of Data Data
Study relationship Target group Country period observation structure seta 
Formby, Bishop, and Slight negative Poor households United 2007 Household Cross section CPS 
Kim (2010) States (March & 
ORG) 
Horrigan and Mincy Negative Families (with United 1980– Family Annual RCS March 
(1993) MW workers) States 1987 CPS 
Knabe and Schöb Positive Low-wage Germany 2006 Individual Cross section SOEP 
(2008) workers 
Mascella, Teja, and Very slightly All households Canada 2004 Household Cross section SLID 
Thompson (2009) negative 
Müller and Steiner None All households Germany 2008 Household Cross section SOEP 
(2008) 
Sutherland (2001) Negative Poor households UK 2001 Household Cross section HBAI 
aCPS = Current Population Survey. SOEP = Socio-Economic Panel (Germany). SLID = Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (Statis-
tics Canada). HBAI = Households Below Average Income (UK). 
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Interactions between the Minimum Wage and Other
Antipoverty Policies 
There have been few studies on the interaction of antipoverty poli-
cies and the minimum wage; more often the studies focus on the com-
bined effect on employment (see Table 7.6).12 Kramarz and Philippon 
(2001) consider not only changes in the French minimum wage but also 
in the payroll taxes that employers must pay. In the 1990s, those taxes 
pertaining to low-wage employees were reduced several times to off-
set increases in the minimum wage. Consequently, despite increases in 
the minimum wage, employers’ costs of hiring of low-wage workers 
fell, and affected workers had a higher probability of employment than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) subsidizes employment by 
reducing income taxes on labor income, primarily for low-income fami-
lies with children. Neumark and Wascher (2011) examine the separate 
and combined effects on employment and earnings of the EITC and 
minimum wage on both single mothers and members of other demo-
graphic groups that are likely to compete with them in the labor market. 
They report that the minimum wage has a positive effect on both em-
ployment and earnings of single mothers, an important part of the target 
group of the EITC, both by itself and especially in combination with 
the EITC. This effect carries through to raise the incomes of very poor 
families with children, enough to reduce the incidence of poverty in this 
group. The flip side is that both policies—in some cases separately, in 
others together, and in yet others both separately and together—reduce 
employment and earnings of individuals who are not eligible for the 
EITC and who compete in the labor market with individuals who are 
eligible for the EITC; they identify these individuals as childless indi-
viduals who have not gone beyond high school, white teenage boys, and 
all teenage girls. 
The French studies consider policies that differ from the anti-
poverty policy considered in the United States, making it difficult to 
compare results across the two countries. The French policies are de-
signed to offset effects of the minimum wage, either to encourage labor 
demand or to reduce labor supply. The U.S. policy, the EITC, is de-
signed instead to encourage labor supply and income of poor families, 
and the minimum wage apparently makes it more effective. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324Table 7.6  Studies of the Minimum Wage and Antipoverty Policies 
Interaction Type
between minimum Sample Unit of Data Analytic of stan- Data 
Study wage and other policies Target Country period observation structure approach dard error set 
Neumark and 
Wascher 
(2001) 
Kramarz and 
Philippon 
(2001) 
Laroque and 
Salanie 
(2002) 
Neumark and 
Wascher 
(2011) 
Not examined—EITC EITC recipients United 1986–1995 Family Two-year Regression Clustered 
vs. minimum wage States panel (state-
year) 
Negative effect on Low-wage France 1990–1998 Individual Repeated Quasi Conven-
employment workers cross experiment tional 
section 
Negative effect on Married women France 1997 Individual Cross Regression Conven-
employment section tional 
Generally EITC recipients, United 1997–2006 Family and Repeated Regression Clustered 
complements competitors in States individual cross 
labor market section 
March 
CPSa 
Labour 
Force 
Survey 
Labour 
Force 
Survey 
March 
CPS 
a Note that the March CPS refers to data for the previous year. Thus, 2003–2007 data are for the period 2002–2006, and similarly for other 
periods. 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Poverty and Inequality 325 
Is the Minimum Wage Well Targeted to Help Low-Income 
Households? 
Another issue is whether the minimum wage is sufficiently well 
targeted to aid low-income individuals and households. The rationale 
for the minimum wage has been regularly criticized because too large 
a proportion of those earning the minimum wage are not in the lowest 
income deciles. We explore this issue in our discussion in Chapter 5, 
Tables 5.1–5.3, and find that a substantial proportion of the U.S. labor 
force and the career labor force were employed at or not far above the 
minimum wage. As part of a study of antipoverty effects of the mini-
mum wage in New Zealand, Maloney and Pacheco (2012) find that the 
relevance of the minimum wage to low-income households is strongly 
related to whether the minimum wage has kept pace with wage growth 
and inflation. The National Party of New Zealand allowed the mini-
mum wage to languish from 1990 to 1999. As a result, the value of the 
minimum wage fell by 1.1 percent relative to inflation and by 8.7 per-
cent relative to average hourly earnings. The Labour Party reversed this 
policy beginning in 2000 and continuing through to 2008.13 Over this 
period, the adult minimum wage rose by 32.9 percent relative to infla-
tion and by 22.6 percent relative to average hourly earnings, and the 
minimum wage of teenagers rose even more rapidly. 
Using the annual income supplements to the Household Labor 
Force survey for 1997 to 2008 to estimate the relationship between the 
real minimum wage and the likelihood that an employee in an income 
decile will be a minimum wage worker, Maloney and Pacheco (2012) 
find that a 10 percent rise in the real minimum wage increases the likeli-
hood that an adult in the 1st decile of the household income distribution 
is a minimum wage worker by 9 percent, by 6.8 percent for one in the 
2nd decile, 3.3 percent in the 3rd decile, 1.5 percent in the 5th decile, 
1.5 percent in the 7th decile, and by 0.25 percent in the 10th decile. A
parallel analysis on the distribution of minimum wage workers across 
income deciles finds that a 10 percent rise in the real minimum wage 
increases the likelihood that an adult minimum wage worker is in the 
2nd decile of household income by 3.8 percent, and decreases the likeli-
hood of their being in the 5th or 10th deciles. 
Maloney and Pacheco (2012, Figure 5) find that the proportion of 
minimum wage workers in each income decile was both low and rela-
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tively constant across the household income deciles in 1997–1999, the 
period in which the minimum wage languished. In contrast, the propor-
tion of minimum wage employees in the lower income deciles were 
markedly higher in 2006–2008, the end of the period in which the mini-
mum wage was substantially raised. For example, the proportion of em-
ployees who were employed at the minimum wage in the lowest income 
decile rose from 5 percent in 1997–1999 to 33 percent in 2006–2008. 
In the 3rd decile, it rose from 4 percent to 16 percent. In contrast, in the 
9th decile, it rose from 1 percent to 5 percent. 
These results suggest that, at least in New Zealand, increases in 
the minimum wage have their largest effect in the lower reaches of the 
income distribution. Further, the answer to whether the minimum wage 
appropriately targets low-income populations is not independent of the 
level of the minimum wage. When the real minimum wage is very low, 
the proportion of workers employed at the minimum wage is not closely 
related to household income. As it rises, it affects the lower deciles of 
the income distribution far more than the upper deciles.14 
HOW LONG DO MINIMUM WAGE EARNERS CONTINUE 
TO EARN THE MINIMUM WAGE? 
The importance of the minimum wage to the economic well-being
of minimum wage earners is related to how long they remain in posi-
tions that pay at or near the minimum wage. If those earning the mini-
mum wage are at the minimum for a brief time and ascend the wage 
distribution rapidly, there is less reason to be concerned about the mini-
mum wage and its effect on workers’ earnings. The effect cannot be 
large because workers spend little time working at or near the minimum 
wage. If, on the other hand, they spend considerable time at or near the 
minimum wage, the minimum wage may have substantial effects on 
their annual and lifetime income. How long individual workers are in 
minimum wage positions is then an important consideration in assess-
ing the effect and effectiveness of the minimum wage. 
Answers to this question are influenced by researchers’ decisions 
about the point in an individual’s economic life cycle to begin measur-
ing their wage growth. The wage path of those still in school is quite 
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different from that of individuals who have permanently left school and 
are beginning career employment. Answers also depend on how far 
above the minimum wage researchers look for wage effects. Several 
studies define the minimum wage as exactly the minimum wage and 
treat any earnings in excess of that minimum wage as above minimum 
wage earnings. Others treat those earning within $0.25 of the minimum 
as minimum wage earners and then consider bands of $0.50, $1.00, 
and $1.50 above the minimum as potentially affected by the minimum 
wage. While the former approach assures that we will find few workers 
spending long periods earning the minimum wage, the latter provides 
better insights into how rapidly workers move beyond the minimum 
wage.15 
The most thoughtful study of minimum wage dynamics is the work 
of Carrington and Fallick (2001) (see Table 7.7). Their use of the NLSY
allows them to track individuals over a decade, providing an extended 
portrait of the wage movement of workers through their early careers. 
Restricting their sample to individuals who have completed their 
schooling removes a large number of minimum wage earners whose la-
bor market decisions are secondary to their education decisions. Defin-
ing a minimum wage job as one that pays no more than $0.25 above the 
minimum wage addresses the imprecision in the reports of the hourly 
earnings from household surveys. Finally, by presenting their results in 
bands above the minimum wage, the authors allow for spillover effects, 
for the effects of within-firm pay increases of longer-term workers who 
entered at the minimum wage, and for increases in the legislated mini-
mum wage. It allows the readers to determine for themselves the wage 
band at which the minimum wage is no longer relevant, rather than be-
ing constrained by the authors’ choices. 
Carrington and Fallick (2001) report that 8 percent of the career 
workforce spent at least half of the first 10 years after completing school 
in positions paying no more than $1 more than the minimum wage. Em-
ployees with a typical career spent at least 2 of their first 10 years work-
ing within $1.00 of the minimum wage. African Americans and women 
spent longer periods close to the minimum wage. In the first year of 
employment after permanently leaving school, 30 percent of employees 
work at jobs paying within $0.25 per hour of the minimum wage, and 
54 percent (including the 30 percent already mentioned) work in jobs 
within $1.00 of the minimum wage. These percentages decline steadily 
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Table 7.7  The Dynamics of Minimum Wage Earners: How Long Do Those Earning the Minimum Wage Remain 
Close to the Minimum? 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure SE Data seta 
Carrington “Most workers who Career United First 10 Descriptive Individual Longitudinal n/a 1979 
and Fallick begin their careers in workforce States years of across years NLSY 
(2001) minimum wage jobs who began career em-
eventually gain more in minimum ployment 
experience and move on wage jobs between 
to higher paying jobs; 1979 and 
however, some work- 1994 
ers spend substantial 
portions of their early 
careers consistently 
working in minimum 
wage jobs” 
Smith and Half of minimum wage Individuals United 1984–1995 Logit and Individual Longitudinal Conven- SIPP 
Vavrichek workers continue in paid exactly States tobit tional 
(1992) minimum wage or close the minimum regressions 
to minimum wage jobs wage in the 
one year later. first year of 
data 
Long (1999) Half of minimum wage Individuals 1992–1993 Logit and Individual Longitudinal Conven- SIPP 
workers continue in paid exactly tobit tional 
minimum wage or close the minimum regressions 
to minimum wage jobs wage 
one year later. 
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Even and 29% of those earning Individu- United 1979–1999 Regression Individual Semilongi- Conven-
Macpherson the minimum are still als earning States tudinal (two- tional 
(2003) at exactly the minimum exactly the year panels) 
wage one year later. minimum in 
the first year 
Phimister and The effect of individual Labor force United 1991–2005 Discrete Individual Longitudinal Approxi-
Theodossiou characteristics on the Kingdom time com- mate boot 
(2009) likelihood of exiting peting risks strapped 
low-pay employment hazard 
differs for men and model 
women and in the 
period prior to and 
after implementation 
of the NMW 
CPS 
Waves 
1–15 
of the 
BHPS 
a NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation. CPS = Current Population Survey. 
BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. 
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as employees gain experience. Those working at the minimum wage 
have about a 50 percent chance of remaining at the minimum wage in 
the next year, and those who are earning above the minimum wage have 
a better than 90 percent chance of continuing to earn above the mini-
mum wage in the following year. At 10 years, only 7 percent earn the 
minimum wage, and a total of 12 percent earn no more than $1 above 
the minimum wage (see Table 7.8). 
Rather than looking at snapshots in time (the end of the first year, 
the end of the first decade), the data can also be arranged according to 
the time spent in various wage bands. Only 4 percent of the respon-
dents spent 5 years of the 10 years within $0.50 of the minimum wage, 
but larger proportions of the workforce spent considerably more time 
within $1 of the minimum wage. Almost 20 percent of the postschool 
workforce spend a quarter of their first 10 years within $1 of the mini-
mum wage, and 8 percent spent 5 years within $1 of the minimum wage. 
Again, fractions of women and African Americans who spent extended 
periods at or close to the minimum wage were higher than the general 
population. Carrington and Fallick (2001) conclude that “most workers 
who begin their careers in minimum wage jobs eventually gain more 
experience and move on to higher paying jobs; however, some workers 
Table 7.8  Share of Population in Minimum Wage or Near-Minimum-
Wage Jobs by Years into Career 
Years into Above prevailing minimum wage by no more than 
career $0.25 $0.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 
1 30.5 38.7 54.5 64.3 72.6 
2 23.4 30.2 42.4 52.4 62.0 
3 16.7 21.8 31.9 42.0 50.8 
4 13.5 17.2 25.6 33.9 42.9 
5 10.5 14.0 21.0 28.0 37.0 
6 9.2 12.0 27.9 24.2 32.4 
7 8.6 10.4 15.8 20.6 27.5 
8 7.7 9.5 14.4 18.2 25.2 
9 7.3 8.8 12.7 17.1 22.5 
10 7.3 8.6 12.2 15.1 20.3 
NOTE: “Years into career” begin immediately after schooling was completed. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NLSY79. Reproduced from Carrington and 
Fallick (2001, Table 2). 
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spend substantial portions of their early careers consistently working in 
minimum wage jobs” (p. 17). 
Most studies examine wage dynamics over shorter periods, use 
more restrictive definitions of minimum wage workers, or consider dif-
ferent populations. Smith and Vavrichek (1992) use data from the SIPP
from September 1983 to March 1986 to track employees who are hired 
at exactly the minimum wage ($3.35 in 1983). As summarized in Table 
7.9, 37 percent still earned no more than the minimum wage a year 
later: 16 percent earned an hourly wage up to 7.5 percent more than the 
minimum wage (between $3.36 and to $3.50); 24 percent earned be-
tween 7.5 percent and 19.5 percent more than the minimum wage (be-
tween $3.51 and $3.99); and 23 percent earned at least 120 percent of 
the minimum wage (at least $4.00). Similar patterns, again reported in 
Table 7.9, are found in a replication of this study with data from 1991 to 
1994 (Long 1999). Nineteen percent remained exactly at the minimum 
wage after two years. Another 45 percent of respondents were earning 
at least 124 percent of the minimum wage two years after being paid 
the minimum.16 These results are comparable to those of Carrington and 
Fallick (2001), who report that of those earning the minimum wage, be-
tween 34 and 54 percent earned an hourly wage more than $0.25 above 
the minimum wage a year later. 
The CPS follows individuals for no more than two years, and until 
1994, linking individuals across even these two years was technically 
challenging and incomplete. Thus, the CPS is less suited for tracking 
the wage dynamics of individuals than true longitudinal data.17 These 
limits are counterbalanced by the size of the CPS sample, its represen-
tativeness, and the long time period for which CPS data are available. 
Using the CPS monthly surveys for 1979–1999 and matching individu-
als across the two years in which they are respondents to the survey, 
Even and Macpherson (2003) consider wage change in the year follow-
ing employment at exactly the minimum wage. Twenty-nine percent of 
respondents continue at exactly the minimum wage, 47 percent have 
earnings at least $0.01 above the minimum wage, and 24 percent leave 
employment. Of those who earned exactly the minimum wage in their 
second year in the survey, Even and Macpherson report that 39 percent 
were not previously employed, 32 percent had been earning less than 
or exactly the minimum wage, and 28 percent had wages above the 
minimum in the previous year. That some workers “fall back” to the 
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Table 7.9  The Dynamics of the Minimum Wage 
Study Smith and Vavrichek (1992) Long (1999) Even and Macpherson (2003) 
Period studied September 1983–March 1986 October 1991–December 1995 January 1979–December 1999 
Minimum wage $3.35 $4.25 Varies 
Definition of Individual earns exactly the Individual earns exactly Individual earns exactly 
MW worker federal minimim wage of $3.35 the binding minimum wage the binding minimum wage 
Distribution of the earnings of minimum wage (MW) workers 
Wage bands used % of sample Wage bands used % of sample Wage bands used % of sample 
One year later No more than MW 37 No more than MW 30 No more than MW 29 
Above the MW to 16 Above the MW to 21 More than MW 47 
105% of minimum 111.5% of minimum 
Above 105% 11 Above 115% to 123% 20 
More than 119% 21 More than 123% 29 
Two years later No more than MW 19 
Above MW to 111.5% 15 
Above 111.5% to 123% 21 
More than 123% 25 
One year before No more than MW 33 
More than MW 28 
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minimum wage suggests that the dynamics of the minimum wage are 
more complex than its simply being an entry-level wage that individu-
als rise above over some time. Although this study does not estimate
how far back individuals fell, it indicates the possibility of retrograde 
movement. 
Factors Affecting Wage Growth 
What factors affect whether individuals remain at or near the mini-
mum wage? There is broad agreement among studies. All of the re-
search indicates that minimum wage earners are more likely to remain 
at the minimum wage, however defined, if they are female, younger, 
have less education, or are Hispanic. Most studies indicate that African 
Americans are more likely to remain at or close to the minimum wage. 
Studies that include older workers indicate that those approaching the 
end of their working lives have lower wage growth and, if near the 
minimum wage, are more likely to remain there than younger work-
ers. The unmarried are more likely than those who are married to have 
lower wage growth and to remain at the minimum wage, although some 
studies suggest this is only true of unmarried men. 
Is the pattern of wage growth among workers exactly at the mini-
mum wage different from that of other low-wage workers? At issue is 
whether earning the minimum wage either identifies workers with par-
ticularly low productivity or permanently affects them—“scars them,” 
in the colorful terminology of economists—so that their wage growth is 
adversely affected. Comparing those earning the minimum wage with 
those earning slightly more, Grossberg and Sicilian (1999, p. 547) find 
the wage growth of women in these two categories does not differ, but 
that the difference for men is large, with the minimum wage group ex-
periencing slower growth. 
What explains wage growth of men at the minimum wage being 
slower than that of men earning a bit above the minimum? One possi-
bility is that those who are hired at the minimum wage are less produc-
tive. Another is that there is scarring, that time spent at the minimum 
wage reduces wage growth either by reducing a worker’s productivity 
(bad habits) or labeling the worker so that employers are unwilling to 
grant the types of increases granted other low-wage workers. Neumark 
and Nizalova (2007) investigate this issue, but, as we have suggested in 
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Chapter 2, their methods are not adequate to their purpose. Jones et al. 
(2007) use the British Household Panel Study, a longitudinal data set 
that follows the members of families over time, to investigate whether 
the lower-wage growth of minimum wage workers is due to unobserved 
lower productivity or scarring (see Table 7.10). Their panel, which runs 
from 1999 to 2004, includes the initial implementation and early in-
creases in the NMW. Those earning at or below the minimum wage 
have a 29–36 percent probability of remaining at a wage no higher than 
the minimum wage the following year; 50 percent of those no higher 
than the NMW earn more than the NMW in the following year. The 
rest move out of employment. After allowing for individuals’ observ-
able characteristics, Jones et al. estimate that those at the NMW are 14 
percent more likely to be employed at that wage in the next year than 
an employee who is currently earning more than the NMW. However, 
once the estimates allow for unobserved individual differences, those at 
the NMW are only 4 percent more likely to earn that amount in the next 
year than are those currently earning a bit above the NMW. Much of the 
persistence in individuals’ remaining at the minimum wage is then as-
sociated with their characteristics; working at the minimum wage does 
not per se reduce prospects for future wage growth. 
Phimister and Theodossiu (2009) use the British Household Panel 
Survey to investigate how the implementation of the NMW affected 
wage growth among low-wage men and women. They estimate com-
peting risk-hazard rate models that allow for individual heterogeneity 
for a pre-NMW panel running from 1992 to 1998 and a post-NMW
panel running from 1999 to 2005. Individuals potentially exit low-wage 
employment into a high-paid job, unemployment, or inactivity. The au-
thors report a complex relationship between personal characteristics 
and gender, the duration of low-pay spells, and the likelihood of exit-
ing a low-pay spell that makes it difficult to “draw out a single pattern 
in gender differences” (p. 33). Broadly, personal characteristics have 
a smaller influence on women than men, but these differences decline 
after implementation of the NMW. The gender difference in the likeli-
hood of exiting to a high-pay job declines after implementation, as does 
the difference in the duration of low-pay spells. Simulations for the 
“typical” characteristics of those observed in low pay suggest that the 
duration of low-pay spells rises after the NMW, and there is a substan-
tial increase in the probability of exiting to a high-pay job. The NMW
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Table 7.10  The Dynamics of Minimum Wage Earners: How Is Wage Growth Affected by Receiving the 
Minimum Wage? 
Type of 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error Data seta 
Grossberg and 
Sicilian 
(1999) 
Jones et al. 
(2007) 
Minimum wage 
earners’ wages grow 
more slowly than 
those earning close to 
the minimum wage. 
Continued work at the 
minimum wage is asso-
ciated with employees’
characteristics rather 
than scarring effects of 
the minimum wage. 
Small and 
low-wage 
firms con-
centrated in 
the South and 
Midwest 
Males 18–65; 
women 18–60 
United 1982 Regression Firm Cross-section Conven-
States tional 
United 1999–2004 Pooled and Individuals Longitudinal Corrected 
King- random ef- over time for unob-
dom fects probit served het-
erogeneity 
and initial 
conditions 
EOPP 
BHPS 
waves 
9–14 
a BHPS = British Household Panel Survey; EOPP = Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects. 
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is then associated with complicated alterations in the low-wage labor 
market, narrowing gender differences, increasing time spent at low—if 
higher than before—wages, and increased probabilities of moving into 
better-paid work. 
CONCLUSION 
What can we conclude about the effect of the minimum wage on 
inequality and poverty and on the duration of employment at the mini-
mum wage? Although the magnitude of the effect remains in play, all 
eight articles that consider the effect of the minimum wage on the wage 
inequality find that higher minimum wages reduced wage inequality by 
raising the wages of those in the lower tail of the earnings distribution.18 
The effect is stronger for women than for men. This research supple-
ments the research on bound workers and spillovers, as it indicates that 
minimum wage affects the wages of bound workers and spillover into 
higher deciles of the wage distribution, particularly among women. 
Research also suggests that the minimum wage may have not have 
much effect on poverty. This result is not entirely surprising, given 
that those in poverty are substantially less likely to be working than 
higher-income groups. Broadening the focus of research on this topic to 
low-wage workers would likely produce more interesting results. The 
near poor, families with incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the 
experimental poverty line, compose one-sixth of the U.S. population. 
Half live in households headed by a married couple, and more than a 
quarter have a family member working in a full-time, year-round posi-
tion. Research that focuses on the effect of the minimum wage on the 
near poor is a natural step in establishing whether the minimum wage 
aids low-income workers. 
Finally, a broad conclusion about the dynamics of employment at 
the minimum wage is that most career workers who start in minimum 
wage jobs move on to higher-wage jobs fairly rapidly, but a substantial 
proportion spend the first decade of their careers employed at or near 
minimum wage. This conclusion is universal among the studies that 
examined how fast those employed at the minimum wage move out of 
minimum wage employment (Carrington and Fallick 2001; Even and 
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Macpherson 2003; Long 1999; and Smith and Vavricheck 1992). Of the 
three studies of the effect of the minimum wage on future wage growth, 
one suggests that the lower rate of wage growth among minimum wage 
employees is due to personal characteristics (Jones et al. 2007), and the 
other suggests that minimum wages scar workers and result in lower 
wage growth (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999). 
For a large minority of the working population, including the part 
that has completed its schooling, earnings remain close to the minimum 
wage. Given the effect of the minimum wage in setting a floor under 
the wage structure, and the evidence for spillover effects, the minimum 
wage positively affects the income of part of the working population for 
more than a brief period. Although few workers remain at the minimum 
wage for long, substantial numbers do not pass through the neighbor-
hood quickly. 
Notes 
1. Edsall (2013) summarizes discussions of the importance of increases, or lack 
thereof, on income inequality. Although he finds the arguments of those concerned 
with inequality more compelling than the arguments of those who find it to be 
unimportant, he provides links to the key arguments and evidence on both sides 
of the controversy. 
2. The effect of the minimum wage is sensitive to the order in which the effects are 
entered into the model. There is no “right” order of introducing the effects into 
the model, so we include the highest and lowest estimates reported by DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). 
Although the effect of the real minimum wage on wages appears to be limited 
to the lower portion of the wage distribution, the upward movement of wages 
caused by the minimum wage has had a large effect on inequality by reducing the 
90/10 and 95/5 wage differential. For example, the decline in the real minimum 
wage between 1979 and 1988 accounted for between 25 and 30 percent of the in-
crease in the 10/90 differential and 44–48 percent of the 5/95 differential (for men 
and women, respectively). 
3. Lee (1999) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) note the somewhat puzzling 
positive relationship between the minimum wage and inequality between the 90th 
and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution. Although the latter suggests that the 
minimum wage variables are picking up spurious economic relationships, an al-
ternative possibility is that legislated changes in the minimum wage are reflective 
of broad changes in legislation affecting wage inequality. For example, the most 
recent period of stagnation in the minimum wage was also a period in which taxes 
and market regulations were reduced, likely increasing the growth of wages and 
salaries at the upper end of the wage distribution. 
   	 	 	 	 	
  
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
338 Belman and Wolfson 
4. The analysis of inequality is used to determine whether the NMW is so binding as 
to produce the employment effects that are the main concern of their work. 
5. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 9th ed. Springfield, MA: Merriam-
Webster, 1985. 
6. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1971. 
7. Fisher (1992) presents a detailed history of the development and evolution of the 
poverty line, and the bulk of our discussion of this topic is based on this article. 
Fisher mentions that at the same time as Orshansky was doing her analysis, at least 
one other government economist derived a similar figure for the poverty line with 
a different approach, suggesting that this figure was reasonable at the time. 
8. Current work by the U.S. Census Bureau with experimental poverty measures 
represents an effort to better align poverty measures with the needs of families 
relative to their income (see Short [2010]). The experimental measures account for 
the effects of income transfer programs and better allow for the costs that differ-
ent types of families face. In terms of the interests of this study, the experimental 
measures result in a larger proportion of those who are working part- or full time 
being classified as poor. 
9. Note that this is for care in someone’s home, which is less than it would be in an 
accredited child care center. 
10. Further reason to be concerned with the effectiveness of this method for measur-
ing state-level effects are the results with other state variables. It would be ex-
pected that the prime-age male unemployment rate, the prime-age wage rate, and 
EITC coverage would have substantial effects on poverty levels, but, with a single 
exception among 15 estimates, they are not significant. 
11. There would potentially be issues of sample selection in the division of the sample 
by income decile, but these matters are well understood, and the appropriate cor-
rections are incorporated into modern software. 
12. As a result, these analyses are described more fully in Chapter 2. 
13. Inflation was measured by the New Zealand Consumer Price Index. 
14. Maloney and Pacheco’s (2012) work applies multinomial logit and probit to re-
peat cross-section data and are likely subject to issues with the correct estima-
tion of standard errors that characterize regression models. Such issues, which are 
not discussed in their paper, limit the usefulness of the hypothesis tests. This re-
search nevertheless begins to address how the minimum wage affects low-income 
workers. 
15. We omit Schiller (1994) from this review. Although interesting, 80 percent of the 
sample was in school at the beginning of the study. Their labor market decisions 
were likely secondary to their decisions about school, making their wage dynam-
ics less relevant to our concerns. 
16. Both sets of estimates include both individuals who are in school and individu-
als who have completed their schooling. Both studies provided distributions re-
stricted to those employed as hourly workers in their second and third years, as 
well as for the full sample, including those who were unemployed, who were not 
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in the workforce, who were no longer hourly employees, and those who were self-
employed. We present the distribution for those who remained hourly employees. 
17. Until 1994, linking individuals across time was uncertain because, while house-
holds carried the same identifiers across years, individuals were not identified. 
Matching within households was done by age, gender, and race, and, due to the 
“hot carding” of incomplete records, there were a significant number of individu-
als who appeared to change sex, race, or both between years. Since 1994, individ-
ual identifiers allow for exact matching. Because the CPS is a geographic survey 
rather than a survey of individuals, there is significant attrition of respondents 
between their first and second rotations. In contrast, longitudinal data sets follow 
individuals when they move and make heroic efforts to retain individuals in the 
survey. 
18. A ninth article, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004), also considers the ef-
fect of the minimum wage on the distribution of wage by creating wage bands 
relative to the minimum wage. There are issues with the construction of the data 
and the lack of clustering of errors. Because the authors believe that there are 
considerable lags in the effect of the minimum wage, and their model is based on 
annual changes in wages in matched data, they need to measure wage change over 
a two-year period. Unfortunately, the rotation structure of the CPS only allows the 
observation of individuals’ wages over one year. The authors build a specification 
that may capture the lagged effects over this longer period, but the assumptions 
about the wage formation process are rigorous. The estimates find a positive effect 
of the contemporary minimum wage on wages but a strictly negative effect of the 
constructed lagged minimum wage. This raises the question of whether the lagged 
effect is a result of the construction of the lagged data. Adding to this concern is 
that they find a positive effect of the contemporary minimum wage, and a negative 
effect of the lagged minimum wage, among individuals earning six to eight times 
the minimum wage. This is well above the level at which effects are found in any 
other study. These suggest sufficient issues that lead us, here as in Chapter 2, not 
to include this analysis in this review. 

Part 2 
Macro 
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Gross Flows in the Labor Market 
As both the survey and meta-analysis of employment studies indi-
cate, the effect of the minimum wage on employment is at most small. 
One way to understand why this is so is to examine the effect of the 
minimum wage on gross flows—the flows into and out of employment 
over time. 
If Empt is employment at a single moment, say, the beginning of 
year t, Equation (8.1) defines the change in employment during year t: 
(8.1) dEmpt = Empt +1 − Empt 
The first thing to notice about this is that the two variables on the 
right are stock variables, measured at different moments of time, while 
dEmpt on the left is a flow variable, measured over the period separating 
the two stock variables. The second is that even as definitions go, it is 
not especially interesting. However, rearranging to read 
(8.2) Empt +1 = Empt + dEmpt 
redirects our attention. Employment at the beginning of year t + 1 is 
determined by employment one year earlier and the change in employ-
ment over the intervening year. The flow variable, dEmpt , is the net 
change in employment during year t. A useful next step is to decompose 
it into its positive and negative components, the gross changes or gross 
flows, and separately examine their responses to the minimum wage. 
The positive gross flow is accessions, the number of people who 
are working in positions at the beginning of one year that they were not 
working in at the beginning of the previous year. The jobs in question 
may have existed, but someone else may have been working in them; 
or they may be newly created, perhaps as a result of a firm that opened 
for business during the year; or they may result from an expansion or 
reorganization at a firm that was already in business at the year’s start. 
The negative gross flow is separations, the number of people who at 
the end of the year are no longer working in the same position as at the 
343 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
   
       
                                
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
344 Belman and Wolfson 
beginning. Some separations consist of positions that no longer exist, 
either at firms that downsized their workforces or that are no longer in 
business. Others are positions that not only existed previously but con-
tinue to be occupied, just not by the same person as before.1 As defined 
here, both accessions and separations are quantities, but each can also 
be defined as a rate, where the quantity is divided by employment at 
the beginning of the year. The accession rate, Accessionst /Empt, is the 
number of people who move into new jobs during the year (the number 
of accessions) divided by employment at the start of the year. The sepa-
rations rate is Separationst /Empt . The result is either of the following 
equations: 
(8.3a) dEmp = Accessions − Separationst t t 
(8.3b) dEmp  Accessions  Separationst t t = −Empt Empt Empt
When employment is growing over time, dEmpt , the change in 
employment, is positive and accessions exceed separation; when 
employment is shrinking, dEmpt is negative and separations exceed 
accessions. 
Table 8.1 lists one dozen studies of gross labor market flows. For 
descriptive purposes, studies of gross flows can be organized into three 
groups. Analyses in the first group rely on models of the labor mar-
ket other than a perfectly competitive one. Pinoli (2010); Portugal and 
Cardoso (2006); and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) appeal to search 
models that incorporate frictions so that minimum wage increases have 
the potential for increasing employment. Georgiadis (2013) examines 
efficiency wage models in which it is cost minimizing for firms to pay 
a higher than competitive wage. Studies in the second group make 
no appeal to any theoretical model of the labor market: Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich (2007); Thompson (2009); and Skedinger (2006). Giuliano 
(2013) straddles the two groups, taking an agnostic view of these mod-
els. Studies in the third group focus on quits, a part of separations; 
because most of these studies predate the NMWR and grow out of a 
different literature, human capital and compensation, they are treated 
separately in the last section of this chapter. 
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DATA ISSUES 
Although it is the Swiss Army knife for the examination of many 
economic issues concerning the U.S. population, the CPS is far from 
ideal for the study of gross flows (Bjelland et al. 2007; Davis and 
Haltiwanger 1998).2 It is a retrospective household survey in which one 
adult often responds for all household members. Data collection errors 
that tend to cancel out in the measurement of stocks reinforce each other 
in the measurement of flows. Systematic biases and attrition that can be 
adjusted for in the measurement of stocks are more difficult to correct 
in the measurement of flows. The rotation structure of the CPS inter-
feres with the construction of any but short-term employment histories. 
Finally, before the 1994 revision that included the question, “Do you 
still work for [company name]?” in order to improve data consistency, 
use of the CPS to measure gross flows between jobs was not possible.3 
Although the federal structure of the government that is reflected in the 
CPS complicates some of these problems, household labor force sur-
veys in other countries also exhibit them. 
Long-term longitudinal surveys such as the NLSY and the PSID 
overcome some (not all) of the shortcomings of the CPS but introduce 
other problems, such as samples that are not representative of the entire 
labor force (Fallick and Fleischman 2004). 
Data that link employers and employees, especially tax data, are 
better than either one of those surveys for the examination of flows 
to or from jobs. In the United States, recent work on gross flows has 
moved to reliance on data sets that link employer and employee survey 
data through data collected by state unemployment insurance programs 
(Abowd and Vilhuber 2011a,b; Bjelland et al. 2007; Hyatt and Spletzer 
2013).4 Because not all employers must pay taxes for unemployment 
insurance (the self-employed, most employers of domestic and agricul-
tural workers, government), these data do not capture all flows. Never-
theless, this type of data, such as the Longitudinal Employer-Household 
Dynamics Program of the Census Bureau, is not only extensive but also 
unique in tracking both individuals and firms over time and including 
characteristics of each. Its increasing use in the study of gross flows 
suggests a belief that it is the most appropriate public data available.5 
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Table 8.1  Gross Labor Flows 
Study Target Country Sample period Data seta Variable Response Comments 
Dube, Naidu, and SF restaurants United 2003–2004 Private Separation rate None 
Reich (2007) States survey 
Dube, Lester, and Teenagers, United 2001–2008 QWI Accessions, Negative Accessions, 
Reich (2012) restaurants States separations ≈ separations 
Georgiadis (2013) Home care United 1999–2001 Private Accession rate, None 
sector Kingdom survey separation rate 
Giuliano (2013) Teens in retail United 1996–1998 Personnel Teen share of Varied, none Teen share in accessions 
States data accessions and doubles only when using 
of separations both preferred sample 
and specification. 
Grossberg and Minimum United 1988–1994 NLSY Quits (women) None. Negative if 
Sicilian (2004) wage workers States Quits (men) MW is relatively low, 
(men, women) positive if MW is 
relatively high 
Leighton and White and United 1967–71 NLSY and Job tenure None (NLSY), 
Mincer (1981) black men States (NLSY) PSID negative (PSID) 
1973, 1975 
(PSID) 
Pinoli (2010) Youth Spain 2000–2006 EPAS Accessions, Varied, positive No hiring response 
separations to unexpected increases, 
negative after a large, 
expected increase 
Portugal and Teenage Portugal 1986–1989 QP Teen share of Negative, negative Accessions-separations 
Cardoso (2006) workers accessions and > 0 
of separations 
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Skedinger (2006) Unskilled 
workers 
Sweden 1979–1999 CSE Accessions, 
separations 
Negative, varied Separations positive 
1979–1991, mixed later 
in the 1990s 
Sicilian and 
Grossberg 
(1993) 
3,000 small 
firms in the 
South and 
Midwest 
United 
States 
1982 
(back to 1978) 
EOPP Quit rates Net negative Interaction with tenure 
dominates direct effect 
on quits 
Thompson (2009) Teenagers United 
States 
1996–2000 QWI Accessions (teen 
share) 
Negative 
Wessels (1980) Manufacturing 
industries 
United 
States
 1909–1972 EE Quits Mixed 
a QWI: Quarterly Workforce Indicators (based on Unemployment Insurance records). NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youths; 
PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics; EPAS = Economically Active Population Survey (quarterly household survey, 6 quarters in 
sample); QP = (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (personnel records, Portuguese Ministry of Qualification and Employment); CSE = Firm 
and worker data from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise; EOPP  = Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects. EE = Employment 
and Earnings (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1973). 
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The studies discussed below use many types of data. Dube, Lester, 
and Reich (2012); Portugal and Cardoso (2006); and Thompson (2009) 
use tax data. Skedinger (2006) uses payroll data for many firms col-
lected by an employer confederation, and Giuliano (2013) uses person-
nel and wage data from a single firm. Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) and 
Leighton and Mincer (1981) rely on long-term longitudinal surveys. 
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) and Georgiadis (2013) use data from 
privately conducted surveys of employers, Pinoli (2010) uses the Span-
ish counterpart to the CPS, and Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) analyze a 
survey from the late 1970s and early 1980s that was conducted in order 
to study a program for retraining the unemployed and aiding them in 
finding work. 
STUDIES OF GROSS FLOWS THAT LEAN HEAVILY ON 
SPECIFIC LABOR MARKET MODELS 
Several of the studies that include examinations of the gross flows 
make appeals to (or firmly embed themselves in) models of the labor 
market other than the competitive model. Georgiadis (2013) examines 
implications of one type of efficiency wage model for gross flows. Pinoli 
(2010) appeals to the search model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
to motivate her study. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, 
and Reich (2012) turn to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to explain their 
results concerning the response of gross flows to the minimum wage. 
Georgiadis (2013) uses the UK care home industry data of Machin, 
Manning, and Rahman (2003) to examine the relevance of an efficiency 
wage model. Efficiency wage models resemble the competitive model 
of the labor market insofar as prospective employers and employees 
have no difficulty in finding each other; members of both groups have 
complete and costless information about who is on the other side of the 
market. Where these models differ is that in efficiency wage models, 
a higher wage is associated either with greater productivity or lower 
nonwage costs. Consequently, it is optimal in these models for firms to 
pay a wage that is higher than the equilibrium wage of the correspond-
ing competitive model; that is, the two models are identical except 
for this effect on productivity or costs. At the higher wage, aggregate 
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employment is less than in the competitive equilibrium. Knowing this 
and the consequence that finding a new job as good as their current one 
is not so easy (unlike in a competitive equilibrium), employees are less 
likely to either quit or behave in ways that would lead to being fired. 
By itself, the lower level of employment results in fewer separations; 
the employee response adds to this, reducing the separation rate. Simi-
larly, the lower level of employment results in fewer accessions, and 
the lower separation rate implies a lower vacancy rate (fewer job open-
ings relative to the level of employment), which in turn implies a lower 
accession rate. Georgiadis (2013) focuses on the turnover efficiency 
wage model, which emphasizes reduction in turnover as the motivation 
for the efficiency wage. Firms pay the high wage because turnover is 
costly; total costs are less despite the higher wage because it reduces 
the quit rate and, with fewer positions to be filled, the accessions rate. 
With regard to both rates, Georgiadis reports that “the results are uni-
formly insignificant across all specifications and minimum wage mea-
sures used” (p. 36). 
Pinoli (2010) appeals to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), extend-
ing their search model to motivate her focus on the distinction between 
anticipated and unanticipated increases in the minimum wage. Impor-
tant features of the original Mortensen and Pissarides model are that 
only the unemployed search for work, it is costly to firms to create a 
vacancy, and all jobs pay the same wage. Pinoli (2010) adds an addi-
tional friction, a firing tax that firms pay. Since her focus is the lower 
end of the labor market, the single wage is the (binding) minimum 
wage. For an unexpected minimum wage increase, all changes to sepa-
rations and accessions occur only after the fact. Separations rise imme-
diately and then stay constant.6 Accessions fall immediately, but the 
increase in unemployment from both their fall and the rise in separa-
tions means that unemployment rises; this in turn makes it easier for 
firms to fill vacancies, leading to a gradual increase in accessions to 
a higher level than before the minimum wage increase, though not so 
high as to reduce unemployment to its previous level. Turnover, the 
sum of accessions and separations, has increased above its initial value 
by the time accessions have recovered from their initial fall. 
For an anticipated minimum wage increase, there are not two peri-
ods for the purposes of analysis, before and after the increase, but three: 
1) before the increase in the perceived likelihood of the minimum wage 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
350 Belman and Wolfson 
increase; 2) after the minimum wage increases; and 3) an intermedi-
ate interval, before the minimum wage increases but after its perceived 
likelihood has risen. In this scenario, separations rise in steps. The first 
increase in separations occurs immediately upon entering the interme-
diate period, i.e., when expectations change. Separations rise to their 
final level, as high as in the case of an unexpected increase, when the 
minimum wage increase actually occurs. Accessions fall immediately 
on entering the intermediate period, and then, as in the case of an unex-
pected increase, rise to a level higher than their initial level because 
of the increase in unemployment. When the minimum wage actually 
increases, accessions initially fall to the same level as before the change 
in expectations, and then, as before, gradually rise to the new long-run 
level, higher than either the initial or intermediate levels. Because much 
of the adjustment takes place during the intermediate period before the 
minimum wage increase, once the increase occurs, accessions approach 
their new level more rapidly in the anticipated scenario than in the 
unanticipated one. Not only is turnover higher after the increase than 
before the change in expectations (at the same level in the long run as 
in the unanticipated scenario), it first rises in the intermediate period. 
Turning to the empirical analysis, Pinoli (2010) reports that the 
separation rate of teenagers rises by 3 percentage points following the 
unexpected minimum wage increase, all in the quarter immediately 
following the increase.7 For the three largest expected increases in her 
sample, the separation rate increases by 5.6 percentage points, 4.1 per-
centage points in the quarter before the increase, and 1.5 in the follow-
ing two quarters. The accession rate displays no (statistically detectable) 
response to unexpected minimum wage increases, and a decrease of 4.8 
percentage points in the two quarters after a large expected increase.8 
When she distinguishes between permanent and temporary workers (a
category that includes 70 percent of employed teenagers), there is no
detectable impact on the separation rate for permanent workers, but the 
effect on the separations rate of temporary workers (those hired for a 
fixed rather than indefinite term) is the strongest so far: 4 percentage 
points on impact for unexpected increases and 7.7 percentage points in 
response to a large, expected increase. More than 6 percentage points of 
that response immediately precede the increase in the minimum wage, 
half of the remainder immediately follows the increase, and the other 
half comes in the next two quarters. She explains that the difference in 
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responses reflects the smaller penalty firms suffer from laying off tem-
porary rather than permanent workers.9 
How do these estimates compare with Pinoli’s (2010) theoretical 
model? The estimated response of separations in the unexpected sce-
nario are about half the size as that in the expected scenario, not the 
same size as the theoretical model predicts, and the point estimate dur-
ing the intermediate interval of the expected scenario is not smaller than 
that after an unexpected increase but a third again as large. Rather than 
an increase in accessions, she finds no response to an unexpected mini-
mum wage increase and a decline in response to an expected minimum 
wage increase. 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) 
both turn to Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) search model as a way of 
rationalizing their findings.10 In this model, firms with vacancies post 
a wage, and with a positive probability some individual learns of it 
(employment status is not germane to this probability). If the wage is 
sufficiently high—above the individual’s current wage if employed 
or above the individual’s reservation wage if unemployed—then the 
individual takes the job. Unlike the model of Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994), this one generates a distribution of wages. In the absence of a 
minimum wage, many who are currently employed will take a vacant 
job because the offered wage is higher than their current one, which sets 
off a cascade of separations and accessions until someone who is not 
currently employed fills a position. 
A minimum wage raises the entire wage distribution, but more at 
the bottom than the top, compressing it at the lower end, that is, com-
pressing wages in low-wage labor markets. Because of the compres-
sion, workers in low-wage labor markets are less likely (than in the 
absence of the minimum wage) to find positions with a higher wage 
than they are already earning, so rather than move to a new job, they 
stay put.11 An open position is therefore more likely to go to some-
one who is currently not employed.12 With a (higher) minimum wage, 
the cascade either never begins or it ends more quickly, reducing both 
accessions and separations.13 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) rely on a detailed data set of employees 
in Portuguese firms to understand the response to a substantial increase 
in the minimum wages for teenagers in 1987. Theirs is the first study 
we consider in which gross labor flows are the focus of the analysis. 
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Their data consist of annual observations on individual firms. They use 
the recent history of the firm to classify labor flows in finer detail than 
accessions or separations, distinguishing among accessions and separa-
tions at continuing firms, accessions due to births, and separations due 
to deaths. At continuing firms, the share of teenagers in accessions fell 
by about four percentage points in both 1988 and 1989, the second and 
third years after the increase in the teenage minimum wage (see Table 
8.2), but their share in separations fell several times as much, 14–15 
percentage points in each of these years. At new firms, their share of 
accessions changed by about the same amount as at continuing firms, 
about four percentage points in both 1988 and 1989, while their share in 
separations due to deaths rose by 5 percentage points in 1988 and half 
as much in 1989. Overall, teenagers’ share in accessions fell, and their 
share in separations fell even more. Portugal and Cardoso conclude that 
“workers affected by a sharp rise in the minimum wage are not over-
represented among those who afterward separate from their employers” 
(p. 999).14 
To see how sharply the behavior of accessions and separations 
for teenagers differed from that of adults, it is necessary to correct for 
employment change during this period. The accession and separation 
rates allow us to do this.15 In 1986, the year before the increases, the 
teenage accession and separation rates were both about two and a half 
Table 8.2  Changes in Teen Shares in Gross Flows in Portugal Following 
the 1987 Minimum Wage Increase 
Deaths Continuing firms Births 
Separations 
1988 0.050** −0.150** 
1989 0.025 −0.140** 
Total 0.075 −0.290 
Accessions 
1988 −0.036** −0.042** 
1989 −0.043** −0.041** 
Total −0.079 −0.083 
NOTE: **statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the annual dummies. Statisti-
cal significance for the totals is not known (covariance between annual dummies is 
needed). 
SOURCE: Portugal and Cardoso (2006). 
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times as large as the corresponding rates for adults: 50 percent versus 
19 percent for accessions, and 45 percent versus 16 percent for sepa-
rations (see Table 8.3). Two years later, in the second year after the 
increases, the rates for adults increased by about one-third, to 26 per-
cent for accessions and 21 percent for separations. For teenagers, the 
increases were proportionately smaller, resulting in an accession rate of 
57 percent and a separation rate of 48 percent. Teenagers’ attachment 
to jobs did not increase in absolute terms during this period; however, 
because the adult separation rate grew nearly six times as fast as that of 
teenagers, the increase in teenagers’ share of total private employment 
was dramatic relative to previous trends, more than a percentage point 
in two years. 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) apply their border-discontinuity 
approach (Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010) to the 2001–2009 Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators to examine the minimum wage response of hir-
ing and separation rates of both teenagers and the restaurant industry.16 
Table 8.4 displays their results. They begin with a regression equation, 
similar to Neumark and Wascher’s canonical model, with fixed county 
and time effects. Their use of a familiar specification enables the reader 
to determine how dependent the results are on a novel data source. For 
teenagers, the employment elasticity is −0.2 (standard error = 0.07), and 
those for accessions and separations are −0.45 (0.09) and −0.46 (0.10), 
respectively. The employment elasticity equals the midpoint of the con-
sensus range of estimates in the older minimum wage literature. For 
the restaurant industry, the employment elasticity is −0.12 (0.04), and 
those for accessions and separations are −0.47 (0.08) and −0.47 (0.08). 
In each case, the minimum wage responses of the two gross flows effec-
tively cancel each other out, an outcome that is difficult to square with 
the estimated response of employment.17 
Table 8.3  Gross Flows for Teens and Adults in Portugal Following the 
1987 Minimum Wage Increase (%) 
Separations Accessions 
Teens Adults Teens Adults 
1986 45 16 50 19 
1987 48 22 56 23 
1988 48 21 57 26 
SOURCE: Portugal and Cardoso (2006, Table 6). 
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Table 8.4  Estimated Elasticities 
Canonical model Border-discontinuity model 
Restaurant Restaurant 
Teens workers Teens workers 
Employment −0.20** −0.12** −0.04 −0.06 
Hires −0.45** −0.47** −0.22** −0.34* 
Separations −0.46** −0.47** −0.25** −0.32 
Turnover rate −0.27** −0.33** −0.19** −0.26** 
NOTE: *statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. 
SOURCE: Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012, Table 3.) 
In Dube, Lester, and Reich’s (2012) border-discontinuity model, 
they compare adjacent counties across the borders of states that have dif-
ferent minimum wages. Instead of two-way fixed effects, they include a 
common time effect for adjacent counties. Although the wage response, 
which is positive and statistically significant in the canonical model, 
becomes larger (and remains statistically significant) in the border-
discontinuity model, the estimated employment response disappears. 
For teenagers, the employment elasticity is −0.04 (0.07), the accessions 
elasticity is −0.22 (0.11), and the separations elasticity is −0.25 (0.10). 
For restaurants, the three elasticities are −0.06 (0.10), −0.34 (0.17), and 
−0.32 (0.13). In both cases, the gross flows cancel out, as before, but in 
contrast with the canonical model, the point estimates for employment 
elasticity in the border discontinuity model are both small and not sta-
tistically significant. An especially telling detail is a comparison of esti-
mates for the border-discontinuity model using the whole sample and 
using a sample purged of people with less than one-quarter of tenure 
in the current job, that is, those most likely to be earning the minimum 
wage. The minimum wage elasticity of the separation rate falls dramati-
cally, for teenagers by more than half, and for restaurant workers by 
more than 90 percent. In both cases the results are no longer statistically 
significant despite modest reductions in the estimated standard error. It 
appears that the minimum wage affects separations of those with little 
job tenure, not those with greater job tenure; a minimum wage increase 
leads to greater stability in firms’ personnel and reduces high-frequency 
job changes, something that is costly to firms. It is not possible with the 
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data that Dube, Lester, and Reich use to determine whether this is due to 
changed behavior on the part of firms and employees or to a composi-
tional effect in the labor force as a result of the minimum wage increase. 
The findings of those who rely on formal models in their study of 
gross flows are mildly contradictory. The model that Georgiadis (2013) 
uses predicts lower accession and separation rates, which he does not 
detect. Pinoli’s (2010) model predicts higher levels of accessions and 
separations. She reports higher separation rates, though not quite as her 
model predicts, and unchanged or lower accession rates. The model that 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) turn 
to predicts a decline in both accession and separation rates, and that is 
what both analyses find, the former reporting greater declines in separa-
tions than accessions of teenagers, and the latter reporting declines in 
the two flows of roughly the same size. 
STUDIES OF GROSS FLOWS THAT ARE AGNOSTIC ABOUT
LABOR MARKET MODELS 
In their analysis of San Francisco’s restaurant industry and its 
response to the introduction of a citywide minimum wage, Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich (2007) detect no change in the separation rate. In his study 
of the effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment, Thompson 
(2009) briefly considers the teenage share of hires, reporting a variety 
of samples and specifications that make it difficult to summarize his 
results quantitatively. However, 8 of his 12 results are statistically sig-
nificant and have the negative sign that Thompson expects. The 1997 
increase appears to have reduced the teenage share of new hires by 
between 8 and 12 percentage points overall, and between 10 and 13 
percentage points in small counties where the minimum wage is high 
relative to the wage distribution.18 
Skedinger (2006) uses accessions and separations as his primary 
measures of the response of unskilled employment to changes in the 
minimum wage in the Swedish hospitality industry. Rather than examine 
the response of each to changes in the minimum wage, he considers the 
response of separations only to increases in the minimum wage and the 
response of accessions only to decreases in the minimum wage. In both 
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cases, the competitive model of the labor market implies an increase 
in the gross flow under consideration. For the period 1979–1991, the 
elasticity of the separation rate with respect to minimum wage increases 
is 0.58 (and highly statistically significant). For the same period, the 
elasticity of the accession rate to minimum wage decreases is 0.84 (also 
highly statistically significant). However, when Skedinger turns to the 
minimum wage increases of the 1990s, the results are more varied, with 
the elasticity of the separation rate varying by sample and age group. 
Estimates for older teenagers (18–19-year-olds) are not statistically sig-
nificant. Depending on the sample of firms used, estimates for adults are 
larger or smaller than the estimates from the earlier period. The larger 
adult estimate is statistically significant, and the smaller one is not. As 
mentioned in the chapter on employment, Skedinger believes that the 
results with regard to separations are consistent with the standard com-
petitive model, but that the results for accessions are much weaker and 
may be consistent with a monopsony model.19 
In a study using personnel data from a large U.S. chain store, 
Giuliano (2013) reports that the minimum wage has no effect on the 
share of teenagers in separations and a fragile positive effect on their 
share in accessions. When she combines her preferred sample with her 
preferred specification, the share of teenagers in new hires doubles; oth-
erwise the increase in the share is about 50 percent but is not statisti-
cally significant.20 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON SEPARATIONS 
AND ACCESSIONS 
Several of the analyses consider either only one type of gross flow 
or both types but only in different situations: Dube, Naidu, and Reich 
(2007) report only on separations, and Thompson (2009) looks only 
at accessions. Skedinger (2006) considers both types of employment 
flows but looks at accessions only following minimum wage decreases 
and at separations only following minimum wage increases. It is dif-
ficult to use these results for further insight on the question of the mini-
mum wage and employment. 
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Although Giuliano (2013) does not find a robust response of either 
accessions or separations to the minimum wage, Portugal and Cardoso 
(2006), studying a highly regulated labor market, and Dube, Lester, and 
Reich (2012), studying one that is considered very unregulated for a 
developed economy, report sharp declines in both accessions and sepa-
rations following an increase in the minimum wage. In both, the decline 
in separations is at least large enough to cancel out the employment con-
sequences of the decline in accessions. Because Pinoli’s (2010) results 
are less clear, they are difficult to interpret. Contrary to Dube, Lester, 
and Reich (2012) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006), Pinoli reports that 
separations rise as a result of both anticipated and unanticipated mini-
mum wage increases. Her findings about accessions are largely incon-
sistent with her model; they fall after a large expected increase, but 
apparently do not subsequently rise again, nor do they respond before-
hand. Further, she detects no response following the unexpected mini-
mum wage increase, especially surprising since this is also the largest 
increase in her sample. 
It appears that the strongest evidence, the combined findings of Por-
tugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012), supports 
declines in both accession and separation rates that roughly cancel each 
other. This would explain the absence of a clear employment response 
to the minimum wage in the literature. The evidence is certainly not 
overwhelming, and there are results that are not consistent with this 
conclusion. As with the literature on employment, more analysis that 
carefully controls for confounding factors is necessary to arrive with 
confidence at a conclusion. 
Quits 
An accession requires an agreement between two parties who, if 
they agree, become employer and employee. Separations occur when 
one or both no longer find the agreement to be beneficial, and can there-
fore be further divided into quits, sometimes called voluntary separa-
tions, and dismissals and layoffs. 
Because research on quitting, one component of separations, is 
embedded in the theories of human capital and employee compensa-
tion (see Chapter 6), the relationship between the minimum wage and 
quit rates is not central in most of the studies below. However, for the 
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purposes of a rough-and-ready history of results in this vein, we shall 
pretend that it is; it begins with Mixon’s (1978) analysis of low-wage 
industries.21 Next comes Wessels’s (1980) analysis, which incorporated 
the expanded notion of a compensation package that includes fringe 
benefits; firms can reduce benefits to offset minimum wage increases, 
and employees have incomplete information about compensation pack-
ages at other firms. In their study of human capital and the minimum 
wage (see Chapter 6), Leighton and Mincer (1981) report results for a 
phenomenon closely related to quits, the length of job tenure. Although 
they do not examine quitting behavior, Holzer, Katz, and Krueger 
(1991) mention implications of their analysis for aspects of Wessels’s; 
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) examine quit behavior in the same data 
set as Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991) to refute these points. Finally, 
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) make a more expansive use of incom-
plete information and combine it with De Fraja’s (1999) model of jobs. 
Wessels (1980) expands the notion of the compensation package 
to include fringe benefits. The tax treatment of benefits allows firms to 
provide them at lower after-tax cost than employees can do for them-
selves, creating a wedge between firm and employee costs. If firms 
respond to an increase in the minimum wage by reducing benefits, a 
higher minimum wage can reduce workers’ total compensation. Wes-
sels reasons that if those already employed experience this and believe 
that only their own employer has responded in this way to the minimum 
wage increase, quit rates may rise until employees understand the mar-
ketwide effect of the minimum wage increase. 
Wessels (1980) finds some support for the hypothesis that higher 
minimum wages are associated with higher quit rates among broadly
defined manufacturing industries. Estimating models on 13 3- and 4-
digit low-wage industries, Wessels reports 8 positive point estimates 
for the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the minimum wage. Of 
these eight, only two are statistically significant, but, consistent with 
his hypothesis, they are in the highest-wage industries. Leighton and 
Mincer (1981) consider the effect of the minimum wage on job tenure in 
the same framework and with the same data used in their study of wage 
growth and training. They are noncommittal about the expected effect 
of the minimum wage, emphasizing that human capital theory does not 
provide an unambiguous prediction about the relationship between the 
minimum wage and quits. As with their work on the minimum wage 
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and human capital, their estimates vary systematically with data source 
and specification. Estimates using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) indicate that both higher minimum wages and increased cover-
age have a significantly negative effect on tenure. Estimates using the 
NLSY indicate that job tenure among white or black men is unaffected 
by either the level or coverage of the minimum wage. 
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) revisit issues that Wessels (1980) 
examined, and they compare his analysis to that of Holzer, Katz, and 
Krueger (1991). Using data collected by the Economic Opportunity 
Pilot Projects, Holzer, Katz, and Krueger had determined that longer 
queues formed for minimum wage jobs than others, ceteris paribus, 
and inferred that these positions had rents that accrued to the employ-
ees because firms were unable to fully offset the higher costs from the 
minimum wage. Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) use the same data set 
to consider whether workers altered their views of jobs once they were 
working and had more complete information. If so, quits would rise 
following minimum wage increases, consistent with Wessels (1980), as 
the rents would only be expected, not actual. 
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) compare quit rates of those hired at 
exactly the minimum wage with workers who were hired above the 
minimum. The “hired at minimum wage” dummy enters the regression 
equation by itself and interacts with measures of labor market tightness 
and employee tenure. Although the coefficients for the dummy and its 
interaction with tightness are both positive, neither satisfies a 0.05 sig-
nificance test. The only minimum wage coefficient that does is the one 
for the interaction with tenure, and it is negative; for someone hired at 
the minimum wage, a one-month increase in tenure reduced the likeli-
hood of quitting by 0.14 percent. The authors conclude that their results 
are consistent with Wessels’s (1980) hypothesis but do not relate them 
to Holzer, Katz, and Krueger’s (1991) hypothesis concerning rents. 
In fact, their use of a “hired at minimum wage” dummy rather than
the percentage change in the minimum wage turns attention from the
response of employees earning the minimum wage when it increases to
those who begin a position at the minimum wage irrespective of sub-
sequent increases. In doing this, they are focusing on a different issue,
one that they analyze more explicitly in their next work. 
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) expand the problem of incomplete 
information beyond one that applies only to current employees, combin-
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ing it with De Fraja’s (1999) model of the nonpecuniary features of jobs 
that affect workers’ utility. The wedge from the tax treatment of fringe 
benefits plays no role, and that is also true of mistaken belief in the 
short term by current employees that only their employer has reduced 
them. The issue instead explicitly concerns the inferences about a posi-
tion’s intangible characteristics that prospective employees must draw 
when deciding whether to accept an offer. According to Grossberg and 
Sicilian’s hypothesis, the posted wage is the most important piece of 
information for these inferences, and only after a perhaps quite lengthy 
period can the (now) employee determine whether they were reason-
ably accurate. 
The authors agree with Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2012) that the amount of wage compression at the 
low end of the wage distribution will vary monotonically with the rela-
tive minimum wage, more salient when it is high than when it is low. 
Grossberg and Sicilian do not, however, rely on Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998) and expect this to lead to a decline in quit rates due to the inabil-
ity of those already in low-wage jobs to find higher paid ones. Rather, 
they expect that wage compression in low-wage environments results 
in mistaken inferences about the nature of jobs. In the presence of wage 
compression, positions that pay minimum wage will not be homoge-
neous with respect to these intangible qualities that can be judged accu-
rately only with experience. Those newly hired at the minimum wage 
will then include many who, after some experience of the job, conclude 
that it is not what they expected. Their hypothesis is similar to that of 
Wessels (1980) and Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) in the central role 
played by information loss resulting from compression of the lower 
tail of the wage distribution due to the minimum wage. It differs from 
Wessels’s (1980) in that this is now a problem not just for those who 
are employed when the minimum wage increases but for all individuals 
who start a position at the minimum wage, at least when it binds and 
leads to much wage compression. 
To examine this hypothesis, Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) turn pri-
marily to the NLSY, with a bit of help from the CPS. In addition to 
much important descriptive data about individuals and their jobs and 
employers, the NLSY has information about when an individual began 
a job and the starting wage, when employment in that position ended 
and why. From the CPS they construct a relative minimum wage vari-
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able as the ratio of a state’s effective minimum wage in each year to 
its median that year; the period of their study, 1988–1994, was one of 
considerably greater variation in the minimum wage, both across states 
and years, than was available in their earlier work. From these two data 
sources they can identify quits and model them (i.e., the probability 
that an employee quits a job) as a function of job tenure, the relative 
minimum wage, the starting wage relative to the minimum wage, an 
extensive list of individual and job-specific factors, and local macroeco-
nomic conditions. In presenting their results, they distinguish between 
state-year cells in which their relative minimum wage was very high 
and very low.22 
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) estimate separate hazard models for 
men and women, reporting their results in a fashion that calls to mind 
a difference-in-differences framework. They compare the likelihood of 
quitting a job when the minimum wage is high, and wage compression 
is greater, with that when the minimum wage is low. What corresponds 
to a treatment group consists of those hired at the minimum wage, and 
the analog to a comparison group is those hired at more than 10 percent 
above the minimum wage. Their central result is that when the mini-
mum wage is binding and there is (likely) much wage compression, the 
likelihood of a man’s quitting is many times greater for one hired at the 
minimum wage than for one hired at more than 110 percent of the mini-
mum wage (and the level of statistical significance is phenomenally 
high). In contrast, when the relative minimum wage is low, the same 
difference in likelihoods appears to run the other way, although it is 
both much smaller and not statistically significant. They detect no rela-
tionship between starting wage and women’s relative quit rates. They 
conclude that when the minimum wage is relatively high, and wage 
compression ensues, the minimum wage results in a loss of information 
that reduces the value of matches in the labor market because job seek-
ers cannot tell without experiencing a position that the previous cor-
relation between wages and intangible characteristics of jobs no longer 
exists.23 
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Notes 
1. Firms that are newly in business are referred to as births, and those that are newly 
out of business are referred to as deaths. Those that were in business previously 
and are still operating are called continuing firms. 
2. This led the Bureau of Labor Statistics to cease publication after 1952 of estimates 
for a related set of gross flows, those between labor force states: employed, unem-
ployed, not in the labor force (Frazis et al. [2005]). 
3.	 Fallick and Fleischman (2004) were the first to take advantage of this question to 
measure flows between jobs. 
4. Data from the Unemployment Insurance program and income tax programs can 
be used to link employer and household data, as they include both social security 
numbers and employer identification numbers. 
5. One drawback is that the Census Bureau limits access to the data and closely 
controls how the data are used and what is released to prevent the identification of 
individuals and firms. See http://lehd.ces.census.gov/. 
6.	 This discussion of the behavior of gross flows in Pinoli’s theoretical model draws 
from Figure 3 in Pinoli (2010). 
7.	 In presenting the estimated effects for flows, Pinoli (2010) assumes a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage. While this is an efficient way to convey informa-
tion, this is at least 50 percent larger than any of the in-sample increases (and more 
than twice as large as most of them), so involves extrapolating well outside her 
sample. 
8. Pinoli (2010) presents results for other treatment and control groups, but the ones 
cited here are among the strongest and are based on the best match between treat-
ment and control group: those aged 16–24 and those aged 25–34, respectively. 
The “large expected increases” were the anticipated ones that occurred under the 
center-left government and were between two-thirds and five-sixths as large as the 
unexpected increase that occurred shortly after it came to power. 
9. Pinoli (2010) does not present results for accessions of temporary workers. 
10. Both report a sharp decline in separations. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report 
a decline in accessions that is smaller than the decline in separations, leading to 
an increase in the teenage share of employment. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) 
report a decline in accessions of both teens and restaurant workers that is roughly 
equivalent to the decline separations. 
11. It is worth noting that this result is not due to the posting of fewer higher-wage 
jobs when there is a minimum wage but to low-wage workers already occupying 
a higher-wage job than they would in the absence of the minimum wage. 
12. This could happen eventually without a minimum wage, when the cascade of hir-
ings and quits ends with the hiring of an unemployed person, except that the cas-
cade itself raises costs for firms and they end up trying to fill fewer positions than 
otherwise. 
13. A further consequence, relevant later when we come to labor force participation, 
is that because the wage compression increases the probability of finding a job for 
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someone who is unemployed, it draws more of those who are not employed into 
active search. 
14. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report results as changes in relative shares, which 
complicates straightforward interpretation of the effect of the minimum wage on 
gross flows. However, because the only changes in the minimum wage were for 
those of teenagers, we can treat minimum wage–induced changes in gross flows 
of other groups as zero. 
15. All calculations are based on Portugal and Cardoso (2006, Table 6, p. 995). The 
accession rate is defined as the number of accessions divided by employment at 
the beginning of the year. An accession is identified as an individual employed at a 
firm, either continuing or new, at the beginning of one year but not at the same firm 
at the beginning of the previous year. The separation rate is defined similarly, as 
the number of separations during a year divided by employment at the beginning 
of the year, where a separation is identified as an individual employed at a firm, 
either continuing or one that went out of business, at the beginning of one year but 
not at the same firm one year later. 
16.	 Teenagers are defined as those aged 14–19 inclusive. 
17. Owing to differences in presentation, a quantitative comparison of the results of 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) with those of Portugal and Cardoso (2006) is not 
possible. 
18. Chapter 2 contains more detailed discussions of Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) 
and Thompson (2009). 
19. Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) apply Skedinger’s approach to Finnish teenagers, 
but their results appear to be internally inconsistent to a degree, and they sus-
pect that their sample period is too short to control adequately for trends in youth 
employment. Thus, as in the chapter on jobs, this chapter does not discuss their 
results. 
20. Guiliano develops several alternatives to competitive theories in understand-
ing the impact of the minimum wage within firms. Her work is guided by these 
theories. 
21. Because of the use of now-dated time-series methods and strong evidence of 
uncorrected first-order serial correlation in Mixon’s analysis, the account that fol-
lows begins with later work. 
22. In their mildly confusing terminology, a state-year cell in which the relative mini-
mum wage is high is a low-wage environment (because the median wage is rela-
tively low), and one in which the relative minimum wage is low is a high-wage 
environment (because the median wage is relatively high). We will instead focus 
on whether the relative minimum wage is high or low (and thus whether it results 
in much compression of the distribution of low wages). 
23. A serious concern is the reliability of Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) statistical 
inference. They report using robust standard errors, a correction for conventional 
heteroskedasticity (i.e., different variances). The use of state-year cells to define 
the relative minimum wage immediately calls to mind not only the Moulton (1986, 
1990) problem but the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), both 
of which indicate that clustered standard errors are in order. The extremely small 
364 Belman and Wolfson 
p-value of Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) most interesting result, the relative 
probability of quitting for a man hired at minimum wage in a low-wage environ-
ment, 0.00001, reinforces this concern. 
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Labor Force Participation Rate,
Unemployment, and Vacancies 
We have so far considered the effect of the minimum wage on sev-
eral labor market quantities: the number of jobs filled, the number of 
people employed, and the number of hours worked, all of which are 
measures of employment; and gross flows in and out of employment 
(accessions and separations). These are measures most frequently of in-
terest to labor economists and those interested in the functioning of the 
labor market. In this chapter, we examine four other labor market mea-
sures that are more often considered in discussions of macroeconomic 
phenomena: the labor force participation rate (LFPR), the unemploy-
ment rate, unemployment duration, and the vacancy rate. 
Table 9.1 indicates how the population is segmented for the pur-
pose of defining the labor force and its two primary components, the 
employed and the unemployed—those who are not employed but are 
actively searching for jobs. Individuals who are neither employed nor 
actively seeking employment are classified as “not in the labor force.” 
Mincer (1976) suggests that changes in the size of the labor force are 
a better indication of the effect of minimum wages on the welfare of 
actual and prospective workers than is the response of employment. 
He reasons that even if both employment and the probability of finding 
work decline following a minimum wage increase, an increase in the 
size of the labor force indicates that, for many, the higher prospective 
wage offsets these other factors. 
As Table 9.2 shows, the LFPR is the number of people in the labor 
force divided by population size. Like the employment ratio (the num-
ber employed divided by the number in the population), the LFPR can 
be defined for specific demographic groups. 
The unemployment rate is the number of the unemployed divided 
by the number in the labor force, or one minus “the employment ratio 
divided by the LFPR.” At first glance, this is inversely related to the 
employment ratio, rising when the latter is falling and falling when the 
latter is rising, so it is not obvious what is to be gained by its study. The 
365 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table 9.1  Labor Force Definitions 
Term Definition 
366 
Civilian noninstitu-
tional population 
(CNIP) 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Labor force 
All individuals aged 16 and over who are not in the armed forces or in prison, or other institutions. 
Members of the civilian noninstitutional population who did any work for pay or profit during the sur-
vey reference week; persons who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work in a family-operated enterprise; 
and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad 
weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons. 
Persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the 
prior four weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were wait-
ing to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as unem-
ployed. 
The sum of employed and unemployed persons. The labor force participation rate is the labor force as 
a percent of the civilian noninstitutional population. 
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Table 9.2  Labor Force Measures 
Measure Definition Formula 
Labor force The ratio of the number of individuals in the labor # in LF LFPR participation ratio force to the number of individuals in the civilian non- = # in CNIP 
institutional population (CNIP). 
Employment ratio The ratio of the number of individuals employed to the # Employed ER =number of individuals in the CNIP. # in CNIP 
Unemployment rate The ratio of the number of individuals unemployed to  # Unemployed 
# in LaborForce 
the number of individuals in the labor force. Measured UR 100 
 
×= 
as a percentage. 


 
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answer is that the unemployment rate varies not only when the employ-
ment ratio does, but also when the LFPR does. Partridge and Partridge 
(1998) observe that at the state level, the standard deviation of the an-
nual growth rate of teenagers’ employment is several times as large 
as that of the annual teenage unemployment rate (pp. 368–369).1 They 
suggest that this higher variability is noise that obscures the signal of 
the minimum wage and is unrelated to anything that is either of interest 
or controlled for. At the least, examination of the unemployment rate 
will complement studies of the employment rate in the minimum wage 
literature and may well be more fruitful. 
Unemployment duration is the average length of time that an unem-
ployed worker has continually sought work.2 This is of interest because 
even if none of the other variables already mentioned vary in response to 
minimum wage changes, a change in unemployment duration contains 
information about the effect of the minimum wage on (some) workers. 
It is widely believed that it is undesirable to be unemployed (the song 
“Hallelujah! I’m a Bum” not withstanding), and longer periods in this 
condition are worse, perhaps more than in proportion because as skills 
and networks deteriorate while unemployed, finding a job becomes 
ever more difficult. 
The unemployment rate is a supply-side quantity in the labor mar-
ket. The vacancy rate is its counterpart on the demand side. Also defined 
as a fraction, its numerator is the number of positions that firms are try-
ing to fill—the number of vacancies—and its denominator is typically 
the size of the labor force.3 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
Table 9.3 lists Flinn (2006), already discussed in Chapter 2, and 
three other studies that have problematic standard errors. Flinn (2006) 
develops two closely related search models, which he calls the endog-
enous and exogenous models. The difference between them is that the 
minimum wage influences the contact rate in the endogenous model 
but not in the exogenous model, which is the one that he believes to 
be more reliable.4 To estimate the models’ parameters, Flinn relies on 
CPS data for teenagers and young adults from just before, between, and 
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Table 9.3  Labor Force Participation Response 
Data
Study Country Target Data structure Period Comments 
Flinn (2006) United White, male CPS Individual 
States teenagers and repeated 
youth cross section 
Addison and Ozturk OECD Women OECD Country-annual 
(2012) panel 
Wessels (2005) United Teenagers CPS State-quarter 
States panel 
Ahn, Arcidiacono, United White, male CPS Repeated 
and Wessels States teenagers cross section 
(2011) 
9/96, 
2/97, 
8/97, 
1/98 
1980s– 
2000s 
1979– 
2001 
1989– 
2000 
Very rich search model that models the participation 
decision. Indicates that the late 1990s increases in the 
U.S. federal minimum wage most likely increased 
youth participation, employment, and unemployment, 
the last because of a larger increase in the LFPR than 
employment. 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies. 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies. 
Search model that builds on Flinn (2006). Identifies 
compositional effects, where the minimum wage attracts 
teenagers from more-educated households into the labor 
force. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique 
applies; no standard errors for the elasticities (which are 
the interesting result). 
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shortly after the 1996 and 1997 changes in the minimum wage.5 The 
exogenous model implies that labor force participation rises until the 
minimum wage exceeds more than $8.00/hour, above which it declines. 
The endogenous model pegs this decline as beginning, imperceptibly, 
at a minimum wage somewhere around $3.00/hour and first becoming 
perceptible around $3.75/hour.6 
Considering calculations based only on the range of minimum wage 
values in the data, the exogenous model indicates a small rise in the 
LFPR from less than 64 percent at a minimum wage of $4.25/hour to 65 
percent at a value of $5.15/hour, while the endogenous model indicates 
instead a fall from less than the original value of 64 percent to about 59 
percent in this interval. As mentioned in the earlier discussion, Flinn 
(2006) provides no error bias for these results that would allow us to 
judge whether these movements are the equivalent of statistical noise.7 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Table 9.4 lists 10 studies that examine the effect of the minimum 
wage on either the unemployment rate or the duration of unemployment.8 
Partridge and Partridge (1998) consider the effect of the minimum wage 
on teenagers’ unemployment rates, and in their 1999 study they look at 
the long-term unemployment rate.9 Most of the estimates in each study 
come from models that include both a contemporaneous and a lagged 
minimum wage; in these cases, the two-point estimates are always sta-
tistically significant but have opposite signs. When they do not include 
the lagged term, the point estimate of the coefficient on the contempora-
neous term is not even remotely near statistical significance. According 
to the equation with both terms, the response of the unemployment rate 
is quite large, both initially when it declines in response to a minimum 
wage increase, and in the next year when an increase in the unem-
ployment rate more than cancels out the previous decline. It would be 
useful to know the statistical significance of the two coefficients’ sum, 
something that would take into account the correlation between the two 
terms. It is likely that the sum, the net response of the unemployment 
rate over two years, is not distinguishable from zero.10 
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In their study of the effect of minimum wage increases on teenagers 
in New Zealand in 2001, 2002, and 2003, Hyslop and Stillman (2007) 
report a statistically significant increase in unemployment for those 
aged 16–17 in response to the largest of the increases, which happened 
in 2001, but only when they do not include business cycle controls. 
Once included, none of the increases has a statistically significant effect 
on unemployment. For older teenagers, aged 18–19, a lack of business 
controls is associated with a statistically insignificant effect on unem-
ployment. With the inclusion of business cycle controls, the effects on 
unemployment are statistically significant decreases in the later years, 
and no statistically significant effect in 2001. 
Flinn’s (2006) analysis has interesting implications for the unem-
ployment rate. His model has three states for individuals: 1) out of 
the labor force; 2) unemployed (that is, in the labor force and not em-
ployed); and 3) employed. According to the exogenous model, where 
the contact rate is independent of the minimum wage, the 1996 and 
1997 minimum wage increases led to increases in both the employment 
ratio and the unemployment rate, the latter by 0.2 percentage points. 
The increase in the unemployment rate was due to a small increase in 
employment and a slightly larger increase in labor force participation. 
In the endogenous model, the policy raised the unemployment rate by 
0.4 percentage points, resulting from a large drop in employment and a 
slightly larger drop in labor force participation. 
Tulip (2004) examines whether the minimum wage affects the rate 
of unemployment consistent with a stable inflation rate. The question 
arises from an interpretation of macroeconomic data, which concludes 
that prolonged attempts to hold the unemployment rate at a level that is 
too low can be identified by a rate of inflation that is getting ever larger, 
while allowing the rate to be too high can be identified by its opposite, 
an inflation rate that declines over time. NAIRU, the abbreviation for 
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, is one acronym for the 
“Goldilocks value” of the unemployment rate—the value that is just 
right because it is associated with a stable inflation rate. To address the 
issue, Tulip derives a regression equation in which the rate of wage in-
flation depends on the current unemployment rate, on the Kaitz index, 
on the change in the relative minimum wage, and on several lagged 
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Table 9.4  Unemployment Rate/Duration 
Study Country Target Data Data structure Period Comments 
Carmeci and 
Mauro 
(2002) 
Flinn (2006) 
Hyslop and 
Stillman 
(2007) 
Partridge and 
Partridge 
(1998) 
Partridge and 
Partridge 
(1999) 
Pedace and 
Rohn 
(2011) 
Italy Regional 
growth rates 
Many Italian 
sources 
Regional-
annual panel 
1965–1995 Apply cross-country growth framework to Italy’s 
regions; argue that inappropriately high minimum 
wage leads to high unemployment, slower growth 
in poorer regions. Minimum wage disappears from 
view in the course of the model’s derivation. 
United 
States 
White, male 
teenagers 
and youth 
CPS Individual 
repeated 
cross section 
9/96, 2/97, 
8/97, 1/98 
Very rich search model that models the 
participation decision. Indicates that the late 1990s 
increases in the U.S. federal minimum wage most 
likely increased youth participation, employment, 
and unemployment, the last because of a larger 
increase in the LFPR than employment. 
New 
Zealand 
Teenagers HLFS Individual-
annual panel 
1997–2003 Once business cycle controls are included, the only 
effects are declines in the unemployment rate for 
18–19-year-olds. 
United 
States 
Teenagers CPS, BEA, 
others 
State-year panel 1984–89 Similar to Neumark and Wascher approach, for 
unemployment of teens; panel short enough that 
Bertrand critique not too serious. 
United 
States 
Long-term 
unemploy-
ment 
CPS, BEA, 
others 
State-year panel 1984–89 Similar to Neumark and Wascher approach, for 
long-term unemployment; panel sufficiently short 
that Bertrand critique not too serious. 
United 
States 
Unemploy-
ment dura-
tion 
CPS, 
Displaced 
Worker 
Survey 
Individual-year 
panel; repeated 
cross section 
1984–2000 Hazard model of unemployment duration. Separate 
estimates for men, women, and various subgroups. 
Decline in duration for male high school 
graduates; increase for male high school dropouts, 
and for women, especially older women and less-
skilled women. 
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Tulip (2004) United BLS Quarterly 1948:1– Estimate a Phillips curve with minimum wage 
States time series 2003:1 as a control variable. Then holding inflation 
constant, solve for the NAIRU, see how the 
NAIRU responds to minimum wage. NAIRU rises 
0.7 percentage points in response to a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage. 
van den Berg Nether- Dutch labor OSA Labor Unbalanced 1985–1990 Apply Burdett and Mortenson’s (1998) search 
and Ridder lands market Supply Panel individual-year model to the Netherlands; partition the labor 
(1998) Survey panel market into 170 segments; estimate MRPL for 
each, and analyze effect of the minimum wage.  
No standard errors provided for the policy 
analysis, and they express some skepticism about 
the result. 
Fortin, Keil, Canada Statistics Regional-annual 1967–1991 Why has the unemployment rate risen over this 
and Symons Canada panel long period? Four sets of estimates, by gender 
(2001) and age. Effect reported for both types of women; 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique 
applies. 
Addison and OECD Women OECD Country-year 1980s–2000 Cross-country analysis of women’s labor market 
Ozturk panel outcomes; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2012) (2004) critique applies. 
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measures of wage and price inflation. The intuition for including the 
minimum wage derives from the following line of reasoning: 
 An increase in the minimum wage raises wages. 
 Because firms set prices as a percentage over unit costs, they 
raise prices. 
 Higher prices lead to lower demand for output. 
 Firms respond by reducing their demand for labor. 
 Unemployment rises. 
According to the underlying logic of the NAIRU, if policymakers 
respond by stimulating demand to keep unemployment constant at the 
original level but make no further changes to the minimum wage, sev-
eral rounds of ever-smaller price increases will follow that will inflate 
away the minimum wage increase. In the end, both the unemployment 
and inflation rates will have returned to their original levels, and the 
price level will be higher, offsetting the initial rise in the real minimum 
wage. If policy is instead focused on keeping both the real minimum 
wage constant at its new, higher level through repeated increases in 
the nominal minimum wage, and the inflation rate at its original level 
through tighter monetary policy, the unemployment rate necessarily 
rises. 
Tulip (2004) estimates this equation on aggregate quarterly data for 
the United States for the period 1947–2003.11 Based on his estimate, 
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases the NAIRU by 
0.7 percentage points, slowly declining over time until inflation has re-
duced the real minimum wage to its original value.12 
Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) use data from the Netherlands to 
examine how well a search model that generates wage dispersion fits 
observed data. Previous work in this vein relied on a model in which 
only unemployed workers searched for work. Van den Berg and Ridder 
instead use Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) search model, which, by 
allowing for on-the-job search, is able to generate certain types of het-
erogeneous results with fewer assumptions made specifically to attain 
this goal. Observed wages are always between an employee’s reserva-
tion wage and the corresponding employer’s marginal revenue product 
of labor. Individuals are heterogenous in the value of their reservation 
wage for a variety of reasons, including their current employment sta-
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tus and their current wage if employed.13 Firms differ in the value of 
their marginal product of labor. Wages of employees at the bottom of 
the wage distribution rise as the minimum wage is increased until it 
exceeds the value of some firms’ marginal revenue product. That firm 
goes out of business and its employees become unemployed. 
To estimate the model, Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) make use 
of a long-term survey of Dutch households that has information on in-
dividuals’ employment spells between 1985 and 1990. It allows them 
to partition the Dutch labor market into nearly 200 segments based on 
traits of both individuals and jobs. From their estimates of the mar-
ginal revenue product of labor in each segment, they calculate that a 
10 percent increase in the minimum wage would have no effect on the 
unemployment rate, but a 25 percent increase would raise the unem-
ployment rate by 16 percentage points. They present no standard errors 
for this estimate and are wary of placing much weight on its precise 
value because institutional factors in the Dutch labor market prevent 
them from being able to distinguish adequately between the effects of 
search frictions and the minimum wage.14 
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION 
Pedace and Rohn (2011) study whether (and how) the minimum 
wage affects the length of unemployment spells by estimating hazard 
functions on 1984–2000 data from the Displaced Workers Survey (a 
biennial supplement to the CPS). Hazard functions model durations, 
how long something lasts, in this case the duration of unemployment 
spells. In Pedace and Rohn’s specification, unemployment duration de-
pends on an individual’s demographic traits, including details of the 
last job held before becoming unemployed, on state and year dummies, 
and on the level of the minimum wage. In some specifications, they 
also include the percentage of each states’ labor force that receives the 
minimum wage. As an ad hoc examination of robustness, Pedace and 
Rohn report results from several different functional forms commonly 
used to relate duration to regressors, and they perform their estimations 
separately for each gender as well as for subgroups within each gender: 
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by age (younger than 25 or not), skill level, and whether or not the indi-
vidual completed high school. 
For males, higher minimum wages reduce the length of unemploy-
ment spells of high school graduates, with a $1.00 increase leading to a 
21 percent reduction in the average unemployment spell. At the average 
values in the data for this group, this is a reduction of 5 weeks in unem-
ployment duration, a 27 percent increase in the minimum wage, and an 
unemployment duration elasticity (with respect to the minimum wage) 
of −0.8. For males without a high school degree, the corresponding fig-
ures are a 63 percent increase in length of unemployment spells, a 28 
percent increase in the minimum wage, an elasticity of 2.25, and a more 
than 21-week increase in the mean length of unemployment spells.15 
The pattern of results for women is quite different in signs, size, 
and statistical significance. For the same $1.00 (27 percent) increase, 
females with a high school degree experience a 55 percent increase in 
unemployment duration, nearly 18 weeks at the average, for an elastic-
ity of about 2. Lower-skilled women experience a 66 percent increase in 
unemployment duration, 15 weeks at the average, for an elasticity near 
2.4.16 For those aged 25 and older who experience the same $1 increase 
in the minimum wage, the increase in women’s unemployment duration 
is 47 percent, for an elasticity of 1.74, and the decline in men’s unem-
ployment duration is −17 percent, for an elasticity of −0.62. 
As an alternative way to consider their results, Pedace and Rohn 
(2011) report the response of median unemployment durations to all 
the federal minimum wage increases during the 1990s. For males with 
a high school diploma, the minimum wage increases resulted in a de-
crease in the median duration of unemployment from 17 weeks to 11 
weeks. For males without a high school diploma, however, the median 
unemployment spell more than doubled from 21 weeks to 49 weeks. 
For women with a high school diploma, the median duration more than 
doubled, from 16 weeks to 35 weeks, as it also did for women who are 
lower skilled, from 19 to 47 weeks. 
These estimated effects, both the elasticities and the increases in 
median durations, are substantial. In addition to the compositional ef-
fect indicated by the simultaneous reduction in unemployment duration 
for male high school graduates and increase in duration for women, 
these results are consistent with incumbents in minimum wage jobs be-
coming more attached to them, as both Portugal and Cardoso (2006) 
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and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) report for teenagers. They are also 
consistent with Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) results for men in high-
wage states, for whom the minimum wage increases job tenure.17 
VACANCIES 
The Beveridge curve, which plots the vacancy rate against the un-
employment rate, is a tool that macroeconomists use to diagnose the 
state of the economy. In the short run, if the Beveridge curve is not 
shifting around, a plot of observations is downward sloping, with high 
values of the vacancy rate observed simultaneously with low values of 
the unemployment rate, and low values of the vacancy rate observed 
at the same time as high values of the unemployment rate. The former 
set of points indicates that the economy is in a boom and the latter that 
it is in a recession. Over the longer run, it is not uncommon for the
Beveridge curve to move toward or away from the origin (also de-
scribed as shifting in or out). When it shifts out, higher vacancy rates 
than before are observed with each unemployment rate, and higher 
unemployment rates with each vacancy rate; the labor market is operat-
ing less efficiently as more unfilled jobs coexist with more workers in 
search of jobs. 
Table 9.5 lists two studies that examine the impact of the minimum 
wage on vacancies. Both—Samson’s (1994) study of the Canadian Bev-
eridge curve for the period 1966:1–1988:4 and Singell and Terborg’s
(2007) study of vacancies in the restaurant and hotel industries of Wash-
ington and Oregon in 1994–2001—rely on time-series data. Neither 
adequately addresses serious problems that time-series data commonly 
present to the econometrician: unit roots, cointegration, and serially 
correlated residuals.18 If serial correlation is not properly addressed, 
whether in the estimation or in the calculation of standard errors, then 
the resulting statistical inference is unreliable. If variables in the regres-
sion have unit roots that are not addressed, then the point estimates are 
meaningless. 
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table 9.5  Vacancies 
Authors Country Target Data Data structure Period Comments 
Samson 
(1994) 
Canada Macro-
economy 
Various Quarterly time 
series and region-
quarter panel 
1966:4– 
1988:4 
Estimate unemployment and vacancy equa-
tions, including the real minimum wage in 
both. Lack of attention to time-series issues 
(unit roots, cointegration, serially correlated 
residuals) despite the use of time-series data 
defeats any confidence in the results. 
Singell and 
Terborg 
(2007) 
United 
States 
Restaurant 
and hotel 
industries in 
WA and OR 
Classified 
ads 
Monthly time 
series 
1994:1– 
2001:12 
Analyze monthly want-ad data for restaurant 
and hotel jobs collected from Portland and 
Seattle newspapers (one each). (Even) less 
sensitivity to time-series issues than in the 
analysis of employment, similar to Samson 
(above). 
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CONCLUSION 
On balance there is reason to believe that minimum wage increases 
of the size seen in the U.S. data slightly increase the LFPR of youth, 
but it is not clear that the size of this response is at all precisely mea-
sured. It also appears that the unemployment rate increases in response 
to minimum wage increases, but here too the lack of appropriately cal-
culated standard errors defeats attempts at reliable inference. Flinn’s 
(2006) model suggests that the increase in the unemployment rate is 
not big and is in large part due to growth in labor force participation 
that outstrips employment growth. Pedace and Rohn’s (2011) study of 
employment duration is quite interesting, suggesting that employers 
substitute toward better-educated male workers and away from both 
less-educated men and women in all relevant categories, not just less-
educated ones. Although they do not mention this, the adverse impact 
on older women but not younger ones raises the possibility of sexist-
age discrimination. Finally, the small bit of work relating the minimum 
wage to vacancies has statistical problems that keep it from being in-
formative. A fair summary of the research into the consequences of the 
minimum wage for these macroeconomic variables is that too little of 
it exists to draw any certain conclusions, and much of what does exist 
relies heavily on specific models. The models may well be of high qual-
ity, and they are certainly interesting, but they are not sufficiently tested 
yet to inspire great confidence. 
Notes 
1. Admittedly, focusing on employment growth rates rather than the employment 
ratio involves a comparison of apples and oranges; the point would be clearer, and 
substantively the same, if Partridge and Partridge (1998) referred to teen employ-
ment ratios instead of employment growth rates. 
2. “Duration of unemployment represents the length of time (through the current ref-
erence week) that persons classified as unemployed had been continuously looking 
for work. For persons on layoff, duration of unemployment represents the number 
of full weeks since the end of their most recent period of employment. Thus, it is 
a measure of an in-progress spell of joblessness, not a completed spell. Two useful 
measures of the duration of unemployment are the mean and the median. Mean 
duration is the arithmetic average computed from single weeks of unemployment. 
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Median duration is the midpoint of a distribution of weeks of unemployment.” 
See BLS Handbook of Methods, Chapter 1, for a discussion of duration and its 
measurement. http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_c.htm (accessed August 15, 
2013). 
3. Defining the denominator to be the labor force (the sum of the number employed 
and the number unemployed) rather than the sum of vacancies and the number of 
jobs filled (which itself is roughly equal to employment) makes the vacancy rate 
as measured a mix of demand and supply side measures, but it makes it easier to 
compare the vacancy and unemployment rates. 
4. Briefly, the contact rate is the number of job offers that a job seeker can expect to 
receive in each period of search, or that a firm can expect to make for each vacancy 
in each period. More precisely, in labor-search models, a contact is defined as a 
worker’s approaching a firm that has a vacancy and asking “How much would you 
pay me to fill that vacancy?” The firm is able to evaluate how much the worker is 
worth in that position and makes an offer that reflects that value. The contact rate is 
defined differently depending, on whether the perspective is that of the job seeker 
or of the employer. In each period, the numerator is the number of contacts in that 
period, and the denominator is either the number of job seekers or the number of 
vacancies that firms are looking to fill. 
5. The federal minimum wage rose from $4.25/hour to $4.75/hour on October 1, 
1996, and, as part of the same legislation, to $5.15/hour on September 1, 1997. 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm (accessed August 15, 2013). 
6. This is inferred from the behavior of “out of the labor force” in the top part of 
Flinn’s (2006) Figures 1 and 2. 
7. Wessels (2005) and Addison and Ozturk (2012) also examine the LFPR, us-
ing the empirical approach associated with Neumark and Wascher (1992, 
1994). Both report a labor supply response that is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, Wessels for teenagers in the United States, and Addison and Ozturk 
for women in OECD countries. In both cases, the statistical significance re-
lies on conventional standard errors, which are likely to be biased downward.
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) consider several variables measuring labor 
market outcomes, but these are not mutually exclusive and cannot be combined
to give labor force participation. 
Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) use a search model similar to Flinn 
(2006) to study compositional effects of the minimum wage, specifically, the dif-
ference in labor market outcomes for teenagers from more- and less-educated 
households. According to their estimates, as the education level of the head of 
household increases, teenagers’ reservation wages rise, and their search costs fall. 
The reverse is true if the household head is either unemployed or a single parent. 
They conclude that a higher minimum wage attracts teenagers from all types of 
households into the labor force. While most of their point estimates are statistically 
significant, that is based on conventional standard errors and, given the structure 
of their data, the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique is pertinent. In 
addition, they present no standard errors for the elasticities calculated from these 
point estimates. 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
 
 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Labor Force Participation Rate, Unemployment, and Vacancies  381 
8. One study not listed is Bouvet (2009), which studies unemployment, vacancies, 
and the minimum wage using both an annual panel of five countries and an annual 
panel of 60 regions in those five countries. Bouvet’s minimum wage variable is a 
dummy for the existence of a legislated minimum wage; it is difficult to figure out 
exactly how she carried out her analysis; and unless minimum wage policy in these 
countries is very different from that in the United States, the Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004) critique is pertinent. Except for the criticism of the minimum 
wage variable, the same comments apply to Morgan and Mourougane’s (2005) 
analysis of structural unemployment in several EU countries. 
9. Both this study and Partridge and Partridge (1999) are short enough (six years of 
annual data) that the problems may not be especially severe. 
10. With a pair of positively correlated variables, this situation (each coefficient 
statistically significant and with opposite signs when both variables are in the re-
gression, but when only one is in the equation its coefficient is much smaller in 
magnitude and not statistically significant) suggests that the variables probably do 
not belong in the equation. 
11. Tulip’s (2004) residual diagnostics indicate a few of the typical problems from 
this type of estimation. The exception is a test that indicates that the residuals are 
not normally distributed. On the one hand, this raises doubts about any statistical 
inference using the equation. On the other hand, it is rarely evident what sort of 
adjustments to the equation or estimation will solve this problem. 
12. Tulip (2004) recognizes that the relationship between the minimum wage and un-
employment or the NAIRU is not likely to be a simple causal one and may in 
fact be due to a third variable that is both causally related to unemployment and 
correlated with the minimum wage, but that until this is better understood, the 
relationship remains useful for forecasting if not policy analysis. Tulip also reports 
other countries’ experiences and explores other variables that may play the role 
of the third variable. He writes, “If some strong but plausible assumptions are
made . . . when wages at the bottom of the distribution are compressed, the NAIRU
usually increases. Furthermore, the wide variety of policies across countries sug-
gests that this correlation is not the result of one particular set of institutions or 
rules. . . . [T]he latter may reflect a causal effect of inequality on unemployment . . .
[and] the strong influence of governments in setting wages at the bottom of the 
distribution” (pp. 17–18). 
13. The relevant reservation wage here is not the standard one, the wage necessary 
to draw someone into the labor force and accept a job, but the lowest wage offer 
necessary to induce someone to switch jobs. 
14. Another study of minimum wage effects in countries other than the United States 
is Carmeci and Mauro (2002), which uses data for 19 Italian regions during the 
period 1965–1995. The causal chain linking the minimum wage to unemployment 
is quite long, in the course of which the minimum wage disappears from view. 
The minimum wage plays no explicit role in any versions of the equation that they 
estimate, and in the end, it is both difficult to ascertain the effect of the minimum 
wage and not at all clear that any effect attributed to the minimum wage is not 
actually due to other factors. 
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15. The $1.00 increase is a different percentage increase in the average minimum 
wage experienced by high school graduates and those without a high school 
degree because they are distributed differently across states and their different 
minimum wages. 
16. Low-skilled is defined by the occupational category of the last job held before 
becoming unemployed. Pedace and Rohn (2011) report the details needed to cal-
culate the elasticity only when the results are statistically significant across several 
specifications of the model: thus, the figures for men without a high school degree 
versus those for low-skilled women. 
17. Recall their interpretation that in low-wage states, the minimum wage results in 
so much wage compression that the wage alone does not convey useful informa-
tion about job quality to prospective workers, so there is no discernible effect on 
tenure. 
18. Samson (1994) reports the Durbin-Watson statistic, but the values she reports are 
typically agnostic about serial correlation. Of greater concern is that it is not an 
appropriate statistic to report; because of the lagged dependent variables in her 
equation, the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased away from detecting serial correla-
tion. If there is serial correlation in her residuals, the reported standard errors are 
inconsistent. 
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The Product Market 
How does the product market reflect increases in the minimum 
wage? In the short run, any adjustment must come through output and 
prices. If there are important differences in productivity across firms 
in markets that are affected by the minimum wage, then the degree of 
competition may change in the long run as less-productive firms shrink 
or leave the market and more productive ones expand. A number of 
analyses have examined the price response, a few have examined the 
effect on profitability, very few have studied the output response, and 
none have seriously explored any long-term effect on market structure. 
This chapter discusses studies of the effect on prices and then briefly 
discusses those that have examined the effects on output or profitability. 
PRICES 
Most analyses of the price response have examined only the res-
taurant industry, especially the fast food sector, and by and large they 
agree that minimum wage increases lead to higher prices at fast food 
establishments.1 They do this with a variety of analytic techniques, ap-
plied to a variety of data sets drawn from several different time periods 
in three countries, bolstering the robustness of this finding. There is 
some disagreement about the strength of the response, but none about 
its existence or direction. Table 10.1 lists seven studies of the price re-
sponse to the minimum wage. Those of Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan 
(2010); Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000); and MaCurdy and McIntyre 
(2001) are based on explicit economic models that relate increases in 
the minimum wage to price increases in either the restaurant industry or 
in the broader food sector. Rather than estimating these models directly, 
parameter values are set according to relevant estimates or measure-
ments that others have calculated elsewhere. The remaining analyses 
are purely statistical in nature, with no underlying economic model 
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Table 10.1 Prices 
Sample Analytic Unit of Data Type of 
Study Effect Target Country period approach observation structure standard error Data seta 
Positive Food away from United 1978–1995 Regression City-month Panel Robust BLS, Stat-Aaronson home sector States, Can, Chamber(2001) Canada of Commerce 
Dube, Naidu, Positive San Francisco United 2003–2004 Quasi Firm-year Panel Robust Private survey 
and Reich restaurants States experiment 
(2007) 
Fougère, Positive Restaurants France 1994–2003 Regression Meal-estab- Panel MLE FSI 
Gautier, and lishment-
Le Bihan month 
(2010) 
Lee, Schluter, Positive Food sector United 1992, 1997 I/O analysis Industry Cross sec- — Various 
and O’Roark States tion 
(2000) 
MacDonald and Positive Food away from United 1995–1997 Regression Item-estab- Panel Clustered (by BLS 
Aaronson home sector States lishment- est.) 
(2006) month 
MaCurdy and Positive Minimum wage United 1996 I/O analysis Industry Cross sec- — SIPP, CES 
McIntyre workers States tion 
(2001) 
Long- Minimum wage United 1996–2006 Regression Industry- Time Newey- Various Wadsworth term industries Kingdom month series West(1) (2010) Positive 
a BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics. FSI = French Statistical Institute. CES = Consumer Expenditure Survey. SIPP = Survey of Income and 
Program Participation. Various = CPS-ORG, Census of Manufactures, BEA I/O Tables for the United States. 
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guiding the attempt to relate the timing and size of price increases in the 
restaurant industry to the timing and size of minimum wage increases. 
Having suggested that monopsonistic competition (also called dy-
namic monopsony) in the labor market may explain the absence of a 
decline in employment following minimum wage increases, Card and 
Krueger (1994, 1995) look for evidence of a decline in prices, one of 
the implications of this hypothesis. In a labor market that is a dynamic 
monopsony, a sufficiently small increase in a sufficiently small mini-
mum wage will lead to more employment of low-wage labor, and this 
will in turn lead to more output. Then, whether or not the output mar-
ket is competitive, output prices must fall for the market to clear. Both 
Card and Krueger (1994), in their study of New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania, and Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007), in their study of the San 
Francisco Bay area, report a substantial rise in average prices in the 
area that experienced the minimum wage increase. Because this result 
is in both cases based on a simple two-by-two difference-in-differences 
analysis, its reliability is suspect for the reasons that Donald and Lang 
(2007) identify. However, each study also presents estimates based on 
a wage-gap measure of the minimum wage increase, a framework not 
suspect in this way. In both, the size of the price increase in the treated 
area does not vary with the wage gap. If not evidence against the pres-
ence of dynamic monopsony in the labor market, it is at a minimum not 
evidence in its favor. While Card and Kreuger draw no inferences from 
these results about the structure of the labor market, they do conclude 
that the higher wage bill came out of consumers’ pockets (and not from 
reductions in firm profits). 
In a series of studies, both alone and with others, Daniel Aaron-
son has examined the effect of minimum wage increases on restaurant 
prices in Canada and the United States, and the implications of these 
responses for labor market structure.2 In the earliest study, Aaronson 
(2001) constructs monthly inflation rates from 1978–1995 using BLS 
data from 88 U.S. cities to compare changes in the “food away from 
home” component to changes in the minimum wage, considering both 
the timing and the size of the changes. He performs a similar analysis 
for “food at restaurants” in 10 Canadian provinces. In both countries, in 
the seven-month period centered on the month that a minimum wage in-
crease occurs, the minimum wage elasticity of restaurant prices is about 
0.07. One interesting difference is that in the United States, the bulk 
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of the price rise takes place in the three-month period centered on the 
increase, especially the month before and the month of the increase. In 
Canada, the price rise appears to begin only a month after the increase, 
and the largest part of it occurs three months afterward. 
Another data set allowsAaronson (2001) to look specifically at three 
fast food chains in the United States—McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, and Pizza Hut—and the results are less clear cut. Analyzing 
the data in several different ways, he consistently finds a response in 
the price of McDonald’s hamburgers that is at least as large, and per-
haps twice as large, as that of the restaurant prices already mentioned. 
The response of Kentucky Fried Chicken prices varies from none to as 
large as the largest McDonald’s hamburger price response, while the 
response of Pizza Hut prices varies from none to barely a third of that 
reported above for the restaurant sector. 
MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) use the same BLS data for 1995– 
1997 before it has been aggregated to the level of the city to explore 
the behavior of price changes in individual establishments, both full-
service and limited-service restaurants, and how changes in the mini-
mum wage affect this. Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) perform 
a similar analysis using French data for 1994–2003. In both surveys, 
the prices refer to combinations of items called meals (breakfast, lunch, 
or dinner) rather than to individual items. In both countries, minimum 
wage labor is an important component of employment (40 percent of 
restaurant workers in France), and inflation was low during the periods 
covered. The U.S. data set covers a period in which there were two 
increases in the national minimum wage, three states each raised their 
own minimum wages to levels above the new national minimums at 
the same time as these increases, and six states raised their minimum 
wages a total of 12 times in other months. During the eight and a half 
years that the French data cover, the national minimum wage changed 
in May 1998 and each July, 9 times in all. Complicating the analysis is 
the changeover of French currency from the franc to the euro in January 
2002, a moment at which it was easier than usual to slip price changes 
through unnoticed. 
Both studies document that prices of individual items in restaurants 
are fairly constant. In the United States, limited-service restaurants 
(predominantly fast food restaurants) raised prices on about 5.5 per-
cent of items on average in months when they experienced no increase 
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in the minimum wage, and 11 percent in months when they did. For 
full-service restaurants in France, prices on about 5 percent of items 
increase each January and September, when they reopen after the holi-
days, compared to about 3 percent in each of the other months. In fast 
food restaurants, about 10 percent of prices rise, on average, in each of 
the months of January, February, and July, versus less than 7 percent in 
each of the other months. As July is also the month of the annual mini-
mum wage increase, the large July increase may be related to the rise 
in the minimum wage. The month of minimum wage increases, July, 
exhibits an unusually high proportion of price increases, but so do two 
months as far from July as possible, January and February. Fougère, 
Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) attribute a larger role to seasonality than 
to the minimum wage in explaining price increases in French restau-
rants. In the United States, the corresponding numbers for full-service 
restaurants are 5.6 percent in months of minimum wage increases (ver-
sus 10 percent in France) and 5.4 percent in other months (versus 7–10 
percent in France). Presenting data for France, and reporting others’
findings for the United States, they show that in other sectors of the 
economy, larger fractions of prices change each month. 
The geographic variation in the U.S. data and the variation in both 
wage distributions and the level and timing of changes in the minimum 
wage enable MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) to gain purchase on the 
data from a number of purely statistical angles. First, controlling for 
whether the item is typically associated with breakfast, lunch, or din-
ner; for price changes in other inputs; and for recent price increases 
and decreases, they report an elasticity of restaurant prices with respect 
to the minimum wage of about 0.07 in the three two-month periods 
centered on minimum wage increases.3 That is, a 10 percent increase in 
the minimum wage quickly leads to a (roughly) 0.7 percent increase in 
restaurant prices. When they break out limited-service restaurants sepa-
rately, the elasticity is more than twice as large (0.16); for full-service 
restaurants, the elasticity drops by about half. Explicitly exploiting the 
variation that comes with the geographic reach of the United States, 
MacDonald and Aaronson interact the minimum wage with terms that 
locate it relative to the 20th percentile of the local wage distribution. 
In areas where low-wage workers earn relatively high wages, changes 
in the minimum wage should have little effect on wages or costs, and 
therefore, one expects, on prices. That is indeed what they find. 
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Do restaurants respond to minimum wage increases with larger in-
dividual price increases or increases in the prices of more items? To 
examine this, MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) rely on the reasoning 
underlying conventional models of price adjustment: that it is costly 
to the firm not only to change prices but also for prices not to be at the
value that equates supply and demand. The cost of having the wrong 
price depends on its distance from the optimum price. The cost of 
changing prices, known as an adjustment cost, is attributed to the costs 
of gathering and evaluating information needed to determine the ap-
propriate price and of changing signs, labels, database values, and 
advertising. The amount of adjustment costs that the firm incurs de-
pends on the frequency of price changes.4 To reflect recent incidence 
of adjustment costs, they constructed a dummy variable, review, which 
was set to one if an establishment had changed any price in the previous 
period. According to the underlying reasoning, having recently incurred 
the costs of price adjustment, a restaurant would be less likely to do so 
again even if the minimum wage had subsequently risen. MacDonald 
and Aaronson (2006) report exactly this outcome. Of particular interest 
is the estimate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage roughly 
doubles the probability that an individual item in a fast food restaurant 
will experience a price increase in the same month. 
The French data set had less variation in the timing of minimum 
wage increases and in the variables that would be expected to vary 
across large geographic expanses. Consequently, Fougère, Gautier, and 
Le Bihan (2010) find a more formal approach necessary, modifying and 
estimating a conventional model of price adjustment that combines the 
two different parts of the decision that MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) 
examine separately: the decision to change a price, and the calculation 
of the appropriate value of the new price. According to their estimate, 
those prices that change in response to the minimum wage exhibit a 
minimum wage elasticity of between 0.08 and 0.11, with those in fast 
food restaurants nearer the upper end, and those in full-service restau-
rants nearer the lower end. Robustness tests of their model are generally 
reassuring, although they note that it appears to produce mild overes-
timates of both the frequency of price changes and the size of both 
increases and decreases. Both studies find that restaurants do not raise 
all prices in response to minimum wage increases, but rather groups of 
prices, leaving others unchanged. 
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Using their estimates to examine how long it takes for the mouse of 
minimum wage increases to work its way through the python of French 
restaurant prices, Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) report a much 
longer period than Aaronson (2001). Recall his result that nearly all the 
response of fast food restaurants in both the United States and Canada 
occurs in a three-month period, which is centered on the increase in the 
United States, and which follows the increase in Canada. For French 
fast food establishments, only half of the adjustment occurs within the 
six months following the increase, and after another year, roughly 10 
percent of the adjustment remains. The process is nearly twice as long 
for full-service restaurants in France. 
Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) also rely on a formal model, 
though not one of price formation and change, to study the impact of 
two of the increases of the federal minimum wage in the 1990s.5 They 
use a specific model of production that has clear implications for price 
formation, an input-output model of the food sector. The model begins 
with data on the distribution of each sector’s production costs that are 
payments to producers in other sectors of the economy and to employ-
ees. It combines these data with two important assumptions. The first 
is that the technology implicit in this distribution is optimal in the short 
run so that even if relative input costs change, firms will not quickly re-
organize production. The second is that residual income (profit, interest 
payments, and depreciation allowances) does not change; prices adjust 
fully to reflect any change in costs. As they admit, these are very strong 
assumptions and imply that their estimates of the price response are 
an upper bound.6 Finally, they consider several different assumptions 
about the effect of minimum wage increases on wages that were higher 
ex ante than the new value of the minimum wage (known as spillover 
effects). 
Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) report that had the 1992 mini-
mum wage increased in that year by 12 percent, from $4.25 to $4.75 
(something that did not happen until 1996), restaurant prices would 
have increased by between 1.0 percent and 1.4 percent.7 The implied 
price elasticities with respect to the minimum wage are between 0.08 
and 0.12. A $0.50 increase in 1997, from $5.15 to $5.65 (10 percent), 
would have led to restaurant price increases of between 1.0 and 1.2 
percent, or price elasticities between 0.09 and 0.13. While greater than 
both the 0.07 of MacDonald and Aaronson for restaurants (both full-
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service and limited-service) and the 0.08–0.11 of Fougère, Gautier, 
and Le Bihan (2010), this is not surprising in light of their recognition 
that their numbers are an upper bound. In addition, Lee, Schluter, and 
O’Roark report elasticities for different food manufacturing industries 
that range between 0.01 and 0.03 in 1992, and 0.01 and 0.03 in 1997. 
MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001), as part of a more ambitious analy-
sis to determine which households gain and which lose from minimum 
wage increases, also perform an input-output analysis to measure price 
responses to a minimum wage increase. After allowing for their having 
considered a substantially larger minimum wage increase, their analysis 
differs from that of Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) in two important 
ways: MaCurdy and McIntyre incorporate employer payroll taxes while 
neglecting spillover effects. These modeling choices lead to offsetting 
results, with the former choice resulting in larger price increases than 
otherwise, and the latter in smaller price increases. For the restaurant 
sector as a whole, they report a price elasticity with respect to the mini-
mum wage of slightly less than 0.12, at the high end of those that Lee, 
Schluter, and O’Roark estimate when they allow for the greatest spill-
over effects. 
The United Kingdom’s National Minimum Wage (NMW) was 
introduced with the expectation that it would lead to higher prices, ac-
cording to Grimshaw and Carroll (2006). It was thought that affected 
firms would either become more efficient (by some combination of re-
organizing operations or improving employees’ skills) or move into a 
niche in which they could compete on quality or characteristics other 
than price. The price response was instead quite tepid, and Grimshaw 
and Carroll explore this experience in interviews with owners and man-
agers of 36 small British firms in six low-wage industries.8 The one 
manufacturing industry faced international competition that prevented 
pass-through of the increase. In three of the service industries (clean-
ing, care home, and security), firms dealt with a dominant customer that 
refused to pay the higher prices. In the security industry, there was both 
widespread violation of the new law and reductions in service (fewer 
guards in place) without any reduction in what was charged—possible, 
it seems, because the customers were unaware of the practice. In the 
care home industry, there may also have been some attempt to cut ser-
vice quality, but this was constrained by government regulations (recall 
Note 1). 
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Wadsworth (2010) is an extensive exploratory analysis of the rela-
tion between the NMW and prices in the United Kingdom. Using a 
variety of data from several sources, he examines the effect of the mini-
mum wage on prices in both the short run and the long run. He begins 
with wage data from two sources to determine which industries have a 
large number of minimum wage employees. His next step is to exam-
ine (publicly available) accounts of firms in these industries to identify 
those in which wages of minimum wage workers are a large share of 
value added. Having identified 10 “minimum wage” industries, most 
of which are consumer services including such familiar ones as hotels, 
restaurants, pubs, and take-out food, Wadsworth turns to monthly re-
tail price data for the corresponding products. His empirical analysis of 
prices uses these either as is or aggregated up to each industry. 
The analysis itself is fairly simple. Recognizing that the connection 
between changes in costs and changes in prices is not straightfor-
ward—Milton Friedman’s comment about the long and variable lags 
relating monetary policy to its effect on the economy comes to mind— 
Wadsworth (2010) avoids elaborately specified regression equations. 
To examine the short-run association between price changes and 
changes in the NMW, he asks, “Is there an association between price 
increases and the NMW, its implementation, and subsequent increases 
in the months immediately before or after these changes in the NMW?” 
To address this, he regresses the monthly inflation rate for each in-
dustry on a constant and a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
NMW increased that month, as well as two leads and two lags of the 
dummy. The results are underwhelming: 6 out of 41 coefficients on 
minimum wage dummies are statistically significant. A variety of ad-
ditional analyses, including combining the individual time series into a 
panel, also generate no statistically significant estimates. One exception 
is when he considers inflation rates for individual goods and services 
rather than the more aggregated ones for each industry: there is then 
evidence of a weak association starting in the month of the increase 
and continuing for (at least) the next two months. However, the same 
exercise performed on non–minimum wage industries and their goods 
also generates a statistically significant result either one month before 
the increase (using industry-level data) or two months before and two 
months after (using item-level data). To this point, there is no strong 
evidence that the NMW leads to higher prices, at least in the short term. 
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To examine longer-term effects, Wadsworth (2010) asks, “Has the 
inflation rate in affected industries been greater since the beginning of 
the NMW than it would otherwise have been?” His answer involves 
estimating a difference-in-differences equation where the dummies in-
dicate whether the observation is for an item from a minimum wage 
industry, and whether the observation was before or during the period 
in which the NMW was in effect. The coefficient of interest has an es-
timated t-statistic of three, suggesting that over the long run, the NMW
is associated with a statistically significant increase of 0.7 percent in 
the annual inflation rate of minimum wage industries.9 He concludes, 
“The extent of any observed relative price increases in minimum-wage 
sectors does not appear to rise in line with the share of minimum-wage 
workers in total costs, suggesting that a simple pass-through model of 
price changes may not hold. . . . [In addition], any effects on prices ap-
pear to accumulate gradually over time” (pp. 111–112). 
OUTPUT 
Little research on the minimum wage considers the response of out-
put from affected firms. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) turn to 
it briefly near the end of their study of the effects of the introduction of 
the national minimum wage in 1999 on Britain’s home care industry. 
They report a positive response that is not statistically significant once 
control variables are included in the analysis. In combination with their 
finding of “some evidence of employment and hours reductions occur-
ring in homes after minimum wage introduction,” this suggests that the 
minimum wage led to less output than would have otherwise been the 
case (p. 178). 
PROFITABILITY 
If firms act as profit maximizers, and if the only immediate effect 
of the minimum wage increase is higher costs, then profits must fall. 
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By assumption, firms have no new possibilities available to them.10 
Several responses are possible, all of which were available before the 
increase in the minimum wage. If the labor market is competitive, then 
one response is for firms to reduce employment and output. If the la-
bor market is monopsonistic, they may raise employment and output. 
If they have market power in the product market and are unregulated, 
then the qualitative effect is likely to resemble that of competitive labor 
and product markets, with both higher prices and lower employment 
and output. Firms may substitute capital for labor. Finally, firms may 
not respond in any way other than to raise wages where necessary. The 
higher minimum wage does not create any of these possibilities but 
only changes conditions so that certain choices become relatively more 
attractive in comparison with what they had been doing. It follows that 
since firms could have done any of these before but are only choosing 
to do them following the minimum wage increase, and since costs are 
higher, lower profits must result. If profits do not fall, something else 
must be going on (see Note 10). 
Do profits in fact fall? Table 10.2 lists seven studies that examine 
the effect of the minimum wage on profitability or outcomes related that 
reflect profitability. Card and Krueger (1995) devote a chapter to this 
question, reporting the results of several event studies. The premise of a 
typical event study is that a firm’s share price reflects the best estimate 
of its future profits in light of all relevant information that is currently 
available. An event study is a comparison of changes in the share price 
relative to the value of the whole market as new information that is 
especially pertinent to the firm or firms in question becomes available. 
Card and Krueger identify two sets of publicly traded companies for 
examination, those in industries with a large number of minimum wage 
employees, and those whose annual reports include mention of the fed-
eral minimum wage hikes of the early 1990s as a source of increased 
labor costs. The information events they study are headlines in the Wall 
Street Journal over a two-and-a-half-year period preceding final con-
gressional approval of the increases, and the timing of events about a 
memo leaked during the early Clinton administration concerning plans 
to push for minimum wage increase (resulting eventually in the increases
in the later 1990s). 
For both sets of firms, the first set of events provides no consistent 
support for the hypothesis that the minimum wage is bad for profits. 
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Table 10.2 Profitability and Failure Rates 
Type of 
Central Sample Analytic Unit of Data standard 
Study variable Effect Target Country period approach observation structure error Data seta 
Card and Krueger Profits Mixed Firms sensitive United 1987–89, Event study Daily-firm Panel OLS CRSP 
(1995) to the mini- States 1992–93 (stock return) 
mum wage 
Draca, Machin, Profits Negative Low-wage United 1998–2002 Quasi Firm-year Panel OLS FAME, 
and Van Reenen firms Kingdom experiment LFS, 
(2011) WERS 
Machin and Wilson Exits None Home care United 1998–1999 Regression Firm-survey Two-period OLS Private 
(2004) Kingdom response panel survey 
Mason, Carter, and Profits Small Small and United 2003 Descriptive Enterprise Cross — Private 
Tagg (2006) decline midsized Kingdom section survey 
enterprises 
Orazem and Mattila Failures Positive Firms in retail United 1989–1992 Regression County- Aggregate OLS UI records, 
(2002) or service, not States industry-qtr. panel private 
professional (Iowa) survey 
Pacheco and Naiker Profits Mixed/ Firms in indus- New 2000–2001 Event study Daily-firm Panel OLS HLFS, IS, 
(2006) none tries with many Zealand (stock return) IRG 
minimum wage 
employees 
Waltman, McBride, Failures Negative Aggregate United 1948–1983 Regression Annual Time series OLS Dun and 
and Camhout failure rate of States aggregates Bradstreet 
(1998) firms 
a CRSP = Center for Research in Security Prices (US). FAME = Financial Analysis Made Easy (UK). HLFS = Household Labour Force 
Survey (New Zealand). IRG = Investment Research Group (Share Prices in New Zealand). IS = Income Survey (New Zealand).
WERS = Workplace Employment Relations Survey (UK). 
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Results for the second set of events are different, especially for those 
firms that had previously referred explicitly to the importance of the 
minimum wage for their operations. Card and Krueger (1995) conclude 
that their results are ambiguous and that further work is necessary; on 
the basis of their analysis, one could make a case that the minimum 
wage has a noticeable effect on profits of firms that one would expect to 
be sensitive to it, but one could make the opposite case with equal ease. 
Pacheco and Naiker (2006) perform an event study similar to Card 
and Krueger’s (1995), using data from New Zealand, where a substan-
tial reform and increase of the minimum wage for teenagers occurred, 
starting in early 2001.11 Using detailed income data to determine which 
industries are sensitive to the minimum wage, they find four that to-
gether employ more than half of minimum wage workers and in which 
the share of minimum wage workers substantially exceeds the indus-
try’s share of the total workforce. Pacheco and Naiker next identify 32 
firms that are largely specialized in 1 of these 4 industries, and 10 events 
that were both related to the revision of the minimum wage between 
late 1999 and late 2000, and are discussed in published news sources. 
They judge the results of their event analysis to be ambiguous, with 
profitability responding to some events as expected but not responding 
to many others. While expressing concern that the result may be due to 
extensive noncompliance (between 2 and 3 percent of the employees in 
the data earned less than the relevant minimum wage), they conclude 
that “the number of tests and robustness checks performed in this study 
all point to the same conclusion, implying that some weight should be 
given to the argument that investors simply find changes in minimum 
wage value irrelevant” (p. 488). 
Mason, Carter, and Tagg (2006) conduct a nationwide survey of 
small business firms in the United Kingdom to examine the response 
to the 2003 increase in the NMW and how it varies geographically. 
The difference between high- and low-wage regions is evident in the 
effect of the NMW increase. Fifteen percent of firms in high-wage ar-
eas (southeastern England and the London metropolitan region) had to 
raise wages while 25 percent did in low-wage, peripheral areas (Scot-
land, Wales, Northern Ireland, and both the northeast and northwest of 
England). The proportion of employees who received wage increases 
ranged from 6 percent in the high-wage regions, to 13–14 percent in 
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most of the low-wage regions, and to nearly 18 percent of those in 
Wales. 
Mason, Carter, and Tagg’s (2006) use of a five-point Likert scale 
makes interpretation and comparison with other analyses difficult. On 
the one hand, they report that “London and the South East contained the 
smallest proportion of businesses that anticipated a decline in profitabil-
ity, at just 15 percent. In contrast, around one-quarter of businesses in 
the North East, Northern Ireland, Wales, Yorkshire and the Humber, and 
the North West anticipated a decrease in their profitability as a result of 
the national minimum wage uprate” (p. 109). These percentages match 
those for the proportions of firms that had to raise wages in response 
to the increase. On the other hand, only 20 percent of firms that had to 
increase wages for any employee expected this to decrease profitability, 
and, on the 5-point scale, the mean response for overall profitability 
was 2.84 (where 3 means no change and 2 means a slight decrease), so 
the effect on profits appears to be very slight even for firms that had to 
increase wages. It thus appears that profits declined or were expected to 
do so, but not by much. Because of their presentation (which is not al-
together clear) and the low survey response rate (which raises questions 
of selection bias), the accuracy of this finding is not certain. 
If firms’ profits decline following a minimum wage increase, one 
likely consequence is an increase in firm failure rates. Waltman, Mc-
Bride, and Camhout (1998) run a simple regression to examine failure 
rates for the whole economy, comparing years without minimum wage 
increases to those with them, and do not find a larger rate in the former 
years. They repeat this for years following those with minimum wage 
increases relative to other years and produce a similar result.12 
Orazem and Mattila (2002) study low-wage retail and nonprofes-
sional service firms in Iowa from the middle of 1989 through 1994. 
Combining quarterly data collected by the unemployment insurance 
program with tax and other economic data allows them to examine the 
effect of the minimum wage on firms and workers at the county level. 
They report statistically significant, negative responses in the number 
of firms. The minimum wage elasticity of the number of firms is −0.17 
within one quarter and −0.25 over four quarters. Peculiarly, there is 
little difference between the covered and uncovered sectors; that is, the 
movements are almost identical for firms that must pay the minimum 
wage and those for which it does not apply. Either all firms feel obliged 
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to pay employees the minimum wage, whether or not legally required to 
do so, or their minimum wage variable is picking up other phenomena 
for which Orazem and Mattila have not adequately accounted. 
In their study of the British care home industry and its response 
to the introduction and first increase of the NMW, Machin and Wilson 
(2004) examine exit of firms from the industry. While the overall rate 
of exit is high, they are not able to find any indication that it varies 
with either firms’ sensitivity or exposure to the minimum wage.13 This 
suggests that the NMW did not have a material effect on profits; oth-
erwise, homes with greater exposure or sensitivity would presumably 
have experienced a greater decline in profits and would be closing down 
at greater rates. 
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) examine two samples of 
firms. With one, they perform a much more ambitious analysis of the 
minimum wage and firm profitability than those previously presented, 
a quasi experiment in which the firms in the treatment and comparison 
groups differ according to their average wages. In the United King-
dom, even privately held corporations must report considerably more 
accounting information than U.S. firms, including employment and the 
total wage bill. This gives Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen a broad sam-
ple of firms, including many smaller ones likely to be more sensitive to 
the NMW than larger, publicly traded firms. The average wage bill in 
their treatment groups suggests an average wage about 9 percent higher 
than the NMW at the time it was first introduced. After determining that 
wages in the treatment group rose relative to those in the comparison 
group, they report that profits fell in the treatment group, and by an 
amount that suggests that affected firms made no adjustments other than 
to raise wages as needed to satisfy the law. Because a given value of 
the average wage is consistent with many different wage distributions, 
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen are not entirely comfortable with their 
definitions of the treatment and comparison groups, and they poke and 
prod their specification in a variety of ways to test the robustness of 
their findings. Their results hold up. 
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) also conduct a regression 
analysis on the sample of residential care homes that Machin and Wilson 
(2004) and others have used to study the NMW; the sample of firms is 
much narrower than their prior work, but this is balanced by the greater 
detail, and so more careful measurement of each firm’s response to the 
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NMW. They are able to infer total costs, and from that—defining profits 
as the difference between revenue and total costs—the rate of profit (as 
a percentage of revenue). Relating this to the value of a firm’s wage 
gap—the percentage that the wage bill must rise if low-wage employees 
are to make no less than the minimum wage—Draca, Machin, and Van 
Reenen report an elasticity of the profit margin of −1.5. A firm with a 10 
percent wage gap faces a 15 percent decline in its profit margin (about 5 
percentage points on average). However, they confirm the conclusions 
of Machin and Wilson that the data on firm closings do not reflect this. 
For both samples, Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) consider 
exits and find no effect of the NMW on this measure. What they can-
not examine with these sources is any effect on births of new firms. A 
different data set based on registration for the value-added tax allows 
them to study the rates of entry into and exit from low-wage industries, 
and whether this changed in response to the NMW relative to other in-
dustries. They find a small and statistically insignificant relative decline 
of the rate of firms’ entry into low-wage sectors. Rather than study exit 
alone, they combine entry and exit and report a statistically insignificant 
(or imprecisely measured) decline in growth rates of low-wage sectors 
of five percentage points. One response to this estimate is to extrapolate 
to the long run and infer that after a period of 25–30 years, the NMW
will lead to roughly half as many firms in low-wage sectors as would 
otherwise have been the result.14 The long horizon, especially in combi-
nation with the large standard errors, suggests that other factors would 
likely swamp this effect. In summary, there is good evidence that the 
minimum wage reduces profits, certainly in the United Kingdom, but it 
does not show up where one would expect, in changes in exit rates or 
firms’ share prices. Results of Orazem and Mattila (2002) suggest that 
the situation may be different in the United States, but the similarity of 
their results for firms in the covered and uncovered sectors suggests that 
they have not adequately controlled for other factors affecting the rates 
of firms’ exit and profits. 
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Notes 
1. A handful of articles look at the care home industry in the United Kingdom and 
find no price response. This is not surprising in light of the heavy price regulation 
of that sector, which makes any further reference here to this work superfluous. 
2. Although Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) have an additional analysis 
of the same BLS data, it is, empirically, largely a reprise of Aaronson (2001) and 
MacDonald and Aaronson (2006), its focus being more on the implications for 
labor market structure of the minimum wage response of prices. For these reasons, 
we do not discuss it here. 
3. Restaurants were each surveyed monthly or bimonthly, thus the use of two-month 
periods. 
4. For big-ticket items especially, frequent price changes may be costly as well to 
customers, who may respond by more frequent information gathering, which may 
in turn lead them to switch to a new supplier. 
5. These are the second increase, in 1992, and the fourth and last increase, in 1997. 
6. If the assumption that inputs cannot be quickly readjusted is correct, but the as-
sumption that cost increases fully pass through to prices in the short run is not, it 
is likely that profits will suffer. 
7. The range results from different assumptions about the extent of spillover effects 
on the wages of those higher up the wage distribution. 
8. The industries are clothing and footwear manufacturing, industrial cleaning ser-
vices, hospitality, residential care, retail, and security. 
9. While Wadsworth (2010) presents results overall and separately for each mini-
mum wage industry, this discussion is limited to the overall results. 
10. This rules out, for example, shock effects and effects on labor supply. Shock ef-
fects, the sudden rise in costs due to the minimum wage increase, lead firms to 
search more carefully for efficiencies in production, which in turn reduces the cost 
of hiring qualified employees. 
11. For details, see the discussion of Hyslop and Stillman (2007) in Chapter 2. 
12. Taylor and Arnold (1999) identify a serious data mistake but agree that it does not 
change the results that Waltman, McBride, and Camhout (1998) report. 
13. Exposure is measured by the percentage of employees initially paid less than the 
NMW. Sensitivity is measured by the wage gap, the fraction of the ex ante wage 
bill needed to bring those who had been paid less than the NMW up to that level. 
14. From the discussion, it is not exactly clear what period the entry and exit rates refer 
to, but it appears to be not a single year but rather the entire period following the 
treatment, about two and a half years. 
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Conclusion 
What have we learned from this exhaustive (and to us, exhausting) 
review of the minimum wage literature? It is only fair to the possibly 
equally exhausted reader that we briefly summarize our findings and 
provide some, but not too many, comments about the implications for 
the minimum wage as a tool of policy and about how economists go 
about studying controversial topics. 
Evidence leads us to conclude that moderate increases in the mini-
mum wage are a useful means of raising wages in the lower part of the 
wage distribution that has little or no effect on employment and hours. 
This is what one seeks in a policy tool, solid benefits with small costs. 
That said, current research does not speak to whether the same results 
would hold for large increases in the minimum wage. Our suspicion 
is that large increases could touch off the disemployment effects that 
are largely absent for moderate increases, but evidence for the United 
States is lacking because there have not been large increases in the last 
generation. Similarly, increases in the minimum wage are not the only 
policy needed to address issues of low income in the United States. As 
many others have argued, programs such as the EITC and Food Stamps 
play a critical role in placing a floor under incomes and consumption, 
and higher minimum wages are not a substitute for such programs. In 
other words, the minimum wage is a useful tool for policy and, as with 
most policy tools, must be used wisely and in coordination with other 
policies to achieve the desired end. 
A SUMMARY OF OUR FINDINGS 
Employment 
Employment, long square one for disputes about the minimum 
wage and its effects, has been more intensively studied than any other 
variable in the minimum wage, both in the NMWR and before. Un-
401 
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fortunately, much work exhibits one or the other of two statistical 
problems (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Donald and Lang 
2007) that make judging the reliability of the analyses impossible. Of 
the work that has avoided or satisfactorily resolved these issues, little 
has been able to detect a substantively significant response of employ-
ment, measured as the number of jobs, the number of people working, 
or the number of hours. Although this does not close the issue, the pre-
ponderance of the evidence currently leans that way. This is borne out 
by our own meta-analysis.1 Once a correction for publication bias is 
incorporated, overall elasticities for the United States are both statis-
tically insignificant and very close to zero, even when restricting the 
focus to teenagers and young adults. The corresponding elasticities for 
eating and drinking establishments in the United States appear to be 
somewhat larger, with precision weighted means near −0.05, but still 
not statistically significant. 
How long does it take for employment responses to increases in 
the minimum wage to play out? Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999) 
is one of the most ingenious and frequently cited analyses by someone 
other than a participant in the original conference. Providing an inter-
pretation of earlier work, it suggested that the period in question is at 
least five to six years. Coming, however, before Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004) and the increased recognition of the relevance of 
the Moulton (1990) problem to panel data research on the minimum 
wage, the robustness of their interpretation is not clear. Following the 
logic of the rational expectations hypothesis, Pinoli (2010) argues that 
much of the response to an anticipated increase occurs before the in-
crease itself. From the little work that is relevant, this does not appear to 
be the case, at least in the United States. Furthermore, analyses that di-
rectly examine the timing indicate that the employment response takes 
no more than three years to complete (Belman and Wolfson 2010). 
However, considerably more work, using data from a variety of situa-
tions and countries, is necessary before drawing any conclusions with 
confidence. 
Gross Flows 
If employment is not affected, what is? For one, there is some evi-
dence of declines in both accessions (hiring) and separations (quits and 
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layoffs). This suggests that jobs do become harder to find following 
increases in the minimum wage, and that previously employed workers 
are sufficiently productive, at least afterward, that employers are not 
inclined to fire them. Explanations for this include a different allocation 
after the increase of the surplus that the employee creates in this job, a 
reorganization of the work process following the increase (known as the 
shock effect), and efficiency wage theory, where the higher minimum 
wage induces greater productive effort from the worker. 
The study of the effect of the minimum wage on quits (voluntary 
separations) is a theoretically and methodologically distinct area of 
research on gross flows. Although Wessels (1980) reports evidence 
consistent with his hypothesis that quit rates are temporarily higher fol-
lowing minimum wage increases, the research is old, the result is at 
odds with more recent work on separations, and new research is needed 
to establish that Wessels’s findings remain relevant. 
Unemployment 
A few analyses examine the response of the unemployment rate to 
increases in the minimum wage. The only one that makes no recourse 
to economic models detects no effect on the unemployment rate of teen-
agers. Those that begin with well-articulated models report a moderate 
increase in the unemployment rate. This disagreement raises questions 
about the extent to which the results are baked in, that is, whether the 
theoretical models determine the result. One of those that indicates an 
increase in the unemployment rate attributes it to increases in the la-
bor force participation rate—in other words, increases in the minimum 
wage induce those without jobs to begin looking for them. 
Even if the unemployment rate does not move up and down with the 
minimum wage, the decline in hiring suggests that it may be harder for 
those previously unemployed to find work following increases, some-
thing that should be reflected in the length of unemployment spells. The 
one study that examines this reports a decline in unemployment dura-
tion for male high school graduates and increases in duration for several 
groups: men without a high school diploma, women with a high school 
diploma, low-skilled women, and women older than 24. The one de-
crease in unemployment duration is slightly more than a month, while 
the increases range between three and a half months and five months. 
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Wages and Benefits 
What effect does the minimum wage have on wages and their dis-
tribution? It is evident that average wages rise along with increases in 
the minimum wage. Most studies that look specifically at workers who 
were previously earning less than the new higher minimum wage report 
higher wages after the fact. It is quite clear that wages of the lowest paid 
10 percent of workers are higher following a minimum wage increase, 
and for women it appears that this is true for the lowest 30 percent. 
The extent of spillovers varies by country; research on spillovers in the 
United Kingdom suggests it reaches considerably higher up the wage 
distribution, and particularly the male wage distribution, than is the 
case for the United States. Current research also finds that while many 
incumbents quickly move out of minimum wage jobs after entering the 
labor market, a substantial fraction of U.S. workers spend much of their 
first decade at the minimum wage or at wage levels that are affected by 
the minimum wage. Finally, studies that look at the entire wage distri-
bution report that the minimum wage does indeed raise wages at the 
bottom and reduce wage inequality. 
It has long been suggested that employers may respond to mini-
mum wage increases by reducing spending on training, fringe benefits, 
and working conditions valued by employees. Results for health insur-
ance are mixed, as are those for training, though some of the evidence 
for a decline in training after increases in the minimum wage seems to 
be due to those in low-wage jobs receiving little training irrespective of 
minimum wage policy. 
Enrollment 
As with many types of policy, the minimum wage may have un-
intended consequences. One of the most serious that has received 
attention is that it may induce teenagers to leave school, interrupting or 
prematurely ending their formal education. An issue with this literature 
is how little discussion there is between those approaching the topic 
from economics and those coming from education policy. Another is 
statistical problems that likely overstate the precision of the estimates. 
These problems and the disagreement among results suggest that a de-
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finitive answer awaits further work, although a reasonable foundation 
exists on which to build it. 
The Product Market 
Broadly speaking, economists use two competing classes of models 
to understand the minimum wage and its effects in the labor market, 
competitive models and a variety of models referred to as monopsonis-
tic models, the most important of which involves firms’ searching for 
workers and workers’ searching for jobs. Competitive and monop-
sonistic models have different implications for the response of both 
employment and product prices. Competitive models imply lower 
employment and higher output prices in response to a minimum wage 
increase. Monopsonistic models allow for the possibility of higher em-
ployment, which in turn implies lower prices in affected industries. It 
is quite clear that restaurant prices rise by a small amount following 
minimum wage increases. In industries that are both sensitive to the 
minimum wage and face foreign competition, the price response ap-
pears to be weaker. In the United Kingdom, there is some evidence that 
increases in the minimum wage reduce profits at affected firms, but it is 
difficult to detect this in exit rates, that is, in firms going out of business, 
suggesting that the response is small. Analyses of the value that finan-
cial markets in the United States and New Zealand place on firms that 
are affected by the minimum wage indicate no pass-through to profits. 
Perhaps the price response, while weak, protects profits enough to make 
it worthwhile to remain in business. 
WHAT WE KNOW WITH CONFIDENCE 
What then can we be reasonably certain of with respect to the 
minimum wage? As the minimum wage increases considered in this re-
search have been moderate, the conclusions that we draw are premised 
on moderate increases. 
Under such conditions, there is little evidence of negative labor 
market effects. Hours and employment do not seem to be meaningfully 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
406 Belman and Wolfson 
affected. Accessions and separations may slow after minimum wage 
increases. Decisive evidence that training or benefits responds at all to 
increases in the minimum wage does not exist. 
The evidence on schooling is suggestive but not sufficient to draw 
conclusions for policy making. This reflects both limitations of the cur-
rently available studies and the variety of outcomes across studies. If 
any conclusion can be drawn from extant studies, it is that any negative 
effects of the minimum wage on school enrollment is associated with 
allowing students to leave school in the first two years of high school. 
Mandatory attendance laws that only allow students to leave in their 
junior or senior year of high school appear to eliminate any negative 
effect on school attendance. 
There is strong evidence that the minimum wage boosts the earn-
ings of the lowest-wage workers, and it may boost the earnings of those 
earning moderately higher hourly wages. In almost every wage study, 
the effect is more marked for women, who are more likely than men to 
be in low-wage positions. 
Considered together, increases in the minimum wage raise the 
hourly wage and earnings of workers in the lower part of the wage dis-
tribution and have very modest or no effects on employment, hours, and 
other labor market outcomes. The minimum wage can then, as original-
ly intended, be used to improve the conditions of those working in the 
least remunerative sectors of the labor market. While not a full solution 
to the issues of low-wage work, it is a useful instrument of policy that 
has low social costs and clear benefits. 
BIG IDEAS 
Given the certain predictions of core economic theory, how is it 
possible that the minimum wage raises wages without the anticipated 
negative effect on employment and employment-related measures? We 
are reluctant to spend much time and ink on this, as the ground has been 
covered repeatedly over the last two decades. Earlier we alluded to the 
two most widely discussed models of the low-wage labor market, the 
competitive model and monopsonistic/search models. 
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Another possibility, which Kaufman (2007) has ably synthesized, 
is that in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty about the 
future, firms do not respond to wage changes mechanistically. In this 
view, an employment relationship is not the exchange transaction de-
picted in the core economic model but rather a relationship that persists 
over time because of transaction costs in the labor market. Moreover, 
uncertainty about these costs means that firms do not face a precisely 
defined relationship between wage levels and employment.
 In Kaufman’s (2007) view, although the use of labor in the pro-
duction process is universal and labor’s place in production can be 
organized many ways, the labor demand curve used in the core eco-
nomic analysis presumes an employment relationship: “That is, firms 
are the ‘employer’ who go to the labour market and hire people as ‘em-
ployees’ to provide a certain amount of labour services and follow the 
directions of the employer in return for a certain amount of remunera-
tion per time period” (p. 776). 
Such a relationship cannot exist absent transaction costs because 
without such costs, labor markets become competitive markets for in-
puts from atomistic independent contractors. Rather than each supplier 
being an employee of a specific firm, each has a separate relationship 
with one or more firms to provide a product or service. There is no 
employment relationship and no labor market that differs in important 
ways from, say, Summers’s (1985) market for ketchup. 
Transaction costs arise from the combination of limited human 
rationality, imperfect information, and ambiguities in property rights. 
They require that employers and employees establish employment con-
tracts that define the terms under which work will be performed, and 
so define labor supply curves.2 Employment contracts are inherently 
incomplete; they cannot fully specify outcomes because changes in cir-
cumstances such as economic environment, technology, and consumer 
taste necessitate altering the terms of employment. For example, most 
employment contracts establish compensation but not hours or em-
ployment levels. Changes in the circumstances facing an employer can 
result in large fluctuations in employment and hours. Because of imper-
fect information and bounded rationality, marginal product schedules 
and the demand curves derived from those schedules are probabilistic. 
If future circumstance A occurs, then the demand curve is in position 
A, but if future circumstance B occurs, then the demand curve will be 
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in the nearby but not identical position B. The firm faces a “set” of de-
mand curves with different likelihoods attached to each curve. The firm 
does not know which curve will be realized tomorrow and may well be 
uncertain about which demand curve it is on today. This moves firms 
away from a deterministic relationship between wages and employment 
levels and provides some latitude for firms to set wages. Latitude in 
wage setting is increased because the costs of job search for individuals 
provide firms limited monopolistic power over employees. Because of 
the transactions costs, deviation from a market wage will result neither 
in instantaneous loss of labor if a firm pays a below-market wage nor 
a long line of individuals seeking employment if it offers an above-
market one. 
Our own thoughts on why there is such a weak employment effect 
follow a different and possibly more practical path. Economic theory 
and models are developed to explore specific topics. This focus makes 
possible rigorous exploration and full development of the implications 
associated with an issue of interest. This approach does not replicate 
the situation of decision makers in the market. Decision makers are 
daily confronted not with a situation in which all is constant except the 
change in the minimum wage. Rather, they face a world in which little 
is constant from day to day, week to week, month to month, or year to 
year. Not only does the minimum wage change, so do prices of supplies, 
fuel, rental, and myriad other factors. Demand is constantly changing as 
economic conditions, changes in views and tastes, and chance influence 
consumers’ choices. 
In a situation where so much is in flux, the stylization of decision 
making used in economics does not reasonably approximate decision 
makers’ situations. In determining how much to produce, employers 
cannot simply take the consumer demand curve as fixed and, having de-
termined their price, know what quantity to produce. Instead, in the face 
of a shifting demand curve, one must determine both price and quantity 
and then accept either the excess that could not be sold or the lost profits 
due to less product than could have been sold at that price. Because the 
firm’s labor demand curve is derived from its product demand curve, 
the decision maker has no more certainty about the appropriate number 
of employees to hire than about the price and quantity needed to exactly 
satisfy demand. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Conclusion 409
 In such a world, one dominated by change rather than comparative 
static exercises, economic actors are unlikely to make decisions on the 
knife edge depicted in economic diagrams. Rather, small changes in 
prices are unlikely to move the decision maker to action. Slight move-
ments in rent, fuel prices, or wages are unlikely to cause decision makers 
to rethink their use of inputs. While a large price increase might have 
sufficient effect for one to reconsider how to use that and other inputs, 
small increases likely get lost in the change of day-to-day operations. 
This view is consistent with our results. It does not require that de-
mand curves neither exist nor slope downward; rather, it suggests that 
the downward slope is not a one-dimensional line but rather a line with 
some width, implying that for any quantity of employment, the firm is 
willing to pay a wage within a defined range. Were the minimum wage 
to increase 50 percent, it would be beyond the range consistent with the 
current employment level, and firms would reduce their employment. 
However, when increases are moderate, are within the range consistent 
with current employment levels, decision makers are too engaged with 
the world to change their existing arrangements. It is also consistent 
with the finding that increases in the minimum wage reduce accessions. 
Both the formation of a firm and the decision to expand require positive 
action to bring new employees into a business. At such times, decision 
makers may well consider the cost of inputs, including labor inputs, and 
alternative arrangements. 
If we supplement economic theory with this view of the situation 
facing economic decision makers, we are then likely to conclude that 
thresholds, which must be crossed before decision makers act, exist. 
These thresholds differ by market and individual and are unlikely to 
be stable over time. Without a doubt, the changes in the value of finan-
cial instruments that impel arbitragers and their computers to action 
are many times smaller than those required to attract the attention of a 
retailer or fast food franchiser to change their employment policies. The 
rise in the minimum wage needed to catch the attention of the fast food 
franchiser in Westchester County, New York, may be far larger than 
that for exurbia in Alabama. With such an understanding of the world, 
the lack of a relationship between moderate increases in the minimum 
wage and employment no longer stands in contradiction to core eco-
nomic theory. Rather, it points to a research program to investigate the 
factors affecting thresholds of action in labor markets. 
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ISSUES OF INNOVATION AND CRAFTSMANSHIP 
Although the purpose of this review is not to reflect on the work 
of the economics profession, our reading and rereading of hundreds of 
articles reveals a tension between innovation and craftsmanship. The 
drive toward innovation is strong in economics—witness the popularity 
of Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner 2005)—and has been productive 
over the last 50 years in driving a rethinking and expansion of econom-
ics thought. Innovators such as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, William 
Baulmol, and George Akerlof have done much to advance our under-
standing of markets and of homo economicus. 
Answering the important economic questions of the day requires 
more than novelty. While it can provide new understandings and ap-
proaches, unless founded on strong methodological approaches and 
placed in the context of prior work, it forgoes much of its opportunity 
to expand knowledge. Too often in our review we have been unable to 
reconcile results across journal articles because the authors have not 
systematically explored the sources of differences between what they 
present and prior work on the topic. Even when articles draw on the 
same data sources, differences in time period, technique, and measures 
preclude knowing the source of (the sometimes dramatic) differences in 
the results. All too often, systematic investigation would have required 
no more than one table and a page or two of text. Furthermore, in too 
many cases, authors have failed to investigate important variations of 
their model to examine the robustness of their results. For example, 
although it is well established that the choice of comparison group can 
affect the estimates from difference-in-differences models, most au-
thors choose to present estimates for one or possibly two comparison 
groups rather than for each of the obvious comparison groups. 
Absent greater emphasis on craftsmanship, on the workmanlike 
investigation of an issue, economists limit their contributions to our 
understanding of a topic. Without knowing how differences in controls, 
data, time period, and method influence results, we are left with too 
many unreconciled findings. Sensitivity to these issues is particularly 
important when topics are controversial, because there is a greater need 
to understand the sources of differences between studies and so limit 
the scope of passion. 
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How might economics place greater weight on craftsmanship? 
Partly by training graduate students to be more thoughtful about their 
research, but more so by reviewers and editors requiring authors to ex-
plicitly reconcile their work with prior work and to address reasonable 
variants on their models. This requires that editors and particularly re-
viewers be familiar with the topic under study. It also requires that they 
ask authors to compare and contrast their work with prior work explic-
itly, and to investigate differences. We believe that reconciliation would 
not require too much empirical effort or too many journal pages. It will 
be challenging intellectually, as it is likely to bring to the fore issues of 
control groups, time periods, and measures. 
Redressing the current imbalance between innovation and crafts-
manship is then important to advancing our understanding of markets 
and the investigation of markets. Innovation provides the drive forward, 
while craftsmanship provides integrity. Both are required for the robust 
and credible investigation of markets. 
INTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Social scientists emphasize, and possibly delight, in pointing to the 
unintended consequences of social policies. This reflects the dual con-
cern of social science: to document the world and to reveal what cannot 
be readily seen or understood. Unintended consequences have played a 
large role in the discussion of the minimum wage, with many arguing 
that despite the goal of raising the earnings of low-income workers, the 
minimum wage has resulted not only in higher unemployment but also 
the receipt of the gains by large numbers of individuals who do not need 
them, for example, teens in relatively high-income families. 
Our review finds that the effect of the minimum wage has largely 
been one of intended consequences: it achieves the ends initially sought 
by the originators of the U.S. legislation. The moderate increases seen 
in the United States have resulted in increased earnings with little to 
no effect on employment. The increase in earnings has gone largely to 
households in the lower half of the earnings distribution. While not a 
stand-alone policy for resolving the issues of low income in the United 
States, the effectiveness of moderate increases in the minimum wage in 
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raising earnings with few negative consequences makes it an important 
tool for labor market policy. 
Notes 
1. Caveat lector: As we discuss in Chapter 4, it does not include all articles because 
too large a number do not report results in a way that makes them comparable to 
others. 
2. Following Rosen (1974), the labor supply curve is defined not only by the wage 
but also by all the terms and conditions of employment available to employees. 
The presence of labor supply curves is then premised on there being an employ-
ment relationship that specifies those terms and conditions, and following back a 
step in Kaufman’s (2007) logic, on transaction costs. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Appendix A 
Data Sources and Variables 
Several data sets are used in many analyses of the minimum wage and 
its effects. The same variables appear in much of this work. For the reader’s 
convenience, we discuss these below rather than discuss them in detail either 
repeatedly or only the first time each is encountered. 
DATA SOURCES 
Governments are the source of the most frequently used data in minimum 
wage research.1 There are two types of government data sets that are most 
commonly used in studies of the minimum wage: household surveys and es-
tablishment-based data. Other types of data follow individuals or families over 
long periods of time. 
Household Surveys 
In many countries, the government conducts a large-scale survey of house-
holds at regular intervals, and it provides the data used to calculate unemploy-
ment rates, as well as other information about the labor market. Studies of the 
minimum wage that focus on demographic groups—for instance, teenagers, 
minorities, young adults, single mothers, or married women—most commonly 
rely on household surveys. In the United States, the household survey that 
typically fills these roles is the CPS. Every 10 years, the U.S. census generates 
a complete listing of all extant residences in the United States. Every month, 
the U.S. Census Bureau generates a sample from this list of households to 
interview.2 Within each household, one person answers questions about all the 
people in the household. Once selected, a household is interviewed for four 
consecutive months, is not interviewed for eight months, and is then inter-
viewed over four additional consecutive months. This is known as a 4-8-4 
rotation. In the last month of each of the four-month interview cycles, the usual 
monthly interview is supplemented with questions about hours, earnings, and 
other economic matters. The households in the last four months of interviews 
are collectively referred to as the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG), and it is 
information from the ORGs—not those from households in any of the other 
months of their cycle—that is used in most minimum wage studies. 
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About 50,000 households are interviewed for the CPS each month. 
Roughly 25 percent of these are in the ORG for either the first or second time 
and will leave the CPS after this month, either for eight months or permanently. 
Each month, roughly 12.5 percent of the households are added to the CPS for 
the first time, and another 12.5 percent start their second cycle of four months. 
The answers of each household refer not to the whole month but to a reference 
week, which is defined as the week (Sunday through Saturday) that includes 
the 12th of the month. 
Other countries have similar surveys. In Canada, Statistics Canada con-
ducts the monthly Labor Force Survey. It comprises about 56,000 households 
each month, each household remains in the survey for six consecutive months, 
and each month one-sixth of the households are in the survey for the first time 
and another one-sixth are in for the last time. The reference week is the one that 
contains the 15th of the month. In the European Union, countries also conduct 
Labour Force Surveys, often quarterly. In the United Kingdom, it consists of 
about 60,000 households that remain in the survey for five consecutive quar-
ters, also with a rotation structure similar to the Canadian one. The survey is 
conducted throughout the quarter, and the reference week is distributed uni-
formly throughout. New Zealand has the quarterly Household Labor Force 
Survey, consisting of about 15,000 households, each of which remains in the 
sample for eight quarters. The survey is conducted throughout the quarter and 
the questions asked refer to the week before the interview. 
In the United States and Canada, these surveys can be aggregated to the 
level either of states or provinces, respectively, or the entire nation. In the
United States, most studies that aggregate to the state level combine the ORGs 
for an entire calendar year to minimize problems of high variability associated 
with small samples in the less-populated states. Canadian studies follow the 
U.S. convention of aggregating the data into calendar years.3 The studies that 
use European data, whether individual or more aggregated, are more evenly 
split between quarterly and annual frequencies. 
Establishment-Based Data 
An establishment survey is a survey of workplaces: stores, offices, fac-
tories, and so forth. In the United States, the most important establishment 
survey is the Current Employment Survey (CES). The CES collects data from 
payroll records of about 400,000 establishments. These data include the num-
ber of employees, number of paid hours, and total wages paid for both all 
workers and only production workers, for the payroll period that includes the 
12th of the month.4 Data series are available by industry, state, or both. 
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Another data set that has become important in recent years is the Quar-
terly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which “derives its data from 
quarterly tax reports submitted to State Employment Security Agencies by 
over 8 million employers subject to state Unemployment Insurance laws and 
from federal agencies subject to the Unemployment Compensation for Federal 
Employees program. This includes 99.7 percent of all wage and salary civil-
ian employment. These reports provide information on the number of people 
employed and the wages paid to the employees each quarter.”5 
The types of data available are total number of jobs and total payroll, by 
SIC or NAICS industry, and aggregated to county or state. Because both the 
CES and the QCEW rely on payroll or tax records, they are considered to be of 
unusually high quality, but the number of variables measured is limited. 
Another relatively new data source in the United States is the Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators, based on a partnership between states and the Census 
Bureau. Intended to provide data in which the unit of observation is the job, 
that is, the employer-employee pair, it combines data from multiple sources, 
including Unemployment Insurance data from the states, household data from 
the Census Bureau, and establishment data from the U.S. Department of Labor 
(Abowd et al. 2005). Because it is a voluntary partnership with states, few 
states were involved in the early years (the 1990s), and the number grew over 
time. 
Other countries also have establishment surveys. Several studies of the 
United Kingdom examine the New Earnings Survey (NES), a very large-scale 
annual survey of employers about those of their employees who are currently 
in sample. Because the NES has evolved into a longitudinal survey, we delay 
further discussion to that section. Two articles covered in this volume use a 
Portuguese establishment survey, the Quadros de Pessoal. Based on personnel 
records, it has considerably more demographic detail then either the CES or 
the QCEW. 
Longitudinal Surveys 
Longitudinal surveys repeat measurements of the same subjects over a 
long period of time. In the United States, among the best known are the Na-
tional Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), conducted by the Bureau of Labor Studies 
of the U.S. Department of Labor. They are a set of surveys designed to gather 
information at multiple points in time on the labor market activities and other 
significant life events of several groups of men and women. The most well-
known are the surveys of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97), both of which began 
with about 10,000 people in their teens or early twenties at the time of the first 
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interview. They are interviewed annually or, after a period of some years, bien-
nially about many topics, including their schooling and labor market experi-
ence. For more than four decades, NLS data have served as an important tool 
for economists, sociologists, and other researchers. 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a longitudinal 
household survey used in a few studies of the U.S. minimum wage. Its focus is 
the measurement of labor income and various government transfers, both cash 
and noncash, and includes questions that indicate labor force status. Begun in 
1984, the sample size has varied over time, from 14,000 to more than 35,000 
households. The length of time that households are in the sample has varied 
over time. Household members over the age of 14 are interviewed three times 
a year.6 The size of the SIPP allows it to be used as a cross-sectional household 
survey for some purposes, but the linking of data across time, usually several 
years, allows the data to also be used as longitudinal data. 
Longitudinal surveys such as the NLSY79, NLSY97, and the SIPP are 
useful for studying changes that occur over long periods of time, such as the 
number of job changes or unemployment spells that people experienced over 
some segment of their lives, the number of times they moved to a different 
county or state, or the number of years in which their family income was be-
low the poverty threshold. They are also useful for examining cause-and-effect 
relationships. Cross-sectional surveys of the labor market have shown, for ex-
ample, that workers who have been with their employers a longer period of 
time have higher earnings than workers who have shorter service with their 
employers. Cross-sectional surveys are not useful, however, for determining 
whether longer service leads to higher pay, whether higher pay leads to longer 
service, or whether there is a cause-and-effect relationship at all. Longitudinal 
surveys have been used to examine whether the statistical correlation between 
tenure and earnings exists because workers become more productive as they 
gain seniority and are paid more for that higher productivity or, conversely, be-
cause highly paid workers tend to stay with their employers for longer periods, 
rather than seeking employment elsewhere. 
Several studies of the United Kingdom rely on the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), a household survey conducted (mostly) every fall, in 
which the same households are followed for many years. From time to time, 
additional households are added to the panel. It was originally modeled after a 
long-running U.S. survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
The NES is a longitudinal establishment data set used in minimum wage 
studies for the United Kingdom. It is based on annual tax records from employ-
ers, and the sample includes every employee with the same last two digits in 
their National Insurance number, the British counterpart of a social security 
number. Although not originally intended to be longitudinal, because these two 
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digits have been the same since the original survey in 1975, individuals remain 
in the sample indefinitely and can be tracked from one year to the next (Ada 
et al. 2006, p. 647). One consequence of the sampling design is that data on 
about 1 percent of employees are gathered each year. Because the data come 
from employers, they contain rich and accurate descriptive information about 
each employer and the position that an employee fills, but little demographic 
information beyond the age and sex of the employee. The questions of the sur-
vey refer to the first week of April, and the sample is constructed in February. 
Individuals whose earnings fall below the minimum required for this particular 
tax withholding (Pay as You Earn), in particular, part-time employees and low-
earning women, are underrepresented in the data set.7 Furthermore, individuals 
who are unemployed in February but not in April are also excluded. 
VARIABLES 
Several key variables reappear in many studies. Rather than describing 
them each time, or describing them only the first time they occur, we describe 
them below. 
Measures of Employment 
Employment is measured in several different ways. The degree of fineness 
turns on whether the measure refers to the total amount of paid (employed) 
labor, typically the number of hours, or a cruder measure. We will first look at 
the latter, because studies that use them are the most common. 
In studies of demographic groups, the most widely used measure is the 
employment ratio. This is the fraction of the group under study that is em-
ployed. The teenage employment ratio is the percentage of teenagers who re-
port having a job.8 If at some moment all teenagers reported that they had a 
job, the teen employment ratio would be one. If none reported having a job, 
it would be zero, and if half did, it would be 50 percent. It automatically cor-
rects for changes in the size of the teenage population, and studies that use it 
implicitly assume that if there were no trends and nothing changed but the size 
of the teenage population, a constant fraction of teenagers would always be 
employed. Employment ratios can be calculated for any demographic group or 
for the entire population. In many studies that use aggregate panels, where an 
observation is, for instance, of a particular state and year aggregated from the 
CPS, the teenage employment ratio would be the fraction of teenagers in that 
state who report having a job during the year.9 
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Industry studies and others that use establishment data more commonly 
measure employment as the number of jobs (number of individuals employed) 
or the growth rate of the number of jobs. Quasi experiments in which the unit 
of observation is a business establishment, perhaps a fast food restaurant, 
would measure the number of jobs at each establishment before and after the 
change in the minimum wage. Regression analyses of the restaurant industry 
generally use either the total number of jobs in the industry or the growth rate 
of the number of jobs in the industry. 
Measures of Hours 
As mentioned, these employment measures are somewhat crude, distin-
guishing between neither full-time and part-time employment nor differences 
in the length of the workweek. Controversy about the response of employ-
ment to the minimum wage suggested to some that less-crude measures might 
provide resolution. These tend to be variations on the number of paid hours 
of employment. Total hours, for an individual, an establishment or firm, or an 
industry, are a common choice. Others include average hours over all individu-
als in an establishment or an industry, and full-time equivalents (FTEs), that 
is, total hours divided by the number of hours considered to be in a full-time 
workweek (40 or 35, for example). 
“Hours of employment” drawn from establishment data are based on ac-
tual hours that were paid for during a specified period, often a specific week. It 
is not uncommon for studies of demographic groups, which most often depend 
on household surveys, to include several measures of hours worked. As an 
example, before 1994 the CPS asked about both total hours worked at all jobs 
in the previous week and usual weekly hours worked. Starting that year, and 
continuing through the present, it asks separately for the number of hours at 
the primary job and at all other jobs, if any, in the previous week. The question 
on usual hours was changed in a parallel but somewhat problematic fashion. 
While before 1994 this was a simple question about “usual hours worked per 
week,” since then this question has not only also distinguished between usual 
hours at the primary and all other jobs, but people who respond “variable,” that 
is, that they do not have a usual number of hour of work per week, are coded 
as −4.10 
A few observations about this are pertinent. To begin with, studies that use 
usual hours will not be directly comparable to studies that use actual hours; 
they are measuring closely related but different phenomena. Second, studies 
that use usual hours from the CPS for the period since 1994 must exclude peo-
ple who answered “variable” since they are coded −4, unless the variable for 
hourly wage earners is used. Even if the studies do not address hours directly, 
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those that use a measure of hourly earnings will exclude individuals who in-
dicate that they work variable hours and are not paid by the hour from their 
sample because it is not possible to calculate hourly earnings. It is not evident 
that those excluded are, in either instance, statistically identical to those who 
remain.11 
Third, it is useful to understand how “total hours of work,” “average hours 
of work, conditional on employment,” and “average hours of work” differ. The 
first is calculated as the product of average monthly hours and total monthly 
jobs. It is the total number of hours worked each month (in their case, in a par-
ticular industry) and is the obvious analog to the number of jobs. The second, 
common in studies that use data derived from establishment surveys, is the 
total number of hours that those employed have worked, divided by the num-
ber of employed. It tells us more about the length of the workweek than the 
amount of labor employed or paid for. While useful for some purposes—for 
example, determining whether the employed are actually earning more follow-
ing a change in the minimum wage—it is not appropriate for examining the 
effect of the minimum wage on employment measured as the amount of labor 
paid for. Changes in the minimum wage that lead to changes in the number of 
individuals employed will cause this measure to vary differently from total 
hours. However, if the minimum wage does not influence the number of jobs, 
then it is possible to infer change in total hours from this measure. This can be 
seen with a bit of algebra. Let Ht, ht, and Jt be the total number of hours, the 
number of hours per job, and the total number of jobs, all in period t: Ht = htJr . 
If the minimum wage increases between periods one and two, then the change 
in hours is 
H − H = h J − h J2 1 2 2 1 1 
= h2J − (h1J − h1J2) − h1J2 2 1 
= (h2J − h1J ) + (h1J − h1J )2 2 2 1 
= (h − h )J  + h (J − J )2 1 2 1 2 1 
If there is no change in the conditional number of average hours, then h2 − 
h1 equals zero, and the first term in the last line of the expression above is zero. 
If there has also been no change in the number of jobs, then the very last term 
in the line is also zero, and total hours have not changed. 
The third measure, average hours of work (sometimes referred to as the 
unconditional average), is the total number hours that those employed work, 
divided by everyone in the same category (i.e., teenagers, immigrants, etc.), 
whether or not they are employed or even in the labor force. For instance, the 
unconditional average hours of work of teenagers is the total hours that em-
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ployed teenagers work divided by all teenagers. So long as the number of teen-
agers does not vary in response to changes in the minimum wage (and there are 
no large changes in its value from period to period), then this figure correlates 
highly with total (usual) hours of work. Where the second measure is used, it is 
necessary to combine the findings for hours with those for employment where 
possible, but this is a bit ad hoc. 
The Minimum Wage 
The value of the legislated minimum wage at any moment is a nominal 
variable; that is, without consideration for the price of anything else, it is mea-
sured in terms of dollars per unit of the item under consideration, here an hour 
of labor. We can say that the federal minimum wage was $5.85 (per hour) for 
the year beginning on July 24, 2007, and that the minimum wage in Washing-
ton, D.C., was $8.07 in January 2008. This raises two issues about measuring 
the minimum wage. The simpler one is “What is the measured value of the 
minimum wage when the data are aggregated over time?” If the unit of obser-
vation is aggregated from monthly data up to a calendar year, as is frequently 
the case with panels that rely on the CPS, what is the appropriate value of the 
federal minimum wage for 2007? The standard approach is to set it to the aver-
age value not over the course of the year but over the dates of the CPS surveys, 
which are monthly and refer to the week that contains the 12th of the month. 
The value of the federal minimum wage was $5.15 for the first seven surveys 
(January through July) of 2007, and $5.85 for the last five (August through 
September), so the annual value would be $5.44. 
In some jurisdictions, there is more than one minimum wage law: for ex-
ample, in the United States, not only is there a federal minimum wage, but 
many states have their own minimum wage. Except in well-specified situa-
tions wherein, for example, a firm is smaller than a certain size specified in the 
federal law, the higher of the two applies. The standard practice is to ignore 
this condition because it applies to relatively few employees, and to use the 
higher of the applicable levels. Rather than repeatedly use the phrase “higher 
of federal or state minimum wage,” this is commonly indicated by the phrase 
“effective minimum wage.” 
A more complicated problem pertains to inflation and the price level more 
generally. A minimum wage of $5.85 has a different impact in 2007, when the 
mean wage for U.S. teenagers was $8.20 per hour and the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) had a value of 207, than it has in 1981, when the teenage mean 
wage was $3.77, and the CPI was 91. The cost of living also varies between 
cities, states, and regions, but there is no accepted index comparing costs 
geographically. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
Appendix A  421 
To think about possible solutions, consider a panel data set where each 
observation refers to a specific state and year and the relevant variables are 
constructed from CPS data. One common way of correcting for cost differ-
ences among states and over years is to calculate the average wage (for all 
employees, perhaps, or for prime-age adult males or teenagers) for each state 
and year, and divide that into the minimum wage. This is the relative minimum 
wage. As Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) observe, in times of prosperity, both 
employment and wages will rise, and the rise in wages will cause a decline in 
the calculated value of the relative minimum.12 Similarly, in times of recession, 
employment and wages will fall, and the decline in wages generates a rise in 
the relative minimum wage. As a result, there will be a negative correlation 
between employment and the relative minimum wage due only to movements 
in wages, whether or not employers respond to a higher minimum wage with 
lower employment or hiring. An alternative is to calculate the real minimum 
wage, dividing the nominal one by a price index such as the CPI. The short-
coming with this approach (at least for the United States) is that the CPI is 
not available at the same level of geographic disaggregation as the minimum 
wage. An equivalent approach is the inclusion of a distinct constant term for 
each year (annual fixed effects).13 
The Kaitz index—a coverage-adjusted, relative minimum wage—is a 
measure of the minimum wage that once was quite common but no longer is. 
The relative part of this term is clear enough; coverage adjusted refers to the 
fraction of individuals employed in industries to which the minimum wage ap-
plies, industries that are covered. At different times in the past, different levels 
of the minimum wage have been relevant for different groups of individuals, 
and for different businesses or industries. There have been lower minimum 
wages for teenagers than for older workers, and minimum wages for smaller 
establishments have often been less. Adjusting for coverage uses a messy for-
mula that is a weighted average of minimum wages that reflects the distribu-
tion of employment across industries, establishments, and demographic groups 
with different values of the minimum wage.14 
Two other ways of measuring the minimum wage are the fraction affect-
ed (also sometimes called fraction at risk) and the wage gap. Card (1992a) 
introduced the fraction affected measure early in the NMWR in his cross-
sectional analysis of change in employment following the 1990 increase in the 
federal minimum wage. Its value is the percentage of workers who, prior to 
an increase in the minimum wage, earn between the old and new values of the 
minimum wage. The intuition is that observations where this value is large are 
more sensitive to the minimum wage increase because it will be necessary to 
raise wages for a large fraction of employees to remain in compliance with the 
new, higher minimum wage. In Card’s (1992a) study, with states as the level 
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of analysis, it accounts for differing levels of the minimum wage across states 
before the federal increase. Employees initially earning below the minimum 
wage are excluded from the measure under the assumption that their employers 
are either not required to pay the minimum wage or have chosen not to comply, 
and this is likely to continue following the increase. 
The wage gap, introduced by Currie and Fallick (1996), can be calculated 
for an individual worker or for a larger aggregation. For an affected individual, 
one who was previously earning less than the new, higher, value of the mini-
mum wage following an increase, the wage gap is the difference between the 
new level of the minimum wage and her wage before the increase. It can be 
measured as a monetary value (e.g., in dollars) or as a percentage. For all oth-
ers, those whose wage prior to the increase was already above the new, higher 
value of the minimum wage, the wage gap is set to zero. For establishments 
or regions, the wage gap is measured as the share of total payroll necessary to 
bring the fraction affected up to the new minimum wage. 
Unlike the measures that incorporate the value of the minimum wage, both 
of these measures reflect the size of the relevant section of the lower tail of 
the wage distribution, the part of the employed workforce that is potentially 
affected by an increase in the minimum wage. Consequently, both are more 
sensitive to the ex ante facts on the ground. The wage gap goes beyond fraction 
affected in considering not only the size of this part of the tail, but the wage 
levels of those within it. 
Wages 
The terms wages and earnings are used inconsistently across studies. For 
the purposes of this review, wage rate refers to the straight-time hourly wage 
an individual is paid. Earnings commonly indicates the pretax amount in an 
employee’s paychecks over some period. For those paid weekly (or biweekly 
or monthly), hourly earnings are the amount they are paid per week (or fort-
night or month) divided by the number of hours they worked that week (or 
fortnight or month). For those paid by the hour, hourly earnings might also 
be their wage rate, but if they worked overtime at time and one-half or better, 
hourly earnings might be greater than their wage rate. While earnings can be 
computed for all employees, wage rates are only available for those who are 
paid by the hour. In this review, we use wages as a general term referring to 
employee pay. It encompasses both wage rates and earnings, but, unlike wage 
rates or earnings, it is not a specific measure. 
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Notes 
1. Only 10 of the roughly 70 studies covered in Chapter 2 use privately generated 
data: Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009); Card and Krueger (1994); Dube, Naidu, 
and Reich (2007); Giuliano (2013); Katz and Krueger (1992); Machin, Manning, 
and Rahman (2003); Machin and Wilson (2004); Neumark and Wascher (2000); 
Orazem and Mattila (2002); and Skedinger (2006). 
2. As time passes since the last census, the list of residences grows out of date. The 
Census Bureau addresses this by collecting data on building permits on an ongo-
ing basis and augments the list of residences to keep the list current. The formula 
used to determine whether to include a particular household is quite complicated 
and is not of particular interest for our purposes, but the likelihood is not equal 
across all households because with careful design, it is possible to construct more 
accurate statistics for surveys of the same size (and thus cost) by allowing this 
likelihood to vary in certain systematic ways. 
3. Canadian studies could aggregate the data by quarter. The sample size is similar to 
the CPS, and there are only nine provinces, so there would be less of an issue with 
small samples in causing excessive variance in the measures. 
4.	 This may seem a strange way of defining the reference period, but it differs across 
establishments, depending on whether they pay weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, 
or monthly. 
5. From http://www.bls.gov/cew/cewfaq.htm (accessed April 28, 2011). 
6. This information drawn from the SIPP Web site, http://www.census.gov/sipp/ 
overview.html on July 28, 2013. 
7. Ritchie (1995) contains a wealth of information on the NES. 
8.	 Individuals who are institutionalized or in the armed forces are not defined as part 
of the potential labor force and are not asked labor force questions in household 
surveys. Similarly, only those aged 16 or older are asked labor force questions, as 
those under 16 are not currently considered part of the potential labor force. There 
is no age limit after which the labor force questions are no longer asked. 
9. Other common measures of employment outcomes, such as unemployment, are 
only rarely used in minimum wage studies. The definition of an unemployed per-
son is one who is not only neither self-employed nor employed by another but is 
also actively seeking a job. The unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of 
those who are unemployed to the sum of those employed and the unemployed. 
A problem with this measure for minimum wage studies is that the distinction 
between the unemployed and those without jobs who are not actively seeking 
work is sensitive to influences such as the current condition of the labor market, 
the availability of unemployment benefits, and whether respondents are in school 
(full-time students are not classified as unemployed). Teasing out the effect of the 
minimum wage from other factors affecting the unemployment rate is consider-
ably more challenging than the already difficult task of measuring the effect on the 
employment ratio. 
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10. In addition, since the early 1980s and continuing through the present, the CPS 
has had a separate question for hourly wage earners that before 1994 recorded the 
usual weekly hours “at this job” and since 1994, “at this rate.” Analysts who rely 
on “usual weekly hours” rarely specify whether they are using this variable or one 
of the others, but the large number of missing values for this indicates its rare use. 
11. In 2006, those who answered “variable” compose about 8.5 percent of respon-
dents and 14 percent actual working hours, but 14 percent of  teenagers and10.6 
percent of their actual hours. Those answering “variable hours” are as likely to be 
male as female among both teens and adults. Teenagers are more likely to be 16 or 
17 and less likely to be 19. 
12. Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) are here extending an observation that Freeman 
(1982) made with reference to studies that analyze cross-sectional data. 
13.	 It appears that Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004) first introduced this 
approach. 
14. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1961 and 1966 extended full 
minimum wage coverage to all but the smallest firms, making adjusting the mini-
mum wage for coverage far less important. As a result, the Kaitz index has largely 
disappeared from minimum wage research. 
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